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ABSTRACT
All complex human societies make social provisions to ensure the 
wellbeing and security of their citizens and to facilitate social 
integration. As in other societies, China's formal welfare system 
is embedded in its social structure and its informal networks of 
self help and mutual aid. This thesis explores the development of 
one of China's major welfare bureaucracies - the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs and the local agencies which it supervises from 1949, with 
especial reference to the period between 1978 to 1988.
The study begins by surveying the theories, both Western and 
socialist, that purport to explain the determinants of welfare. 
Richard Rose's welfare mix concept (1986) is modified to yield a 
framework that posits welfare development in terms of the role of 
the state, the family, the collective and the traditional culture 
of welfare. The operational definition in the Chinese context is 
then set out with reference to the programmes of social 
amelioration established under the aegis of the Minstry of Civil 
Affairs in order to assist those social groups that lack the 
capacity and resources for independent living. Before 1978, Civil
Affairs Departments functioned as agencies of last resort, playing 
a small but vitally important role in meeting the needs of the
poorest members of Chinese society. This remains true at the 
present time.
Then policy developments in the current period are analysed 
in both the national context and in the province of Guangdong,
where the economic reforms have gone furthest in reshaping Chinese 
social life. Emerging frcm the review is the interaction between
social and economic policies, including the impact of the 
transformation of the institutional context and the changes in 
broader political objectives.
In the final section, attention is drawn to the narrowly 
residualist character of the Ministry's approach to welfare. 
Several institutional factors, it is suggested, account for the 
degree of residual ism - the state's narrow conception of the role 
of statutory welfare, the cultural importance of utilitarian 
Chinese familism, the all-embracing nature of the collective canopy 
and the general influence of the cultural legacy. The Chinese 
welfare system, it is argued, is what it is because it fits the 
structural requirements of Chinese socialism.
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CCP
Civil Affairs
CcaiirnLinity
Services
Danwei
The "Five 
Guarantees"
Fuli
Fuli Yuan 
Fupin
Guanxi
Household
Responsibility
System
Chinese Communist Party
or minzheng gongzuo. means work carried under the 
aegis of civil affairs departments, which includes 
social welfare services and production, disaster 
and social relief, resettlement of demobilized 
soliders, preferential treatment, marriage and 
society registration, funeral reform, territorial 
boundary administration and supervision of
grassroots neighbourhood organizations.
or shegu fuwu. refers to services and amenities 
provided by urban neighbourhood organizations. 
Such provisions include nurseries, aged homes, 
social centres for the elderly, disabled and 
soldiers' dependants, reading roams, canteens,
shops, repair services, home help, support groups 
and so on. Services are financed by local
communities and are given free or at a small 
charge.
work unit for urban employees. For students, the 
danwei is their school or college; for the 
unemployed, it is the urban neighbourhood 
organization.
or wubao. is a rural relief scheme run by rural 
communities that provides for food, clothing, 
housing, medical care, burial (for the aged) or
schooling (for orphans) to the aged, disabled and
orphans who have no family, work ability or means 
of livelihood.
welfare
social welfare institutions
literally means aid to the poor. Fupin or 
development aid refers to loans granted to 
hardship households to start economic projects, 
also include support through supply of raw 
materials, training and technical assistance.
personal connections
a system whereby rural households contract with 
the local collective (village) to lease land for 
cultivation. After delivering the agreed quota of 
produce (or cash in lieu), peasants can keep the 
surplus. This frees peasants to make their own 
productive decisions and assume responsibility for 
profit and losses.
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Kaifang Gaige 
labour Insurance
Minzhencr Bu
Mou
Neibu
Preferential
Treatment
Social Welfare 
Enterprises or 
Factories
Socialization of 
Social Welfare
The Third Plenum
The Three Partial 
Components
Xiang
Yuan
open door and reform
or laodong baoxian. refers to social insurance for 
urban employees which includes retirement, 
sickness, disability, survivor, maternity and 
health benefits.
Ministry of Civil Affairs
one-sixth of an acre
for internal use
or voudai fuxu or voufu. refers to aid given to 
veterans, serving soldiers and their dependants.
or shehui fuli give or shehui fulidhang. refers to 
productive enterprises where at least 35% of the 
operatives are disabled persons. Such units 
qualify for tax reduction or exemption from the 
state.
or shehui fuli shehuihua. means the sharing of 
responsibility in the funding and administration 
of welfare support so as to avoid sole dependence 
on the state. local communities, work units, 
social groups, families and individuals are 
expected to contribute to this effort.
the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central 
Committee held in December 1978. At this forum, 
the CCP resolved to change the general course of 
the country from political struggle to economic 
construction and reform.
or sanae yibufen. refers to the three central 
purposes of civil affairs work, namely the 
construction of grassroots power organs, social 
security, and civil administration and management.
administrative village, normally comprises of a 
number of natural villages (cun).
Chinese currency, also kncwn as renminbi. In 1978, 
the official exchange rate was US$100=168.36 yuan; 
in 1988, it was US$10O=372.21 yuan.
Zhen town or township in rural areas
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CHAPTER ONE
SOCIAL WJFKRP. EEVEEDtMEHT IN  CAPTT&hlSr AND SOCIALIST SQCTRITRS
1. Nature of Study and Central Concerns
This study examines the evolution of social welfare in China. Its 
central concern is this: what forces contribute to the development 
of social welfare under Chinese socialism and hew do they interact 
to shape the welfare landscape? To accentuate its dynamic nature, I 
shall concentrate on the period when grewth has been most rapid, 
from 1978 to 1988. To outside observers, this is a most intriquing 
decade. Known as the period of Open Door and Reform fkaifana 
gaige), the country ended its seclusion to rejoin the world 
community. In the economic sphere, there have been wide-ranging 
reforms to expedite the process of modernization. Politically, 
China has shed old animosities to form new alliances irrespective 
of differences in ideology. Indeed, post-Mao society is one of high 
promise, dramatic changes and palpable tensions. The new course has 
wrought profound alterations in the social fabric. New problems 
arose to challenge the existing social arrangements. During this 
period, the interplay between economic and social policy was 
highlighted as never before. The present, of course, cannot be 
divorced from the past. The themes of both continuity and change 
are to feature prominently in this exploration.
The current attempt is not a comparative study. It does not 
compare the welfare systems of whole countries. Nor does it 
analyse similar policies across nations. Nevertheless it embraces a
- 13 -
comparative perspective by placing Chinese experience in the light 
of developments elsewhere. In doing so, 1117 belief is that real 
learning comes from comparison (Higgins, 1981) and there are 
distinct gains to be made. First, comparative social policy allows 
the researcher to distinguish between the general and the specific 
(also see Rodgers et al., 1968). Second, it widens one's awareness 
of the range of policy options (Finer, 1974). Most importantly, it 
permits one to "identify the social determinants of policy and to 
differentiate between culturally specific causes, variables, 
institutional arrangements and outcomes and those which are 
characteristics of different systems and different countries" 
(Higgins, 1981. p. 14). I could not agree with this last point more. 
If the thesis is to make a theoretical contribution, any 
explanation (s) preferred must single out the universal and 
particular strands of Chinese welfare socialism.
To say China is special is a truism. It has the worlds' largest 
population (one billion people). Its culture dates back five 
thousand years. It is both vast and diverse. Above all, it is a 
socialist society. This richness suggests that it is important to 
be as attentive to possible theoretical implications as it is to 
empirical details. To address the latter, the study asks such 
questions as : Hew is social welfare defined in China? What are
the welfare arrangements? What functions do they perform in 
Chinese society? What are seme of the intrinsic and emerging 
problems? To explore the relevance of theory, there are two major 
questions. Hew far is the Chinese welfare system an example of 
certain theoretical paradigms? Or is it, by virtue of its 
idiosyncrasies, a unique case in its cwn right? As the study
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unfolds, these issues will form its agenda.
Meaning of Welfare
Lest the study be taken for something which it is not, the frame of 
reference needs clarification. In this connection, it is essential 
to start with the meaning of social welfare as used in China and in 
the West.
Historically, in the West, social welfare was equated with 
charity and provisions for the poor. This approach was based in a 
context of laissez-faire, individual responsibility and private 
philanthropy before the twentieth century. Gradually, as notions of 
social right and collective obligation took root, social welfare 
was no longer treated as despised services for the unlucky few. In 
most industrial nations, the end of the Second World War saw 
impressive extensions in social protection. Together with this, the 
meaning of social welfare has broadened. It began to be used 
interchangeably with social policy and the welfare state (Titmuss, 
1968 and 1974? Marshall, 1975? Sleeman, 1974? Mishra, 1977).
Traditionally, social policy is taken to mean policy regarding 
the social services in cash and in kind. Titmuss later broadens the 
scope of social policy to include benefits provided under the 
fiscal and occupational systems, which serve similar purposes in 
redistributing resources and enhancing social integration (Titmuss, 
1963). Likewise, Townsend (1969) sees social policy as any policy 
that contributes to the fulfilment of socially defined objectives. 
The term welfare state is commonly used to refer to state-protected 
minimum standards in education, health, income and housing on the 
basis of equality of citizenship. Later an, the concept is extended
- 15 -
to the ways in which the welfare system operates in the context of 
the political economy of society (Gough, 1979). New, in Western 
Europe, issues of employment, wages and overall macro-economic 
policy are considered integral parts of the welfare state complex 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990).
In contrast, social welfare in China has a distinct 
connotation. The Chinese word for welfare is fuli which translates 
as benefits and is frequently aligned with relief (jiuji)
(Feuchtwang, 1987). In fact, the terms social welfare and social 
relief are commonly used together (Mok, 1983) and refer to 
assistance and services to vulnerable groups in society (Wong, 
1986). Fragmentation in responsibility reinforces the marginal 
nature of welfare support. In China, jurisdiction for social
welfare rests with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Minzheng Bu. 
Meanwhile, for people at work, the concept of social insurance or 
labour insurance is applicable. Carrying the onus for social
protection of the "normal" population are at least three state
organs: Ministry of labour for workers, Ministry of Personnel for
state cadres and the Organization Department of the Communist Party 
for its 40 million members (Yuan Qihui, 1986).
The present study is concerned with the welfare work of the 
Minzheng Bu and agencies under its guidance. The major ways in 
which this system has operated and redefined its roles since 1978 
form the core of a national purview. However, in recognition of its 
physical vastness and possible local variations, the study builds 
in a regional perspective. Guangdong Province, a pioneer in
economic and social developments, was chosen for intensive study. 
This area focus is intended to throw light on the unity and
- 16 -
diversity of related arrangements as well as to enrich our 
knowledge of the complexity of the social policy process.
Despite its confined boundary, the welfare work of the Ministry 
is only meaningful when seen in the context of wider institutional 
arrangements to meet social needs in Chinese society. It invariably 
interacts with and is influenced by other systems of care. The part 
and the whole are intimately linked. In the backdrop of socialism 
in transition, what then were the implications for welfare? What 
problems have been thrown up and hew did welfare organs rise to the 
challenge? Would attempts at institutional restructuring lead to 
new perceptions of the meaning and scope of social welfare? These 
themes will be tackled in the study.
Motivations
The study of Chinese social policy is a rather fallow field. This 
is in spite of the extensive and venerable scholarship on Sinology 
in the past decades. Most China experts - anthropologists,
sociologists, political scientists, economists - have little to say 
on welfare matters. Oftentimes social welfare issues warrant no 
more than a chapter in a book or a few odd articles. Examples of 
the first kind are Whyte and Parish's Urban Life in Contemporary 
China (1984) and Village and Family in Contemporary China (1978), 
Ruth and Victor Sidel' s The Health of China (1982) and 
Davis-Friedmann' s Long Lives - Chinese Elderly and the Communist 
Revolution (1983). Special articles are also rare. In article form 
is Kallgren's report on the labour insurance scheme in the early 
years of its inception (Kallgren, 1969) as is Davis-Friedmann1 s 
analysis of the "five guarantees" scheme (Davis-Friedmann, 1978). A
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particularly important book an the way Chinese work units function 
as agencies of production, administration and welfare is Walder's 
Communist Neo-traditional i sm; Work and Authority in Chinese 
Industry (1986). Contributors like Croll, Feuchtwang and Hussain 
also enrich our understanding of welfare-related issues. For 
example, Croll (1987) has discussed the implications of the rural 
reforms in terms of the rise of the independent peasantry. 
Feuchtwang (1987) elucidates the changes in the system of basic 
social security in the countryside and suggests tentatively that 
the household and kinship links among households bear the brunt of 
social support. Feuchtwang and Hussain (1988) examine the nutrition 
and incidence of poverty in rural areas. Hussain and Liu have 
chronicled the history of rural social security (1989). On urban 
welfare, Davis argues that despite recent reforms in labour 
insurance, what has emerged is even more inequality in occupational 
entitlement (1988). She has also commented on the broad 
achievements of social policy after forty years of socialism 
(1989).
Apart from more general works, there are at least three books 
that focus directly on social welfare in China. The first one is 
Dixon's The Chinese Social Welfare System. 1949-1979. Published in 
1981, this is the first book on the subject to appear in English 
and provides a wealth of information on welfare practices. 
Meanwhile, Wong and MacQuarrie's China's Welfare System: A View 
from Guancrzhou is based an field observations by Hong Kong social 
workers in Guangzhou. It examines welfare services during the first 
half of the 1980s. I edited this volume and wrote a long 
introduction, therein acquiring a keen interest in follcwing
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through same of the vital issues raised in the book. Finally there 
is Chew's The Administration and Financing of Social Security in 
China (1988). Apart from describing the programme, the author 
evaluates its performance and prescribes certain solutions. The 
book offers a good factual account, even if the assessment tends to 
be impressionistic and general in character.
All the above are English publications from outside China. In 
addition, since 1984, there has been a treasure trove of indigenous 
literature relating to labour insurance, social security and social 
welfare. Such work usually appears in social science magazines and 
academic journals published by leading universities. The more 
prominent ones are Chinese Sociology and Anthropology. Shehui. 
Shehui Keshe. Chinese Economic Studies and Shehui Yaniiu. Of 
absolute importance are two Ministry of Civil Affairs serials: 
Zhongguo Minzheng (Chinese Civil Affairs, hereafter ZGMZ) and 
Shehui Baozhang Bao (Social Security Newspaper, hereafter SHBZB) as 
well as a regional magazine Guangdong Minzheng (Guangdong Civil 
Affairs, hereafter GEMZ). Relatively unknown overseas, they are 
truly mines of information on social welfare, covering new 
developments, official policies, service data, debates and 
problems. The first is a monthly journal, the second published 
twice weekly, and the third a quarterly. Although overseas 
subscription is accepted these sources remain undervalued by 
Sinologists.
In addition, the civil affairs system released many volumes of 
regulations, policy documents, handbooks and anthologies in the 
1980s. Access to these is rather difficult? mine were obtained 
through informal channels. These materials are extremely useful in
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shedding light on past and current practices. The coverage often 
goes beyond straightforward reporting; ideological debates, 
government attitudes and candid exposes of problems are included. 
The last feature distinguishes MCA publications from national 
newspapers and yearbooks. As a rule, the latter are more condensed, 
self-congratulatory and short on originality. Had it not been for 
the ministerial offerings, an indepth study on social welfare would 
not be possible.
Determinants of Social Welfare: Western Theories
Insights from two systems of social welfare are relevant to this 
study. The first source is the welfare state literature from 
Western capitalist societies; the other is from the experience of 
socialist states.
Before industrialization, social welfare in Europe was largely 
a family matter. In an economy of scarcity, poverty was the lot of 
the ordinary man and considered both natural (the result of 
individual failings and improvidence) and useful (for the wealth of 
the nation). Under such circumstances, the relief of the poor was 
left to private charity. Primarily, assistance was organized 
through the parishes and monasteries, and to a lesser extent by 
neighbours, guilds and friendly societies. By the sixteenth
century, which saw an alarming increase in the number of beggars 
and vagrants in England and much of continental Europe, exclusive 
reliance on local decisions was beccming inadequate (Rimlinger, 
1971, p. 13). With the rise of the modem nation-state, poverty 
became a national issue (Flora, 1983). However, in the context of 
nascent nationalism and the economic pcwer struggle in the
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the need to repress idleness 
and instil industry was felt so strongly that no decisive
institutional charges for the relief of destitution emerged. It 
wasnot until the 1880s that the take-off of the modem welfare 
state occured (Flora, ibid) when the social costs of 
industrialization were too rampant to be ignored.
Germany was the first modem state to introduce social
security. In 1883, it introduced a sickness insurance scheme for 
workers. This was followed by invalidity and old age pensions in 
1889 (Handel, 1982? Jones, 1985). In Britain, the terms on which 
poor relief was to be granted was radically revised under the 1834 
Poor Law Amendment Act. Although the State accepted oversight for 
poor relief, the problem was narrowly defined as able-bodied 
pauperism and aid was based on the principles of "less
eligibility" 1 and deterrence. In 1886, following alarming riots 
by unemployed workers in London, the government issued a circular 
authorising municipal schemes of public works to relieve the 
unemployed. The making of separate provisions reflected a change in 
offical attitude —  that the Poor Law was not appropriate in 
dealing with the problem of unemployment and that in the last 
resort society as a whole had responsibility, which led eventually 
to the Unemployed Workmen's Act in 1905 (Fraser, 1984,
pp. 140-1). In 1908, old age pensions were provided for a small 
number of the poorest elderly (over 70) who were subject to test of
1 According to the Poor Law Commission, "less eligibility" meant 
that an individual should be given relief only on condition "that 
his situation on the whole shall not be made really or apparently 
so eligible as the situation of the independent labourer of the 
lowest class". (Report from His Majesty's Commissioners for
Inquiring into the Administration and Practical Operation of the 
Poor Law. 1834, p. 228) quoted by Rimlinger, 1971, p. 52.
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means and character. Three years later, the National Insurance Act 
of 1911 set up health and unemployment insurance for the 
self-supporting work force (Rimlinger, 1971).1 In 1913 Sweden 
became the first nation to introduce an insurance pensions scheme 
covering the entire population. By that time nearly all countries 
in Western Europe had made same provision for pensions and sickness 
insurance (Johnson, 1987). In comparison, the arrival of social 
security in the United States took much longer; it was not unitl 
1935 that the Social Security Act was passed, stipulating old age 
insurance and federal backed assistance for designated categories 
e.g. the aged, mothers with children and the blind (Jones, 1985). 
On the whole twentieth century developments in social policy in 
Western industrial societies have been impressive; by the mid-1950s 
most had consolidated and extended social security on a universal 
basis.
The importance of state social provisions can be glimpsed from 
the resources devoted to them. For example, in 1960 Britain devoted 
13.9 percent of GNP to social expenditure; the percent was 14.5 for 
Sweden, 20.5 for West Germany and 10.9 for the United States (OECD 
Observer. No. 126, January 1984, p.5; Jones, 1985, p.80). The 
average social expenditure among the OECD countries was between 10 
to 20 percent of the GNP. In 1985, the proportion increased to 23.7 
percent of GNP for Britain, 33.4 percent for Sweden, 31.5 percent 
for West Germany and 20.8 percent for the United States (OECD. 
Social Expenditure 1960-90; Rose and Shiratori, 1986, p.209). In
1 An initial motivation. behind the British legislation was for 
national efficiency; recruitment for the Boer War had revealed a
shockingly large number of young men unfit for military service.
See Rimlinger, 1971, p.60.
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the mid-1980s, the leading industrial countries devoted one fifth 
to one third of the GNP to social expenditure.
Two features stand out when one examines the pattern of social 
spending. First, a large part of the increase can be traced to the 
growth of pensions accompanying population aging. Second, the input 
of resources between countries does vary. Sweden and West Germany 
emerged as clear leaders whereas the United States and Japan (17.5 
percent, ibid), both economic giants, spent less on social
protection than other affluent nations.
A profusion of theories, what Castles calls "the battle of the 
paradigms" (Castles, 1981), have been advanced to explain the 
similarities and differences among welfare states. Roughly
speaking, three kinds of perspectives can be distinguished. The 
first mode of explanation is technolgical-econamic in nature, the 
second approach centres on the importance of politics and the third 
on the contribution of ideology to the development of social 
policy.
Included in the first perspective is the industrialization 
thesis. This sees social welfare as an inevitable consequence of 
the industrialization process. The genesis of change is thought to 
be located in the breakthrough and proliferation of technology 
which produced fundamental changes in the economy. A simple mode 
of production based on agriculture and small-scale handicrafts gave 
way to an urban industrial economy dominated by the factory system 
and modem enterprises operating along bureaurcratic lines. As a 
result, changes in the social structure developed, giving rise to 
problems like family breakdown, eclipse of communities, 
unemployment, neglect of the elderly, public health, cvercrcwding
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and so on. Permitting social costs to lie where they fell would 
result in social chaos and inefficiency. Therefore, societies had 
to find collective solutions through large-scale social 
intervention, which was also made possible by vastly increased 
wealth under the new economic order. The most lucid account of this 
thesis is provided by Wilensky and lebeaux in their book Industrial 
Society and Social Welfare. 1965. Even earlier, the key role of the 
"logic of industrialism" was recognised by Kerr, Dunlop, Harbeson 
and Myers in Industrialism and Industrial Man (1962). They proposed 
that as industrial societies develop, they became increasingly 
alike as they respond to the same kinds of economic and 
technological imperatives and resort to common strategies of
management. In short, industrializing societies converge, however 
different their starting point.
In the sphere of social welfare, the eventual pattern will be a 
mixed system underpinned by a major state role with various 
combinations of market, voluntary and informal care. looking across 
different social systems, Mishra postulates that the extremes of 
total state control in socialist states and unremitting
laissez-faire in capitalist ones will both narrow and move to the 
centre. This is because under capitalism, the injustices of the 
market, expanding democracy and the importance of a more efficient 
work force make a residual state role no longer viable; on the 
other hand, centralized planning and distributing systems will 
prove too rigid and increasingly unaffordable (Mishra, 1981).
Another way of interpreting the move to the middle way is for 
capitalist societies to adopt some of the collectivist features of 
socialist states and for command economies to inject free market
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and pluralist features into their welfare system. There are strong 
indications that such a trend has been gathering momentum in 
Eastern Europe since the mid-1980s (Deacon, 1990). According to 
Pinker (1991a), this may not mean the end of ideology as prophesied 
by Bell (1960). Rather it is more accurate to talk about a growing 
disenchantment with classical political economy in its purest, 
competitive liberal form and the Marxist tradition of class
struggle and complete state domination (Pinker, 1991a).
Both the industrialization and convergence theories are 
premised on the importance of technology in social change. A 
natural derivative is the close link between economic level and the 
range and generosity of welfare state provisions. To subject this 
proposition to empirical test, Wilensky examined the experience of 
60 nations. He found the association between economic level and 
social development to be statistically important (Wilensky, 1975). 
Kohl supports this view: "The rapid economic growth of the recovery 
period after World War Two enabled Western democracies to increase 
public spending in almost all fields because of greater fiscal 
resources" (Flora and Heideriheimer, 1981, p. 307). This, of course, 
is not a surprising finding. Hcwever it is not an adequate 
explanation for the diversity in welfare arrangements that prevail 
in societies with similar economic attainment. For example the 
United States and Japan are recognized welfare laggards. Besides, 
even though total spending may be broadly alike, there are 
substantial variations in institutional arrangements across 
nations. Furthermore, if attention is turned to socialist states, 
the discrepancy is more acute. Most countries in the Eastern bloc, 
except perhaps East Germany and Czechoslovakia, are technologically
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and economically backward; however they do have extensive
provisions for social care. Surely this monocausal and 
deterministic mode of explanation is too simplistic. In short, why 
is there only one model of social change? Why cannot prescriptions 
differ even if common maladies occur?
The second approach is to emphasize the role of politics. 
There are several permutations to this school of thought. One is to 
look at political intent in social reform. Here, the classic 
example is Bismarck's introduction of social insurance to thwart 
the appeal of revolutionary socialism. In this case, social policy 
was vised as a substitute for widening the basis of political 
authority, and not as a consequence of it (Jones, 1985). Apart from 
this example, other cases are less clear cut. Indeed, the motives 
behind policies may not be explicitly stated and even their aims 
are subject to different interpretation (George and Wilding, 1984). 
The search for political intent behind specific reforms is too 
piecemeal and open to dispute.
An alternative means is to focus on the association between 
political parties and welfare policies. Following this, social 
scientists have investigated whether leftist parties, social 
democratic governments and Catholic party power are instrumental in 
social reform (Rimlinger, 1971; Castles and McKinlay, 1979; Flora 
and Heideriheimer, 1981; Pinker, 1991b). However, Heidenhemier, 
Heclo and Adams are less emphatic and argue "that there is at best 
an unreliable and fairly weak relationship between leftist 
dominance and extensive income transfers relative to the economy. 
More striking is the fact that where socialist parties and strong
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labour movements are more or less absent, government transfers are 
consistently smaller in the aggregate" (Heideriheimer, Heclo and 
Adams, 1983, p.210). Nevertheless, such an argument is weakened by 
research that shows centre-right governments taking the lead in the 
growth of social expenditure (Alber, 1983). The case of Britain is 
instructive. Both before and after the Second World War, 
substantial agreement on welfare policies existed across the major 
parties. It was not until the mid-1970s that opinions became more 
sharply and overtly divided. Government hostility to high social 
spending notwithstanding, the conservative administrations in 
Britain and the United States could not embark on wholesale 
dismantling of the welfare state in the context of widespread 
public support of the social services (Johnson, 1987, 1990; Jewell, 
Witherspoon and Brook, 1989; Mishra, 1990).
A third permutation is to explore the relationship between 
state intervention and political and class conflict. This is 
essentially a Marxist perspective within which several approaches 
can be identified. First, there are those Marxists who see social 
welfare as gains wrested from a hostile capitalist class. For 
example, in accounting for the divergent developments of the 
welfare state in Britain and the United States, Mishra believes 
that "the higher the proportions of labour force unionized the 
greater the chances that the state will assume responsibility for 
basic needs" (Mishra, 1977, p. 105). Second, there is an alternative 
top-down approach which describes advances in state welfare in 
terms of voluntary concessions from the ruling class in order to 
perpetuate their pcwer (Saville, 1957). This ascribes the rise of 
the welfare state largely to the functional necessities of system
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integration (maintaining the integrity of the system) and social 
integration (maintaining harmony between social groups) in 
capitalism (Baran and Sweezy, 1968). Most contemporary Marxists 
recognize the combined effects of both forces (Saville, 1957; 
Damhoff, 1971? and Offe, 1984).
In my view, the Marxist perspective is useful in pointing out 
the central problems in welfare capitalism. Because of the conflict 
of group interests, ideology and pcwer, social welfare and
capitalism coexist in perpetual tension. When the market serves as 
the primary channel of distribution, the welfare system can only 
augment its deficiencies, oftentimes reflecting and reinforcing the 
structural inequality in society. This point of view is, of course, 
not unique to Marxists. Many social theorists are agreed about the 
inherent contradiction between social and economic policy and the 
persistence of inequality and poverty in the midst of affluence can 
be attributable to it (Titmuss, 1963, 1968? Marshall, 1963? Miller, 
1978? Le Grand, 1985? George, 1988).
In relation to China, the relevance of party influence and 
political conflict will be important issues for investigation. 
Admittedly, the institutional patterns are not the same. In the 
context of its one party polity and state dominance, how will these 
factors affect the choice of its welfare model? Will there be 
similar social tensions arising from the relentless push for 
modernization? Will new conflicts between groups emerge? These and 
the general question of whether social welfare there serves similar 
functions of system and social integration as in capitalist 
societies will be explored.
The third category of theories attributes a leading role in
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welfare state development to the impact of ideology. For example, 
Baker’s social conscience thesis (Baker, 1979) sees welfare 
provisions broadening as a result of a widening and deepening sense 
of social obligation. It is postulated that as deprivations became 
better known and more resources are at hand (with increased 
fiscalization), countries everywhere tend towards greater 
generosity in the social services. A parallel perspective is 
Marshall's citizenship thesis (1963). This traces the proliferation 
of social welfare to the acceptance of social rights, which, 
together with civil (guarantees of individual liberty) and 
political rights (right to vote and to seek political office) are 
the three component rights of citizenship. Defined broadly as the 
right to enjoy "a modicum of economic welfare and security", social 
rights gained ascendency in the twentieth century and were credited 
with the transformation of the Boor Law. Thus, the social services, 
initially restricted to the needy, were later extended to the 
working classes and eventually to the whole population. This thesis 
enjoyed considerable support during the 1960s and 1970s. Its 
contribution, however, is more important in justifying an extension 
of social rights than in explaining the dynamics of their 
evolution.
More recently, Esping-Andersen (1990) has made an original 
contribution to the theoretical debate by identifying the 
importance of the nature of states and regime types in the 
structure of welfare provisions in post-industrial societies. He 
distinguishes between three models —  the liberal, corporatist- 
statist and social-democratic traj ectories, each with its distinct 
forms of economic and employment management, social stratification
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and benefit structures. For an explanation of regime types, he 
looks beyond simple class mobilization to include the key role of 
political class coalition and historical forces. By looking at the 
richness of a country's experience indepth, this mode of analysis 
can overcame the pitfall of over-generalization from universal 
theory. Such themes offer food for thought in relation to a vast 
country like China.
The above are key paradigms that purport to explain the common 
causes of welfare states. Less elaborate but of no less importance 
are those variables identified as crucial to social policy
development. One is the role of demography. Here, one's attention 
is drawn to such things as declining fertility, increased aging, 
the rise of divorce rates and single-parent families, which have 
the tendency to push up demand for social care (Rocm et al., 
1990). Another is bureaucratic influence. This refers to the 
self-interest of bureaucracies, and professionals within them, to 
expand programmes quite independent of need. Hence, while emphasing 
economic level as the key independent variable, Wilensky provides 
this qualification:
"Over the long pull economic level is the root cause of 
welfare state development, but its effects are felt chiefly 
through demographic changes of the past century and the 
momentum of the programs themselves, once established." 
(Wilensky, 1975, p. 47)
Still another factor is cultural diffusion (Rys, 1964).
This stresses mutual exchange and learning. But the influence 
can also penetrate by political imposition. In this category 
are former colonies and states that came under Soviet dominance 
after the Second World War.
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In China, there is no evidence of a professional welfare lobby. 
However, the problem of demography, caused by the one child 
population policy and rising numbers of old people, are matters of 
national concern. Likewise, the role of diffusion via the 
incorporation of the socialist development model is of interest. 
The extent to which socialist strategies imprint on China and the 
implications on welfare will be areas for exploration.
In trying to account for cross-national differences, the 
cultural or value dimension of social welfare merits further 
consideration. According to Tropman (1976, 1989), the backwardness 
of the American welfare state is due to such cultural values as 
individual ism, problem morality, melting pot ethos, success 
orientation, limited government and respect for religious and 
ethnic diversities. Although values like protection of the weak, 
equality, and social right coexist, they are of secondary 
importance. The result, therefore, is a niggardly and fragmented 
system of care. In a similar vein, Glazer (1986) writes of two 
systems of welfare in America. Welfare I comprises the contributory 
programmes for all and education. Welfare II is the residual 
programmes for those not helped by the first kind. While programmes 
for independent individuals still expand despite the climate of 
stringency in the late 1970s, "welfare” programmes for the 
dependent are in increasing disrepute. He attributes such bipolar 
treatment not only to cultural values but fundamental features of 
American society: federalism, ethnic and religious diversity, race, 
individualism, voluntarism and profit-making agencies in social 
policy. By looking at the value patterns and institutional 
practices, the whole culture approach gives due weight to the
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influence that the historical and social contexts have on welfare. 
It has the potential of discovering the general and special 
character of a country’s welfare system.
The consideration of cultural factors brings us to the vortex 
of two rival perspectives set out earlier. To what extent are 
countries examples of universal models? Or can one only treat every 
country as unique? This question is tackled by Pinker in his 1986 
paper "Social Welfare in Japan and Britain: A Comparative View. 
Formal and Informal Aspects of Welfare", using the central concept 
of the culture of welfare. In any society, the culture of welfare 
has two parts: values which influence people's notion of obligation 
and entitlement, and the conventions through which these values 
find practical expression. Hie two components are expressed partly 
in formal social programmes and partly in informal services based 
on the affiliations of family, friendship and neighbourhood. Values 
primarily influence choices made in social policy whereas 
institutional arrangements are affected by national 
characteristics. After contextualizing Japan and Britain's welfare 
ingredients in terms of statutory, occupational and voluntary 
services, he concludes that
"Comparative analysis is unlikely to reveal striking 
similarities between societies if the formcil and informal 
dimensions of welfare are taken into account and both are 
then related to cultural variables." (Pinker, 1986)
Despite its brevity, the paper offers a stimulating line of
enquiry. In the case of China, hew relevant is the cultural legacy
in shaping current practices? Can traditions blend with socialist
ideology? These themes will be examined in this study.
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Relevance of Socialist Experiences
From the start, the search for guidance from practising 
socialism is hampered by many difficulties. The key obstacle is 
the dearth of publications on the subject. Language barriers 
and restricted contacts have compounded the problem of 
cammunication between East and West. Insofar as materials are 
available, the statistical and contextual data are not as full 
as in the Western literature. Additionally, there is an absence 
of theory about welfare development, except in an idealised 
form by Mishra (1977) and Deacon (1983), which was so 
acknowledged by Deacon in his recent work (1990). Under such 
conditions, one's quest for relevant theory and conceptual 
frameworks from welfare socialism is not an easy one.
The Soviet Union, the first nation to go through a Marxist 
revolution and the most powerful of socialist states, offers a 
natural starting point. A few works in English about the 
Russian welfare state have appeared, the most wellkncwn being 
Madison's Social Welfare in the Soviet Union (1968), George and 
Manning's Socialism. Social Welfare and the Soviet Union (1980) 
and Deacon's Social Policy and Socialism (1983). In addition, 
Rimlinger (1971) and Pinker (1979) have documented the 
historical evolution of Russian welfare arrangements.
Contributions originating from socialist Europe were even 
fewer and these did not become available until the 1980s. By 
and large, Ferge of Hungary provides the best national sketch 
of a socialist state with A Society in the Making. Hungarian 
Social and Societal Policy 1945-1975 (1979). She has also
published extensively in European volumes on social policy
- 33 -
(1986, 1987, 1988, 1990). Other Eastern bloc writers include Sik
(1988), Szeleryi (1978; 1983) and Szalai (1990) of Hungary, Svetlik 
(1988, 1990) of Yugoslavia, and Jarosz (1987) and Ksiezqpolski
(1987, 1990) of Poland. Their works have enriched people1 s
understanding of socialist social policy.
In brief, the factors that emerge as being relevant in shaping 
socialist welfare systems are (1) ideology, (2) political and 
economic policies, (3) meaning of work and the enterprise, and (4) 
special conditions within these societies.
The Marxist ideology of distribution is buttressed by the 
concepts of equality and the primacy of need. Equal distribution of 
the social product can only came about after the private means of 
production has been abolished and all resources are brought under 
state control. In the transitional stage of socialism, due to 
economic backwardness and remnants of the old order, distribution 
is still tied to work. Hcwever, when the higher form of communism 
is reached, people will be rewarded according to need (Mishra, 
1977; George and Manning, 1980; Deacon, 1983). In the Soviet Union, 
the state was anxious to enhance its legitimacy by early 
implementation of egalitarian principles. Thus, immediately after 
the revolution, it premised comprehensive non-contributory social 
insurance for all, free medical care and universal education. That 
such promises took longer to realize and had to leap over setbacks, 
notably in the Stalinist period, did not pervert the strength of 
ideology as a moulding force. Likewise, in Yugoslavia, which 
converted to socialism in 1945, a concern to solve the "social 
question of the working class" came early. The promotion of general 
social security and welfare is a means towards this end. In the
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1950s, the leadership had taken the basic steps toward establishing 
a welfare state: a social security system was created by central
legislation, the health service was socialized, housing was 
nationalized, free and compulsory elementary education was extended 
to eight years, and child care services started to expand (Pusic,
1987). It is noteworthy that these countries, when introducing 
extensive social security schemes, were more backward than when 
such programmes were adopted in market societies. In short, the 
ideological imperative of Marxism has been instrumental in 
achieving what can only be construed as "premature" social 
development.
Partly motivated by ideology and partly by strong desires to 
catch up with the developed world as soon as possible, all 
socialist states pursued common political and economic programmes 
after seizing power. The measures included land reform, 
nationalization of firms, heavy investment in heavy industries, and 
price and wage policy (Furtak, 1986). They all have the aims of 
equalization, creating employment (and preventing unemployment), 
and ensuring adequate, if only basic standards of life (Ferge, 
1979; George and Manning, 1980; Deacon, 1983). The desired outcome 
has not been absolute equality. Because the goal has been to put 
production first, welfare policies were subordinate to it. Indeed 
Szeleryi argues that the social policy in centrally planned East 
European states is inherently inegalitarian in its effects. This is 
because with the disappearance of markets, the distributive 
mechanisms are basically created and structured by the state 
(1978). For example, in rationing urban housing, administrative 
allocation has demonstrably, albeit unknowingly, favoured
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burearucrats, intellectuals and white collar workers (1983). As 
long as seme criteria have to be used in allocating scarce 
resources, the substitution of bureaucratic decisions for market 
criteria does not guarantee equality of outcome unless that goal is 
consciously pursued.
The fusion of welfare and economics and the latter*s dominance 
over social policy in command societies has been recognized by many 
writters. For example, social security in the Soviet Union was used 
to enforce labour discipline and consolidate state power 
(Rimlinger, 1971? Kallgren, 1969; Dixon, 1981; Walder, 1986). Thus 
industrial workers were heavily favoured by the benefit structure. 
Rewards for the self-employed and collective fanners have been 
neglected. It was not until 1965 that the latter were brought into 
the scheme. The preoccupation with economic growth also resulted in 
high rates of investment. For example, in Yugoslavia, as late as 
1976-80, the average share of investment was still 36.9 percent of 
GNP (Pusic, 1987). That such was possible was due to significant 
curtailment of consumption and infrastructural development. For the 
second item, Ferge estimated that in the West, two-thirds or more 
of all the investment served infrastructural purposes? this 
proportion was only around 40 percent in the planned economy 
(Ferge, 1987, p,80). With regard to social policy, the Hungarian
government did not feel that an autonomous social policy was needed 
since the egalitarian framework of the command economy and rising 
affluence would solve all social problems (Ferge, 1979 and 1987). 
Such a view is of course consistent with the Marxist tenet of 
"basis" determining "superstructure11. As long as full employment 
prevails, there will be adequate protection for all. Not
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surprisingly public assistance and welfare services for special 
groups were not taken too kindly. If available, these were only 
granted to those who had no working ability or family support. 
Recipients of special welfare suffered from the stigma of 
dependence (George and Manning, 1980; Pusic, 1987? Ferge, 1987).
Under socialism, work is of paramount importance. Man has a 
right and a duty to work. To reward someone who has made no input 
to production is to encourage dependency and idleness. Hence 
welfare benefits have to be earned through labour and the state 
assigns an important welfare role to enterprises. Sik and Svetlik 
(1988) gave two reasons for the state's interest in direct 
provision of services by enterprises. First, it allows the state to 
omit some responsibilities, to promote the idea of collectivism on 
a lower (quasi-community) level and to simplify the welfare system. 
Second, enterprise welfare serves as a means of labour competition 
under conditions of full employment. Taken together, universal 
social services by the state and welfare support from employers are 
assumed to meet all human needs.
Finally, the effects of common characteristics of socialist 
societies. Despite Marx's dictum that the overthrew of the old 
regime will take place under advanced capitalism, most states were 
economically backward at the time of the revolution. Their 
economies were typified by the dominance of agriculture and
relatively small industrial and service sectors (Ferge, 1987). Two 
outcomes followed from these conditions. One was the relative 
scarcity of economic resources for social consumption. For example, 
in the Soviet Union, continuing economic stagnation has caused the 
Stalinist reversion from utopian egalitarian social policy to one
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that was firmly tied to occupational award to stimulate production 
(Mishra, 1977). This was also true of Eastern Europe. It came as no 
surprise that financial stringency would pervert the goals of 
equality and adequacy. Thus, Pusic, writing about Yugoslavia, was 
to observe that "the essential problem of the welfare state 
everywhere seems to be that its economic cost is increasing beyond 
its fiscal capability" (Pusic, 1987). Again, this is a familiar 
experience elsewhere.
Are the above themes relevant to China? With a per capita
income of US$280 in 1987 (World Bank, 1987), the effects of
financial constraints were almost a foregone conclusion. Writers 
like Yuan Qihui in China (1986) and Nelson Chew in Hong Kong (1988) 
suggest that already labour insurance for urbanites may have been 
more generous than what China can afford. The other feature, the 
prominence of traditional structures in social care, has been
widely recognized. In Chinese society, the vital role of the 
family, lineage and village communities is well documented (Fried, 
1953? Freedman, 1966, 1970? Baker, 1979). Since the revolution, the 
family has kept its pride of place (Lei, 1985? Liu and Xue, 1987?
Yuan Fang, 1988). Beyond the family, village communities were
important agencies of local cooperation and mutual aid (Ngan,
1985). Their socialist replacements —  the commune and work units 
—  have likewise functioned as institutions for collective
production and consumption (Whyte and Parish, 1978, 1984? Walker, 
1984? Walder, 1986? Shue, 1988). The ways in which old
institutional arrangements and their modem equivalents function as 
welfare instruments, the idea of continuity and change in
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entitlement and obligation, will frame the agenda of the current
study.
In Search of an Analytical Framework
After the above literature review, we can new phrase the major
intellectual questions. Significantly, no theory stood out as being 
eminently suitable as a framwork of explanation. Nonetheless, a 
number of important variables can be identified. From Western 
theories, these are: the place of ideology, the role of
industrialization, political party influence and interest groups. 
Also deserving close scrutiny is a country's culture of welfare. 
Experience frcrn socialist countries confirms the relevance of
ideology. Other influences centre around the peculiarities of 
socialist states - their economic and political strategies, the 
special meaning of work and the importance of the enterprise, 
economic constraints, and the hold of traditional institutions. All 
these warrant exploration in the Chinese case. The next step is the 
search for a meaningful framework for analysis.
As was already mentioned, the welfare state as a concept has a 
number of shortcomings. First, it is closely linked to its social 
origins in Western liberal market societies. In Eastern Europe, the 
word welfare system is generally preferred. Second, the concept 
confounds state, or trappings of the government apparatus, with 
society. By focusing on statutory welfare, it does not do justice 
to other institutions in society that perform similar functions 
(Hadley and Hatch, 1981; Rose, 1986? and Sik and Svetlik, 1988). In 
short, a concept that is less culture-bound and broad enough to 
ac%yaTinnyYfoi-/3> both formal and informal systems of social care is 
called for.
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In conceptualizing social welfare, several models have been 
advanced. Ihe classic dichotomy is drawn by Wilensky and Lebeaux 
who identify:
"two conceptions of social welfare... the residual and the 
institutional. Ihe first holds that social welfare institutions 
should come into play only when the normal structures of supply 
break down. Ihe second, in contrast, sees the welfare services 
as normal, 1 first line* functions of modem industrial 
society." (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965, p. 138)
Titmuss, one of the most eminent British policy analysts, 
distinguishes between three models: (1) the residual, (2)
industrial achievement-performance, and (3) institutional 
redistributive models. Ihe first and last correspond to Wilensky 
and Lebeaux's residual and institutional approaches. Ihe second one 
"incorporates a significant role for social welfare institutions as 
adjuncts of the economy... (holding) that needs must be met on the 
basis of merit, work-performance and productivity" (Titmuss, 1974, 
p.70). Ihe development of welfare in Western society is said to 
progress from the residual to the institutional model. For example, 
Ramarryshyn (1971) conceptualizes the overall trend of social 
welfare development as evolving from charity to justice, passing 
through such phases as benevolence, social security and social 
planning, and ending in transformation into a welfare society. 
While these depictions may be useful in describing broad patterns, 
in reality most countries adept a mixed approach (Pinker, 1971, 
1979, 1991b).
A model that was based on the special character of socialist 
societies was developed by Mishra in 1977. Called the structural 
model, it identifies welfare as an integral part of the social 
structure. Among the more important features of this model are:
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total state responsibility for meeting individual needs, the 
domination of the need-based ideology of distribution,
comprehensive range of statutory services which cover the entire 
population, high level of benefits, high proportion of national 
income spent on state services, entitlement as of right and the 
social services as an expression of the basic values of society 
(Mishra, 1977, pp. 121-49). Ihis model is very much an ideal type. 
To be fair to the architect, Mishra did concede that substantial 
deviations from the norm exist in reality because of a backward 
economy in transition to communism. However, in the long run, he 
insists that the ideological imperative of need-based distribution 
will persist to a degree sufficient to bring services closer to the 
blueprint.
Taking the Soviet Union as an example of the structural model, 
the patterns of formal social services are quite similar to Western 
welfare states. In 1970, it had developed near-universal income 
security, comprehensive free health care for the whole population, 
and free and compulsory ten-year education. Ihe proportion of 
national income spent on income maintenance, health and education
was 18.3 percent as against 17.4 percent in Britain (Mishra, 1977). 
Meanwhile the major departures of Soviet experience from Western 
welfare states are the monistic role of the state, a poorly 
developed tax system and the near absence of a voluntary sector to 
augment state provisions. Ihe most marked difference is the
former's wide resort to wage policy to reduce inccme inequality. 
Ihe social services, meanwhile, have the effect of increasing 
equality and improving living standards of the majority of the
population (Mishra, 1977; Deacon, 1983).
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Mishra1 s model does not, in my view, place enough emphasis on
the role of work and occupational welfare. In China, enterprise
welfare is of paramount importance (Walder, 1986). In the absence 
of a uniform system of social security for all citizens, labour 
insurance is confined to urban workers (Dixon, 1981? Walder, 1986? 
Wong and MacQuarrie, 1986? Shen, 1986). Furthermore, enterprises 
are responsible for funding the programme. Life-long employment in 
one work unit means there is no job mobility or a free labour 
market. Despite these divergencies, the structural model appears to 
have prima facie relevance for China. It is interesting to examine 
the extent to which the Chinese welfare system approximates this 
paradigm.
From the cutset, it has been said that this study is a case 
study of a welfare ministry. However, the discussion of welfare 
state, welfare models and theories of development is at the system 
level. What are the justifications?
There are two good reasons for looking at macro phenomena.
First of all, societal forces shape the environment and provide the 
contextual framework for the development of parts. Furthermore, the 
boundary between components is never clear cut. Nor can one 
demarcate micro, middle level and macro phenomenmena neatly. The
fusion and mutual influence between institutions means that it is 
not possible to analyse a segment in isolation from the whole. From 
what is known about the situation in China, welfare policy for 
marginal groups is affected by the way in which welfare for the 
majority is designed. The allocation of responsibility, be it by 
certain government ministries, work units or neighbourhoods, is 
ultimately a societal decision. The resources devoted to different
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kinds of programmes also have to come out of the total resource 
pool. Because of these reasons, a macro perspective is justified.
An analytical framework less bedevilled by the shortcomings of 
the welfare state concept is the welfare mix approach (Rose, 1986). 
As its name implies, welfare is the product of a mixture of social 
arrangements. In any society, there are four ways of providing a 
given service, depending on whether or not the service is monetized 
at the point of production, and whether it is sold at the point of 
consumption. These are: the market (where both production and
consumption of services are monetized), the state (production 
monetized but consumption an a non-market basis), the household 
(neither production or consumption is monetized) and barter (a 
market exchange without money). Of the four, barter is of marginal 
importance in a modem economy. Thus total welfare in society (TWS) 
can be depicted by the following equation:
T W S = H + M + S  
in which H equals the household production of welfare, M equals 
welfare bought and sold in the market, and S equals welfare 
produced by the state. The welfare mix of a given society is 
characterised by the proportion of goods and services produced by 
each supplier. Furthermore, each sector is inherently replaceable 
by another source of supply. Thus a dominant state role does not 
imply that state monopoly is inevitable, neither does a mixed 
economy of welfare lead to a diminution of welfare goods produced. 
Indeed, Rose believes that total welfare in society is likely to be 
greater if there are multiple rather than single producers although 
the distribution of welfare is likely to be different. The question 
of what is the best approach is ultimately a matter of political
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choice. For example, the state can assume responsibility for 
universalist services in income maintenance, health care and 
education (as in Britain, France, and Scandinavia). Alternately, 
fiscal restraints can activate calls for privatisation (as by the 
Thatcher and Reagan administrations) and greater use of the 
voluntary sector (Wolfendon Committee, 1977? Hadley and Hatch, 
1981). More elastic in the production and consumption of welfare is 
the household in response to such adversities as unemployment, 
decreased income and the curtailment of state provisions. The means 
available to the household include caring for disabled members, 
resorting to do-it-yourself services or mutual aid between 
households and neighbours. Exercising significant influence are 
cultural values in society. For example both Japan and China extoll 
family values. In these societies, the state takes a back seat in 
providing personal social services (Maruo, 1986? Pinker, 1986? 
Yang, 1957? Yuan Fang, 1988). One can argue that one form of 
provision may be morally superior or more efficient than other 
approaches. Nevertheless, the notion of a plurality of forces
shaped by cultural and practical circumstances is a useful idea 
because it takes greater account of social and economic realities.
There are a number of objections to Rose’s model. First, the 
three sectors do not have the same capabilities. Second, to regard 
production sources as basically substitutable ignores the
possibility that the product may be different in quality or have
important consequences on the producer. For example, home care of a 
handicapped member is not the same as rehabilitation treatment in a 
professional agency. When families are asked to take on too many 
burdens in social care, they face the risk of breakdown. Hence
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equality of supply cannot be assumed under all circumstances. Most 
importantly, in command economies with limited markets, the 
ingredients of the mix may not be appropriate.
This last point leads us to examine further the special 
features of a socialist state. Furtak considers the following 
criteria as determining the socialist character of a state: the 
possession of the monopoly of power by a political party which 
adheres to Marxism-Leninism and claims to be building socialism 
and/or communism; the elevation of Marxism-Leninism to the 
exclusive ideology of state and society; the predominance of public 
ownership of the means of production, and the centralized planning 
of the economy (Furtak, 1986). The first two conditions guarantee 
and legitimize the party and the state. As for the economy, the 
place of the market is eclipsed by central planning, if not ruled 
out altogether. Seen in this way, Yugoslavia was rather unique in 
its lack of central, directive planning and its experiment with 
'’market socialism". Even there, the socialist component was 
dominant. By the 1970s many East European states had tried out 
reforms to improve economic incentives through the incorporation of 
limited market mechanisms. Hungary in 1968 introduced 
liberalization of prices, profit as a success indicator, the 
principle of self-financing of enterprises, encouragement of 
private initiatives and decentralization of decision-making 
(Knight, 1983). In China, economic reforms started in the 
countryside in 1978; by 1984 they had spread to urban areas. The 
Chinese reforms, modelled very much on those of Hungary, went even 
further in admitting a role for the market (Knight, ibid). Recent 
publications have pointed towards some of the changes in people's
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livelihood, pcwer relations and welfare practices after the onset 
of the reforms (Croll, 1987? Feuchtwang and Hussain, 1988? Vogel 
and Davis, 1990? Goodman and Segal, 1991). As was said in the 
beginning, the interface between economic and social policies is an 
important concern of this study. A related issue is whether or not 
the development of more competitive markets in China will result in 
social chaos. The impact of these changes on the coherence of 
China's welfare system will be looked at in depth.
Conclusion
The themes so far developed need to be drawn into a close.
First, concepts in Western social policy tend to reflect values 
rooted in its own traditions and social system. To be meaningful in 
cross-system comparisons, concepts should be relatively free of 
such biases. This means that the analytical framework adopted 
should take sufficient note of the socialist and traditional 
character of China.
Second, countries differ significantly in cultural vales, 
institutions and practices. These are an important source of 
influence quite independent of common ideologies and social 
structure. Thus socialist countries may also differ in their 
welfare arrangements on account of their different cultures. In the 
Chinese case, the vagaries of continuity and change in the culture 
of welfare has to be taken into account.
Third, the welfare mix approach seems to yield a reasonable 
framework of analysis. However, the ingredients of the mix should
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derive from both system and cultural imperatives. Hence, in place 
of Rose's original trinity, the state/collective/household 
framework will be adopted. In the Chinese context, the collective 
refers essentially to the unit of production, which also performs 
political and social functions for the state. Meanwhile, the family 
will be the defining component of the household dimension. Ihe 
introduction of market reforms and their impact on the other three 
sectors will be kept under review.
Fourth, it is proposed that the Chinese welfare mix is affected 
by sectoral changes which result in a redefinition of roles to 
maintain an overall equilibrium. Ihe influence of possible
determinants of welfare, identified through the literature review, 
will be examined in the light of the current analytical framework.
Ihis chapter has set out the theoretical problems for the 
present study. In the second chapter, I shall clarify the
substantive issues and propositions derived from the use of this 
analytical framework to examine the welfare role of the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs. The methods used in conducting this study are 
detailed in Appendix 1.
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CHAPTER TWO
A WFTFARK MDHSTKY IN THE MAKING
The Ministry of Civil Affairs or Minzhencr Bu was set up in 1978 
(Minzhencfou Dashiii. 1988, p. 292, hereafter Dashii i: Zhoncrouo
Minzhena Cidian. 1990, p.8, hereafter ZGMZCD). Prior to this year, 
civil affairs work came under the Ministry of Internal Affairs or 
Neiwu Bu (1949-69). Since their inception, civil affairs
departments have defined their mission as "sharing the burden of 
the state and solving the problems of the masses" (Civil Affairs 
Work in China. 1986. p.4). However, despite their responsibility 
for a host of political and administrative programmes, both 
ministries' most prominent function was and is social welfare. It 
is the contention of this thesis that examining the evolution of 
the Ministry's welfare work unravels the dynamics of welfare
development in China. In turn, the forces that contribute to 
determining China's welfare mix spring from society's basic
structures and their transformation.
The present chapter hopes to achieve five things. First, it 
locates the welfare contribution of civil affairs departments in 
the context of societal arrangements to protect the welfare of 
Chinese citizens. Second, it identifies the whole range of their 
duties, emphasizing service nature and targets. Third, it surveys 
the development of welfare programmes from 1949-78, which gives the 
historical backdrop to a focussed study of the current period. 
Then, it reviews the civil affairs approach to welfare. It is 
suggested that this represents a case of welfare residual ism as a
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result of the interaction between a number of factors. Finally, the 
lines of enquiry guiding the rest of the thesis are drawn. A number 
of propositions relevant to explaining the determinants of welfare 
in China are set out.
The first Civil Affairs Ministry in China was set up in 1906, 
in the twilight years of the Qing Dynasty. This Ministry had 
extensive responsibilities. Its duties ranged from police, public 
security, registration of households, land administration, roads, 
hospitals, to sanitation, public health and welfare (Minzherer 
Goncrzuo Gailun, 1987, p. 2, hereafter Gailun; Zhoncrouo Minzhencr 
Shicrao. 1986, pp. 44-45, hereafter Shigao). The birth of the Chinese 
Republic saw the Qing agency replaced by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs in 1912, later renamed Ministry of Heme Affairs, Neizheng 
Bu (1918) after the practice of Western governments. This new 
organ had even broader jurisdiction. Its remit included: local 
government, elections, relief, rehabilitation and charities, 
household registration, land administration, police, conscription, 
registration of societies, health and the supervision of local
officials (Shigao. 1986, pp.4-5). In 1940, a Ministry of Social
Affairs was created to take charge of war relief and social welfare 
(China Handbook 1937-1945).
Before the communists achieved final victory, they had set up 
civil affairs agencies in occupied areas. These came under the 
aegies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This practice was 
perpetuated after 1949. Internal Affairs was one of the first 
ministries established under the Government Administration Council, 
later renamed the State Council. Belcw the central (ministry)
level, civil affairs agencies were established in each
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administrative region, province, city and county. Hie official 
designations are minzhencr tincr (for provincial civil affairs 
department), minzhencr iu (city and county bureau) and minzhencr ke 
(city district sub-bureau) (Gaicre Kaifancr Zhoncr De Zhongquo Shehui 
Fuli - Guancdoncrshencr Zhuanii. 1989, p.13, hereafter GDSZJ). To 
simplify the terminologies, the Ministry of Civil Affairs will 
henceforth be called the MCA and its predecessor the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, the MIA. CADs or civil affairs departments 
(minzhencr bumen) will be used as a collective term for all agencies 
fulfiling civil affairs functions and especially to refer to 
agencies belcw the central government level.
Social Welfare and Civil Affairs
The available literature suggests that social welfare in China 
operates under the tension of the relationship between a broad and 
a narrow definition. Hie narrow conception is represented by the 
welfare work of civil affairs departments while the broad view sees 
it as the sum total of arrangements to meet human needs in the 
material and spiritual domains. Under the latter notion, social 
welfare does not only mean help to vulnerable groups but also 
protection for all citizens - through allocation of work, 
distribution of income, measures to equalize life chances and 
consumption and spiritual betterment (Wong, 1986, p.84). To realize 
such broad aims, responsibility is diffused. CADs and many 
institutions contribute to their fulfillment.
Reflecting a broad perspective are the multiple welfare rights 
codified in China's Constitution, Marriage Law and Inheritance Law. 
In the 1982 Constitution, there are provisions for the right as
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well as the duty to work (Article 42), the right to rest (Article
43), the right to retirement (Article 44), and most embracing of
all, the right to welfare support:
"Citizens of the FRC have the right to material assistance from 
the state and society when they are old, ill or disabled. The 
state develops the social insurance, social relief and medical 
and health services that are required to enable citizens to 
enjoy this right. The state and society help make arrangements 
for the work, livelihood and education of the blind, deaf-mute
and other handicapped persons." (Article 45)
The Constitution also prescribes equal rights for women
(Article 48). Article 49 stipulates the obligation of family
support. This inposes duty on parents to support dependent children 
and grown-up children to support needy parents. Equally, protection
of women, old people and children from abuse are also codified.
The duty of family support is further enshrined in other 
statutes. The Marriage Law (1980) extends reciprocal rights and 
duties to support to grandparents and grandchildren who have the 
ability to do so (Article 22). Meanwhile, the Inheritance Law 
(1985) guarantees the rights of citizens to dispose of personal 
property and heirs to inherit. Notwithstanding such rights, a share 
of the estate should be set aside to maintain dependents who cannot
work and are without income (Article 19) (Palmer, 1988). In extreme
cases, failure to support is punishable by imprisonment.
Rights can only be real if they can be translated into 
practice. In Chinese society, as in other mixed economies of 
welfare, many agencies and units are involved. Figure 1 gives a 
conceptual depiction of the Chinese welfare mix.
In the Chinese welfare system, there are three essential 
ingredients - the family, the collective and the state, the system 
operating in a layered nexus (Wong, 1986, p.85). As most 
individuals live in families, this institution is the core unit
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Figure 1 The Chinese Welfare Mix
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from which citizens obtain their nurturance and support. 
Historically, as later discussions will shew, social welfare in 
China meant family welfare. Even after 1949, the importance of the 
family as a unit of social consumption did not diminish, despite 
communist attack on excessive family loyalty. Admittedly, the 
resources within the family are limited as well as exclusive to its 
members. For these reasons, public arrangements are necessary. In 
welfare matters, the part played by collectives is paramount. For 
city dwellers, the collective means the work unit (Whyte and 
Parish, 1984 ? Walder, 1986).
In the countryside, the collective is the commune where 
peasants work and live (Parish and Whyte, 1978? Croll, 1987; Shue,
1988). When welfare entitlements of urban and rural residents are 
compared, it is found that the former are winners. Urbanites are 
guaranteed jobs with life tenure. Workers in state-ewned units and 
big collective-owned enterprises are covered by comprehensive 
labour Insurance (see Appendix 2). Additionally, better-endowed 
enterprises provide amenities like housing, creches, canteens, 
clinics and the like to their employees (Danadai Zhonaouo De 
Zhiaona Fuli He Shehui Baoxian. 1987, hereafter Danadai). These 
perks are not available to peasants, who make up 73.77 percent of 
the population in 1990 (HR, 17-23 June, p. 30). For them, 
subsistence was guaranteed by an egalitarian grain distribution 
system. There are also minimal support schemes financed by the 
ccanmune welfare fund (Davis-Friedmann, 1978? Croll, 1987? Hussain 
and Feuchtwang, 1988). Rural decollectivization since 1983 has 
eroded even these meagre guarantees. Nevertheless, the locality 
retained the duty to relieve its needy residents and state aid
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was supplementary. In cities too, urban neighbourhoods play a 
supplementary role in helping residents without family or 
occupational support (Chew and Woo, 1986). In recent years, 
community social services have proliferated in quantity and scope 
in recent years. Finally, state welfare is dispensed through civil 
affairs departments. With the exception of designated grants for 
social and disaster relief allocated by central government, CADs 
are funded by their respective tier of administration. This 
residual layer represents the last life line for citizens who have 
exhausted all means of getting help. By and large, it is 
special-need groups who become recipients of state aid, such as 
natural disaster victims, disabled soldiers, veterans and their 
dependents, and hardship households (Dixon, 1981? Wong, 1986). At 
the intersection between the second and third tiers, some overlap 
exists. Specifically, neighbourhood social programmes come under 
the oversight of CADs although direct funding is mostly local. This 
growing zone obfuscates the boundary between statutory and 
non-statutory care.
Civil Affairs .Turisdiction
To people outside China, the term civil affairs is amorphous in the 
extreme. Mao Zedong called civil affairs ''work involving the 
people" (Gailun. 1987, p.2; Minzhenq Goncrzuo Shouce. 1982, pp. 1-2, 
hereafter Shouce). In a similar vein, Marshall Zhu De hailed CADs 
as "the organization department of the masses" (ibid). Still, its 
meaning is no clearer unless one examines what actually goes on 
under its rubric.
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In terms of functions, CADs carry out a wide spectrum of 
activities. To a significant extent, their motley duties suggest an 
undifferentiated hybrid agency in charge of heme affairs. In 1983, 
the State Council identified eleven tasks for the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs. Hiese are: (1) construction of grassroots pcwer organs; (2) 
preferential treatment; (3) resettlement of ex-soldiers and retired 
army cadres; (4) rural disaster relief; (5) social relief; (6) 
urban social welfare; (7) administrative division; (8) supervision 
of marriage registration, funeral reform and societies 
registration; (9) monitoring and controlling the use of civil 
affairs funds; (10) directing development and training of cadres in 
the civil affairs system, and (11) directing the work of the China 
Association for the Blind and Mite (Minzhencr Goncrzuo Weniian 
Huibian. 1984, Vol.l, pp.79-80, hereafter Huibian).
In the same year, the Eighth National Conference on Civil 
Affairs clarified the ministry's organizational mission (Huibian. 
1984, Vol.l, pp.3-17; Dashiii. 1988, pp.581-94):
"In the wake of this epoch, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has 
to carry out the duty to build grassroots pcwer organs, 
resettle demobilised military personnel, administer 
preferential care for veterans and their dependants, provide 
relief for disaster victims, the poor and social welfare 
services, take care of division of administrative areas, 
reforms in funeral and interment and marriage registration. 
Among these tasks, some contribute to the work of government 
construction, some contribute to social security and some 
contribute to civil administration and management." (emphasis 
added)
The above conceptualization is very important. It is the first 
time that the central purposes of the ministry have been 
identified. Under the new designation, the ministry's tasks come 
under "sange vibufen". three partial ccmponents. This means that
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along with other state and nonstate bodies, it contributes to three 
kinds of national effort. The correlation between purpose and tasks 
becomes clearer when the two are juxtaposed.
Figure 2 MCA Tasks and Their Primary Pn-rpo^
Nature Tasks
(as in "Major Duties 
and Tasks of MCA, 1983)
Construction of grassroots power
organs 1
Social Security 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11
Civil administration and
management 7, 8
Organizational support work 9, 10
1. Construction of Grassroots Power Organs
CAD work in this area is confined to the grassroots level. In this 
zone is located both the lowest tier of government as well as mass 
self-governing structures below it. The first refers to village or 
township governments in rural areas and city districts (or small 
cities undivided into municipal districts) in urban areas. Between 
1949-1954, 210,000 village governments were set up (Civil Affairs
Work in China. 1986, p.3). However, these were absorbed into 
communes, which by 1958, were ubiquitous in all rural areas.
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Communes combined both economic and government functions. For 
twenty-five years, they were responsible for all facets of rural 
administration until their abolition in 1983. Replacing them were 
zhen (tcwn) and xiancr (administrative village) governments. To 
assist administration, villagers' committees were formed. These are 
rural equivalents of residents' committees found in city areas 
since 1954. Both rural and urban structures are given
responsibility for self-government, self-education and 
self-catering (Gailun. 1987, pp.43-46). As they were linked to the 
public security and household registration agencies within the 
area, they also played a surveillance role vis-a^vis fellow
residents (Dixon, 1981, p. 172).
The MCA has four specific tasks in relation to grassroots 
administration (Gailun. 1987, pp.46-49). First of all, it keeps 
watch over the operation of grassroots polity and reports problems 
to senior party and government echelons. Second, it sums up 
experience and promotes the exchange of views and good practice. 
The third task is to amend and propose needed regulations and 
guidelines for more effective functioning. Finally, the MCA 
supervises the work of organizing and strengthening villagers' and 
residents' committees. In balance, it is the last task that has 
most salience to welfare as community care became more important 
during the reform decade.
2. Civil Administration and Management
The CAD's role in this respect is more straightforward. The primary 
tasks are marriage registration, funeral reform, and division of 
administrative areas.
- 57 -
According to the 1981 Marriage Law and Marriage Registration 
Regulations, citizens wishing to marry, divorce or resume 
husband-and-wife relations with former spouses must file their 
application with the relevant marriage registration office. In 
rural areas, this means the village or township government, and in 
cities, the neighbourhood office. CADs are responsible for 
inspecting and directing the work of these offices. Civil affairs 
cadres also conduct ideological education - to teach socialist 
ethics concerning love, marriage and family life and the need for 
birth planning. Such indoctrination contributes to the fostering of 
spiritual civilization, that, together with material civilization, 
are considered the twin pillars of socialist culture (Gailun. 1987, 
p.299).
Regarding funeral reform, the ministry sets out to change old 
customs and promote new practices. It denounces the traditional 
preference for lavish funerals and earth burials. In their stead, 
CADs advocate frugal ceremonies and cremations.
The work of societies registration began in the 1950s. Welfare 
bodies, art and literary societies, academic research centres, 
religious and mass organizations were required to register with the 
MIA. This work did not appear to be an important activity and 
lapsed during the 1960s and 1970s. Registration drives were stepped 
up in 1988 when a special division was set up in the MCA (ZGMZCD, 
1990, p.392).
MCA work in territorial administration takes three forms 
(Gailun. 1987, pp. 66-67). The first is the logistical work of 
drawing up administrative boundaries and choosing place names. The 
second task is to mediate in territorial boundary disputes. During
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the reform decade, such work became more important as the value of 
land increased. Finally, the MCA facilitates the formation of 
towns. In this, it counsells provincial governments by studying the 
needs, location and establishment structure of new towns. One 
purpose of township formation is to satisfy the rising material and 
cultural needs of the rural masses. More significantly, towns 
relieve the pressures for peasant influx into cities by localizing 
industries. Indeed, township development has become a vital part of 
the country's economic strategy (Fei, 1986). MCA contribution in 
this area strengthens its work in building administrative and 
resource infrastructures for social development.
3. Social Security
By far the most important role of the CADs is directed at social 
security. An authoritative definition of social security comes from 
lu Mouhua, a senior Ministry official in charge of cadre training:
"Socialist social security in our country generally means 
measures to protect and actively enhance security in the 
material and spiritual life of the people by the state and 
society. Social security, when manifested in the form of 
compensation for various losses and risks is social insurance; 
when manifested in compensation for physical handicaps, 
overcoming and prevention of hardships, and raising the quality 
of life is social welfare; when manifested in nan-ccmpensatory 
assistance in relation to natural disasters and poverty is 
social relief. In the main, social security is the total system 
of comprehensive protection of life for all members of society 
under socialism. Social insurance, social welfare and social 
relief are the instruments of its implementation or concrete 
forms. They are indispensable parts of the social security 
system." (Lu, 1986, p.90) (emphases added)
This view subsumes social welfare and social relief under the 
broad goal of social security and is representative of government 
thinking as a whole (SHBZB, 15 May 1986, 1 April 1988; Seventh Five
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Year Plan for Eooroaic and Social Development). In the West, the 
equivalent concept would be social welfare. There, social security 
is ccmmonly identified as an inccme-maintenance programme while 
social welfare refers to social services in kind and in cash (Kahn, 
1979; Wilson and Wilson, 1991, pp. 3-34). Despite semantic
differences, MCA programmes oriented to social security, according 
to their cwn definition, serve similar purposes as Western concepts 
of welfare. The common goals are to enhance the well-being of 
citizens, meet needs of vulnerable groups and satisfy society*s 
needs for integration and security.
For the purpose of this study, four schemes operated by CADs 
fall under the scope of welfare. These are preferential treatment, 
resettlement of demobilized personnel, social welfare, and social 
and disaster relief. I shall dwell on these very briefly since they 
will be given fuller treatment in subsequent chapters.
(1) Preferential Treatment
The preferential treatment programme covers five categories of 
people. These are (i) dependents of serving army personnel? (ii) 
dependents of martyrs and deceased soldiers; (iii) disabled 
soldiers and government workers? (iv) demobilized army personnel; 
and (v) retired veterans and army cadres.
Preferential treatment or voufu ooncrzuo originated in the 1930s 
(Gailun. 1987, pp. 68-9). At that time the communist army was based 
on farmer-finters who handled the dual tasks of production and war 
in tandem. When the Red Army were away in ccmbat, the livelihood of 
their dependents became a problem. The solution then was to 
mobilize the masses to give help - in tilling and giving aid in
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kind (Gailun. 1987, pp. 69-70; Minzhencr He Shehui Baozhancr Wenxuan. 
1985, pp. 343-44, hereafter Wenxuan). This tradition of mass 
compensation for national service was preserved after 1949. Not 
only did it serve a welfare purpose but also guaranteed a steady 
supply of military recruits.
In the commune period, the major means of mass aid took the 
form of awarding work points to soldiers' dependents. Assistance in 
kind and cash was also given (Dixon, 1981, pp. 348-49). From the 
government, there were one-off death grants, disability pensions, 
institutional treatment and convalescent facilities. The statutory 
programmes have continued. However, since the reforms began, 
collective or mass aid has taken the new form of cash grants. This 
new practice is more congruent with a rural economy run on a cash 
nexus (Gailun. 1987, p.80? Wgnxuan. 1985, p.340).
(2) Resettlement of demobilized personnel
In line with the country's rigid household registration policy 
which restricts residential mobility, demobilised personnel are 
resettled back in their heme communities (Cidian. 1987, p. 112). 
Upon discharge, rural recruits are given a small gratuity, food 
allowance, and travel expenses (Dixon, 1981, p. 354) to make their 
way back to their villages. The majority return to farm work while 
same became village cadres or join rural enterprises. In rural 
resettlement, the role of CADs is facilitative; direct placements 
are found by local governments and collectives.
Urban residency status ensures that recruits from cities return 
there to await job allocation (Gailun. 1987, p. 113). Different 
treatment is accorded to various groups. Those who had work return
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to their former work units as far as possible, or are placed in 
other units. Former students or hitherto unemployed youths are 
allocated jobs by labour bureaux, which apportion all intake quota 
among various trades and government organs. In assigning work, the 
policy has been to favour those with earned merit. This means that 
decorated heroes enjoy first placement rights according to their 
expressed preference (Gailun. 1987, p. 114).
(3) Relief
Relief work of the Ministry is divided into disaster relief and 
social relief. Together these two categories took up over 40 
percent of the civil affairs budget during 1981-85.1
Each year about 100 million people are affected by natural 
disasters, e.g. floods, droughts, locusts, frost etc. which cause 
serious damage to lives and property (Gailun. 1987, p. 145). The 
ministry is not the only body to fight and relieve disasters; mass 
mobilisation involving state organs at all levels, the masses and 
the army is the practice during major calamities. Yet, on-going 
responsibility for disaster relief rests with the MCA.
Four specific tasks are involved in disaster relief work. The 
first one is assessment. Immediately after a calamity is reported, 
local CAD officials make on-the-spot investigations regarding the 
size, nature and extent of the damage, assess the abilities of 
local communities for mutual help and estimate the nature and 
volume of aid needed. Then there is the job of actual, dispensation.
1 In the Sixth Five Year Plan period (1981-85), total state 
spending on civil affairs amounted to 11.4 billion yuan. 
Expenditure on disaster relief was 31 percent. 26 percent was spent 
on social welfare services, including relief of the indigent in 
city areas. See Civil Affairs Work in China. 1986, p. 19.
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Hie policy is to confine the grant to the worst affected areas and 
victims. Hie third task is to review relief policies and their 
implementation so that suggestions for improvement can be made to 
party and state organs at a higher level (Gailun. 1987. pp. 161-62).
Social relief is directed at the alleviation of hardship 
connected with poverty. Three components are involved: rural
relief, urban relief and self-regeneration through work (shengcan 
ziggu) projects.
Hie "five-guarantee” scheme is the cornerstone of the rural 
relief programme. Originally, the "five guarantees" consisted of 
food, fuel, clothing, education and burial (Gailun. 1987, p. 170; 
Cidian. 1987, p. 157). In time, the contents have been upgraded. 
Beneficiaries are confined to the elderly, disabled and young 
orphans who have no family support, work ability or means of 
livelihood. This scheme is funded and administered by the locality. 
In addition, the local collective also dispenses temporary relief 
to hardship households. In the mean time, the CAD role is one of 
monitoring and direction. State relief is restricted to areas of 
chronic deficit.
In the cities, three groups of residents are eligible for state 
relief. Hie first group consists of "three-no" targets (no family 
support, no work ability and no means of livelihood) (Cidian. 1987. 
pp. 168-69). A second group are poverty-stricken households e.g. 
families with a large number of dependents, irregular income or no 
employment. Finally, aged and frail workers laid off during the 
austerity drive between 1961-65, who have reached retirement age 
and are unemployed are given monthly relief equal to 40 percent of 
their former basic wage. Yet another category became eligible after
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1978 (Shguce, 1982, pp.417-9; Gailun. 1987, p. 178). This comprises 
rehabilitated political deviants, discharged criminals, and 
rusticated youths who returned from the countryside, and other "bad 
elements". Among these, only the "three-nos" and designatd 
redundant workers are eligible for regular relief from their local 
CADs.
Self-regeneration through productive work involves helping 
natural disaster victims and poor households to overcome their 
dificulties and regain self-sufficiency through engaging in 
production (Gailun. 1987, p. 185). The work of CADs includes 
educating the masses on self-reliance, running pilot projects and 
promoting sideline production or self-employment. Such work has 
been upgraded into a fuller programme of giving development aid to 
the poor. Under the fupin initiative, CADs not only give loans but 
coordinate other state agencies to provide material and technical 
support to start entrepreneurial activities (Gailun. 1987, p. 208).
(4) Social Welfare
Social welfare services were traditionally confined to people with 
"three-no" status. The services ccme in three forms: social welfare 
institutions, social welfare production enterprises, and urban 
community services.
CADs run three types of social welfare institutions (In, 1986, 
pp. 81-83). The first type are social welfare hemes (shehui
fulivuan), which serve a mixed clientele - mostly old people, also 
seme disabled and orphans. The second type (ertoncr fulivuan) are 
facilities for orphans and abandoned children, most of whom are 
handicapped. Finally, there are mental hospitals for former
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soldiers and "three-no” cases. In recent years, under pressure to 
open up access to other groups, CAD-run institutions have admitted 
self-financed residents and offered day treatments on a fee for 
service basis (Dashiii. 1988, p.757).
Social welfare production enterprises provide employment for 
the severely disabled who have same ability for work but cannot 
cope with open employment. The state grants income tax relief to 
factories where at least 35 percent of the operational staff are 
disabled persons (Shguce, 1982, p.458-59). Both CADs and local 
collectives (neighbourhoods, villages and enterprises) operate 
welfare work schemes for the disabled.
Beyond the scope of welfare institutions and factories, local 
communities are increasingly involved in running social services 
for residents. A wide array of services are provided, ranging from 
group hemes, day care, domiciliary support and household help.
The final welfare programme is relief for vagrants. 
Multi-purpose centres called reception and dispatch stations 
provide relief, re-education, deviants-clearance and repatriation 
services. Those without homes and who repeatedly return to cities 
to beg are put to work in settlement farms (Gailun. 1987, p. 275? 
Shouce. 1982, pp.476-77).
Historical Review of Civil Affairs Welfare. 1949-1978 
Official periodisation runs into five phases (Gailun. 1987, 
pp. 8-9). In each of these periods, I shall comment briefly on the 
political and economic exigencies and identify major developments 
under civil affairs.
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(1) Immediate post-revolution phase (1949-52)
In this stage, the mammoth task of nation building was complicated 
by the profound destruction that followed the Sino-Japanese 
conflict (1938-1945) and the Civil War (1946-1949). Hence national 
priorities were post-war reconstruction, government building, 
re-imposing social order, undertaking land reform and reviving the 
national economy. CADs were involved in many of these activities. 
The First National Civil Affairs Conference held in 1950 laid down 
the following duties for CADs (Gailun. 1987, p.8): the formation of 
democratic government, preferential treatment, resettlement of 
demobilized personnel, social relief, productive work relief, 
hardship subsidy, land administration, household registration, 
nationality, division of administrative areas, territorial boundary 
mediation, registration of societies, marriage registration, 
mobilisation of civilian workers (in public works projects), 
resettlement and migration, rehabilitation of vagrants, and 
reconstruction of old base areas where the early communist 
guerillas operated. In addition, CADs had oversight of religious 
and overseas Chinese affairs.
In this period, CAD relief work was epitomized by the following 
slogan - "achieve self-regeneration through productive work, 
overcame the hardships by thrift, practise mutual aid among the 
masses, substitute work for handouts, and to supplement by 
necessary relief." In terms of actual achievements, CADs recorded 
the following (Gailun. 1987, pp. 165-66):
repatriation of 1.2 million dispersed persons from eight cities 
back to their home villages? 
providing relief for 1.21 million urban residents;
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receiving 110,000 orphans, disabled and destitue elderly; 
rehabilitating and resettling 240,000 vagrants; also 
prostitutes, drug addicts (4 million), thieves and other 
bad elements.
A few observations on the work in this period are apposite. 
First, the bulk of the activities focused on rehabilitation, relief 
and political control. Besides welfare work, the MIA was quite 
prominent in setting up people's representative councils in local 
areas. Second, massive relief was judged undesirable as well as 
impossible because of paucity of resources. This meant that the 
emphasis was on self-reliance and not dependency. Third, missionary 
welfare work, which hitheto played an important role in the 
republican period was attacked and this paved the way for its 
abolition in 1953. Finally, the veteran programme received high 
priority. No less than five regulations relating to preferential 
treatment were announced in December 1950.1
(2) Socialist transformation phase (1952-1957)
This phase coincides broadly with the period under the First Five 
Year Plan (1953-57). In cities, nationalization of industries was 
followed by the organization of handicraft, trade and commerce into 
collective enterprises. By the end of 1956, 90 percent of
1 These are: Temporary Regulations on Commendation and Relief of
Martyred and Deceased Revolutionary Amy Personnel; Temporary 
Regulations on Preferential Treatment for Dependents of 
Revolutionary Martyrs and Revolutionary Amy Personnel; Temporary 
Regulations on Commendation and Relief of People's Militia and 
Civilian Workers; Temporary Regulations on Preferential Treatment 
and Relief of Disabled Revolutionary Amy Personnel; and Temporary 
Regulations on Commendation and Relief of Injured and Deceased 
Revolutionary Workers. See Gailun. 1987, p.71.
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handicraft workers, 99 percent of privately-owned industrial
enterprises and 85 percent of privately-cwned commercial 
enterprises were taken into the public sector. At the same time, 
collectivization of agriculture developed rapidly. By 1956, 96.3 
percent of peasant households had joined cooperatives (A Chronology 
of the ERC, 1986, p. 19, hereafter Chronology).
On the political front, a number of campaigns took place to 
consolidate communist dictatorship. First, there was the mounting 
of the "Five-Anti" and "Three-Anti" campaigns from 1952. The former 
was aimed at officials: to combat corruption, waste and
bureaucratic abuse of power. The latter was directed at
industrialists, merchants and the middle classes to eliminate 
bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, incorrect
fulfillment of government commissions, and the use of official 
economic information for private gain (Kraus, 1979, pp. 34, 66-67). 
A milestone was the adoption of the Constitution (1954)
(Chronology. 1986, p. 12). Then, there was the lynching of
intellectuals orchestrated through the short thaw to "let a hundred 
flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend", which 
quickly gave way to the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957) (Chronology. 
1986, p.21; Wong, 1979, pp.56-59). A party rectification campaign 
then followed.
These political onslaughts effectively eliminated actual and 
potential opposition to the regime. Thus by September 1956 the 
Eighth National Congress of the CCP concluded that the socialist 
system had in the main been established. The principal 
contradiction was no longer that between the working class and the
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bourgeoisie, but that between the rapidly growing economic cultural 
needs of the people and the ability to meet such needs. Following 
frcm this, the main task of the country was to concentrate on 
developing the social productive forces to meet the economic and 
cultural needs of the people (Chronology, 1986, p. 18).
In civil affairs work, this period was marked by an internal 
reorganization and the convening of two national conferences. In 
March 1953, the Ministry was restructured. This resulted in a 
re-shuffling of duties among old divisions and the creation of the 
Director of Relief and Director of Registration (Minzhencr Bu 
Dashiii, 1988, p.59, hereafter Dashiji). The second conference, 
held in October 1953, endorsed the continuation of the tasks laid 
down in 1950 (Dashiii. 1988, pp.67-68). However, at the next 
conference in November 1954, the MIA was severely attacked by 
Vice-Premier Chen Yi for wrongly aspiring to monopolise the work of 
government construction, thereby unsurping the authority of the 
party and superior government organs. The MIA party group was 
forced to conduct self-criticism. Thereafter this aspect of MIA 
work went into eclipse (Dashiii. 1988. pp.88-89).
In social welfare and relief, CADs continued to stress the 
principles of encouraging self reliance, mutual aid, thrift and 
minimal reliance on state aid. In 1953, the takeover of all former 
missionary welfare services was completed, forming the core of the 
ministry's institutional programme.1 The China Blind Persons 
Welfare Association was also set up in that year.
1 In 1953, CADs had taken over 451 charitable undertakings frcm 
overseas missionaries (247 frcm USA? 204 frcm UK, France, Italy and 
Spain). 198 of these were run by Protestant churches, 208 by 
Catholic organizations, see Shigao. 1986, p.300? also ZGMZCD. 1990, 
p. 329.
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Regarding self-regeneration through work projects, statistics 
frcm 52 cities recorded a total of 1,802 work units in 1954. A 
total number of 220,000 poor people were given employment (Gailun. 
1987, p.190? Shigao. 1987, p.294).
In urban relief, because of the nationalization and 
collectivization drives, new targets were included (old and frail 
hawkers, rickshaw pullers, religicus personnel and dependants of 
offenders and deviants undergoing rehabilitation) (Gailun. 1987, 
p. 166). Meanwhile re-education and dispatch work continued. By 
1956, CADs had rehabilitated 426,000 vagabonds and prostitutes and 
ran 90 settlement farms which gave work to 26,000 vagrants (Gailun. 
1987, p.282? Shigao, 1986, p.303).
In rural areas, after the conclusion of land reform peasants 
were mobilized to join cooperative schemes. One way of inducing 
participation and preparing for rural collectivisation was to 
ensure that the indigent receive support. Thus, the 1956 Model 
Charter for Advanced Agricultural Producers* Cooperative spelt out 
the importance of giving relief to members without families and 
ability to work. This laid the basis for the "five guarantees" 
(Gailun. 1987, p.170? ZGMZCD. 1990, pp.283-84).
Improving the veteran programmes became more pressing with the 
conclusion of the Korean War (October 1950-July 1953). In 1955, the 
government passed the Conscription Law and issued the Resolutions 
Regarding the Resettlement of Demobilized Military Personnel. The 
first transformed military service from volunteer service to 
compulsory conscription (Cidian. 1987, pp. 107-8). The latter laid 
dcwn concrete methods of resettlement and preferential treatment. 
The need for a more vigorous approach stemmed frcm the failure of
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earlier efforts. Same areas were amiss in placing veterans in jobs 
and giving help to the disabled. Mary enterprises refused to employ 
former soldiers, branding them as "lacking job skills”, "too fond 
of giving opinions" and "insubordinate" (Shouce. 1982, p.246). Such 
problems caused widespread grievances and were potential threats to 
the draft. The new law and resolutions represented a social policy 
response to ensure the success of conscription. Operating under 
clearer powers and responsibilities, resettlement work became more 
routinised and important. Included in the reform was the creation 
of a regular office under the CADs. This facilitated work execution 
and probably enhanced their political standing. One example of 
actual work done included 66 crippled revolutionary soldiers' 
schools, which provided accommodation, health care and vocational 
training (Shouce. 1982, pp.245-51). Between 1949-56, seme 260,000 
disabled veterans were helped, of whem 60,000 graduated to become 
workers and 4,000 entered institutions of higher learning (Dixon, 
1981, p. 346). Furthermore, CADs ran seven institutions which 
restored limbs for disabled veterans. These later developed into 
artificial limb factories (ibid).
(3) Socialist Construction Phase (1957-1965)
Successful conclusions to the Anti-Rightist and party rectification 
campaigns allowed the government to devote full attention to 
economic development. The principal targets of the First Five Year
t
Plan were fulfilled one year ahead of time. During 1953-56, the 
government recorded an average annual increase of 19.6 percent in 
the value of industrial output and 4.8 percent for agriculture 
(Chronology. 1986, p. 19). Such successes prompted Mao to hasten the
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drive in cxsnraunization and launched the Great Leap Forward (GLF) in 
1958. The GIF called for hyper-speed development in all sectors of 
the eooncsny to catch up with the West in a few years. Euphoria was 
short-lived however. By the following year, the signs of failure, 
industrial stagnation and decreased agricultural output, were 
apparent. To compound the policy blunders were natural disasters in 
three consecutive years - severe droughts and flooding which 
resulted in an estimated death toll of 15-30 million (Ashton et. 
al, 1984; Riskin, 1987). 1960 also saw the tensions with the Soviet 
Union erupting in a full-scale split. Not surprisingly, production 
faltered. The average annual growth rate during 1958-62 was 0.9 
percent for agriculture, 0.6 percent for light industry and 5.7 
percent for heavy industry (as against 4.5 percent, 13.9 percent 
and 21.5 percent respectively during the First Plan period) 
(Bairault, 1988, p.29).
By 1961, the government was forced to carry out a programme of 
"adjustment, consolidation, filling out and improvement” 
(Chronology, p. 30). In agriculture, there was more decentralization 
in decision-making. There was also greater tolerance of household 
cultivation ("the peasant was returned to his village and the 
family to its hearth") (Dixon, 1981, p.203). Likewise, more 
realistic targets were set for industry. A brief spell of revival 
soon followed. In late 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai announced the 
government's intention to build a strong socialist economy with 
modem agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and 
technology. However, this plan was still-born as one year later, 
political clouds gathered and burst into the storm of the Cultural 
Revolution (CR).
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To guide the work of the CADs, three national conferences were 
held in this period. The Fourth Conference (1958) reflected the 
spirit of the times by advocating that politics should take command 
in all tasks. Cadres, the masses, veterans and all welfare 
recipients were enjoined to take full part in the GLF. What this 
meant in concrete terms was unclear. However, in the 1959 
conference, officials reported a slackening of CAD work (Cidian.
1987, p. 21). Particularly hard hit were preferential treatment and 
resettlement work. Disruption also resulted frcm the transfer, 
hence loss of, civil affairs cadres. At the same time, CADs lost 
their brief over territorial administration, household registration 
and migration.1 In the Sixth Conference (1960), there were 
renewed calls to strengthen all civil affairs work. Still, the 
policy of faithfully following the political line of the GLF 
prevailed. By 1961, economic chaos was such that further austerity 
was mandated. The MIA, like all state organs, followed the state 
policy of staff contraction, reducing its establishment from 561 
cadre posts to 417. Its cadre training school, set up only two 
years ago, was also closed down (Dashiii. 1988, p. 181).
Concerning resettlement work, the principle of returning 
demobilized personnel to their place of origin, "from whence you 
ccme, to whence you go" was formally enunciated in 1958 (Shigao. 
1986, 161; Gailun. 1987, p. 108). The same year also saw the passing
of two more sets of regulations to tighten supervision of 
demobilized soldiers and army officers (Gailun. 1987, p. 339). CADs
1 Responsibility for household registration was transferred to 
the Ministry of Public Security in 1956; migration, to the Ministry 
of Agriculture in 1958. Work concerning territorial administration 
and elections was transferred to the the Secretariat office under 
the State Council in 1960 but regained by MIA in 1961, see Dashiii.
1988, pp.730-31; see also Gailun. 1987, pp.8-9.
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were urged to pay closer attention to ideological work of helping 
veterans to re-enter civilian life. The significance of 
resettlement work was reflected by the number of veterans involved. 
By 1958, scone 4.8 million had been successfully demobilized 
(Gailun. 1987, p.102).
In 1960, the MIA called a discussion workshop on preferential 
treatment (Gailun. 1987, p.75). For the first time, there was the 
suggestion that such work should combine the efforts of both the 
state and the masses (rather than relying primarily on the latter). 
The work in rural areas should achieve three kinds of integration 
(san iiehe): integrating preferential treatment by the masses with
government subsidy, integrating political education with material 
benefits, and integrating the working methods of preferential 
treatment with the "five-guarantee” programme (Gailun. 1987, 
pp.75-76). By 1963, the MIA happily reported that many areas were 
able to achieve their objectives of "assessing case eligibility in 
spring, re-assessing it in summer, and paying out preferential aid 
in autumn" (Shigao, 1986, p. 162). In the communes, a yearly average 
of four billion work points were allocated to eligible peasants, 
including veterans and soldiers' families (ibid). Another 
improvement was recorded in 1965 when rural veterans sustaining 
Class 3 disability became eligible for long-term subsidy (in place 
of a one-time disability grant) (Cidian. 1987, pp. 74-75). This 
extension pacified a disgruntled group. It was also a step in the 
direction to improve the lot of former combatants.
In social welfare, two developments were important. The first 
was the clarification of the nature of CAD-run welfare production 
enterprises. These were to consist of four kinds (Shicrao. 1986,
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p. 298):
(i) protective type - units for the blind, deaf and mute;
(ii) service type - units producing tools, cultured, articles,
artificial linibs for the disabled, and crematories;
(iii) reform type - rehabilitation units for vagrants;
(iv) self-help type - work units for dependents of martyrs and
servicemen and poor households.
Along with this categorization was the loss of CAD jurisdiction 
over other types of work schemes. For example, workshops for the 
unemployed were transferred to neighbourhood agencies.
Hie second concerned institutional care. In 1958, the Fourth 
Conference proposed that CADs should set up mental hospitals for 
"three-no" targets. In 1959, most big cities had embarked on such a 
building programme. Seme provinces also started to operate
integrated social welfare institutions. By 1965, CADs ran a total 
of 819 hemes, including mixed institutions, children's homes and 
mental hospitals fShioao. 1986, p.301).
In social relief, the economic crisis dictated the need for new 
relief measures. Between 1961-65, many workers were laid off after 
the fiasco of the GLF. Those within this group who had special 
hardships were given a monthly relief. In rural areas, the 
rudiments of the "five guarantees" had been established in 1956. 
The National Programme of Agricultural Development promulgated this 
scheme explicitly:
"The agricultural cooperative, in treating those commune
members who have no work ability and who are widcwed, childless 
or are orphans, should ensure that they get appropriate support 
in their livelihood, to guarantee food, clothing, fuel, 
education and burial" (Gailun. 1987, p. 170).
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Apart from, categorical assistance, rural relief remained 
limited. Families who fell on hard times could apply for relief 
from the commune welfare fund. However, only temporary help was 
available. During the "three years of difficulties” (1959-61), a 
partial "de-ccmmunization" took place. Just as the GLF introduced 
mess halls, nurseries and old people's hemes overnight to socialize 
family functions, the period of readjustment saw these structures 
disappear all at once (Whyte and Parish, 1984). Family self-help 
was again emphasized. Government support was confined to subsides 
for veterans and disaster relief.
(4) The Cultural Revolution Period (1966-76)
The Cultural Revolution years are now called the "ten years of 
chaos", "the dark age" and "the lost decade". The causes for the CR 
and its long-term effects will probably be debated for years. 
However, the immediate impact is clear: intense political
struggles, interruption of production (especially in urban 
enterprises), and social upheavals (Yan and Gao, 1986). In the 
domain of public administration, the government apparatus became 
the prime target of attack by red guards, youths mobilized by Mao 
to seize power from the authorities and to build a new culture. By 
1968, the chaos was such that the control of state agencies at all 
levels had to be transferred to revolutionary committees formed by 
representatives from veteran cadres, the People's Liberation Army 
(FLA) and workers (Chronology. 1986, pp.45-46). Of immediate 
relevance welfare was the abolition of the MIA in 1969 (Dashiii, 
1988, p. 132), along with the Ministry of Labour (Dangdai, 1987, 
p. 418). The work of mass organizations like labour unions and the
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women's federation was also severely disrupted (Danadai. 1987, 
p.323).
The assault on the MIA reflected Maoist condemnation of 
"econamism", or the use of economic incentives in motivating 
workers (Dangdai, 1987, pp.91-3, 202-3? Dixon, 1981, p.120).
Although the brunt of the attack had been aimed at the Ministry of 
Labour and trade unions, welfare support of all kinds was denounced 
(Dixon, 1981, p. 121). To Maoist radicals, welfare was a form of 
bribery used by State Chairman Liu Shaoqi and "capitalist readers" 
to win the allegiance of workers. For its replacement, Maoists 
advocated self-reliance; even welfare for the indigent became 
politically suspect. However, apart from these general accusations, 
it was unclear whether there were any specific reasons for 
abolishing the MIA.
What happened after the MIA was demolished? There was no doubt 
that the effects have been disastrous. Fran the information 
available, most local CADs survived in this period. In many places, 
CADs were amalgamated with other departments (Wenxuan, 1985, 
pp. 602-3). However the be-heading of the central apparatus deprived 
the organisation of its leadership. In this period, policy 
directives or circulars appear to have dried up completely, apart 
from a few guidelines on veteran resettlement. There was also the 
loss of civil affairs posts and personnel, especially at the 
village or town level. Under such circumstances, local services 
were left to languish on their own. By 1972, the sorry state of 
affairs was causing enough concern for the State Council to convene 
a meeting to discuss what should be done about the work of the 
defunct MIA. The outcome amounted to a formal dismemberment
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(Gailun. 1987, p.76). The Ministry of Finance, vhich appeared to 
have swallcwed up the MIA in 1969, was given responsibility for the 
preferential treatment programme. Resettlement work went to the 
Labour Office under the State Planning Commission, with actual 
placements handled by provincial authorities. Disability assessment 
became the joint responsibility of the Ministry of Health and the 
FLA. Given such disarray, one can only surmise that the human costs 
must have been considerable.
All in all, research on this period is hampered by serious 
shortage of secondary data. Neither were CAD officials willing to 
talk about what happened during the CR when the subject was brought 
up. Such an information black cut makes the CR years the least 
understood phase of civil affairs history.
The MCA - the Case of Residual ism in Welfare
The history of civil affairs before 1978 tells the story of a 
fledgling organization. Steady developments took place between 
1949-1957 and after the GIF. During the CR years, local CADs were 
left to their own devises after the central ministry was disbanded. 
Tortuous and devious their fortunes may be, the CADs have survived 
with their welfare functions intact. It is no exaggeration to say 
that in their first thirty years, one can see a welfare bureaucracy 
in the making. What approach does civil affairs welfare and relief 
represent?
Civil affairs agencies maintained that they were serving up 
toone fifth of the nation every year. Taking 1984 as an example, 
the ccnposition of clients served by CADs is given in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Persons Served bv CADs and Agencies 
Under Their Supervision in 1984
Preferential Treatment and Resettlement
Dependants of martyrs & deceased veterans 
Disabled soldiers 
Dependants of serving soldiers 
Retired & demobilized military personnel
Urban Social Welfare
Residents in social welfare institutions 
Disabled people in welfare factories 
City residents under regular relief 
City residents receiving temporary relief 
Redundant workers on 40% pension
Rural Relief
•'Five-guarantee” recipients 
Residents in old people's heme 
Development aid for for rural poor 
Settlement farm workers
In addition, potential beneficiaries include
Victims of natural disasters (estimate) 100,000,000 (h)
Disabled persons 51,000,000 (i)
Note:
Hie figures do not include users of administrative services 
such as marriage and divorce registration.
Sources:
(a) Gailun. 1987, p.73.
(b) Wenxuan. 1985, p. 170.
(c) Gailun. 1987, p. 167.
(d) Wenxuan, 1985, p. 315.
(e) Wenxuan. 1985, p.373.
(f) Figures for 1985, see SHBZB 6 March 1986.
(g) Gailun. 1987, p.289.
(h) Estimate by MCA, see Summary of Proceedings of the Eighth 
National Conference on Civil Affairs.
(i) According to the 1987 national sample survey on the disabled,
an estimated 4.9 percent of the population (51 million) were
suffering from disability, see SHBZB. 11 December 1987.
3,000,000) 
840,000)(a) 
22,000,000) 
21,000,000)
70,000 (b)
197.000 (b)
230.000 (c) 
1,000,000 (c)
260.000 (d)
2.961.000 (d) 
210,000 (e)
3.300.000 (f) 
15,000 (g)
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When the above figures are examined in the light of services 
rendered, the MCA claims turn out to be inflated. Mast clients are 
not directly served by CADs. An even smaller number received help 
an a regular basis. After leaving cut users of administrative 
services (e.g. marriage registration, funerals) and temporary 
relief, only two categories made up its core targets. These were
(i) soldiers, veterans and their dependents; and (ii) marginal 
groups like the "three-nos". In CAD parlance, they were "the most 
adorable" (zui keai) and "the most pitiable" fzui kelian) (Minzhencr 
Goncrzuo de Tansuo. 1989, p. 24, hereafter Tansuo). Even for these 
residual groups, more help came from neighbourhoods and collectives 
than from the state.
Association with stigmatized groups most probably gave the CADs 
a tarnished image. CAD officials were sometimes derided as doing no 
more than "bai bai nian, pai pai aian" (paying New Year visits and 
doling out a little money). In other societies, the unemployed and 
the homeless suffer a loss of social esteem. In Chinese society 
where family and work status eire the benchmarks of social identity, 
deprived persons become virtual pariahs. Were it not for the 
veteran programmes, the perceived usefulness of CADs would be even 
snaller.
Cognizance should also be taken of factors which diminished 
programme effectiveness. The disaster relief programme was a good 
example. MIA records indicated that emergency grants did not always 
go to the most needy, according to policy. Widespread practices of 
embezzlement, indiscriminate relief and misuse of funds (ranging 
from diverting state grants to official entertainment, staff 
housing and bonuses) have been reported (Gailun. 1987, pp. 155-57?
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Huibian. 1984, Vol.2, pp.139-40, 147-50, 692-97; Dashiii. 1988,
pp.81-82). Of these infringements, the most serious was 
indiscriminate relief, vividly depicted as "drizzles” and
"spinkling with pepper". These practices stemmed from local cadres 
yielding to popular demand to distribute aid equally among 
neighhcurs, regardless of need. Not surprisingly, the amounts 
actually received by disaster victims were paltry and totally 
inadequate in alleviating hardship.
The meagreness of aid should be seen in the context of total 
state spending on civil affairs. According to the official history 
of the MCA (Dashiii. 1988, p.734), total expenditure on civil 
affairs between 1950 and 1978 was 13.9 billion yuan. Over the 
years, there was a slight but steady increase in funding, from 64 
million yuan in 1950 to 1,392 million yuan in 1978. In per capita 
terms, spending per head also went fron 0.31 yuan in 1952 to 1.45 
yuan in 1978. However, the total civil affairs bill remained
inconsequential in the national budget and its share was quite
constant throughout these years. Between 1950 and 1978, the average 
proportion of civil affairs spending was 1.6 percent of the state 
budget. Thus, the MIA remained a poor and humble bureaucracy in the 
government hierarchy.
Having reviewed the twisting saga of civil affairs in the first 
three decades, it is now time to examine hew comfortably the
analytical framework proposed in Chapter One lends itself to an 
interpretation of historical trends.
A number of strands stand out from the history of CADs before 
1978. First of all, the role of the party and state. Here one finds 
that CCP party ideology dictated the government effort. Before
- 81 -
1978, a total of six national conferences on civil affairs were 
convened for the purpose of clarifying MIA tasks and emphases. 
Significantly, all of these took place after CCP congresses or 
National Peoples* Congresses, which rubber-stamped CCP 
recommendations (Walker, 1981, p.53). The linear order of party, 
government and ministerial authority is also discernible in 
preambles to MIA documents which resolutely proclaim MIA's duty to 
follow the overall line of the party and the state. In fact, the 
MIA saw itself as a link between party, state and the masses, and 
an instrument to follow the nation*s work agenda at each phase of 
socialist construction.
Within the ministry, as in all ministries and commissions, the 
party group (by dangju) was the nerve centre for formulating and 
enforcing policy. Usually the Minister acted as the party group 
secretary and a few senior cadres made up its membership. Ihe MIA 
party core reported to the Party Central Committee which received 
and approved its recommendations and then issued policy directives. 
Thus decision-making was the monopoly of the party apparatus while 
the ministry carried out its resolutions. The fusion of party and 
state, in structure and in personnel, ensures the observation of 
the official will.
In the government as a whole, the MIA position was a meek one. 
Over the years, its jurisdiction has diminished in the light of 
growing functional specialization of government. For example, same 
of its political and administration duties were transferred 
elsewhere. More importantly, its marginality stemmed from the 
government's policy of decentralising welfare responsibility to 
other institutions in society. Of particular prominence were the
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work unit, urban neighbourhood and conmune, which serve as agencies 
for production, distribution and political control. Thus the CADs' 
humble part in welfare evolved by design and not by default.
Equally important was the state's reliance on the family in 
ensuring social care. This was especially true in rural areas where 
statutory provisions were practically non-existent. This explained 
why CAD mottos in welfare work were "self-reliance by the masses, 
mutual aid, dependence on the collective, and state help as the 
last resort". The shortage of resources at the disposal of central 
government also dictated this approach. In fact, the pre-eminence 
of the CCP, its ideology, general government policy and MIA role 
are closely interwoven. The significance of this amalgam 
constitutes an area of investigation in explaining the Chinese 
welfare mix.
That the government was able to get away with so little direct 
involvement in meeting welfare needs forces our attention on 
functional alternatives. In this regard, the collective's special 
contribution was noteworthy. In the countryside, collectivization 
of agriculture provided the basis of not only primary distribution 
but also mutual care. Production teams and brigades supported their 
needy residents by funding the "five guarantees" and relieving 
hardship households. Civil affairs welfare was confined to 
supplementing ccmminity care in face of chronic shortage and crises 
(e.g. natural disasters). A similar function was entrusted to 
enterprises in urban areas. To the extent that occupational 
benefits proved inadequate, neighbourhood self-provision served as 
a back up. This made possible the CAD's role as the agency of last 
resort. Consequently contribution of the collective in welfare and
- 83 -
the impacts of recent organizational changes in the collective 
structure is another area for investigation.
Restricting aid to the "three-nos” in both urban and rural
areas is a telling indication of the place of the family in meeting 
needs. Admission to CAD-run homes and regular social assistance was 
contingent on the absence of family support. When temporary
hardship arose, the household as a unit could apply for relief.
The CADs also put much emphasis on harnessing the traditional
virtue of filial obligations. Its ideological work related to 
funeral reform and marriage registration was likewise directed at
modifying family attitudes regarded as harmful to socialist ethics. 
The conscious exploitation of family self-help and moral reform 
needs to be examined in the context of overall government policy on 
the family, changes in family structure, and its adequacy in 
fulfilling its caring function in the face of change. The post-1978 
reforms are likely to exacerbate the pressures on the family.
One variable that is implied but not made explicit in this 
historical review is the place of traditional culture. The Chinese 
family was the key welfare instrument throughout China*s long
history. Also of importance was neighbourly cooperation in rural 
conmunities and village mutual add. (In contrast, the work unit and 
the administrative street/neighbourhood are socialist structures.) 
To what extent do traditional values and practices in welfare 
manifest continuity? Similarly, past beliefs about statutory 
responsibility could influence people*s expectations in the present
day. Inevitably the theme of continuity and change in the culture
of welfare is a crucial facet for study notwithstanding China's 
socialist characteristics.
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Substantive Propositions
The historical review of civil affairs establishes the welfare 
system subsumed under the MIA as an approach underscored by 
residual ism. The next step is to extend the enquiry to the current 
period. For the purpose of this study, developments from 1978 to 
the end of 1988 will be scrutinised. This first reform decade 
provides a fertile field for exploring the relationship between 
social and economic development. It is also a time when more 
information, as well as direct cpportuntity for interview-visits, 
is available than at any other time. After thirty years of 
operation, the civil affairs apparatus inherited a rich welfare 
legacy. The new environment that provides the conditions for more 
orderly political conduct and prospects for additional resources 
from economic growth should give a new impetus for consolidation 
and reform in welfare.
In the light of the welfare mix framework and the foregoing 
discussions, the central problem for the thesis is what accounts 
for the welfare approach of the civil affairs agencies. It is 
argued that a clue concerning the narrow identity of the CADs, 
playing a supplementary part vis-a-vis other social institutions, 
must be sought through a holistic purview of the relationships 
between all relevant agencies. My contention is that a residual 
status for the CADs is the result of the interaction of four 
factors - the culture of welfare, the role of the family, the 
collective and the state. Four propositions are suggested to 
account for the outcome:
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1. The pre-liberation culture of welfare in Chinese society was 
conducive to shaping marginal expections of state welfare 
support. In particular, views on philanthropy, primacy of 
family obligations, perception of state-individual relations 
and importance of communal care evinced a framework of values 
receptive to a narrow approach to welfare. Similarly, welfare 
practices located in traditional institutions contributed to 
cultural acceptance of a limited state welfare role.
2. Welfare residual ism was attributed to a narrow conception of 
welfare as perceived by the party and state, preference for a 
decentralized approach to need satisfaction and the paucity of 
state resources. The marginality of statutory care was shaped 
by communist aversion to non-productive consumption and the 
place of welfare in socialist societies. The government's 
reliance on decentralized welfare arrangements allowed it to 
reduce its direct service role to the very minimum. Resource 
constraints likewise mandated stringency to welfare relief.
3. Skeletal state welfare provisions from the CADs were made 
possible by the continued importance of the Chinese family as a 
welfare mechanism in socialist China. Despite its repugnance 
towards the atomistic and feudal istic aspects of Chinese 
familism, the state embraced a family policy of exploiting the 
ethical and utilitarian dimension of such a legacy. The family 
as a basis of social consumption has never been firmly 
challenged. With the onset of economic reforms, the family took 
on more functions in caring for its members. This bedrock of
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primary obligation lessoned the need for direct welfare 
intervention by the state.
4. The residual role for the CADs was related to the centrality of 
the collective as a welfare instrument. Essentially, the 
collective referred to the unit of production in both rural and 
urban contexts. The reliance on the collective canopy rested on 
the sanctity of work and the role of work as an allocation 
mechanism under Chinese socialism. The fusion of employment and 
welfare guaranteed subsistence and security for the vast 
majority so that only minimum provisions needed to be made for 
special groups. However, the reforms have altered the basic 
institutional pattern. By and large, it was the weakening of 
the collective institutions that called for new welfare reforms 
in civil affairs.
Overall, the above prepositions posit the dynamics of the 
Chinese welfare mix in relation to the role of traditional culture 
and basic institutions of Chinese society. Changes in welfare 
functions in one sector will have implications for other 
institutions so that redistribution of responsibilities is needed 
to keep the mix in equilibrium to respond to human needs.
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CHARIER THREE
THE KEPQFM AND OFtN DOOR DECADE 
Pressures far Ref arm
The Chinese economy at the end of the Cultural Revolution was in 
very poor shape. During these ten years, both industry and 
agriculture advanced at a snail's pace. The per capita grain output 
in 1977 was roughly the same as in 1957 (Xue, 1981). In the urban 
industrial sector, over one-third of all state-owned enterprises 
were running at a loss in 1976 (Perry and Wong, 1985, p.4). For 
both urban and rural residents, the Chinese economy was an economy 
of shortage marked by scarcity of goods and services and almost 
every necessity of life. Despite advances in health, nutrition and 
education 1, Maoist policies had left the nation backward and 
impoverished. In 1978, rural per capita income was only 134 yuan 
per annum (Feniinde Sishinian. 1989, p.4, hereafter FS) ? for 
urbanites, 316 yuan (FS, 1989, pp.96-97). Such a lew standard of 
living after three decades of building socialism was galling. 
Politically, the machinery of governance was in ruins as party and 
state organs were first shaken by red guards and then passed into 
military control. Ideologically too, people's faith in the party 
was shaken by constant reversals, pcwer struggles and over­
mobilization (Hannan, 1985; King, 1986). The death of Mao and the
1 Life expectancy at birth increased from 35 years in 1949 to 
67.3 for males and 70.7 for females in 1987; death rate decreased 
from 25 per thousand to 6.7 per thousand (FS, 1989, p.90) . In 1988, 
primary school enrolment rose 4.5 times over 1946; for high school, 
26.9 times. The enrolment rate for school children was said to be 
97.2 percent, see FS, 1989, p.71.
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arrest of the Gang of Four (a radical clique led by Mao's wife,
Jiang Qing) thus saw the country pregnant with a desire for change.
The reforms that emerged were not merely a result of dcxnestic 
imperatives. New geopolitical perceptions of China's place in the 
world, in particular in a smaller international economy, were 
emerging (Ferry and Wong, 1985, pp. 5-6). Economic isolation 
precluded China from becoming more modernized. The success of 
developing countries, notably the Four Little Dragons of Hong Kang, 
Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea capitalizing on expanding
opportunities of world trade in the 1960s and 1970s was
instructive. China too could benefit from abandoning its autarkic 
stance. Similarly normalization of relations with Japan and the
United States, the end of the Vietnam war, and the advantage of
maintaining leverage vis-a-vis the United States and the Soviet 
Union made the case for rejoining the world community compelling. 
Of course, if China was to develop quickly, Western technology, 
investments and markets would be indispensable.
Alternative Change Approaches
Between 1976 and 1980, there was contention over a number of
alternative approaches to change (Solinger, 1982? Hamrin, 1984). At 
first, conservatives led by Hua Guofeng, Mao's appointed successor 
gained the upper hand. They favoured only limited modification of 
the economic programme adopted since the mid-1970s. By 1978-80, a 
pragmatic approach had unfolded. Deng Xiaoping and his proteges Hu 
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were leading proponents. Firm believers in
raising the economic well-being of the nation by whatever means
that worked, they championed bold experiments that departed from
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the Maoist mode. At the same time, from 1979, another group of 
veteran leaders led by Chen Yun and Peng Zhen argued for a more 
orthodox programme (Bums and Rosen, 1986, pp.5-6). Dubbed the 
"bird-cage economists", they were willing to concede more space for 
economic incentives but remained committed to central planning 
(Vogel, 1989, pp.76-80). Of the above, the pragmatist agenda 
carried the day. However, classical ideologues had considerable 
influence, keeping up vigilance and criticism on measures that 
smacked of capitalism.
General Goal and Strategy
At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Congress in December 1988, 
Deng's followers unveiled plans for a new course. From then on, the
country was to abandon such leftist slogans as "taking class
struggle as the key link" and "politics to take command". Instead
the general orientation would be shifted toward economic 
development. The party resolutions were ratified by the Second 
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in 1979. The 
country was set on the course of "readjusting, restructuring, 
consolidating and improving the national economy."
The overall goal of the reforms was to achieve the four
modernizations - in industry, agriculture, science and technology, 
and national defence. The specific objective was to quadruple the 
gross value of industrial and agricultural output between 1980 and 
2000 and to increase per capita income from about US$300 to US$800, 
or about five percent each year. In order to reach these targets, 
the population would have to stay close to 1.2 billion at the end 
of the century (World Bank, 1985, pp. 1-2). Two general principles
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guided the reform programme : "to the outside, adopt openness; to 
the inside, enliven the economy" (duiwai kaifang. duinei craohuo). 
China then officially entered the era of open door and reform 
(kaifancr gaige).
If the general ethos was to enrich the nation, the reforms did 
not have a well laid out agenda. The official strategy was to "take 
a step, then take a look" (zgu vibu. kan vibu) (Vogel, 1989). 
Pragmatic incrementalism, however, did not mean that the steps 
taken were not bold and sweeping. Touching virtually all areas and 
all party and government organs, the reforms attempted to introduce 
change at the systemic level (tizhi craige), leaving only the 
socialist structure intact.
Rural Reforms
Since 1957, people in the countryside were organized into communes. 
In 1978, there were 52,780 communes. Each commune had an average of 
13 production brigades, which in turn were made up of seven to ten 
production teams. A commune covered the approximate area of a 
township and could include some 15,000 persons. At the lowest 
level, each production team averaged about 35 households (G. D. 
Johnson, 1988). In terms of function, the commune was a unit of 
economic organization as well as an organ of government. 
Decision-making was highly centralized.
The centrepiece of rural restructuring was reform in 
agriculture. Operating under the Maoist line of producing grain as 
the key task and attaining local self-sufficiency, land was not 
always farmed to its best advantage. Individual incentive was 
hampered by an egalitarian work point system of income
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distribution which did not relate reward to effort (Ghose, 1987). 
At the same time, the restrictions on private plots, rural markets 
and sideline occupations depressed rural income. However, the 
safety valve of relieving rural stagnation via migration to cities 
was blocked by a rigid system of household registration which has 
been in force since 1957 (Taylor, 1988). All these policies locked 
the peasants in a rural bondage of tight control, lew productivity 
and bare subsistence.
The household responsibility system was the most notable reform 
in agriculture. Paradoxically it was not introduced from above. 
Rather, different forms of work contracting were initiated by the 
grassroots. From 1978, Sichuan and Anhui peasants began leasing 
land from their production teams to farm on a work group, household 
or individual basis. After delivering the agreed quota of produce, 
peasants could keep the surplus. These arrangements proved so 
popular that they spread to other areas. By the end of 1982, 79 
percent of peasants had signed household contracts; one year later, 
98 percent of production teams1 land had been contracted to 
households (Chronology, p.91). Simultaneously, the contract period 
was extended from a few years to 15 years (Croll, 1988).
In addition, a number of other new agrarian policies were 
pursued. First, in 1979, state procurement prices for farm produce 
was raised by 20 percent. At the same time, agricultural taxes were 
reduced. Second, the government promoted domestic sideline 
production: keeping of pigs, sheep, rabbits, chickens, fish ponds,
silkworms and so on. Then, in 1984, the State Council gave 
permission to revive rural markets and allow the sale of grain 
outside the peasants' own counties and provinces. A more radical
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move came one year later when the state abolished its monopoly on 
grain purchase and switched to buying on contract (Croll, 1987? FS. 
1989, p. 21). By and large, the rural economy was reoriented to run 
on market lines, thereby stimulating individual effort which was 
lacking under the old system.
Above all, the government was keen to develop rural industries 
to raise income and absorb surplus labour. The last decade saw an 
explosion of rural industrial enterprises (xiancr-zhen give). 
Between 1981 and 1986, these units jumped from 2.30 million to 
15.15 million at the breakneck speed of 45.8 percent per annum. 
During the same period, their workforce grew from 30.91 million to 
79.37 million, or 20.7 percent per year (Chen and Xia, 1988, 
pp.56-57). By the end of 1988, rural industries accounted for 35.5 
percent of rural inccme (China Report. Social And Economic
Development 1949-1989. p. 67, hereafter CRSAED). 95 million farmers 
were working in the industrial and tertiary sectors (HR, 30 April - 
6 May 1990).
The economic reforms were also accompanied by political
reorganization. The 1982 new constitution provided for the 
abolition of communes. Beginning in 1983, administrative functions 
of communes were transferred to township (zhen) or village (xiang) 
governments, which also had the remit to provide cultured, and 
welfare services. Below this lowest tier of administration, 
villagers' ccmmitees, the parallels of residents' committees in 
urban neighbourhoods, were organized to function as self-governing, 
self-educative and self-servicing mass organs ("CCP and State 
Council Joint Circular on the Implementation of Separation of
Government From Commune and the Establishment of Xiang
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Governments", 12 December 1983).
Effects of Rural Reforms 
On Production
The effects on farm output were remarkable. In the first five 
years, production of grain grew at 5.6 percent per annum, reaching 
a peak of 402.3 million tons in 1984 (BR, 19-25 February 1990). 
There was also a sharp increase in the supply of non-grain products 
as a result of diversification and specialization. However, after 
1984, grain production began to level off. The success of cash crop 
farming and rural sidelines made grain cultivation unattractive. By 
1986, serious concern began to surface about the prospect of a 
grain shortage. Conservative leaders like Chen Yun clamoured for 
renewed emphasis on its production (Sullivan, 1988).
On Distribution
On the economic front, the most important consequence was the 
resurrection of the family farm. Under the new system, households 
were given free rein to make their own economic decisions and 
assume accountability for profit and loss. This heightened 
incentives. At the same time, higher purchasing price for farm 
produce, sideline work and industrial employment raised peasant 
incomes. Between 1978 and 1988, rural per capita net income1 rose 
from 134 yuan to 545 yuan. This represents an increase of 15.2 
percent in absolute terms or 9.7 percent after inflation has been 
taken into account (FS, 1989, p. 104; CRSAED. p.263). Concurrently,
1 Net income refers to income left over after deductions are made 
for production expenses, depreciation, taxes and levies.
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the proportion of households living in poverty, defined as having 
an annual per capita income of less than 200 yuan went down 
sharply. In 1978, 82.6 percent of households were in this income
bracket. By 1988, only 5.3 percent lived below this level (FS. 
1989, p. 465). Whether this can truly represent an alleviation of 
rural poverty is a complex matter. This issue will be further 
explored in Chapter Five.
There were bound to be winners and losers in a competitive 
economic climate. In the main, people who prospered were households 
which had abundant labour power, skills, capital and information on 
markets. Residents in coastal and fertile places also did well. 
Households without these advantages were left to begrudge the good 
fortunes of specialized households (for whom at least 50 percent of 
the income comes from seme form of commodity production) and 
"ten-thousand yuan households” (wanvuan hu). Just as income 
inequality across households had widened, polarization along 
regional lines became more pronounced (Ta Kuna Pag, 23 February 
1987; Kueh, 1988). Inland provinces suffering from the effects of 
geography and underdeveloped infrastructures felt shortchanged by 
state policies that favoured the seaboard areas (Sullivan, 1988). 
Official tolerance of income gaps, rationalized as "to let same 
people get rich first" (vara vibufenren xianfu qilai) led to the 
spread of "red eye disease" (jealousy), fueling animosity between 
the haves and havenots.
Another consequence has to do with surplus farm labour. Thanks 
to increased efficiency and specialization, up to a third of the 
300 million agricultural workers could become redundant (Taylor, 
1988? Mira Pao. 16 November 1990). Although many have found jobs in
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rural industries, trade, construction, transportation and services, 
the spectre of large scale rural unemployment threatens to produce 
social and economic instability (White, 1987). Furthermore, 
selective migration of young able-bodied persons causes family 
separation. Those left behind tended to be wcroen, children and the 
old. Even though remittances are a boon to household incomes, they 
cannot compensate for the disruption of family life. Such issues as 
old age care and socialization of children became more of a 
problem.
Political and Social Implications
The return to household farming meant a corresponding weakening of 
party and collective control. Commentators attributed it to rising 
affluence in villages. A new centre of influence based on 
possession of material assets emerged to rival and corrode official 
power - through bribery, cooptation and payment of fines to resist 
such policies as birth planning (Sullivan, 1988). The loosening of 
bureaucratic control gave rural households new freedoms to manage 
their lives. This included the revival of old "feudal" customs - 
rebuilding ancestral halls, constructing elaborate graves, 
worshipping deities, holding lavish funerals and wedding feasts 
(Renmin Ribao. 14 November 1985? Hgnggi, 15 July 1986 and 1 October 
1986? Sullivan, 1988). These indulgences were more rampant in 
affluent coastal areas. Even rural cadres were culpable, setting 
bad examples to the masses and making law enforcement difficult. 
Besides, there were misgivings about ideological confusion and 
"spiritual, pollution " (Marks, 1988).
More importantly, the diminution of party and collective
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authority was caused by the change in the institutional framework. 
Village and township governments could not match the communes in 
authority and resources. Of immediate concern to welfare was the 
problem of funding. Previously, allotment for collective health and 
welfare projects came from the carmine welfare fund, which was 
deducted from collective income before allocation to households. 
When agriculture was decollectivized, the revenue had to be scraped 
together from various sources - taxes, profits from rural 
industries (if available) and household levies after primary 
distribution (GDSZJ, 1989, pp. 86-87? Miner Pao. 15 February 1990? 
Hussain, 1989). Reportedly peasant resistance was common. When 
households had to live by their cwn devices without much help from 
the authorities, it was hardly surprising that helping the needy 
became an unwelcome burden (Xu, ZGMZ. May 1990, p.40).
As a corollary, there have been a number of social regressions. 
One was the collapse of collective health insurance schemes which 
had been highly effective in ensuring peasant access to primary 
health care (Taylor, 1988? Davis, 1989? Henderson, 1990). 
Concurrently, there were losses of valuable human resources such as 
teachers and doctors, who responded to the government1 s call to get 
rich by changing to more lucrative occupations. More worrying was 
decreasing school enrolment when money-minded parents withdrew 
their children to work in family farms or village enterprises. Not 
unexpectedly, most of the drop-outs were girls (BR, 21 October 
1985? Renmin Ribao. 25 October 1987? Miner Pao. 19 November 1990).
Stripped of the collective umbrella, the vacuum in social 
security in villages was fully exposed. Civil affairs bureaux, 
which have oversight of rural social welfare, have to correct the
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damage. Rural poverty has always been a problem. New, the survived 
of the indigent has become a more critical issue. The problem was 
aggravated by demographic and social change. In particular the 
rising number of old people in the population and shrinking family 
size (as a result of population planning policy) reduced the 
abilities of families to look after their members. An indepth 
analysis of these themes will be made in Chapters Nine and Ten.
Urban Eoonocmic Reforms
The urban reforms were the second stage of the reform. In December 
1984, the Central Committee adopted the long-awaited "Decisions on 
the Reform of the Economic System". In tackling the urban 
industrial economy, the tasks facing the reformers were more 
complex. Typically, urban productive and business enterprises came 
under the ownership of the state or the collective. Attached to 
different tiers of administration, subordinate units were run on 
bureaucratic fiat. This meant that decisions relating to output, 
supply of raw materials, capital and sales were made by higher 
authorities. The other important factor in production, labour, was 
assigned by labour bureaux. Enterprises had no power to refuse 
their quota nor could they dismiss redundant or recalcitrant staff. 
The results were overmanning and waste. The sole responsibility of 
managers was to achieve their assigned annual targets under the 
state plan (Yuan Qihui, 1986; In, 1989). Given the intimate link 
between the state and enterprises, any changes in the urban 
industrial econcmy struck at the heart of not only business 
management but also public administration.
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General Direction
In simplified terms, the overall directions of the urban programme 
can be conceptualized as four fold. First, the economy was to 
transform from a rigid command structure to one that would respond 
to such levers as price, interest rates and taxes. Second, 
enterprises, the cells in the urban economy, were to be invigorated 
by granting them more managerial autonomy, making them responsible 
for profits and losses, and linking reward to performance. Third, a 
better sectoral balance in favour of light industry (rather than 
heavy industry) and the tertiary sector was used to improve 
availability of goods and services. Fourth, the ownership structure 
was to be modified. While the socialist sector would remain 
dominant, it would be supplemented by the individual and mixed-mode 
economy (Sino-foreign joint ventures, cooperative units and 
foreign-owned enterprises). The rationalization was that the 
non-socialist components could inject needed skills and capital, 
increase employment and augment shortages for the consumer.
Content and Tnplementaticn
I shall be brief on policies that were designed to improve the 
macro-economic framework and the investment environment. These 
included the adjustment of the monetary and credit sysems, granting 
the regions more financial autonomy and power in managing foreign 
earnings, drafting of economic legislation, and setting up fourteen 
open cities and four special economic zones. Most importantly, the 
reform of the price system was to bring about a rational allocation 
of resources which truly reflect the value of commodities. It was 
with this last area that the reformers had the most difficulty.
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Partial opening of the price structure created many anomalies: 
intensified shortages of seme items, profiteering, corruption and 
above all inflation. Inflation was especially serious after 1985 
when the general index of retail market prices increased by 8.8 
percent (1985), 6 percent (1986), and 7.3 percent (1987) over the
preceding year (China Statistical Yearbook 1988. p. 691, hereafter 
CSY). In 1988, it reached the intolerable level of 18.5 percent (Ta 
Kuna Pao. 1 March 1989? ER, 19-25 February 1990). To soften the 
blew on consumers and forestall political unrest, the only option 
was to increase subsidies. Thus between 1978-1988, state subsidies 
leapt frcm 15.4 billion yuan to 76.3 billion yuan, of which price 
subsidies accounted for 9.4 billion yuan (1978) and 31.7 billion 
yuan (1988) respectively (HRSAFP, p.336? Mina Pao. 9 January 1989). 
By 1990, state subsidies accounted for 31 percent of revenue (Mina 
Pao. 3 September 1991). Such outgoings contributed to fiscal 
imbalance. Thus deficits in the state budget occured in all years 
between 1979 and 1988 except for 1985. In this period, cumulative 
deficits reached a staggering 65.2 billion yuan (Mina Pao. 16 
February 1990).
A significant development in the early 1980s was the
encouragement of the individual economy. This was brought about by 
two policies. First, in 1980 the State Council adopted "Certain 
Policy Decisions Regarding Non-agricultural Individual Economy in 
Cities and Towns”. One year later, the "Resolutions Concerning 
Opening of Opportunities, Enlivening the Economy and Resolving the 
Question of Employment in Cities and Towns" was announced. The 
result has been a rapid growth of the self-employed. In 1978, the 
individual economy was negligible - with a work force of 150,000.
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At the end of 1988, China had 6.59 million self-employed persons 
working in cities and tcwns (FS, 1989, pp. 96-97), mostly in 
commerce, service, transportation and small-scale production. At 
the same time, the proportion of employees in state and collective 
sectors also changed scsnewhat. In 1978, the state economy employed 
78.4 percent of all urban workers while the rest (21.6 percent) 
were in the collective units. By 1988, the corresponding 
percentages were 73.4 percent and 25.9 percent respectively. 
Another 0.7 percent of the urban work force were found in 
enterprises of other modes (FS, 1989, pp.96-97).
From the perspective of welfare, the most pertinent changes
were reforms in the enterprise structure. The temporal sequence of 
these reforms is not easy to determine. This is mainly due to the 
fact that experimentation invariably preceded policy enactment and 
that different places followed their cwn timetables. Furthermore, 
the pace of introducing certain policies, most notably price 
reforms, was postponed when planners met with opposition and
practical difficulties.
The move to enhance incentive in production was heralded by 
across-the-board wage rises for urban workers in 1977. Pressure to 
raise wages has built up for a long time since they have been
effectively frozen throughout the Cultural Revolution (Danqdai.
1987, p.94). Next, wider use of bonuses and piece rates was
adopted. At the same time, enterprises were allowed to retain a
greater proportion of their profits. Then in 1984, retention of
profit was substituted by remission through taxes (li qai shui)
(lee, 1986). Later, bolder strategies came in the form of the 
Barikuptcy law (November 1987) and Enterprise Law (August 1988).
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The first empowers the closure of units which are unable to pay 
their debts. The second exposes enterprises to full responsibility 
for profits and losses, thus facing market forces head on without 
recourse to state subsidies. Hcwever, from information available, 
the last two measures have only been implemented on a limited scale 
because of the problems they entail (Wu, 1988b? Hsu, 1988).
In the system of employment, radical changes were introduced by 
four important regulations that came into effect on 1 October 1986. 
These were: "Temporary Regulations on the Implementation of Labour
Contracts in State-owned Enterprises", "Temporary Regulations on 
the Recruitment of Workers in State-cwned Enterprises', "Temporary 
Regulations on the Dismissed, of Workers in State-owned Enterprises 
who Violate Discipline", and "Temporary Regulations on Unemployment 
Insurance for Workers in State-cwned Enterprises".
These regulations have profound implications. The first measure 
abolished life tenure for new recruits into state enterprises. At 
year end 1988, China had 12.33 million contract workers, amounting 
to 9.1 percent of all urban employees (FS, 1989, p.98). The second 
regulation made possible open recruitment and competitive 
examinations for posts. It also abrogated the system of dim ti 
which provided the option to substitute an adult child for a parent 
who left a work unit (Davis, 1988). The effect of the third was to 
give enterprises the right to fire employees who repeatedly 
disobeyed rules. The grounds for dismissal include such offences as 
"having a poor attitude to service" and "quarrelling with 
customers" fFEER. 16 October 1986). Finally, the fourth legalized 
unemployment insurance, hitherto anathema to a socialist society. 
During the period of redundancy, an allowance equivalent to 50-75
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percent of the workers' previous basic wage (excluding bonuses) 
would be paid up to a maximum of two years (Renmin Ribao. 10
Septemeber 1986).1 Shanghai was the first place to introduce
unemployment insurance in October 1986. By May 1988, 30,000 persons 
there had received this allowance (SHBZB, 10 February 1989).
Official alarm over escalating social security expenditure 
propelled reforms in this area. In the 1950s and 1960s, the number 
of retirees was snail. As late as 1978, there were only 3.14
million retirees. However, by 1988, their number shot up to 21.1 
million (FS, 1989, p.99). This drastic increase resulted in hefty 
expenditures. In 1978, labour insurance and welfare funds for 
retirees accounted for 1.73 billion yuan; in 1988, they cost 27
billion yuan (CRSAED, p. 373). If the total bill for staff welfare 
benefits for all workers are included (covering pensions, health 
care, hardship subsidies, allowances and collective welfare 
facilities), the spending sprang from 7.81 billion yuan to 65.6 
billion yuan in 1988, an increase of 840 percent over ten years. If 
the same trends continue, the social security bill will impose an 
impossible burden on the economy.
Retirement benefits (including pensions, health expenses and 
subsidies), were the most expensive item in the labour insurance 
budget. In 1978, these took up 21.1 percent of total insurance and 
welfare spending; by 1988, the proportion was 39.2 percent. 2
1 Unemployment insurance funds are administered by provinces or 
municipalities, to which state enterprises contribute one percent 
of their total payroll. Workers who have been dismissed, made 
redundant through bankruptcies or whose contracts are not renewed 
can collect 60-75 percent of their basic wage for the first year 
when unemployed, and 50 percent for an additional year (FKKk. 16 
October 1986).
2 In 1987, out of 19.64 billion yuan spent on labour insurance 
and welfare funds for retired state workers, pensions accounted for
67.9 percent; medical care, 11.9 percent; living subsidies, 10.5 
percent, according to CSY. 1988, p. 174.
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Consequently pension reform topped the action agenda.
The method of financing pensions since 1969 has been irrational 
to say the least. When first introduced, enterprises paid three 
percent of the wage bill to a national pension fund, with labour 
unions taking part in its administration. However, the practice 
became untenable during the Cultural Revolution when the relevant 
agencies - the Ministry of Labour, All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions and their subordinate organs were abolished (Dangdai. 1987). 
In November 1969, the Military Control Commission in the Ministry 
of Finance redefined pensions as a non-operating expense, and 
shifted from the system where pensions were paid from funds 
earmarked for pensions fzhuan kuan zhuan ygng) to a system of 
reimbursement fshibao shixiao) where each enterprise covered 
pensions from their current wage bill (Davis, 1988). This singular 
method was a millstone on enterprises; it also gave rise to 
inequalities. "Old" units, those with a high proportion of retired 
workers, went broke paying pensions. Even for "young" units, such 
expenditure could devour any profit that could be ploughed back 
into productive investment. Enterprise hardship and bitterness over 
unfair burdens cried out for redress (Yuan Qihui, 1986; Shen, 1986; 
Yu and Liu, 1986).
1984 saw the beginning of experiments with unified financing of 
pension funds (tone chgu) at the city and county level. By early 
1988, 1,600 cities and counties (70 percent of the total) had
adopted this measure fZhoncxmo Jincrii Gaige Shinian. 1989, p.539). 
The next step is to extend this to the provincial level (interview 
data, 1988).
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In the area of health care too, full reimbursement for 
treatment has resulted in waste and abuse. Hie All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions revealed that seme enterprises in Zhongshan, 
Nantong and Hangzhou have introduced health insurance schemes built 
an contributions from employees and work units. By and large, 
Guangdong experiments have gone further than other places. For 
contract workers, free health care has been dispensed with 
altogether. Instead workers were paid same 10-15 percent more than 
tenured staff as compensation. In some state enterprises, permanent 
workers received a fixed sum health care allowance of 5-7 yuan per 
month instead of free treatment. Two exceptions were: the scheme 
did not apply to retired workers nor for treatment of serious 
illnesses, for which full reimbursement was still allowable 
(interview data, 1988). Ultimately, these experiments were to 
culminate in a complete overhaul of the existing labour welfare 
system. It was envisaged that by 1990, a "prototype" social 
security system would evolve (Seventh Five Year Plan for Social and 
Economic Development, 1986-1990).
Implications of Urban Economic Reforms
When compared with the rural reforms, the success of the urban 
reforms is more difficult to assess. In the opinion of Gale Johnson 
(1988), "either little reform has occured or, when there have been 
significant reforms, most reforms have misfired because the reform 
was incomplete, and the results that occurred had serious negative 
consequences." (D. G. Johnson, 1988).
For the urban consumer, there is no doubt that recent reforms 
have improved their living standards. Goods and services, until
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then scarce and poorly served, have increased in quantity and 
quality. Nowadays almost every commodity can be bought in the open 
market. Shops, restaurants and services operated by private
operators make life easier for all urban dwellers. Likewise, 
competition forces state firms to provide better services. These 
changes are noticeable to any regular visitor to China in the 
1980s.
An important gain was the rise in urban incomes. In 1978, the 
annual per capita income of urban households was 316 yuan? in 1988, 
it was 1,119 yuan, an increase of 380 percent in nominal terms and
120.9 percent at constant prices (FS. 1989, pp.96-97). However 
growing inflation since 1985 has eroded purchasing power. In 1987, 
about 20 percent of urban wage earners reported a fall in their 
living standards as a result of rising prices (Honcr Kong Standard. 
18 August 1988). This worsened in the following year when 34.9 
percent of all urban families experienced such a drop (Renmin 
Ribao. 1 March 1989? Ta Kuna Pao. 1 March 1989). Among the hardest 
hit were government employees and workers on fixed pay.
There was no evidence that the hoped for improvement in 
enterprise effectiveness had occurred (D. G. Johnson, 1988). 
Productivity had not risen as a result of greater enterprise 
autonomy nor had bonuses induced greater effort. In fact, in most 
work units, bonuses were given in standard amounts due to 
measurement problems and peer jealousies. The result had been 
inflated pay and bonus awards.
The enrichment of the ownership mix was associated with more 
inequality in staff welfare. Under the old system, workers in small 
collective undertakings, seasonal workers and apprentices endured
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inferior benefits (Walder, 1986; Lockett, 1988). Following 
diversification, these deprived groups were joined by contract 
workers, staff in rural industries and employees in joint ventures 
and foreign-cwned enterprises, all of which did not enjoy job 
tenure. Completely left out of any security cover were employees in 
the individual and private economy. Contraction of welfare 
benefits, for example, in health care, likewise induced hardship. 
The worst off were employees in failing enterprises whose survival 
in a climate of open competition and inflation were more 
precarious.
The serious gaps in China's labour insurance coverage was 
pinpointed by a senior member of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Science, Zhu Qingfang (1990). According to her estimate, of the 
country's 535 million labour force in 1989, only 29 percent (160 
million) were covered by social security. Seme 75 percent were 
outside the safety net altogether. The deprived groups included the 
11 million workers in collective enterprises below the county 
level, 47 million workers in rural enterprises, 12.8 million 
non-regular employees in state firms, 23 million employees in 
individual and private enterprises and 320 million peasants. The 
existence of such severe shortfalls called into question the 
country's claim of having a superior social system.
Labour mobility has not occurred on any scale. Despite the 
introduction of unemployment relief, objections to dismissal were 
intense. This was attributable to the low level of relief as well 
as ideological aversion to redundancies in a workers' state. In 
equal measure, the underdevelopment of socialized housing, child 
care, health services and welfare facilities not linked to
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employment made lay-offs impractical and politically costly. Under 
such circumstances, the hitherto closed system of welfare support 
administered by civil affairs bureaux came under mounting pressure 
to mate their services more accessible. Likewise, neighbourhood 
organisations were asked to step up their provision of informal
care. Concurrently, population aging also increased demands for
welfare support. From 1964 to 1990, people aged 65 and above 
increased from 3.6 percent to 5.58 percent (1990 Census). This may 
be lew by international standards. The sheer numbers, with the 
attendant cost of old age care, can be crippling to a developing 
economy (Zhu, 1990). The real crunch will came in the next century. 
In 2000, there will be 130 million elders aged 60 and over (11
percent). By 2025, the number will swell to 280 million or 20
percent of the population (National Committee on Aging, 1988).
As yet, the new methods of financing social security are too 
new to allow an assessment of their effectiveness. In itself, the 
development of unified pension funding was hardly more than a 
partied, solution to a very complex problem. As it is, the system of 
social security is too fragmented and the economic conditions over 
the country too diverse for the emergence of a uniform system. At a 
narrower level, just within the ambit of civil affairs programmes, 
the challenge of safeguarding the livelihood of the destitute in 
the midst of emerging affluence and widening inequality is a tall 
order given very meagre resources. Further examination of these 
issues will follow in subsequent chapters.
Political Reforms
Political reforms were intended as a complement to economic
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restructuring, namely to remove the organizational strictures that 
impede the deepening of economic reforms. In China, the party and 
the state are fused, with the party reigning supreme in political 
and social life. Thus the core issue in political reform centres on 
the position of the party, especially its relation to government 
and economic institutions.
The need to separate the powers of the party from the state was 
identified by Deng Xiaoping. In his opinion, the fusion has given 
rise to unhealthy outcomes, namely overcanoentration of power and 
bureaucratism (”0n the Reform of the System of Party and State 
Leadership11, August 1980).
The principle of dividing the powers of the party from those of 
government was put into practice for the first time to relieve Hua 
Guofeng of his premiership, which he held simultaneously with the 
chairmanship of the CCP and chairmanship of the CCP Central 
Military Commission. Also, secretaryship of the party committees 
and revolutionary committees (government) of the same province were 
assumed by two different persons (Chang, 1988). However, further 
progress has not been easy (Bums, 1989b).
Another reform target was party leadership at the enterprise 
level. In order to free decision-making from bureaucratic
interference, party secretaries of enterprises were to have their 
powers curtailed so that factory directors could become solely 
accountable for enterprise performance. Party committees then would 
play a supervisory role and concentrate on ideological work.
The Beijing Dyeing and Printing Plant, which I visited in April 
1988 was one of thirteen mills in the capital to introduce reforms
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in political leadership.1 There, the factory director had been 
made the legal person of the firm. The party secretary was relieved 
of tasks in direct management but would be consulted over important 
matters. Should conflict of opinion come to a head, the views of 
the factory director would prevail. This new system was said to 
have resulted in efficiency in decision making and more effective 
management. Many such experiments have been reported by Chinese 
sources. Nevertheless, there did not seem to be consistent evidence 
that party secretaries had relinquished their predominance? factory 
directors operated with more responsibility than real authority 
(Zhongquo Oiveiia. No.l, 1987, p.18).
In the ideological sphere, there have been campaigns to 
counteract “corrupt11 influences associated with Westernization and 
economic liberalization. In October 1983 a short-lived campaign 
against "spiritual pollution" was mounted. It was called off when 
the reforms were threatened. However, criticisms on ideological 
deviance, corruption, profiteering and erosion of public morality 
have been aired with regularity. Since 1983, the term "bourgeois 
liberalization", referring to ideas of Western capitalism and 
democracy, came into currency. This led to the forced resignation 
of Party Secretary Hu Yaobang in January 1987 for failing to 
suppress pro-democracy student demonstrations (FEER, 5 October 
1989). The fact that the economic reforms were encountering 
increasing difficulties also underlined stiffened resistance to the 
reforms.
1 The Beijing Dyeing and Printing Plant had a work force of
3,300 in 1988. It produced textile goods worth some 200 million 
yuan in 1987. The information was obtained from my interview with 
the plant's party secretary in April 1988.
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Tnpiim-h-icns of Political Reforms
Hie effects of the political reforms were harder still to judge. In 
general, the premise to segregate party and state powers was more 
talked about than delivered. Having been in full command since 
1949, a diminished role for the party amounted to self-immolation. 
This would not only strike at entrenched interests but also destroy 
the foundation of Chinese politics. For old revolutionaries,
negation of party leadership is a betrayal of socialism.
In the relation between the central government and regions, 
though, much devolution has occurred. Since 1980 provinces and 
municipalities have been given more power over their budgets and 
allowed to retain more funds for their own use (Guoiia Yusuan,
1987). This led to a rapid growth of locally retained revenue, that 
is extra-budgetary funds outside the state plan. Between 1978 and 
1987, such funds increased nearly six fold from 34.71 billion yuan 
to 202.9 billion yuan. Its size in relation to the national budget 
also increased from 50 percent in 1981 (FS, 1989, p. 65) to 91.2 
percent in 1988 (CRSAED, p. 332). Fiscal decentralization has 
resulted in diminished centred receipts. When ministry regulations 
cannot be backed up by state grants and subsidies, central 
influence decline. In welfare matters, the detriments lay in the 
weakened ability of the Ministry to effect regional redistribution 
and implement key projects. The feeling of pcwerlessness in guiding 
local welfare development was palpable in MCA officials during my 
visit in 1988.
The issue of political reforms threw up sharp divisions within 
the party. On the one hand, liberal-minded leaders were convinced 
that changes in the political structure were needed to complement
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the economic reforms. As long as bureaucratic power remained 
centralized, liberalization of economic forces would encounter 
institutional constraints, which made the full realization of 
economic reform difficult (Chen, 1988). However, resistance was 
strong and reformers had to tread gingerly over potential 
minefields. What's more, Deng's support for political 
liberalization was uncertain. The contention of the two factions 
vitally affected the future direction of the reform agenda.
Guangdong Under Reform 
Guangdong and its unique position
Guangdong province, situated to the south of China, lies directly 
north of Hong Kong. It has a total area of 212,000 square 
kilometres. In 1988, its total population stood at 59.28 million 
(Guancfdonashenq Toncri i Nianiian. 1989, p. 57, hereafter GDSTJNJ). In 
size and population, it is similar to the United Kingdom (1987 
population: 56.87 million; area: 244,493 sq. km.). Historically, it
had the reputation of an important trading region and centre of 
Chinese emigration.
In 1979 the central government resolved to adopt special and 
flexible policies in Guangdong (and Fujian), in other words to 
allow it to go one step ahead of other places in modernizing its 
economy (Guangdong Nianiian. 1987, p. 62? Vogel, 1989). This 
privilege was conferred on Guangdong because of its unique 
position. The province was the place of origin for over 90 percent 
of Hong Kong people. The two places share commonalities in dialect 
and culture and sustain strong familial and friendship ties. They 
also have had a long history of economic exchange. Since the end of
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the Second World War, Hong Kong has emerged as a centre of regional 
development in the Pacific Rim. Guangdong's proximity and close 
links with Hong Kong placed it in an unrivalled position to gain 
access to the latter*s market, capital, management technology and 
world-trade networks. The signing of the Sino-British Joint
Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong in 1984 signaled even 
stronger links ahead when the sovereignty over Hong Kong reverts to 
China in 1997. If China achieves its goal of modernization, with 
places like Guangdong attaining affluence, and in time administers 
Hong Kong successfully, the return of Taiwan will be more hopeful. 
Thus the political goal of national unification also lay at the 
back of economic reforms and the granting of privileged treatment 
to Guangdong (Vogel, 1989, pp.82-85).
Guangdong's Reform Experience
According to the System Reform Office of the Guangdong Provincial 
Government, three phrases summarized the territory's reform
experience. They were: "to the outside, more openness; to the
inside, more liberalization; to units below, more decentralization" 
(interview data, 1988).
Guangdong occupies a central place in the country's coastal 
development strategy. Designated as an experimental zone, the 
territory is to be a window that opens to the outside world. Three 
of the country's four special economic zones (SEZs) are in 
Guangdong (Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou); the fourth, Xiamen is in
adjacent Fujian. SEZs have the mission to learn and digest new 
practices from the outside as well as attract foreign capital.
Since 1986, Guangdong has ranked first in foreign exports (total
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value: US$4.29 billion) (GOSTJNJ. 1989, p. 18). Two years later,
foreign e^orts rose to US$7.33 billion and US$7.9 bilion foreign 
funds have been used (FS, 1989, p.251), equal to 16.6 percent of 
all foreign capital used (FS, 1989, p.59). Guangdong also had 60 
percent of all Sino-foreign joint ventures (GDSTJNJ. 1989, p. 15) 
and earned 80 percent of all export-processing fees (interview 
data, 1988). Without any doubt, it is the most outward-oriented 
region in China.
Guangdong's progress in market development has gone further 
than other places. The component under state-directed planning has 
shrunk as the market-regulated canpanents have expanded. In 1988, 
the ratio of planned procurement quota as against open market 
transactions were :
25 : 75 for agricultural products
20 : 80 for industrial goods
30 : 70 for natural commodities (interview data, 1988)
The province also benefitted from a special formula of
government financing. Starting from 1980, Guangdong (and Fujian) 
have followed the "big contract system". This means that after 
boundaries for income and expenditure were defined, the amount of 
revenue to be delivered to central government would be fixed for a 
period of five years (CRSAED. p. 339). In 1979, Guangdong handed 
over 890 million yuan to the central treasury. For 1988, the quota 
was negotiated at 1.4 billion yuan, to increase by 9 percent 
annually thereafter. At the same time, Guangdong was allowed to
keep more of its foreign exchange earnings: it surrendered 70
percent as against 75 percent for other provinces (interview data,
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1988). Such favourable treatment was the envy of other areas.
Hie economic development of Guangdong in the first reform 
decade has been remarkable. In 1978, Guangdong ranked seventh in 
the value of its gross domestic product? by 1987, it was third in 
the country (GDSTJNJ. 1989, p. 14). Between 1978 and 1988,
Guangdong's gross domestic product increased from 93.1 billion yuan 
to 109.86 billion yuan, or at the average rate of 12.9 percent per 
year.
Per capita income in the province likewise rose rapidly. In 
1988, the annual rural net income per head was 809 yuan, 616 yuan 
more than in 1978. For urban workers, the average wage was 1,474 
yuan in 1988, an increase of 1,072 yuan over 1978 (GDSTJNJ. 1989, 
p. 19). In the prosperous Pearl River Delta, incomes went even 
higher. By 1988, worker salaries there averaged 2,307 yuan per 
annum (GDSTJNJ. 1989, p. 360). Other high-wage areas included open 
coastal cities like Guangzhou (2,683 yuan) and Zhanjiang (1,828
yuan) and the SEZs (Shenzhen: 3,388 yuan; Zhuhai: 2,764 yuan and
Shantou: 1,603 yuan, GDSTJNJ. 1989, p. 389). Thus Guangdong wages
are among the highest in China. In 1988, the province was number 
one in gross domestic product, value of goods retailed, foreign 
export, average urban living expenditure, personal savings and 
amount of foreign capital used (Liang, 1990, p.4).
Historically, the distinctiveness of Guangdong people was long 
recognised. The Cantonese have always been regarded as having 
special characteristics. "Chinese from other provinces stressed the 
uniqueness of the Cantonese. They were considered uncommonly
belicose, and they were often looked down upon as serpentine 
yph—man (savage southern barbarians) whose habits were bizarre and
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uncouth." (Wakeman, 1966, p.57). Other stereotypes were that they 
were "clannish, diligent in the pursuit of their cwn advantage or 
that of their family, eager to embrace new ideas or novel things, 
often impulsive, stubborn, and unyielding (and therefore difficult 
to deal with in business), egalitarian in spirit, and personally 
aggressive." (Vogel, 1969, p.21? Moser, 1985, p.208) On the other 
hand, the Cantonese were proud of "their cosmopolitan tradition, 
their cleverness, their quickness, their technical skills in 
getting things done (Vogel, 1989, p.21). Strong localism among the 
masses and leadership gave rise to an urge to speed up growth. In 
this respect, leaders from provincial to xiano-zhen levels were 
equally ccmmited. One way of getting the help needed —  capital, 
markets, equipment, donations —  was to seek out former natives now 
resident in Hong Kong and Macau to contribute to the development of 
their heme communities.
With their reform achievements, the distinctiveness of 
Guangdong aroused greater national attention. In sum, the feelings 
were a combination of admiration, jealousy and disdain. Their 
remarkable growth, increasing affluence and sophistication spurred 
envy. At the same time, they were criticised as being capitalistic, 
bourgeois and unscrupulous (Vogel, 1989, p.447). Beijing was very 
critical of Guangdong's activities in smuggling and corruption. In 
particular capitalist practices in the SEZs attracted the wrath of 
central condemnation (Vogel, 1989, pp. 120-21).
Feelings and judgement apart, Guangdong had to contend with the 
same socio-economic challenge that confronted the country during 
the course of modernization. For example, there was the issue of 
income inequality. Apart from the more developed delta basin and
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special economic zones, much of Guangdong remained backward. This 
was especially true for the hilly areas in the north and west. 
There was also the problem of relieving the poor after communes 
were dismantled. In the urban areas too, new employment practices 
created insecurities as well as new freedoms. Guangdong was the 
first to experiment with labour contracts. By 1988, contract staff 
(555,600) made up 7.4 percent of all workers (GDSTJNJ. 1989, p.13). 
In terms of ownership type, the urban labour force comprised of 
5.03 million employees in state-owned units, 2.17 million in urban 
collectives, 594,300 individual workers and 275,100 in other (e.g. 
joint, foreign) enterprises, all with different tenure and welfare 
entitlements. Similarly, the rising number of the elderly has meant 
mounting pressures for improved welfare. The social demands and the 
efforts of welfare agencies and localities in meeting such needs 
will be the subject of Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER POOR
THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNDING OF CIVIL AFTAIRS
The civil affairs system is made up of bureaucratic agencies, the 
CADs, and the local communities under their oversight. The 
effectiveness of CADs is intimately linked to the adequacy of their 
organizational structure, manpower and financial resources. Without 
these, policy implementation would be difficult. Neither would they 
be able to direct and coordinate the work of informed, agencies at 
the grassroots. This chapter examines related managerial issues in 
the light of developments in the 1980s. Two major themes are 
explored. In Part One, the organizational aspects - central and 
local CAD structures, their changing remit and personnel issues - 
are analysed. Part Two focuses on civil affairs financing. 
Pre-reform methods are surveyed briefly to lay the ground for a 
thorough examination of post-reform funding arrangements. As it 
turns out, this review exposes serious institutional shortcomings 
in the system of welfare.
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Part One
The Organization of Civil Affairs
The decision to re-establish the civil affairs apparatus was taken 
in the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on 26 
February 1978. The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) was set up to 
replace the defunct Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and Cheng 
Zihua was named Minister (Dashiii. 1988, p.292). At the same time 
the MCA Party Group (Minzhengbu dangzu) was formed, with Cheng 
doubling as its Secretary. He was assisted by two deputy 
secretaries and ten other members, eleven of whom held the rank of 
vice-minister rDashiii. 1988, p.294). What distinguished this party 
group from previous ones was that it was larger? under the MIA, the 
party group consisted of three to seven members. This no doubt 
reflected the scope of organizational and policy development work 
that was ahead.
The party group lost no time in carrying out its tasks. After 
two days in office, it convened its first meeting. Its immediate 
job was to investigate the state of civil affairs work in the 
country. The thirteen members divided themselves into six teams to 
visit different regions and hold discussions with local officials 
(Dashiii. 1988, p.295). In July the decision was taken to call the 
Seventh National Civil Affairs Conference, the first one in 
eighteen years, to set out future directions. The deliberations of 
this and other important forums will be detailed in Chapter Five.
Ministerial Structure
The Ministry of Civil Affairs is an executive agency under the 
State Council (central government). It is linked through its party
- 119 -
grot?) to the party centre's Committee on Politics and Law (zhengfa 
weivuarihui). Important policy, personnel and administrative 
decisions are made in the party system while the Ministry has the 
job of carrying out party resolutions.
In May 1978, the MCA was divided into eight departments/offices 
with specialised functions: general administration, rural relief,
preferential treatment, urban social welfare, civil service 
personnel, political affairs, social organizations and and civil 
management. The following months saw the Ministry given new 
responsibilities in drawing up administrative boundaries, 
organizing local elections and assessing middle and lower level 
government cadres (below chu grade).
In 1979, the Ministry set up a new office: Office of People's 
Letters and Visits. This office dealt with complaints from 
aggrieved service recipients and enquiries from the public. Apart 
from this, a number of bodies were formed under the supervision of 
the MCA. First, there was the revival of the China Association for 
the Blind, Deaf and Mute which had been disbanded during the 
Cultural Revolution. Control of this and other bodies was achieved 
through appointment of MCA leaders to organize and head the 
sub-party group and incorporation of the latters' administrative 
posts in the Ministerial establishment (Dashiji, 1988, p. 306). 
Second, the Institute of Prosthetic Research was founded (Dashiii. 
1988, pp.311-12). Third, the Steering Group on the Reception and 
Resettlement of Indo-Chinese Refugees was created under the State 
Council. The Minister of Civil Affairs was made its leader and the 
ministry given the job of resettling ethnic Chinese refugees 
expelled from Vietnam after the two countries went to war briefly
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in 1979 (Dashiii. 1988, p.317).
In July 1980, the civil service personnel work that the 
Ministry undertook for general cadres was turned over to a newly 
created Personnel Office under the State Council (Bums, 1990). In 
the same month, the State Council approved the formation of the 
Research Office on Revolutionary History in the Ministry. As at 
mid-1980, the total establishment of the MCA consisted of 326 cadre 
posts (including 26 posts in social organizations under its 
supervision) (Dashiii. 1988, p.346).
In 1981, the Ministry added a Resettlement Bureau to take 
charge of resettlement of retired military cadres and soldiers, 
hitherto the province of an office under the State Council 
(Dashiii. 1988, p.353). This led to the increase of 4,000 cadre 
posts in local resettlement administration nationwide. To offset 
the additional expenditure, an earmarked grant was voted by the 
Ministry of Finance. This year also saw the Ministry carrying out 
its task of organizing elections (Dashiii. 1988, pp.363-4). In 
September 1981, eight more cadre posts were approved for the MCA 
while local CADs also gained between one to four extra posts 
(Dashiii. 1988, p.366). Further reorganization took place in 
November 1981, when the Research Office on Revolutionary History 
was abolished. New departments put in place included the Office for 
Policy Research, Cadre Bureau, Office for Foreign Affairs and a 
task group on party discipline. On the other hand, cadre posts in 
the General Administration Office and Office for People's Letters 
and Visits were cut. Thus, notwithstanding the creation of new 
divisions, at the end of the year, the MCA establishment had only 
grcwn marginally (374 cadre posts) (Dashiii. 1988, p.369).
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1982 saw another drive in austerity; the State Council trimmed 
the MCA establishment by 15 percent to around 320 posts. Likewise, 
the party group size was reduced. It new had five members instead 
of the original thirteen (Dashiii. 1988, p.375).
A very important development was the naming of a new minister, 
Cui Naifu to replace Cheng Zihua (Dashiii. 1988, p.378). A native 
of Beijing, Cui joined the CCP in 1948 and served in Lanzhou 
University for a long time (in the party office and as academic 
registrar). He was a protege of the former minister in two previous 
posts and followed Cheng to the MCA in 1978 (SHBZB. 16 December 
1988). As befits his long spell in higher education, Cui is a 
frequent contributor of articles to MCA publications. Under his 
tutelage, the MCA actively promoted theory building and research 
related to social security and social welfare. He was generally 
thought of as dynamic and forward-looking.
In 1983, the MCA instituted the Bureau on Personnel and 
Education. In addition, the State Council approved the formation of 
three new bodies: the China Research Centre on Rehabilitation of
Physical Disability, the China Welfare Fund for the Disabled 
(Dashiii. 1988, pp.411 and 414? Huibian. 1984, Vol.l, pp.80-4) and 
the Institute for Administrative Cadres of Civil Affairs (Dashiii. 
1988, p.416? Huibian. 1984, Vol.2, pp.753-4). The last two are of 
special interest. The China Welfare Fund for the Disabled was the 
brain child of Deng Pufang, eldest son of paramount leader Deng 
Xiaoping. Himself a paraplegic (crippled after the Red Guards threw 
him down a building during the Cultural Revolution), Deng Pufang 
committed himself to improving the lot of the handicapped. He was 
its vice-director and later director (1985). The Fund was
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affiliated to the MCA and Deng held the substantive rank of 
vice-minister. With his impeccable quanxi (personal connections), 
this body enjoyed high-level support and also attracted substantial 
overseas donations. It was credited for spearheading a national 
census of the disabled in 1987 and expansion of rehabilitation 
services (Wong, 1990). The Institute for Administrative Cadres of 
Civil Affairs, on the other hand, is the only higher academic 
(degree-equivalent) institution responsible for training civil 
affairs managers. Its formation accelerated the pace for cadre 
training.
In 1983, the MCA went through another reorganization. The 
resultant structure and ministerial duties (as laid down by the 
State Council) has been set out in Chapter Two.
In 1984, the MCA decided to build six civil affairs vocational 
middle schools (in Harbin, Changsha, Tianjin, Jinan, Chongqing and 
Wuxi) (Minzhencr He Shehui Baozhancr Wenxuan, 1985, p. 609, hereafter 
Wenxuan). These offer two-year pre-service training in civil 
affairs work as well as short courses in specialist aspects of 
management to serving officers. Other locally administered centres 
then followed. By 1987, nine more vocational middle schools were in 
operation; another three were being planned (SHBZB, 11 September
1987). However, the capacity fell far short of demand; in 1987, 
there were 100,000 civil affairs cadres in the country. Inadequate 
training greatly hinders the professionalization of welfare work.
In 1985, three new organizations were established. The first 
one was the Chinese Research Institute of Civil Affairs Theory and 
Social Welfare, with Minister Cui as president. This centre had the 
aim of investigating the theory and practice of social welfare
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(Dashiii. 1988, p.469). The second new body was the China Sports 
Association for the Mentally Retarded. It provided training for 
mentally retarded athletes and organized China*s participation in 
overseas sports competitions (Dashiii. 1988, pp.474-75). Third, the 
Ministry took the decision to publish a nation-wide bulletin. 
Initially called the Zhonaouo Minzhencr Bao (China Civil Affairs 
Newspaper, ZGSHB), within a few months its name was changed to 
Shehui Baozhancr Bao (Social Security Newspaper) (Dashiii. 1988, 
p.494). The formation of both the Research Institute and SHBZB 
reflected the growing importance of social security in the MCA 
agenda. Minister Cui and seme of the senior leaders in the Ministry 
were closely identified with this push.
In 1986, the MCA took on additional duties. First, it was given 
the day-to-day work of arbitrating in territorial boundary 
disputes. The economic reforms have increased the value of land. As 
a result, competing claims by local authorities became more 
frequent (Dashiii. 1988, pp.489-90). Second, it acquired the 
responsibility for overseeing neighbourhood organizations after the 
State Council approved the MCA's Draft Report on the Organization 
of Villagers' Committees (Dashiii. 1988, p.497). In October, the
MCA acquired the authority to oversee the routine work of building 
and supervising residents' organizations (Dashiii. 1988, 
pp.531-32). Third, the same year also saw the State Council 
instituting the Steering Group on the Economic Development of Poor 
Regions, with an MCA vice-minister appointed as a member (SHBZB. 21 
August 1986? Xuanbian 1986, pp.59-66). Henceforth, the ministry was 
not only involved with direct relief but also took part in the 
planning of overall strategies to develop backward areas. Fourth,
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the ministry made a proposed to start a social welfare lottery to 
raise funds for welfare services. Agreement in principle was 
granted by Premier Zhao Ziyang in July (Dashiii. 1988, p.521). Its 
implementation in 1987 blazed a new trail in alternative ways of 
welfare financing.
Ihe accumulation of duties exerted pressure for reorganization. 
In mid-1986, the MCA had a new structure (Figure 4).
In 1988, the ministry underwent yet another reorganization. The 
ministry new has fourteen functional departments, as listed below 
(GDSZJ, 1989, pp.19-21).
1988 MCA Structure
1. Administrative Office fBanqcronq Tim)
2. Department of Grassroots Administration rJicena Zhenaauan 
Jianshe Cil
3. Department of Preferential Treatment [Youfu Cil
4. Department of Resettlement fAnzhi Cil
5. Department of Disaster and Social Relief [Jiuzai Jiuii Ci]
6. Department of Social Welfare f Shehui Fuli Ci]
7. Department of Administrative Division and Place Name 
Administration rxincrzhencr Ouhua He Dimincr Guanli Cil
8. Department of Societies Registration fShehui Guanli Ci]
9. Department of Social Affairs fShehui Shiwu Cil
10. Department of Marriage Regulation [Hunvin Guanli Ci]
11. Department of Policy and Regulations fZhengce Fagui Ci]
12. Department of Personnel and Education rRenshi Jiaovu Ci]
13. Department of Joint Projects fZhonahe Jihua Cil
14. Department of International Cooperation [Guoji Hezuo Ci]
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Figure 4 Organisational Structure of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
of the People’s Republic of China, 1986
China Welfare Fund for 
the Handicapped
Chinese Research Institute 
o f Civil Affairs Theory 
and Social Welfare
Public
Organizations
China Association for the 
Blind, D eaf and Mute
China Association for Welfare 
Enterprise Management
China Association
for SOS Children’s Village
China Sports Association 
for the Mentally Retarted
Ministry of 
Civil Affairs
Institutions
Institute for Administrative 
' Cadres o f Civil Affairs
Social Security 
-newspaper office
China Civil Affairs 
"magazine office
Institute of 
Prosthetic Research
General Affairs Office
Office of Policy Research
Department o f Civil Administration
Department o f Urban Social Welfare
Department o f Rural Social R elief
Bureau of Preferential Treatment
Bureau of Resettlement
Bureau of Personnel and Education
Bureau o f Foreign Affairs
Planning, Finance and Capital 
Construction Office
Office for People’s Visits and Letters
Office for the Reception and 
Resettlement o f Indo-Chinese Refugees
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs 
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Several observations may be made about the latest MCA 
re-organization. First, there is much more functional 
differentiation. The hitherto nebulous tasks subsumed under civil 
management have been divided among several divisions. This is more 
rational and gives better attention to their unique purposes. Thus, 
the departments on administrative division and place name 
administration, social affairs, and marriage regulation became 
separate divisions. Second, some measure of unity in rural and 
urban welfare administration has been achieved. Previously, rural 
relief and welfare came under the Department of Rural Relief while 
a separate department dealt with relief and welfare matters in 
urban areas.
The new structure is more sensible in the light of increasing 
urbanization in the countryside and urban migration in the 1980s. 
Third, the work on marriage and societies regulation has expanded 
in scope. New, regulation rather than mere registration is 
mandated. This enlarged the administrative pcwer of the ministry. 
Fourth, new divisions have been formed to suit changing 
circumstances. They are the departments of Grassroots 
Administration and International Cooperation. The former is much 
needed to enhance organizational support to community social 
services, which have become a new growth point in social care in 
urban areas. Similarly the formation of villagers' committees 
created a base for service delivery under the supervision of the 
xiancr-zhen assistant. Meanwhile, increasing cross-national contacts 
via study visits, joint projects, and consultancies underscore the 
importance of having special staff to handle the work. All in all, 
the new structure is more logical and better suited to t the 
complexities of the Ministry's work at the present time.
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Regional and Local Organization
In local areas, civil affairs departments are answerable to two 
lines of authority. Vertically, a CAD at a particular level is part 
of the system of civil affairs with the Ministry at the apex; it is 
both superordinate and subordinate to CADs above and below it. In 
this system, the upper level organ issues policy instructions, 
advice and professional guidance. It also channels funds earmarked 
for specific purposes, mainly disaster relief, developmental aid to 
poor areas, and pensions and relief to retired army cadres and 
government staff. All other funding of local civil affairs projects 
is voted locally. The question of financing, a key issue in 
central-local relationships, will be examined shortly.
Figure 5 depicts the national civil affairs system. At each 
horizontal level, the government is formally elected and supervised 
by a people's congress. For tiers 1 to 3, the local legislature is 
elected by the people's congress immediately below it and serves a 
five-year term. Direct elections of people's congresses are 
prescribed for levels 4 and 5 and the term of office is three 
years. As said before, it is the local administration that controls 
the bulk of the funding. In addition, civil affairs appointments 
are decided locally.
Seme examples can illustrate this principle of dual 
accountability. In the case of a municipal GAD, it is answerable to 
both the provincial CAD and the local municipal government. In 
turn, it directs the work of the CADs in city districts and civil 
affairs assistants in xiancr-zhens. Meanwhile the CAD at the 
municipal district reports to both the municipal CAD and municipal 
government.
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Figure 5 The National Civil Affairs System
Government Tier Designation
1 Ministry of Civil Affairs (Minzheng Bu)
Civil Affairs Departments in Provinces/
Cities directly under central government/ 
Autonomous Regions (Minzheng Ting)
Civil Affairs Departments in Prefectures/ 
Cities/Autcnamous Prefectures (Minzheng Ju)
Civil Affairs Bureaux in Counties/ 
Cities/Autonomous Counties (Minzheng Ju)
Civil Affairs Assistant in Administrative 
Village (xiang) /Township (zhen) / Street 
Office/Nationality Township (Minzheng Zhuli)
People*s Civil Affairs Small Group in Residents*
self-governing Committee/Villagers* Ccmmmittee (Minzheng Xiaozu)
organization
Note: ___  Line Authority
 Indirect Authority
Source: GDSZJ. 1989, p. 13.
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In terms of centre-local relations, the 1980s was a period of 
decentralization. While the periphery enjoyed more financial and 
management autonomy, the influence of the ministry and upper civil 
affairs organs have waned vis-a-vis the local administration. The 
weakening of top-down influence emerged very clearly from my 
interviews. Officials from both the centre and the provincial civil 
affairs apparatus felt somewhat helpless in exacting obedience from 
below when they no longer held the key to the essential resources 
of money and personnel. In particular, they could not sanction 
subordinate CADs which would not give higher priority to welfare. 
The Guangdong experience was indicative. Despite their wealth, same 
townships and even cities in the Pearl River Basin had neither a 
social welfare heme nor welfare factory. The Guangdong Province CAD 
was at pains to influence these laggards. However, there was not 
much they could do apart from a mixture of patient persuasion and 
unrelenting criticism.
An additional gripe from some officials, in less guarded
moments, centred on the perception that a reverse relationship 
existed between pay and position in the civil affairs system. It 
was said that cadres in xiancr-zhens enjoyed higher pay than their 
superiors in municipal bureaux and the latter earned more than 
ministry officials. What made this possible was differential 
tolerance of entrepreneurial activities by state agencies at 
different levels. CADs at city level and below could take up
trading and profit-making projects; provincial and central 
authorities could not. This point was corroborated by an economic
consultant working with the Ministry of Finance, Athar Hussain,
during personal discussions.
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So far the examples given are anecdotal. Short of having 
reliable national pay statistics, it is not possible to draw any 
firm conclusions. Besides, wage differentials are only one form of 
clout. However, what is remarkable is the consistency with which 
such views were held. Overall, the feeling that in senior echelons 
officials had been losing prestige and influence over local 
development was quite widespread, whether in Beijing or Guangdong. 
It echoed central concerns over deepening regionalism. The 
centrifugal tendencies that emerged were an important agendum for 
future research.
Documentary information an provincial and local CAD 
organization was hard to obtain. Because of the dearth of published 
materials, it is difficult to be precise about the general pattern. 
Here I shall restrict myself to interview data on Beijing and 
Guandgong as examples of local permutations.
At the provincial level, the minzheng ting has a divisional 
structure that closely parallels the Ministry's. This is because 
provinces administer to a large population; Guangdong, for example, 
has jurisdiction over 60 million. In 1991, the GDFCAD was divided 
into 14 divisions, virtually identical to the Ministry structure. 
At headquarters level, the provincial bureau had a cadre 
establishment of 160 officers (1991 interview data).
At the municipal level, because cities differ in size and 
administrative status, their structure and establishment also vary. 
In Guangdong, the number of cadres in municipal CADs ranged from 15 
to 45 in 1988, with an average of 25 officers. Zhanjing city, for 
example, had an establishment of only 79 cadres (interview data, 
1988). Further down still, my interviews suggested that county CADs
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also diverged in size and structure, ranging frcra cadre
establishments of 15 (Shunde) to 34 (Dongguan) and functional 
divisions of four (Shunde) to eight (Narihai and Dongguan).
More uniformity characterised the xiancr-zhen organization. 
Being the lowest level of government ruling between 20,000 to
40,000 persons, each xiancr-zhen had only one civil affairs 
assistant to take charge of the whole range of civil affairs 
duties. Exceptionally, seme townships would have two assistants. 
For example, Guangdong reccmmended two cadres if the township 
population was over 40,000. Shunde had the best ratio: two
assistants for each xiancr-zhen: Dongguan had between one to two. My 
Guangdong interviews revealed a general reluctance to approve more 
posts? local administrations pointed out that deploying even one 
more cadre would double the cost. So, seme xiancr-zhens in the delta 
areas took on a non-tenured worker to assist the civil affairs 
official. What was more common, however, was part-time deployment, 
which produced an impossible workload and was the source of 
perennial complaint of such agencies (Shantou Minzheng Ju, GEMZ. 
1990, Issue 4, pp.12-14? Cui, ZGMZ. January 1989, p.6). Besides the 
question of cost, lew pay also created the need to double up from 
the staff side. According to my informants, civil affairs salary 
was lewer than for other posts? civil affairs assistants needed 
extra pay from part-time work if they were to stay in post.
The thin provision on the ground has long been recognized as a 
serious impediment to service planning and delivery in the
countryside. Compounding the problem of numerical weakness were a 
host of maladies. First, civil affairs assistants experienced
frequent transferrals to other posts (SHBZB. 18 September 1987).
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As the posting was controlled by the xiam-zhen government, county 
CADs were unable to block the move. TWo effects followed from this. 
Cadres could not develop commitment and expertise in their work and 
disruption of service inevitably occurred. Another difficulty was 
the lack of training. Very little was available by way of funds and 
materials for training rural cadres (SHBZB. 18 September 1987). 
Finally, the quality of the cadres left much to be desired. The
specific concerns were over their age and education (SHBZB, 1 April
1988? 15 April 1988).
One case illustrates these common predicaments. Ta Xian in 
Sichuan is a large rural county with 1.1 million population. In 
early 1988, its Civil Affairs Bureau wrote to Minister Cui to air 
their grievances over high staff turnover. Although all its 93 
constituent xiana-zhens had managed to fill their CA Assistant 
post, 74 were part-time incumbents. Between January to October 
1987, 48 cadres had been transferred? in one xiana. the occupant
changed three times within the year. In terms of quality, 40 cadres 
were over 50? 53 only had a primary education. Under such difficult 
circumstances, the officials were simply overwhelmed. Some had no 
time to file statistics? if they did, their accuracy could not be 
assumed (SHBZB. 1 April 1988).
The above was by no means an isolated case. Similar laments 
appeared regularly in ministry serials. Bearing in mind that three
quarters of the Chinese live in rural areas, the implication was
profound. Precisely because local communities were to take on a 
bigger role in social care, leadership from a professional cadre 
was essential. If rural welfare is to develop properly, the present 
organization is woefully inadequate.
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Civil Affairs Manpower and Quality
At the end of 1982, the civil affairs manpower system had scare
70,000 cadres. At that time, there were 55,000 xiana-zhens in the 
country but the number of civil affairs assistants was only 48,000 
(part-time appointees included) (Gailun. 1987, p. 326).
Table 1 Acre Group Distribution of Civil Affairs Cadres. 1982
(Percentages)
60 & over 51-60 36-50 35 & below
provincial and
county level cadre 3.4 28.9 45.6 21.6
xiancr-zhen
C.A.Assistant 1.4 25.3 52.7 20.6
Source : Gailun. 1987, p. 326.
For work at the xiancr-zhen level, the age factor was important. 
This stemmed from the job nature and the direct work environment. 
In rural areas, the work of a civil affairs cadre was physically 
demanding. In order to supervise welfare work in villages, much 
travelling was required, often to places where good roads, 
transport and accommodation facilities were difficult. Hence, an 
older person was more disadvantaged than a younger one. Even for 
provincial and county cadres, regular inspection was essential if 
they were to keep in touch with local areas, otherwise they ran the 
risk of passivity and isolation.
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Table 2 Educational Level of Civil Affairs Cadres. 1982
(Percentages)
Senior Junior Primary
College Secondary Secondary School
Provincial and
county level cadre 4.8 25.1 64.4 14.5
Xiancr-zhen
C.A. Assistant 1.3 17.5 56.7 24.5
Source : Gailun. 1987. p. 326.
The above table indicates that over half of all cadres have 
only had junior secondary schooling. The provincial and county 
officials are better educated, with a quarter attaining senior 
secondary level. The ministry has acknowledged that poorly educated 
personnel generally had more problems with understanding state 
policies, filing accurate reports and exercising good judgement. 
Matters were then more prone to be passed up to superiors than 
resolved locally.
In 1985, the country had seme 87,000 civil affairs cadres and a 
contingent of 300,000 service and care staff. Of the cadre corps, 
5,064 had a college education (5.8 percent)? 10,680 reached 
vocational middle school level (12.2 percent) and 71,256 had a 
standard of middle school and belcw (82 percent). Within the last 
group, 68,000 (78 percent) had junior middle school and below
educational level. In comparison, of all 22 million government 
cadres in 1985, 22 percent had a college education? only 30 percent 
had a background of junior middle school and belcw (Wenxuan, 1985, 
pp. 606-7, and 615). Obviously, the qualification of civil affairs 
personnel was inferior to state cadres as a whole.
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More recent figures suggests a modest improvement in education 
among civil affairs cadres. In 1987, among 105,000 officers, 5,498 
(5.24 percent) had a college education? 13,790 (13.13 percent) 
reached vocational middle school standard while 85,630 (81.54
percent) had a standard at senior middle school and belcw. In terms 
of age, 27,130 cadres (25.8 percent) were aged 35 and belcw? 49,824 
(47.55) were between 36-50; 27,951 (26.6 percent) were above 50
(SHBZB. 11 September 1987). Comparing the 1987 figures with those 
of five years ago, there has been a slight lowering of age. 
Hcwever, it was not possible to generalize about the same
improvement in education. The first reason was that the terms used 
in all years were not defined. For example, it was not known 
whether "standard11 referred to attendance or attainment. Second, 
the classifications were crude and lumped together many levels. For 
instance, "junior middle school and belcw" subsumed people with 
junior secondary, primary, no formal schooling and illiterates. 
Breakdown into sub-categories was not available. Given such
unsatisfactory data, one has to be cautious about making
inferences.
Two measuress have been adopted to improve cadre quality. The 
development of training was one response. The recent establishment 
of civil affairs colleges has been mentioned. In 1987, the civil 
affairs education system was said to have the capacity to cater for
2,000 cadres, including pre-service training, refresher courses and 
more skill-based workshops (for example, accounting and finance, 
managing welfare factories). In addition, 14 technician training 
schools were in operation, producing, for instance, artisans in 
the makin of prostheses, mechanical tools and hearing aids (SHBZB.
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1 July 1987). Another new development was training in
rehabilitation. Here, the ministry benefitted from outside help. 
Visiting rehabilitation experts conducted short-term classes (from 
a few sessions to several months) for local teachers and
para-professionals working with the handicapped. The results were 
said to be encouraging, both in the acquisition of work skills for 
staff and improved functioning for service recipients (SHBZB. 23 
February 1988).
Embryonic plans exist to introduce professional social work 
education. From 1952 to 1979, university teaching of the social 
sciences was banned; among the casualties were social work and 
sociology. It was not until 1979 that the discipline of sociology 
was re-established (Wong, 1979; Yuan Fang, 1986). Social work, 
regarded as applied sociology, thus regained a new lease of life. 
Two attempts have been made by the ministry to professionalise 
welfare work through training in social work. First, there were 
efforts to pool scarce professional expertise to build a national 
college of social work. Progress has been limited; up to 1991, the 
plan has not materialized. Second, the teaching of social work 
began in selected sociology departments in Beijing University, 
People * s University and Zhongshan University (interview data,
1988). Even then, the achievements have been modest, one reason 
being that the teachers themselves have had no professional social 
work qualification. Therefore, judging from the progress so far, it 
will be a long time before welfare work becomes a professional 
activity, if ever. Until that happens, it will remain an 
administrative activity dictated by bureaucratic norms rather than 
the standards of a profession.
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Hie second response was the selection of model cadres. In 
China, the use of models (mofang) was a time-honoured method in 
communist ideological campaigns (Burch, 1979). Thus, the CADs have 
a tradition of picking advanced units and workers. In 1986, the 
ministry introduced a grand title - the Bull's Award (Yuziniu 
zhang) as the highest accolade for a civil affairs worker. The 
first winner was Zheng Baoqi, a civil affairs assistant from 
Liaoning province (Dashiii. 1988, pp.539-40? Xuanbian. 1986, 
pp.405-11). In addition to his enthusiasm, selflessness and 
technical competence, Zhang was lauded, in particular, for his 
single-handed achievement in starting many projects to help poor 
peasants. His selection was a belated vindication of the rural 
cadres working in the wilderness. It also reflected the mood of the 
times, 1986 being the high tide of the fupin campaign.
Concurrently, the ministry stepped up its propaganda to raise 
professionalism and moral ethics among its cadres. Such qualities 
as putting duty and clients first, embracing frugality and
accepting self-sacrifice were stressed alongside the possession of 
technical competence.
Conclusion
Three comments can be made on the organization of civil affairs in 
the first reform decade. First, the organization of the ministry 
and local civil affairs agencies has followed a more rational path 
of functional differentiation. Internal reorganization has been 
dictated by enhanced scope and complexity of civil affairs work. 
There have been two countervailing trends. On the one hand, its 
welfare role has been emphasized. On the other, there has been a
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parallel growth of its administrative functions. So in many ways, 
the ministry still retained its historical baggage as a home 
affairs ministry. This profusion of tasks was detrimental to the 
growth of organizational mission. As a result, same opinions within 
the ministry hold it should specialize in welfare. Contrariwise, 
others were reluctant to see the CADs relinguish their political 
and management functions. Ultimately, the future direction and 
orientation of the ministry is a national issue. So far, no 
decision on possible specialization has been taken.
The second point relates to the inadequacy of the local 
organizational structure. To begin with, the staffing of the 
county/city CADs appears insufficient to exercise leadership and 
oversight of subordinate agencies. More critical was the xiancr-zhen 
establishment. As it was, the existing structure could not premise 
faithful implementation of policies, much less innovation. The weak 
organization and manpower situation made it virtually impossible to 
narrow the welfare gap between rural and urban areas.
The third issue has to do with the quality of manpower. The 
deficiencies in the form of cadre age and poor educational
attainment adversely affected professional competence, policy 
adherence and ability to make creative decisions to meet local 
needs. The attempts to improve training and raise personal
commitment were commendable. Hcwever, without real improvements in 
conditions of service, professional training and moral incentives 
in themselves were insufficient. The perceived injustice of central 
and regional level cadres being paid less than their local
counterparts further weakened morale. It also reinforced the
feeling of loss of influence over local development as a result of 
decentralization of authority.
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Part Rro
Civil Affairs Financing
Pre-1978 Social Welfare Rinding Methods
Before the reform period, funds for civil affairs projects came 
mainly from two sources: government allocations and collective
funding. State funds were allocated from the central and local 
governments. Budgets of the State Council and the MCA made up the 
central budget. Funds made available by provinces, cities and 
counties were included in the budget of local government fMinzhencr 
Faqui Xuanbian. 1986, p.253, hereafter Faaui Xnanhian). Meanwhile 
collective expenditure referred to money raised within rural 
communes and subordinate brigades and teams in rural areas, and in 
urban areas, resources provided by neighbourhood organizations.
The general pattern of funding before 1978 had a number of 
characteristics (Wang, 1990c) .First, the central government played 
a leading role in allocating welfare relief funds to local areas 
through a system of quotas and controlled local expenditure via 
approved budgets (Guoiia Yusuan, 1987? SHBZB. 12 February 1988). 
Although the balance of central fiscal powers vis-a-vis local areas 
was stronger in seme periods than in others, on the whole 
centralization was the norm before the reforms. Second, civil 
affairs bureaux were constrained by ministry regulations on the use 
of different types of allocations. Diversion from one purpose to 
another was prohibited. In practice, however, many abuses and 
digressions were reported, including indiscriminate dispensation of 
disaster relief grants, embezzlement and illicit diversions of 
funds (Gailun. 1987, pp. 155-57; Dashiii. 1988, pp.86-87). Third,
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the state and collectives shared responsibilities for financing 
welfare projects. The items for which the state shouldered the 
major burden were preferential treatment (state grants only for 
pensions, death grants, disability relief and institutional
services), disaster relief, urban relief ("three no" targets, 
hardship households, redundant workers laid off between 1961-65), 
social welfare services in cities (social welfare institutions and 
welfare production enterprises) and aid to poor areas and teams.
Poor relief in rural areas was primarily funded by local
communities; likewise important was preferential aid from the
masses. In these, central largesse only went to areas in chronic
deficit. Fourth, both state and collectives followed a principle of 
thrift in controlling welfare spending. Service providers were 
enjoined to became self-reliant, that is, live within their means 
and not blindly emulate more prosperous places. The upshot of the 
frugality ethic was that on average civil affairs spending was 
contained to arround 1.6 percent of total government expenditure 
before 1979 (Dashiii. 1988, p.734, reference Chapter Two).
Civil Affairs Expenditure 1978-1988
Table 3 presents the total government expenditure on civil affairs 
in the last decade. In money terms, civil affairs spending more 
than doubled. However the rate of growth was uneven. In 1979, the 
first year after the MCA was re-established, the outlays jumped by 
35 percent. Between 1979 and 1980, the spending fell slightly. The 
reason for this was unclear but may be related to sharp increase of 
government deficits as a result of massive imports of overseas 
goods and technology associated with the Hua Guofeng leadership
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Table 3 Civil Affairs Expenditure. 1978-1988
Amount percent over As % of govt.
Year (100 m. yuan) previous year expenditure
1978 13.92 — 1.25
1979 18.80 35.10 1.48
1980 17.48 - 7.00 1.44
1981 19.23 10.00 1.72
1982 19.60 1.90 1.70
1983 21.81 11.30 1.69
1984 24.05 10.30 1.59
1985 30.01 24.80 1.64
1986 34.40 14.60 1.51
1987 36.19 5.20 n.a.
1988 40.13 10.90 1.50
Source: Dashiii. 1988, p.734 for statistics up to 1986; 1987 
and 1988 figures from SHBZB. 14 April 1989.
between 1978-80 (Rosen and Bums, 1986). Then, more or less steady 
rises continued until 1985. Thereafter the rate of growth became 
more moderate? the latest report suggests that during 1986-1990, 
state expenditure on civil affairs only increased by an average of 
6.43 percent per year (Li, ZGMZ. June 1990, p.39). A more telling 
indicator of the paltry nature of the civil affairs bill was its 
weight in the state budget. As a percentage of public spending, 
civil affairs outgoings represented a mere 1.55 percent on average 
over the decade. There was actually a slight drop from the 
pre-reform average of 1.6 percent.
The general approach could be summed up by the principle of 
developing "multiple levels, multiple channels and multiple means"
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(duo cencrci. duo crudao, duo xincrshi) of funding (GDSZJ, 1989, 
pp. 147-48). By multiple levels was meant both vertical tiers 
(central government, province, county/city, xiam-zhen/street 
organisations, villagers'/residents1 committees) and horizontal 
sectors (state, collective, groups, individuals) in the welfare 
nexus. Multiple channels referred to diverse sources of income. 
These included, inter alia, funds voted by different layers of 
administration, retained profits from xiancr-zhen or neighbourhood 
enterprises, donations from government departments and social 
units, charitable contributions from the masses, income from social 
welfare enterprises, sponsorship from citizens, gifts from overseas 
and special funds. Finally, multiple means denoted various methods 
of raising income. New developments included the introduction of 
different forms of economic enterprises, fee charging, holding 
charity performances and auctions, and creating special funds of 
one kind or another. In short, the overall aim was to husband all 
available resources in the country and exhaust all possible methods 
to gamer more revenue for social welfare.
The government and party line was to eschew state monopoly in 
welfare finance. Social welfare was to be the business of every 
person and social unit in society. Ultimately, it was hoped that a 
"reasonable distribution" of responsibility would evolve between 
state, collective and individuals (Sixth Five Year Plan for Social 
and Economic Development? SHBZB. 12 June 1986).
The official jargon had considerable overlap in meaning. To 
simplify matters, I shall review the major new developments under 
different sources of funding.
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1. State Funding
At the end of 1978, the resuscitated MCA re-issued the 1962 
regulations governing the use of preferential treatment and relief 
funds (Shouce. 1982, p.627; Facrui Xuanbian. 1986, pp.241-46). In
1984, a more detailed set of regulations - Ministry of Finance and 
Ministry of Civil Affairs Joint Circular on the Use and Management 
of Civil Affairs Funds was promulgated (Facrui Xuanbian. 1986, 
pp. 247-57).
Four principles were enshrined in the 1984 regulations. First, 
the principle of "designated fund, designated use” (zhuan kuan 
zhuan yong) was re-affirmed, banning virement of monies to 
unauthorised purposes. Second, equal distribution of relief 
payments was disallowed. Priority in add was to be given to areas 
and households/victims who experienced the most severe hardships. 
Third, all units were to practice ecarracy, cut waste and maximize 
saving so as to use resources more effectively. Service units 
should generally implement a financial responsibility system which 
defined its managerial accountablity under contract. Fourth, in 
decision-making, the principle of democracy was to be followed. 
This meant that in deciding on such matters as office budgets, 
quota allocation and large items of expenditure, leading cadres 
should mate decisions after holding group discussions. Similarly, 
in distributing temporary subsidies and disaster and social relief, 
the views of the masses should be integrated with the assessment of 
officials. The above stipulations were no doubt related to a number 
of serious offences uncovered in 1981-82, which led to condemnation 
by then Party Secretary Hu Yaabang (Shouce. pp.642-45; Dashiii, 
1988, p.362). They also addressed longstanding irregularities
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which have earned civil affairs departments a bad name.
In addition, the regulation codified a number of new measures 
introduced after 1978. They were, first, the permission to use part 
of the allotment for disaster relief to help poor households 
develop production. Second, a responsibility contract system on 
disaster relief budgetting was introduced based on experiments in 
1980. Henceforth, local areas adopting this method managed their 
disaster relief programme within pre-set limits agreed with central 
government. While they earned the right to retain unspent revenue, 
they had to give up claims for additional central appropriations 
except for dire emergencies. Third, as far as possible, loans would 
be used to replace grants. Only people who had no repayment ability 
(e.g. the "three-nos") could get handouts. These themes will be 
analysed in depth in Chapter Five.
In 1985, further local autonomy, hence greater responsibility 
in financial matters, was granted. This was spelt out in an 
innocuously named administrative note - Ministry of Civil Affairs 
and Ministry of Finance Joint Circular Regarding Adjustments to 
Preferential Treatment and Relief Standards [Minzheng Bu Caimu Bu 
Guanvu Tiaozhencr Fuxu He Jiuii Biaozhun Yaoauan Wenti De Toncrzhil 
(Faqui Xuanbian. 1986, pp.258-59):
"(1) Adjustment to one-off death grants for revolutionary 
martyrs and deceased personnel (from official duty and 
illness), relief for revolutionary disabled personnel and 
maintenance standard for revolutionary disabled veterans 
resident in convalescent institutions will be standardized 
by the Ministries of Finance and Civil Affairs. For all 
other preferential treatment and welfare relief targets, 
persons receiving relief and subsidies from service units. 
and maintenance standards of inmates will be determined by 
provinces, autonomous regions and cities directly under the 
central government in accordance with policies and 
regulations, the financial ability of local areas, and
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living standards of the masses. Their bureaux of civil affairs 
and finance will make specific proposals and report to people's 
governments in provinces, autonomous regions and cities 
directly under the central government for approval. The funds 
will be self-arranged by local finance authorities.
(2) The principles for various relief, subsidies and
maintenance standards set by local authorities should be: to
ensure that living standards for preferential treatment targets 
are higher than the average living standards of the local 
masses; to ensure that living standards of relief targets are 
comparable to basic living standards of the local masses and to 
ensure subsistence living for personnel under reception and 
dispatch treatment. Living standards for single elderly, 
orphans and disabled persons should be better than other
recipients under the same category of veteran and social
relief. Hereafter, relief and maintenance standards should be 
suitably adjusted following the development of the national 
economy, reform in the price system and improvements in general 
living standards of the people." (emphasis added)
Two messages stood out loud and clear. One was the retrenchment 
of central government involvement. From 1985 onwards, the
initiative to undertake welfare work was clearly devolved to local 
areas which took on the major burden of financing welfare from the 
local government budget. This is also the view of Davis (1989). 
Second, welfare improvements were to come about after economic 
growth was attained. This reflected official tolerance of a lag in 
social welfare development.
As regards service standards, once the centre gave up its right 
to set benchmarks except in some veteran benefits, its admonitions 
to local authorities had an empty ring. At the same time, a local 
approach to standard setting was justified in terms of wide
differences in socio-economic levels prevailing in the country. Of 
course, the backdrop was the readjustment of centre-local
relationships. As part of the bargain, local authorities, having 
gained more autonomy than before, must shoulder broader
obligations.
- 146 -
2. local Community Funding
In the countryside, the masses have long contributed to the 
support of soldiers1 families and "five guarantee" households. 
In the post-ccmmune period, the usual method was to issue 
special levies, which could be regarded as a kind of welfare 
tax. The practices varied widely in different places.
The obligation to contribute to the aid of welfare targets 
was usually incorporated in the contract that peasants signed 
with the local collective (xiancr-zhen or villagers' canmittee) 
(SHBZB. 8 January 1988). The form of payment could be in grain 
or cash. Many areas raised separate collections for soldiers' 
dependents and "five-guarantee" households. Levies could be 
assessed in many ways —  according to the amount of land a 
household contracted, the number of working persons in a 
household, or a combination of land and hand (GDSZJ. 1989, 
pp. 87-88, 106 and 115-17). Very often different formulae were
used to calculate incomes, hence the amount of levies issued on 
various kinds of economic pursuits (farming, forestry, grazing, 
commerce, industry, fishery, transportation or construction) 
were variable. In districts where rural industries were highly 
developed, enterprise profits replaced individual levies. This 
was the case for affluent counties in Guangdong (GDSZJ. 1989, 
p. 149; 1988 Guangdong interviews). So, residents in rich areas
were doubly favoured. Not only did their local government have 
more money to spend on services, they paid no direct welfare 
tax.
Many rural areas had introduced centralized collection and 
use of levies. By the end of 1989, over 20,000 xiancr-zhens
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(38.8 percent of the total) practiced fund pooling at the 
xiancr-zhen level (ZGSHB. 1 May 1990). This spread the burden across 
wider boundaries in contrast with pooled funding on a brigade basis 
under the commune system. Places which had set up sound accounting 
systems centralised at the county level, allowing for wider 
sharing. In contrast, the more "backward" localities could only 
manage pooling at villagers* committee level.
Still another case of regional inequality was differential 
provisions for pensions, for example in suburbs of Shanghai, 
Beijing, Guangzhou and the more industrialized patches in Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang. There, pensions were given to peasants above a 
certain age (BR, 12-18 March 1990, pp.20-21). The money usually 
came from individual subscriptions, subsidies granted by rural 
industries or both. Despite its title, the amount was usually 
small, ranging between 15 to 120 yuan per month, and functioned 
more as living supplements than suffice for retirement income. 
Also, the number of beneficiaries was small; only 900,000 rural 
inhabitants were allegedly covered (ZGSHB. 16 February 1990). For 
the vast majority of rural elderly, the family was still the main 
source of support.
In general, levies were not a satisfactory method of financing. 
First, they were difficult to collect. Feasant resistance to paying 
levies has been reported (Hussain, 1989? 1988 Guangdong
interviews). Second, they had an ad hoc character and a dubious 
legal standing. Because of these limitations, they are at best 
temporary expedients. More permanent arrangements, like a sound 
system of local taxation, are needed to furnish an adequate and 
reliable base of funding.
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3. Development of Social Welfare Production
Social welfare production enterprises create employment for 
disabled persons. In the reform decade, they were increasingly 
looked upon as an income source. Funds so created were used to 
expand production, upgrade equipment and improve the welfare of 
employees in these enterprises. In many places, for example in 
Guangdong and Beijing, welfare factories gave subsidies to projects 
like old peoples1 homes and children's hemes. They were also 
expected to donate money to worthy causes at the behest of their 
superintending agencies.
In the 1980s, a rapid expansion of welfare factories and 
workshops took place. In 1982, there were 1,574 social welfare 
production units producing goods worth 928 million yuan. By the end 
of 1988, the number of units soared to 40,496; the value of goods 
produced amounted to 20,630 million yuan (SHBZB, 14 April 1989).
Similar in aim but serving different clientele were economic 
enterprises designed to give jobs to poor households under the 
fuoin programme. These funin iincrii shiti may take the form of 
factories, farms, quarries or workshops. In October 1988, the 
ministry reported a total number of 45,000 such entities. They 
produced goods worth 6 billion yuan and earned 720 million yuan 
profit (SHBZB. 17 October 1988).
4. Inccme-generation by Welfare Hemes and Units
Under the general ethos of competition and materialism, social 
welfare homes and service units were also asked to earn more income 
for themselves. The reasons were two fold. First, the central 
government was in deficit, as has been discussed. Second, self-
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raised income could finance internal service expansion and 
improvement of service standards and staff welfare. Hie last was 
sorely needed to raise staff morale: in the last decade, civil
service salaries dropped behind those of industrial workers, the
self-employed and the more enterprising peasant households.
Entrepreneurship took many forms. On the one end, there were
ventures like growing fruit trees and cash crops, breeding chickens 
and pigs, fish-farming, flour milling and wine-making. More 
ambitious projects included the operation of factories, restaurants 
and holiday-resorts. In all, such pursuits produced incomes of 30 
million yuan for service units in 1988, equivalent to 10 percent of 
their operating budget (SHBZB, 23 June 1989). Case studies will be 
presented in the chapter on Guangdong.
There were two more ways of inccme-generation. One was the
admission of fee-paying residents in CAD-run institutions. At the 
end of 1988, such cases amounted to 17,000 or 24 percent of all
residents; in CAD-run mental hospitals, the number was 11,000 or 55 
percent (SHBZB, 23 June 1989). Another means was charging the
general public for the use of CAD services like day treatment in
rehabilitation hospitals. Open access was generally welcomed as
they met genuine needs in the community.
5. Social Welfare Lottery
In August 1987, China floated its first social welfare lottery in 
Shanghai (SHBZB. 14 August 1987, 24 March 1989). The avowed purpose 
was to raise money for welfare programmes, particularly to help the 
disabled, elderly, orphans and poor households. It was also meant 
to augment the shortage of state funds; in 1987, only 400 million
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yuan could be made available for welfare projects.
The proceeds from the lottery were divided up in three ways: 35 
percent as prizes, 15 percent as operating costs and 50 percent to 
go to a social welfare fund (SHBZB. 14 August 1987). In 1988, a 
nation-wide campaign was launched. Up to the end of 1989, lottery 
sales amounted to 789 million yuan, netting 304 million yuan for 
welfare schemes (ZGSHB, 6 April 1990). Among all provinces, 
Guangdong held the best sales record. In 1988, tickets worth over 
90 million yuan (at 1 yuan each) were sold; 29.55 million yuan were 
retained for use within the region (SHBZB. 24 March 1989).
6. Donations
Under Mao, China prided itself on its self-reliance in relieving 
domestic disasters without foreign aid. The most extreme example 
was the stubborn refusal of overseas aid after the 1976 Tangshan 
earthquake which killed a quarter of a million people (Qian, 1986). 
The policies of open door and reform brought about a fundamental 
change in attitude. In 1980, the State Council authorized the 
acceptance of United Nations donations for the relief of typhoon 
victims in Guangdong (Dashiii. 1988, p. 345). Thereafter, China also 
obtained relief aid from OECD countries. Frcm 1983 to 1988, total 
foreign donations came to some US$50 million (Tansuo. 1989, p. 178).
Another source came frcm the large overseas Chinese 
communities. Indeed, making philanthropic donations to one's native 
place was a long-standing tradition among Chinese emigrants. In the 
past, marry schools, hospitals, roads and bridges were built with 
such money. Overseas remittances were sharply curtailed in the 
1960s and 1970s. When the country ended its isolation, sizeable
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donations found their way back. Guangdong and Fujian got the lion's 
share as places with the largest number of emigrants. Guangdong 
alone received sane 25 million yuan in the few years before 1989 
(Li, in GEMZ, 1989, Issue 6, p.23).
Finally, domestic contributions also went towards the support 
of welfare projects. These could be voluntary or mobilized. 
Examples of the latter kind were money solicited from "ten thousand 
yuan households", firms and ordinary residents. At times, these 
collections amounted to forced levies and were a source of 
irritation to enterprises and households alike.
7. Mutual Funds and Social Welfare Funds
Since 1983, there has been a significant proliferation of special 
funds. Variously called mutual benefit funds, social security 
funds, social welfare funds or social insurance funds, these were 
collections specially created for welfare purposes. Many had a 
contributory element when individuals and households paid monthly 
premiums to build up their entitlements to borrow, withdraw money 
for a contingency, or draw a pension. Wealthy enterprises or 
individuals were also encouraged to donate to these funds.
The CADs have been at the forefront of this development. Seme 
gave start-up grants or provided subsidies to cover administrative 
costs. Some schemes operated on an insurance compensation
principle, for example, to cover the loss of crops, draught animals 
and houses. By year-end 1988, 75,000 funds of various kinds were in 
operation, collecting subscriptions of 690 million yuan fSHBZB. 14 
April 1989). In 1989, 102 counties had started pilot insurance 
schemes, which covered some 4.93 million households and collected
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28 million yuan. Furthermore, 100,000 villagers* committees have 
set up mutual help savings funds covering 20 million households and 
collecting 400 million yuan (ZGSHB, 5 January 1990). Not 
surprisingly, most projects were located in the rich areas.
Conclusion
Welfare financing in the reform decade was typified by 
diversification and ingenious methods of developing funding 
sources. The need arose from tight budgets. In particular, 
innovations were forced by changes in the institutional framework, 
which destroyed old arrangements in funding ccmraunal obligations. 
Consequently efforts were directed at socializing responsibility 
among all sectors in the ccmmunity. To that end, a great deal of 
ideological exhortation was invoked. Hence, in the 1980s, local 
communities and direct service units had become aggressive fund 
raisers. The results have been mixed. On the one hand, more 
resource avenues were tapped, for example by taxing profits from 
the burgeoning rural industries. On the other hand, there were 
hidden snags. For example, the management's money-making fever may 
divert attention from running a good service, as will be explored 
in the chapters to follow. At the same time, appeals for donations 
could become a subtle form of blackmail on the newly rich. 
Furthermore, regional disparity had widened. Local authorities were 
given the responsibility to finance their welfare needs without the 
cushion of state-backed redistribution. Increasing inequality can 
sew the seeds of discontent.
Despite much ingenuity and drive, the plague of inadequate 
funding remained. This made it difficult for CADs and communities
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to satisfy new welfare needs. A more immediate headache was the 
livelihood of dependent groups who could not share in the general 
improvements in living standards and were hurt most by inflation. 
All these developments increased the marginalization of the poor 
and homeless, making their lot more disagreeable than when most 
people were poor and had few means to get rich. The efforts made in 
safeguarding the livelihood of the most vulnerable members of 
society and the extent to which such endeavours have succeeded will 
be the subject of the next two chapters.
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CHAFUfl* F IV E
CTVH. AFFAIRS —  THE NKUCHAL PURVIEW IN THE FIRST REFORM EBCAEE
This long chapter reviews the development of social welfare work 
during the first reform decade of 1978-1988. It contains three 
parts. Part One elaborates the overall direction and policies of 
civil affairs work. This is conducted through an examination of the 
resolutions adopted in civil affairs conferences and the country's 
five year plans which set out the rationale, aims and specific 
targets for various civil affairs programmes. Parts Two to Five 
take a critical look at welfare policies and their implementation. 
Four welfare programmes —  preferential treatment, veteran 
resettlement, social welfare services and production, and relief 
work are scrutinised. An assessment of their successes and failures 
in contributing towards improving social security is attempted. In 
Part Six, a conclusion is drawn by conceptualizing the directions 
of welfare developments during the first reform decade. A 
conceptual model of social welfare responsibilities, with its 
constitutent institutions, source of funding and the underlying 
value premises, is proposed.
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Part One
Mapping Out New Directions
The Seventh National Civil Affairs Conference, 1978
The conference took place in September 1978. 680 key civil affairs 
personnel and party and state cadres attended the conference 
(Dashiii. 1988, pp. 299, 556-5). At the meeting, Minister Cheng
presented a key-note speech entitled "Under the Premise of 
Repudiating the Gang of Four, Diligently Carry Out Civil Affairs 
Work in the Struggle to Fulfil the Overall Duty in the New Era". 
Cheng reaffirmed that the major business of civil affairs 
departments was preferential treatment and settlement of 
demobilized military personnel, rural relief and disaster relief, 
and social welfare. From the conference synopsis, two themes stood 
out. First, the party must pay more attention to civil affairs 
work. Restoration was needed to maximize social stability as the 
country pushed for reform. Resuscitation could only begin with the 
party giving it more attention. Second, the rebuilding of the civil 
affairs apparatus must proceed quickly. Without an appropriate 
organization, normal business could not resume, much less take on 
new duties. Ihe urgency with which agency construction was regarded 
has been dealt with in the last chapter. In particular, enlarging 
the party group provided the leadership structure for the nascent 
ministry.
Die Sixth Five Year Plan 1981-1985
The preparation for the ministry's input into the Sixth Five Year 
Plan (FYP) dominated its attention after the Seventh Conference.
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When the FYP was released, Section 4 on Social Welfare Services 
sounded terse and empty (Dashiii. 1988, p.735):
- to maximize all potential elements and to adopt multiple 
measures to actively provide various social welfare services?
- to take good care of the livelihood of rural "five guarantee" 
households and the families of martyrs and soldiers;
- to suitably develop some convalescent homes and sanatoria, 
and to arrange for workers and cadres to go in groups to 
receive treatment and cure at different times?
- The state will spend 12.6 billion yuan over five years for 
the furtherance of preferential treatment and social relief.
When compared with sections on health, education, labour 
welfare, birth planning and other social programmes, its brevity 
gave the appearance of an afterthought. Such treatment reflected 
two attitudes. First, civil affairs departments were to carry on 
with traditional services and cater to old targets. Dramatic new 
fronts were not envisaged. Second, civil affairs work was of 
subsidiary importance in the overall development of the country. 
Still, the projected budget for the period was an improvement over 
the past.
The Eighth National Civil Affairs Conference, 1983
If the last conference endorsed the significance of continuity, 
the Eighth Conference was remarkable in clarifying new thinking. 
The 690 participants attending the forum renewed their pledge to 
have civil affairs contribute to the overall goal of the four 
TTyxfryrm  rations. Besides providing assistance to some 200 million
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people, CAD work could facilitate economic construction, political 
development and modernization of the armed forces:
"Doing civil affairs work properly is beneficial to: the
consolidation of the people's democratic centralism and the 
development of socialist democracy; mobilization of army morale 
and promotion of modernization of national defence; 
safeguarding the livelihood of targets for preferential 
treatment and relief, and promotion of stability and solidarity 
in society; and the propagation of communist moral ethics and 
the promotion of socialist spiritual civilization." (Dashiii. 
1988, p.584)
The above expectations have special meanings in the light of 
new conditions. In the area of political construction, the 
establishment of village and township governments and villagers' 
committees provided the machinery needed for rural administration 
after the abolition of communes. Insofar as they incorporated 
welfare tasks in their official functions, they furnished the basis 
for neighbourhood mutual aid. With reference to soldiers and 
veteran welfare, the relevant tasks have assumed added significance 
with the country's plan to trim the armed forces frcm four million 
soldiers to three million from 1985. In addition, a new 
conscription law was being drafted. Ccsning into effect in 1984, the 
legislation routinised the arrangements adopted since 1978. Now, 
the People's Liberation Army would cease to be an army of 
volunteers; instead conscripts would make up its main strength 
which would be supplemented by a professional core of servicemen 
who volunteered to prolong their service. Much as the draft gave 
the state greater certainty over recruitment, the morale of
combatants could be adversely affected if their families could not 
get adequate compensation. For this reason, reforms in preferential 
aid took on political importance. Next, the concern for social 
integration was underpinned by the changing environment. In order
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for individual and enterprise competition to take place, a stable 
political and social framework was vital. Expansion and improvement 
in social security could reduce the shocks and pains unleashed by 
economic change. Also, the minimization of income polarities was 
essential to ward off discontent. Needless to say, the protection 
of the most vulnerable gained a new urgency as they lacked the 
means for unassisted survival. Finally, the promotion of socialist 
spiritual civilization through the fortification of socialist 
morals, attitudes and habits supplied the antidote to ideological 
contamination. In welfare matters, CADs could mobilize and 
reinforce mutual help. This was not only a more compassionate way 
of caring, it also saved valuable state resources, which otherwise 
would have to be made more available in looking after the needy.
Overall, the tasks of civil affairs in the new era were 
summarized succinctly by the concept of the three partial 
components, sancre vibufen - civil affairs to serve the objectives 
of political construction, social security and civil management. 
Within this trinity, the work of social security was to be the most 
important.
The Seventh Five Year Plan 1986-1990
The Seventh FYP, adopted by the Central Committee of the CCP in 
September 1985 and formally passed by the Fourth Session of the 
Sixth National People's Congress in April 1986 called for attention 
to social security. The existing arrangements have left cut many 
groups in Chinese society. In the urban areas, labour insurance 
covered only employees of state-owned enterprises and large 
collectives while workers in small collectives, individual and
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private enterprises all received inferior benefits. In the 
countryside, the "five guarantees” and limited relief for veterans, 
their dependants, and hardship households were the only provisions 
in rural social security. The burgeoning army of former peasants 
working in rural enterprises were excluded entirely from labour 
security. These gaps became too prominent to ignore.
In order to complement the country's economic reforms, notably 
enterprise reforms, new social security systems "with Chinese
characteristics" were called for. The intention was to produce, by 
1990, a "prototype" social security system. The contents were to 
include social insurance, social welfare undertakings and 
preferential treatment. Modifications in funding and administration 
were also proposed. Nevertheless, the plan was noticeably vague on 
terminology. For instance, there was no definition of what "Chinese 
characteristics" meant. This was also true of the term "social 
insurance", unheard of before 1985. Only later did it transpire 
that "social insurance" covered not only labour insurance but also 
social protection for contract workers, the unemployed and 
ultimately all workers excluded frcm existing arrangements.
The MCA Five Year Programme 1986-1990
The MCA issued its cwn Five Year Programme to complement the 
country's five year plan. First of all, it identified four major 
deficiencies within the system of civil affairs. First, civil
affairs development fell behind the growth in the national economy
and other social programmes. Many veterans and soldiers' dependants 
could not enter old age hemes, many destitute aged who should be 
taken into care were not and rehabilitation services were woefully
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inadequate. Second, concern was expressed about the dilapidation of 
buildings. Most of the welfare hemes and centres, which were 
converted from ancestral halls and temples or confiscated from 
former missionary charities suffered badly from lack of maintenance 
and repair; 30 percent of such structures were in danger of 
collapse. However, state funds for renovation and extension were 
extremely short. Likewise, living standards of inmates stayed well 
below that of ordinary citizens. Third, the low standards of 
preferential treatment and relief were recognized. Living standards 
of recipients lagged behind that of the masses? in no way could 
they keep pace with general improvements in living standards in the 
country. Fourth, the report acknowledged low effectiveness and poor 
management. Care services offered were of poor quality. Similarly, 
welfare production enterprises were badly managed, inefficient and 
backward.
Next, the ministry spelt out the guiding thought for civil 
affairs work in the current period. The spirit echoed the general 
development ethos of the whole country. The CAD doctrine is to 
"liberate thinking, reform and innovate, help the poor and people 
receiving preferential treatment, overcome poverty to get rich, 
continually develop and perfect a social security system with 
Chinese characteristics alongside the construction of basic level 
polity in order to fulfil the overall mission and objective of the 
party in the new era.11 (SHBZB. 12 June 1986)
To give flesh to the above, six areas of development are 
identified (SHBZB. ibid).
1. Participate actively in building a prototype social security 
system; the ministry should systematically take part in testing out
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useful approaches (shidian). A workable model must suit China's 
special requirements and operate on principles encompassing mutiple 
delivery methods (xinashi ducyang), different items of coverage 
(xianamu butonq), and varying standards of provision (biaozhun 
voubieV.
2. Help the poor by making use of all available resources in 
society; in order to enable the poor and soldiers' dependants to 
get rich, developmental aid must be strengthened. For the relief of 
natural disasters and poverty, special funds should be set up. Help 
must not only take the form of grants but also include the supply 
of materials, technical help and knowledge so that the needy can 
regain self-sufficiency. Hie aims of CADs ?re to help the majority 
(dabufen) to escape frcm poverty and enable seme (ylbufen) to 
attain affluence.
3. Expand and transform direct social welfare services? service 
transformation should be done in three ways. First, their supply 
should change frcm state monopoly to joint provision by the state, 
collectives and individuals. Second, standards should gradually 
move away frcm minimal relief (i iui i xincr) to maximizing welfare 
(fuli xincr). Third, the service orientation should progress frcm 
custodial care (ggngyang) to integration of custodial support and 
rehabilitation (qoncrvancr vu kancrfu xiancr iiehe). The growth of 
services should proceed in a planned and coordinated manner. In 
large and medium-size cities, model facilities can be built as 
demonstration projects. Besides expansion of services, living 
conditions of residents should be raised gradually. As far as 
possible, CAD programmes should also admit fee-paying cases and 
open its doors to serve the general public. Finally, CADs should
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also improve service conditions for their staff.
4. Expand social welfare production enterprises in cities and rural 
areas; these units have the main aim of providing work for disabled 
people. While stressing their social utility (shehui xiagyi), their 
economic effectiveness (iincrii xiagyi) should not be neglected. At 
the same time, more job opportunities should be created under the 
auspices of non-state agencies. All the while, the competitiveness 
of enterprises should be maintained and enhanced by technological 
innovation and infrastructure improvement.
5. Improve preferential treatment and relief work? as the state's 
fiscal ability and people's living standards improve, there should 
be a commensurate rise in benefit levels for preferential treatment 
and social relief. In time these programmes will change their 
emphasis frcm providing pure hardship relief to adopting broader 
service objectives. While recipients' basic living standards must 
be defended, it is equally important to help people earn their 
living and to "get rich through industry". In addition, the 
ministry plans to promulgate the Law on Preferential Treatment for 
Military Personnel and Law on Social Relief to give firmer backing 
to policy enforcement.
6. Ensure the resettlement of retired military cadres and soldiers? 
during the plan period, CADs must work closely with other state and 
social agencies to resettle military cadres and soldiers.
Alongside general guidelines, specific attainment targets were 
spelled out:
- to provide 800,000 beds in social welfare homes of all
kinds to accommodate 750,000 residents?
social welfare production enterprises directly run by
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CADs to produce goods valued at 2.6 billion yuan by 1990, 
to increase at the rate of 8 percent per year?
- the national cremation rate to reach 39 percent by 1990, 
to grew at 2.7 percent annually?
- to set up the China Institute for Rehabilitation and 
Research and Institute of Prosthetic Research in Beijing?
- preferential treatment and relief funds to total 16 
billion yuan in the five years, grcwing at 6.3 percent per 
year from 1985?
- to establish six vocational middle schools for the 
training of civil affairs cadres and one civil affairs 
training college, the former kind to recruit 8,000 
students, with 5,000 completing the course by 1990.
Development of Other Areas of Civil Affairs Work
Although social security work has beccme the main thrust of civil 
affairs in the 1980s, civil management and political construction 
work has not been neglected. I shall only summarize those 
developments that have implications for social security.
First, the ministry has participated actively in reforming the 
rural administrative structure by disbanding communes and 
establishing xiang-zhens. At the end of 1988, the country has set 
15) 69,842 xiancr-zhen governments. Second, to facilitate grassroots 
governance, CADs have directed the formation of villagers' 
ccmmittees, which have grown to 845,025 in 1988 (Cui, ZGMZ, 
December 1990, p.4). Third, the ministry has also contributed to 
revising the criteria for the formation of townships and small 
cities, within its remit of territorial boundary administration.
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Fran 1982 to 1987, the number of townships increased frcm 2,968 to 
11,103 whereas the number of medium and small cities grew frcm 278 
to 378 (Cui, ibid). The growth of towns and cities has provided the 
administrative infrastructure vital to economic development of 
rural areas. In turn, this supplied the basis for administering 
rural welfare, where a bigger role has been assigned to local 
communities. The significance of the last point will emerge with 
greater clarity later in the chapter.
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Part TWo
Preferential Treatment
The Seventh National Civil Affairs Conference in September 1978 
defined the general principle of preferential work as "let politics 
take command, arrange for production, preferential treatment by the 
masses, and relief by the state". After the Third Plenum (December 
1978), the first slogan was considered a remnant of leftist 
thinking. So, during the Eighth Conference, the reference to 
politics was changed to "engaging in ideological education" 
(sixianer jiaoyu). Similarly in line with the emphasis on 
entrepreneurship and self-reliance, "arrange for production" became 
"giving assistance in production" (fuchi shengchan).
In parenthesis, ideological education refers to propaganda 
work. Among the three principal targets, the aim was to help aid 
recipients to became self-reliant and support the four 
modernizations? ordinary cadres and the masses to support the PIA 
and their dependents; and civil affairs cadres to do their work 
well. Giving assistance to production, on the other hand, entails 
providing help of all kinds - money, materials, technical aid and 
facilities to set recipients on the road from subsistence to 
prosperity. Indeed former soldiers and military cadres possessed 
good potential for getting ahead because of their training and 
connections. Therefore their talents would be useful to both 
military and civilian life (iundi lianavong rencai). By giving them 
development aid, the authorities set out to kill two birds with one 
stone: to help former soldiers directly and turn them into
activists in helping poor neighbours.
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To facilitate programme planning, the ministry conducted a 
general survey to register all eligible recipients beginning in 
October 1978. This work was completed in August 1979 (Dashiii. 
1988, p. 317). However because the information was considered 
sensitive, the report was never released. Later reference mentioned 
the figure of 4.9 percent of the population being covered by 
preferential treatment: nearly 3 million dependents of martyrs,
deceased soldiers and personnel missing in action? 840,000 disabled 
military personnel; 22 million dependents of serving soldiers; and 
21 million demobilized and retired soldiers (Gailun, 1987, p. 73). 
However, it must be remembered that these numbers referred to total 
eligible persons. Actual recipients were fewer. Services obtained 
varied locally and according to personal circumstances.
1. State Relief and Subsidy
(1) Death grant
The death grant is a one-off payment to compensate families for the 
loss of a member in the defence of the nation. For survivors who 
have no working ability and no regular income, on-going relief at 
fixed intervals and in fixed amount fdinaai dincrliancr jiuji) is 
also payable.
Regarding on-going relief, a major change came in 1985 when a 
monthly cash grant was introduced, designated as regular relief 
rdinagi fuxu). The ministry issued the following schedule for the 
reference of local areas, as in Figure 6. This served as general 
guidelines for local authorities which could determine the exact 
level of payment to suit local conditions. There was no doubt that 
the new scales were far more generous than previous ones. Between
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1979 and 1987 state expenditure on survivors' regular benefit went 
up by 405.8 percent (SHBZB. 6 November 1987). To implement the new
regulations, an additional 80 million yuan was allocated from the
Ministry of Finance in the first year.
Figure 6 Regular Relief for Dependants of Martyrs and Personnel 
_____________ Who Died From IXrtv and Disease, w.e.f. 1985
A. Death frcm Duty 
Residents in villages 20-25 yuan per person per month
Residents in small tcwns 30-35 yuan p.p.p.m.
Residents in medium and 35-40 yuan p.p.p.m.
large cities
B. Death 
Residents in villages 
Residents in small towns 
Residents in medium and 
large cities
Source: Dashiii. 1988, p.684.
At the same time, the basis for calculating death grants was
also reformed. Way back in 1955 the one-time death grant was 
calculated in units of food grain and the equivalent value was paid 
out in cash. In 1985, the grant was aligned to the deceased 
person's last monthly wage, a better reflection of current living 
standards.
Figure 7 One-time Death Grant, w.e.f. 1985
Revolutionary martyrs 40 months (last wage)
Death frcm duty 20 months
Death from disease 10 months
frcm Disease
15-20 yuan p.p.p.m. 
25-30 yuan p.p.p.m. 
30-35 yuan p.p.p.m.
Source : Dashiii, 1988, pp. 686-87. 
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Two supplementary points can be added. First, the above benefit 
was payable to the surviving dependants in descending order: (1) 
parents if the deceased was unmarried? (2) spouse if the deceased 
was married? (3) either parents or spouse, recipient to be decided 
through family decision? (4) children and siblings for those 
without parents or spouse (GEMZ. Issue 3, 1991, p.44). The priority 
given to parents was understandable as conscripts were called up 
between 18 to 22, when most were still single. However, it was 
unclear what would happen when there were multiple contenders even 
though local CADs were supposed to adjudicate. Second, there was 
the provision of increasing payment in line with earned merit. The 
increments were: additional 35 percent if the deceased was
decorated by the Party Military Commission, 30 percent if decorated 
by the military region, 25 percent for first class military honour, 
15 percent for second class honour and 5 percent for third class 
honour.
Generally speaking, the new stipulations were definite 
improvements on previous methods. Wage-related payments were more 
adaptable than fixed awards, thereby obviating the need for 
constant revisions when wages rose. By the same token, general 
relativities based on rank and cause of death were more rational. 
Insofar as wages are rank-related, seniority is automatically taken 
into account. On the other hand, wide differentials raised awkward 
questions. First, there was the issue of arbitrariness. Second, 
merit-based adjustments further widened inequality. It was doubtful 
whether the principle of compensation for sacrifice and relief for 
hardship was not compromised in such a way that altered the nature 
of the grant itself.
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In 1988, a new set of regulations came into effect,
Preferential Treatment Regulations for Military Personnel. It 
reaffirmed the basic principle of san iiehe. integrated efforts of 
state, society and the masses in providing preferential treatment. 
With regard to the one-time death grant, the concept of linking 
grant levels to number of months salary was retained. However the 
previous schedule of specifying monthly equivalent payment was 
emitted. This was adopted to maximize ease of future adjustments. 
Instead of having to amend the scales, the ministry could define 
new standards frcm time to time.
In respect of regular relief for survivors, the 1988 
regulations concurred with the spirit of the 1985 amendments in 
allowing local areas to fix relief levels. However, a state- 
prescribed minimum was new in force. The practice of "safeguarding 
the floor level, not fixing the ceiling” (baodi bu fengding) 
ackncwleged the need for a protected baseline but at the same time 
was realistic about regional differences in economic and social 
development.
(2) Disability relief
Disability relief is payable to disabled soldiers, police, militia 
and civilian workers hurt in combat as well as cadres of the 
democratic parties and mass organizations. Hie relief was 
previously given in grain (1950-52) and from 1953, in cash, with 
payment dispensed twice yearly. Rates varied according to degree of 
disability, cause and residential status. No relief schedule was 
available before the reform period. Between 1979 and 1987, rates 
were revised several times.
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Effective frcm 1 January 1988, a new schedule was published, as 
set out in Figure 8 belcw. As can be seen, higher awards went to 
persons sustaining disabilities in the course of ccnibat and duty 
than from disease and for those resident in the countryside. The
Figure 8 Standard Scales for the Relief of Revolutionary 
___________Disabled Workers. January 1988_______________
category Grade of Nature of Scales of
of Relief Disability Disability Relief (p.a.)
Diabled special from ccnibat 1,200 yuan
personnel from duty 1,100
resident
in rural 1 frcm ccnibat 1,020
areas frcm duty 950
frcm disease 860
2A frcm ccnibat 740
frcm duty 660
frcm disease 600
2B frcm ccnibat 538
frcm duty 480
frcm disease 450
3A frcm ccnibat 336
frcm duty 322
3B frcm ccnibat 272
frcm duty 272
For special frcm ccnibat 240
employed frcm duty 216
disabled
personnel 1 frcm ccnibat 204
frcm duty 184
2A from ccnibat 156
frcm duty 140
2B from ccnibat 135
frcm duty 122
3A frcm ccnibat 108
from duty 98
3B frcm ccnibat 90
frcm duty 82
Source: GDSZJ. 1979, p. 114.
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differentials between classes of disability were very wide. Relief 
rates for peasants were much higher as they were not guaranteed 
employment and disabilities affected their future earnings much 
more than urbanites who had a work unit to which to return. The 
1988 regulations also retained the concept of relativity. More 
significantly, hcwever, they introduced the new principle of 
relating disability of the special class (complete loss of work 
ability) to the national average wage of an ordinary worker. Based 
on this notional figure, standards for other ranks were derived in 
a preset formula. The "average worker*s wage" concept was a better 
way of linking compensation to average earnings in society. Wage 
indexation allowed easy adjustment and the calculation was 
potentially more scientific. This gave better protection to 
disabled veterans living in villages although with rising prices 
their living standard still fell behind the rest of society.
(3) State subsidy
State subsidy can be either temporary or regular. Temporary subsidy 
is given in contingency situations, for example for natural 
disasters and illness, to disabled veterans to top up their meagure 
disability relief. Also eligible are veterans who do not quality 
for disability payment but need help to tide them over periods of 
hardship. For those who became too frail and old to work, for 
example Red Army soldiers flap hgngjun) who enlisted before 1937, a 
regular subsidy may be given by the local government (ZGMZCD, 1990, 
p.147).
Taking state relief and subsidies as a whole, there has been 
seme achievements in the period 1979 to 1986.
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Table 4 Annual Per Capita Relief, Subsidy and Preferential 
Aid Enioved bv Preferential Treatment Targets 1979-1986
1979 1983 1986 1986/1979
(yuan) (% increase)
1. One-time death grant 447 484 862 92.8
2. Disability relief 103 123 235 128.2
3. Regular relief 52 110 263 405.8
4. Reg. relief for retired
& demobilized soldiers 52 110 153 194.2
5. Subsidy to Rad Amy - 533 659 -
veterans
6 . Preferential aid 84 136 255 203.6
from the masses
Source : Dashiii, 1988, p.761.
Between 1979 to 1986, most items of state aid (1 to 5) have 
increased substantially in amount. The biggest rise was in regular 
subsidies for survivors; improvements in death grants were modest. 
In this period, the state expended 4,290 million yuan on 
preferential relief and subsidies, equivalent to the total amount 
spent in the previous 29 years (SHBZB. 6 November 1987). 
Concurrently, aid from the masses also grew dramatically, doubling 
in 8 years. In 1988, preferential aid from the state and the masses 
was 1,100 million yuan and 880 million yuan respectively (SHBZB. 14 
April 1989). Nevertheless, rising inflation since 1986 has eroded
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purchasing pcwer and increased relative deprivation (Zhou, ZGMZ. 
October 1989, pp. 10-11). Fran 1987 to 1988, if the effects of price 
rises were taken into account, the real value of preferential aid 
frcm the state and the masses actually declined by 9.3 percent 
(SHBZB, 14 April 1989).
2. Preferential Treatment frcm the Masses (Ounzhona ygudai)
Ounzhona voudai refers to goods and services given by the masses 
and society to soldiers and their families. Just as the earliest 
forms of mass aid by way of substitute tilling (1950-56) had been 
replaced by the granting of work-points (1957-1980), the latter 
method was no longer compatible with new conditions. As a result, 
both urban and rural areas adopted a universal cash payment system 
(pupian voudai) to compensate soldiers' families.
To understand the need for change, seme background information 
on military pay and recruitment conditions is important. The FRC 
adopts different approaches in recruiting and remunerating officers 
and rank and file soldiers. Officers ccme primarily frcm graduates 
of military academies, colleges and vocational middle schools; same 
are promoted frcm serving soldiers who pass the requisite 
examinations. Having the status of a government cadre, officers are 
salaried personnel and their families have an assured income. Such 
conditions do not apply to ordinary conscripts. Ccming mostly frcm 
rural areas, persons answering the draft (three years for the army, 
four years for the navy and air force) do not draw a monthly wage. 
What they get is free board and lodgings in the barracks and a 
gmall stipend (about 20 yuan per month) as pocket money. Neither do 
their families get any state remittance. Under the reforms, the
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economic consequences for soldiers1 dependants were obvious - 
denuded labour power and diminished income. The loss was especially 
galling to rural families who needed manpower to work their
responsibility land (zeren tian) or make money through other means. 
Even in urban areas, greater choice in jobs and self-ernplcyment 
also made national service unrewarding. Without reasonable 
recompense, there will be resistance to the draft. A universal cash 
grant system was an answer to the problem.
In the countryside, puoian voudai was calculated by joint
reference to the family's actual need and the average annual income 
in the oammunity. The amount of subsidy usually fell between 50-100 
percent of the average annual income of one unit of labour power 
(laodoncr li). Besides cash payments, local neighbourhoods also gave 
development aid (fuygu), similar in nature to fuoin for the poor. A 
fuller description for fuvou and fuoin will follow later.
Funding for veterans' support came from two main sources. For
localities that maintained cooperative rural industries and other
collective projects, enterprise incomes and profits provided the 
revenue. In general, the more money coming frcm this source, the 
less necessary it was to rely on per capita levies, the second 
means of finance. Areas that resorted to raising levies were 
usually poor communities that had little industrial income. As 
discussed before, this has implications for territorial justice. 
Residents in properous places were exempted from welfare tax; those 
in poor areas were doubly penalized by earning lower incomes and 
having to contribute directly to community welfare.
On the other hand, resourcing in urban areas centred around 
work units and neighbourhoods. The old work units of conscripts
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who held jobs before serving in the army paid half of their basic 
wage to their dependants every month. Danweis were also obligated 
to re-engage former employees who finished their national service. 
Meanwhile financial support for families of previously unplaced 
conscripts came from street offices, which also granted temporary 
relief to demobilized soldiers awaiting job placements.
In 1985, annual cash subsidy to rural conscripts averaged 232.2 
yuan per household. This increased to 255 yuan in 1986, as seen in 
Table 5. During 1987, preferential treatment from the masses grew 
to 810 million yuan, benefitting 3.2 million households of deceased 
and serving soldiers. The amount further increased to 880 million 
yuan in 1988. However, as said before, if price rises were taken 
into account, the value of preferential aid actually dropped 9.3 
percent over the previous year (SHBZB, 14 April 1989).
3. Institutional care
Four types of veterans institutions are run by CADs: (a) hemes for 
disabled soldiers, (b) sanatoria for chronically ill ex-servicemen,
(c) psychiatric hospitals for retired and demobilized soldiers and
(d) homes of glory (quanqvoncr yuan) (for single elderly but also 
accepting orphans and disabled dependants of veterans).
Between 1980 and 1985, the total number of veteran institutions 
went up frcm 564 to 1,045, averaging an annual increase of 13.1 
percent; and the number of beds, frcm 31,612 to 41,320, or 5.5 
percent per year (Dashiii. 1988, pp.742 and 744) • Of the total 
supply, state provision grew frcm 25,873 to 32,658 beds While 
those maintained by rural communities increased from 5,739 to 
8,662. In percentage terms, the expansion of non-state services has
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been more rapid (annual 8.6 percent) than state services (4.8 
percent) (Dashiii. ibid.). Generally, there was still 
underprovision. For example, in 1984, for a population of 840,000 
disabled veterans, only some 40,000 beds were made available. 
Another problem was uneven distribution. For instance, in 1985, 
Hebei province alone had 8,277 beds (20 percent of total beds), 
followed by Jiangxi (6,997 beds, 17 percent) while Gansu, Ningxia 
and Xinjiang all had belcw 100 beds (Minzhencr Gonazuo Weniian 
Xuanbian, 1986, pp.451-52). To what extent these problems have been 
rectified since 1985 remained a mystery.
For those fortunate enough to be served, living standards as 
measured by average spending per resident (mainly food) has shewn 
modest gains.
Table 5 Average Annual Living Expenditure Per Resident
__________In Institutions for Ex-soldiers. 1979-1986
1979 1983 1986 1986/79
(yuan) (% gain)
Homes for disabled
soldiers 464 382 701 51.1
Sanatoria for chronically
ill ex-soldiers 272 292 436 60.3
Psychiatric hospitals 233 279 356 52.8
Homes of glory (aged homes) 153 190 432 182.4
Source : Daishiii. 1988, p.762.
In all institutions, maintenance standards for residents
- 177 -
increased by over 50 percent between the years. Aged homes in 
particular managed to catch up with other establishments. However, 
when the effect of inflation was reckoned, the gains were 
negligible. CAD officials acknowledged that residents were still 
substantially worse off than fellow citizens.
On another front, veteran institutions have made good attempts 
to upgrade the quality of care. In a move to professionalize 
services, the ministry advocated broader aims of providing care and 
rehabilitation treatment besides custodial support. Since 1986, 104 
sanatoria and hemes have provided active rehabilitation treatment 
to seme 27,000 inmates. As a result, it was reported that more than 
30 percent of recipients have shewn "marked improvements" (SHBZB, 8 
January 1988). Another new initiative was open access of heme 
facilities to the general public. In this respect, some successes 
have been reported. Since 1986, four million out-patient treatments 
have been given by veteran sanatoria and hospitals in a fee for 
service basis (ibid). In addition, the admission of self-financing 
residents alleviated their tight budgets. Nevertheless, given the 
shortfall of service, one cannot be sure whether the open door 
policy has worked against soldiers and their dependants.
4. Other Activities
Besides material support, CADs and the masses undertook other 
activities to honour the FLA. To commend martyrs, CADs built and 
maintained memorial structures, compiled biographies of heroes, and 
mounted exhibitions and propaganda drives. Since 1980, 341 name 
scrolls of 1.5 million martyrs were published. In the last 30 
years, some 5,000 memorial monuments were built.
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Another programme was solicitude and support (voncriun voushu). 
The highlights of this took place during the New Year, Spring 
Festival and the anniversary of the founding of the HA. 
Celebrations were usually preceded by ministry circulars reminding 
state and party leaders to honour PIA personnel and support their 
families. Highly publicized broadcasts and hone visits with 
officials bearing gifts dramatized the events. Indeed these yearly 
rituals were so well marked that they stereotyped CADs as "bai bai 
nian. pai pai aian (paying visits, giving money) agencies.
Furthermore, there was the citation of advanced units. 
Selection of government offices and community organizations that 
have performed outstanding work in voncriun voushu was conducted at 
regular intervals. Similarly exemplary individuals were extolled. 
The best known model is undoubtedly Lei Feng, a young PIA officer 
who performed many virtuous deeds and died during the course of 
duty (ZGMZCD. 1990, p. 179). Up to 1987, 19,373 units and 70,076 
persons have received citations.
The authorities were also keen to mobilize the masses to serve 
the military in more direct ways. Marked targets included 
grassroots organizations like militia units, big enterprises, 
schools and neighbourhood groups. According to MCA reports, the 
masses have organized some 1.14 million support groups. Such work 
involved some 12.87 million individuals who performed 11 million 
"good deeds" (hgu shi), whatever that meant. From what is known, 
the impact of these activities are more symbolic than real. 
Nevertheless, given that the state had no plans to take up the onus 
of paying reasonable wages for conscripts and devising an adequate 
support package for veterans, constant reminders to the masses to 
remember their debt to the military were necessary.
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Part Three
Resettlement: of Military Personnel
Since 1958, the resettlement policy has followed the policy of 
"from whence you come, to whence you return" (com nali lai, hu 
nali qu). This means that demobilized personnel go back to the 
places where they enlisted. Between 1978 and 1987, 8 million former 
soldiers were resettled (SHBZB, 22 January 1988).
1. Resettlement of rural recruits
Each year, about 700,000 to 800,000 ex-servicemen return to their 
place of origin, representing about 80 percent of soldiers leaving 
the army. Before 1978, returnees were able to rejoin their former 
communes. After agriculture have decollectivized, this avenue was 
closed. Instead former soldiers had to fend for themselves, albeit 
with the new skills and connections they acquired during their army 
stint.
To prepare veterans for their re-entry to civilian life, rural 
returnees are given a strong dose of indoctrination. Specifically 
they are taught to become independent (fu zhi) and not to rely on 
the state. This is undertaken to assuage feelings of injustice when 
they compare their lot with their urban peers, who continue to 
benefit from state-assigned work placements.
The job of helping veterans is not confined to CADs alone. Many 
government departments are involved in mobilizing resources and 
giving assistance. For example, the programme of fuvou. development 
aid for veterans draws an the effort of many agencies, each 
contributing what they can. Agricultural departments teach
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cropping advice and faming techniques. Supply bureaux give them
preference in selling seeds and fertilizers. Bank and credit
agencies arrange for loans and credit and so on. Hcwever, it was 
the CADs that have the job of coordinating inter-sectoral aid.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the specific tasks of CADs are
three fold. They are (1) reception and repatriation, (2) resettling 
former soldiers, and (3) monitoring and coordination.
Since 1983, in order to fully exploit the talent of
ex-servicemen, CADs originated the setting up of job exchanges at 
county, district and xiana-zhen levels. Frcm 1983 to 1987, same
2,000 counties and cities have established military-civilian
manpower development agencies fiundi liancrvoncr rencai fuwu jiggu, 
serving more than 1.5 million veterans (SHBZB, 25 March 1988). By 
the end of 1987, 250,000 former soldiers were employed as village 
cadres, 260,000 were placed in rural industries, and 110,000 took
up rural sideline and specialist productions. In addition, former 
soldiers set up a total of 2,300 joint economic enterprises. In 
1988, the number of manpower development agencies grew to 2,300, 
serving same 510,000 persons (SHBZB. 14 April 1989).
In the area of skill training, CADs made use of outside
resources. Colleges and technical experts were invited to conduct 
special classes, retraining schemes and counselling. An advanced
city was Jiamusi in Heilongjiang which set up a string of training 
bases, drawing on the help of over 100 units. Changting County in 
Fujian was also cited for innovative projects making use of
existing militia camps for training locations. Furthermore, to
enable stable leadership and institutional support, there was a 
corps of seven cadres frcm various departments to direct the work.
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Apart from a few outstanding examples, hcwever, the performance of 
such schemes varied substantially. While sane offered rigorous 
programmes, others appeared to be organized haphazardly. My 
informants suggested that the training given in most was limited in 
scope and quality. The vast majority of rural veterans who could 
not benefit found job hunting difficult. For them, serving the 
nation had caused them to miss out on local opportunities.
2. Resettlement of Urban Recruits
Since the 1950s, the placement principle was to find jobs that 
matched the professional skills of the veteran (hanove duikou). At 
the end of the Cultural Revolution when the country faced serious 
problems of unemployment and underemployment, it was no longer easy 
to put former soldiers back in their old trades. In 1980, a 
resettlement conference adopted a new policy of finding work for 
returnees. The resolution was that each industry or work sector 
(xitoncri has to accept a state assigned quota (an xitoncr fencroei 
renwu. baocran anzhi) under the state plan. This meant that labour 
agencies still found work in the employment sector where the 
returnee originated, but the job given might not match his skill 
and training.
At the same time, the authorities made attempts to enlarge 
employment sources. Apart from simply waiting for job placements, 
returnees were encouraged to find work using private channels or to 
become self-employed. The general ethos was to get rid of 
dependency and passivity, i.e. reliance on "eating from the big 
pot" (chi daauo fan).
In 1983 a joint circular from the ministries of Civil Affairs,
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labour and Personnel, Public Security, and Defence further resolved 
to link urban job placement with merit and achievement. What this 
implied was differential treatment. For former soldiers who 
achieved merit and prolonged their military service, they would be 
placed in jobs according to their preference; receiving units were 
expected to utilize their expertise in assigning duties. At the 
same time, those who completed their national service would have 
priority of allocation over those who did not. On the other hand, 
miscreants were to be penalised. Ex-soldiers who were convicted of 
offences during their tour of duty or while awaiting job placement 
would be treated like any job-awaiting youth fdaive ainanian), 
meaning that street offices rather than labour bureaux would assume 
responsibility for introducing them to jobs. The length of service 
would also affect placement priority: former soldiers who served 
for over one year would be placed only after the group that 
completed their tour; those serving less than a year would not get 
any priority at all.
Ministry strictures notwithstanding, placement efforts for 
urban veterans meet with many difficulties (Han and Pan, ZGMZ, 
October 1989, p.18; Han, ZGMZ. August 1990, p.24; Bai, ZGMZ. July 
1991, p. 18). First of all, many work units were reluctant to accept 
their quota of returnees. New that enterprises were expected to 
become competitive and managers had more power over recruitment, 
only the very skilled were taken on. Second, most work units tried 
to limit their intake. For example, a common strategy was to 
confine their obligation to children of their own employees. In 
turn, these difficulties reverberated on placement agencies. Seme 
tried to refocus their efforts. As soon as they had found work for
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priority targets (decorated soldiers and officers), they considered 
their mission fulfilled. Unrealistic expectation of returnees 
compounded the difficulties. Most wanted civil service jobs or work 
in financial and trade offices? employment as production operatives 
and in unprofitable enterprises was shunned. Finally, widespread 
practices of "going through the back door" by those with good 
connections stirred resentment. The lack of openness in placement 
work also accentuated the feeling of nepotism and corruption. To a 
large extent, many of these problems are the product of the 
economic reforms. Indeed they are so complex and intertwining that 
they defied easy solution.
3. Resettlement of military cadres
Retired staff (55 for males and 50 for females) are entitled to 
pensions (65-85 percent of basic wage according to year of service) 
and the full range of occupational benefits and allowances. In 
1978, a new retirement status, li xiu. was created to induce aged 
veterans to retire. This applied to army cadres who began their 
revolutionary career before 1949 (Davis, 1988, 1990). On top of 
pensions equivalent to 100 percent of their basic pay and all 
perks, li xiu cadres retain their political privileges (right to 
read government reports, attend meetings and briefings and be 
considered for advisory posts). There are also provisions for 
incremental awards: an additional 5-15 percent of basic pay for
earned merit and previous service in hazardous environments, and 
attendance allowance for veterans suffering frcm special class 
disability or chronic illness. Finally, retired cadres enjoyed 
housing assistance not available to the rank and file. By year-
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end 1988, 48,000 housing units were built for retired officers
(Cui, ZGMZ. January 1989, p.5).
In the reform decade, CADs stepped up supervision work of 
retired cadres. This began with the transfer of the personal 
dossier (dang an) frcm the armed forces. In China, the personal 
file contains all vital information on a person such as his/her 
past and current activities, group affiliation, political 
proclivity and personal and family circumstances (Walder, 1986). It 
is used as a tool of political control and holds the key to one's 
fortune. The other aspect of supervision is on-going 
indoctrination. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, frustrations of 
retired officers and soldiers had given rise to a number of unruly 
incidents (nao shi) (Dashiii. 1988, pp. 351, 356). Because of their 
sensitive nature, the reports were kept under wraps. Frcm what was 
known, inadequate support to veterans, difficulties over work 
placements and lack of supervision were conceded to be contributing 
factors. In order to strengthen the control of veterans, the State 
Council created a Steering Group on Resettlement of Retired 
Soldiers and Retired Cadres in March 1981. This group first had its 
office in the MCA, designating the ministry to be responsible for 
carrying out the routine work. Three months later, the MCA 
established its Resettlement Bureau. Execution of daily work 
identified by the Steering Group was then substantially 
strengthened.
Starting in 1983, CADs were made responsible for overseeing 
former army cadres, taking over the job frcm communes and street 
offices which were proving inadequate to the task. To give effect 
to the new policy, CADs received special manpower and funds. By
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the end of 1988, there were a total of 1,377 agencies devoted to 
supervising veterans (SHBZB. 14 April 1989) • At the same time, CADs 
expanded supportive services. Housing assistance was one important 
resource. The building of cadre rest stations (gan xiu sug), 
centres providing support and social activities for retired arm/ 
cadres, was another. The size of these establishments varied. In 
Guangzhou, the cadre rest station occupied one whole building 
offering comprehensive services. But in seme urban neighbourhoods 
they may only occupy one designated room. Hcwever, from my visits 
to many neighbourhoods, most of them were small club rooms with 
little by way of furniture or amenities. Drop-in users were few.
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Part Pour
fintrial Relief and Disaster Relief
The relief programme consists of three components: natural disaster 
relief, social relief, and development aid or poverty aid (fuoin) 
which developed from efforts to reform the first two schemes.
With universal employment and work-based welfare forming the 
pillar of the urban welfare system, relief of natural disasters and 
poverty has a decidedly rural orientation. During the commune 
period, the relief programme followed the party line of "rely on 
the masses, rely on the collective, self-regeneration through 
production in the main, supplemented by necessary relief from the 
state” (vikao ounzhona. vikao jiti, shenachan zioou weizhu, fuzhnyi 
auoiia biyaode jiuji). Primary responsibility was placed on the 
masses and rural collectives while the state role was subsidiary. 
This did not change with the reforms.
In 1983, the Eighth Civil Affairs Conference spelt out the 
general direction as "rely on the masses, rely on the collective, 
regeneration through production, mutual help and mutual relief, 
supplemented by necessary relief and development aid frcm the 
state" (yikao ounzhona. vikao jiti, shenachan zioou. huzhu huiiu. 
fuzhivi auoiia bivaode iiuii vu fuchi). When compared with the 
pre-reform goal statement, the new emphases were '•mutual help and 
mutual relief" and "developmental aid from the state". These were 
mandated by emergent circumstances. With the abolition of communes, 
the collective element, though not eliminated universally (Oi, 
1990), has largely dissipated throughout much of rural China. As 
discussed before, this plunged local communities into a crisis in
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welfare financing and a new fiscal base had to be fashioned cut of 
taxes from rural industries and household levies. In these ways, 
the values of mutual help and mutual relief by the masses were 
maximized. At the same time, poverty in the midst of emerging 
wealth and greater income inequality became a political issue 
confronting the state. For one, civil affairs agencies came to the 
conclusion that handouts were too passive and could not help the 
poor to regain self-reliance. To be truly effective, the assistance 
given should aim at helping people earn their living. Hence, 
development aid or poverty aid (fuoin) was instituted alongside the 
regular relief programme.
1. Natural Disaster Relief (ziran zaihai iiuii or iiuzai)
At the 1983 conference, three major reforms in disaster relief 
policy were legitimized, as mentioned in Chapter Four. First, the 
adoption of the responsibility system in disaster relief funding. 
Experiments first started in Ningxia and Gansu. By 1985 this method 
spread to other areas. The essence of the system was for the 
central government to negotiate with a province a fixed grant the 
latter would receive annually for disaster relief over a period; 
the latter then managed the best it could within it. While local 
areas retained unspent money, they gave up the right to ask for 
more. The contracted amount was determined by such factors as the 
region's history of natural disasters, number of poor counties, 
local financial ability and demographic characteristics (Gailun, 
1987, p. 158). This policy was justified as promoting local 
initiative and responsibility in managing their resources. At the 
same time, it addressed such problems as exaggerating relief needs
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or hiding hardship situations from the centre.
Second, reform in the use of relief funds. The aim was to 
ensure the most flexible use of limited relief funds to turn "dead 
money into live money" (sicrian bianwei huogian). By "dead money" 
was meant money given by way of grants which went towards meeting 
the consumption needs of victims like food, clothes and shelter. In 
contrast, "live money" was money given out as loans to encourage 
entrepreneurship and the recycling that became possible with 
repayment. Both grants and loans performed useful functions. By 
allowing local authorities flexible use of funds for both purposes, 
the utility of limited state money was enhanced.
Third, change in the method of payment. After the immediate 
requirements of victims were met, recipients who were deemed 
capable of repayment were required to return the amount received 
without interest. Only those without work ability, e.g. "five 
guarantee" households, were exempted.
Table 6 Natural Disaster Victims Receiving Relief 
__________From the State. 1981-1985_____________
Year No. of recipients % decrease over 
(million persons) previous year
1981 98.837
1982 88.066 - 7.1
1983 71.780 -18.5
1984 57.286 - 20.2
1985 23.778 -58.5
Source : Dashiii. 1988, p.750
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The effects of implementing new disaster relief policies were 
worrying. From Table 6, the most striking discovery was the 
progressive fall in the number of recipients of state relief. Hie 
decline was sharpest after 1983.
Frcm ministry records, 1983 and 1985 were bad years when heavy 
losses of lives and property occurred, hence fewer beneficiaries 
could not mean fewer needs (Dashiii. 1988, p.751). 1986 was another 
disaster year. Because of the ruinous drought, MCA had to ask the 
central government for a supplementary grant. Initially, 100
million yuan was approved but in the end 20 million yuan was clawed
back. For the year as a whole, actual state spending on disaster 
relief amounted to 1.02 billion yuan, exceeding the MCA's original 
budget by 130 million yuan (Dashiii. 1988, p.547). The year 1988 
witnessed even more calamities, necessitating state expenditure of 
1.04 billion yuan and 10 billion catties of food to relieve the 
victims. Still, out of 235.4 million people affected, only 68.4 
million person-time units (per person per time) of relief were 
given (SHBZB. 14 April 1989).
In view of the above outcomes, state policies deserve closer
analysis. Regarding the relief fund responsibility system, the 
intended effects have either not occurred or have created new 
problems. To begin with, it was impossible to work out an 
appropriate grant figure, if only because disaster prediction was 
fraught with difficulties. It was also impossible to stamp out the 
abuse in the use of relief funds, a long-standing problem. 
Immediately following the release of the 1983 regulations, a number 
of serious breaches were revealed —  in Anhui, Shanxi and Jiangxi 
in May 1984 (teshiji, 1988, p.430), in Founan and Gaoan counties in
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June 1984 (Dashi-ii. 1988, p. 437) and Hucyou county in 1986 
(Dashiii. 1988, pp. 524-25). Interestingly some of the incidents 
were widely publicized in the national press, aalong with stem 
reprimands from top state and party leaders. Given that cill H*C 
newspapers are under party control, such handling could be an 
indication of the severity of the problem. It could well be 
construed as attempts to shame CADs into adopting stricter 
financial control so as to preempt further pleading for more 
handouts.
The evidence concerning flexible use of relief funds was mixed. 
On the positive side, much valuable work on poverty aid has been 
embarked upon, as will be discussed shortly. Contrariwise the 
policy resulted in much confusion. For example, in the absence of
firm guidelines on what proportions could be used for emergency
payment as against poverty aid, many areas followed the political
wind and became unduly stingy in dispensing relief. This could 
explain why the recipient population dropped so sharply. By 1986, 
many articles in SHBZB and ZGMZ were clamouring for more attention 
to the subsistence needs of disaster victims.
With respect to combined use of loans and grants, the evidence 
was also chequered. On the one hand, difficulties in getting 
grants, except for "five-guarantee” targets, led to the growth of
credit cooperatives and mutual funds initiated by the masses and 
CADs, either singly or in conjuction with agricultural banks and 
insurance companies, as was said earlier. On the other hand, there 
was a reduction in state aid. From 1984 onwards, the ministry 
withheld disaster relief grants to rural counties with annual per 
capita income above 400 yuan. Between 1982 and 1987, 4.2 billion
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yuan was released as loans, equivalent to 57 percent of all funds 
budgetted for natural disaster relief (Minzheng Bu, Zhonaauo Jincri 
Tizhi Gaige Shinian. 1988, p.560). This forced local areas to rely 
more on bank loans and community resources to satisfy development 
needs and finance welfare services.
2. Social Relief fshehui iiirii)
In Rural areas
The "five guarantee" scheme was the cornerstone of the social 
relief programme in the countryside.
Table 7 The "Five Guarantee" Scheme. 1978-1988
Year "Five-G." "Five-G." Rate Ccmmunal Spendinc
persons recipients supported spending per heac
(10,000) (10,000) (percent) (10,000 yuan) (yuan)
1978 315.0 267.8 85.0 12,571 46.9
1979 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1980 294.4 253.9 86.2 17,223 61.4
1981 289.9 259.5 89.5 20,363 79.4
1982 298.9 269.0 90.0 28,455 107.7
1983 295.1 283.8 96.2 33,867 122.5
1984 296.1 269.1 90.9 41,866 151.5
1985 300.8 223.8 74.4 52,854 214.5
1986 293.2 220.4 75.2 n.a. n.a.
1987 287.0 219.0 76.3 46,164 210.8
1988 250.1 218.8 87.5 64,574 295.1
Sources:
1. Figures for 1978-1985 are frcm Zhonaauo Shehui Tonaii Ziliao
1987. p. 120, hereafter ZGSHTJZL.
2. 1986 and 1987 figures are from Zhonaauo Nonacun Tonaii Nianiian
1988. p.278, hereafter ZGNCTJNJ; per head spending calculted
frcm aggregate figures.
3. 1988 figures are from ZGNCTJNJ 1989. p.319; per head spending
calculated frcm aggregate figures.
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Fran Table 7, it is obvious that not all designated persons 
actually received social assistance. Before 1980, the percentage of 
people supported was less than 90 percent. Thereafter, the rate 
increased and peaked in 1983. The collapse of the commune system 
after 1983 seriously threatened the viability of the scheme. 
Between 1984 and 1985, total communal spending increased by 26 
percent, so has per head spending, which reached 215 yuan in 1985. 
Hcwever the percentage of persons supported plummeted to 74.4 
percent. This suggested that localities were more selective in 
granting aid. In 1986 and 1987, the proportion aided remained at 
similar levels. It was not until 1988 that the support rate climbed 
back to pre-1980 levels. In terms of per head spending, there were 
notable gains. Even then, bearing in mind that the annual per 
capita net income of the rural masses has reached 545 yuan (FS, 
1989, p. 104), living standards of "five-guarantee” households were 
only half of those enjoyed by fellcw villagers.
The plight of needy people not getting help aroused much 
attention. Sane destitute persons were reportedly found begging 
from their neighbours or left entirely unsupported. This prompted a 
number of ministerial and provincial circulars reminding the masses 
of their ccmmunal duty. The response from local areas has been to 
find alternative means of financing the "five guarantees", as 
discussed before. Now most places have centralized collection and 
distribution of aid within xiana-zhens. More prosperous places like 
the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong relied primarily on enterprise 
incomes frcm rural industries. Hcwever, these methods were far from 
satisfactory. Levies, in particular, were ad hoc; likewise 
enterprise incomes fluctuated frcm year to year. More reliable
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means of securing income have not been found.
One definite improvement in providing support to "five- 
guarantee11 households has been the building of ccmmunal care 
facilities. Hemes of respect (iincrlao Icy) or aged hemes quadrupled 
in numbers between 1978 and 1988? total residents increased three 
times, reference Table 8. By the end of 1987, 36 percent of xiancys 
had established at least one aged home (SHBZB. 25 March 1988); by 
1988, this increased to 48.5 percent (SHBZB. 14 April 1989). Same 
areas have moved further ahead. For example, in Shandong, by 1987, 
90 percent of xiancr-zhens there had established an aged heme; in 
Jilin province nearly all xiancr-zhens had one facility.
Table 8 Acred Homes Maintained By Rural Communities. 1978-1988
Year No. of Aged Homes No. of Residents Total F-G Persons
(10,000) (10,000)
1978 n.a. n.a. 315.0
1979 7,470 10.6 n.a.
1980 8,262 11.2 294.4
1981 8,544 11.5 289.9
1982 10,586 13.8 298.9
1983 14,047 16.9 295.1
1984 21,190 24.6 296.1
1985 27,103 30.9 300.8
1986 26,678 28.5* 293.1
1987 28,014 31.3* 287.0
1988 28,532 32.5* 250.1
Note : * refers to "five guarantee" elderly only.
Source : same as for Table 7.
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A related development was the setting up of "five-guarantee" 
service centres, which was pioneered by Jilin. Based in the aged 
homes, these centres became a base for organizing support services, 
for example, collecting and supplying grain and domiciliary help to 
the needy in their homes (Cidian, 1987, p. 158? SHBZB. 3 April 
1987). This approach was quickly copied by other areas.
There were other changes. One was income generation. As 
discussed before, the nature and scale of projects varied. In 1987, 
entrepreneurial activities were reaping an income of 60 million 
yuan. By September 1988, 80 percent of all rural homes were
engaging in same form of money-making activity (SHBZB. 23 June 
1989). Yet another experiment was the promotion of care and support 
contracts between the elderly, their family or other carers. These 
agreements were meant to provide better guarantees for support, 
make explicit rights and duties, and forestall quarrels among 
heirs. Both ordinary old people and "five guarantee" folks were 
encouraged to make such agreements. For the latter, the contracts 
would be signed with a relative (who had no legal duty to support), 
neighour, local cadre or the village collective. These were then 
witnessed by village officials. The major terms of exchange was for 
the "five-guarantee" elderly to get material and labour support 
frcm the designated carer or collective and the latter to gain 
possession of the receiver's estate, usually his/her house when 
he/she died. While this has worked well when both parties entered 
the transaction voluntarily, there have been reports of elders 
being forced to give up their property as a pre-condition of 
receipt. The ministry has condemned this practice as violating old 
people's rights to self-determination. Hcwever, since the funding
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and administration of the "five guarantees” is a local 
responsibility, outside intervention is difficult. Equally the 
enforcement of such contracts was an issue given that they had no 
legal standing. Persuasion and social pressure may not be effective 
in ensuring compliance.
Seme prosperous places have gone even further in old age 
protection by setting up pension schemes. The money comes from 
individual contributors, collective subsidies or both. For example, 
in Taoyuan county, Hunan province, individual peasants paid three 
yuan a month and the village also topped up the payment. On 
reaching age 60, subscribers could get between 18-40 yuan per month 
depending on their years of membership (SHBZB, 3 June 1988). 
Similar schemes were found in Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Hubei, Fujian and 
Guangdong. By mid-1988, 7,104 villages had these provisions,
covering 325,800 peasants (ibid). In 1989, pension plans were 
operating in 8,000 villages? total subscribers amounted to 900,000 
(ZGSHB. 23 February 1990).
In Urban Areas
In 1978, the country started to rehabilitate persons who had been 
persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and offered them state 
relief. Twenty-five new groups hitherto excluded because of their 
deviant backgrounds new became eligible. Some of the more important 
categories were: unemployed rehabilitated rightists and
intellectuals? former political deviants (Gucmindang personnel, 
spies, Trotskyists) ? discharged prisoners and offenders with no 
families? families of criminal offenders who experience hardships? 
overseas Chinese and foreign nationals resident in China who
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experience hardships; unemployed family members of deceased
industrialists and capitalists; disabled and unemployed university 
graduates and sent-down youths returning to the cities; persons who 
experience difficulties as a result of injuries arising from birth 
planning; workers discharged frcm enterprises who experience 
difficulties and so on (Gailun. 1987, p. 180).
An analysis of the above list reflects a number of interesting 
facts about welfare policy before the reform. First, political 
deviance could disqualify one from claiming support. The new rule 
offers irrefutable evidence about the importance of political 
desert in determining need in pre-reform China. Second, family 
characteristics were just as influential. Coming frcm an
undesirable class took away one's eligibility for help. Third, 
people who had suffered on account of state policies at the time, 
e.g. sent-down youths, discharged workers and persons disabled as a 
result of birth planning new became eligible for aid. Restoring 
welfare rights to rehabilitated persons fulfilled three functions. 
First, it signaled the new spirit of disregarding class and 
political factors in deciding on the treatment of individuals. 
Second, it recognized that certain state policies were themselves 
unjust and that victims should be compensated. Above all, the more 
humane policies spoke one central message —  social stability was 
fundamental to the fulfilment of ecancmic modernization. Only by 
removing the sources of social conflict could the chance of success 
be increased.
3. Poverty Aid (fupin)
Early attempts to help deficit households to engage in ecancmic
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activities were pioneered by Guangdong, Hubei and Sichuan after the 
Great leap Forward. Hcwever the nascent schemes were aborted by the
Cultural Revolution. There were calls to revive and further expand
fuoin work after the reform.
In 1982, the Party Central Committee and State Council resolved 
to allocate 200 million yuan a year (for 10 years) regional aid to 
poor areas in the arid North West (central Gansu, Shaanxi and 
Ningxia). This was followed by a multi-ministry circular (State 
Economic Commission, MCA, Finance, Commerce, Foreign Trade,
Agriculture and Fishery, Education, Agricultural Bank of China, 
State Commodities Bureau) demanding concerned state agencies to 
provide grants, credit, materials, advice and services to poor 
production teams and households in late 1982 (Huibian. 1984, 
Volume 2, pp.214-17). In 1984, another joint party and state 
circular called for the speeding up of fuoin projects (SHBZB. 4 
April 1989).
In 1985, the state agreed to reduce and exempt poor areas frcm 
agricultural taxes for three to five years. In 1986, regional aid 
for old base areas, territories inhabited by national minorities, 
border and poor areas flao shao bian gigng) was incorporated into 
the Seventh Five Year Plan. The same year also saw a further 
injection of one billion yuan state-backed loans (with interest 
paid by the government) to poor regions. In 1987, selected poor 
counties were exempted from paying energy and transportation
development funds. They were also allowed to lower the reserve fund 
ratio for bank deposits. Between 1985 and 1987, the state further 
gave food, cotton and clothes worth 2.7 billion yuan to poor areas 
(SHBZB. 4 April 1989). The use of loans to poor regions continued.
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In 1988, additional credit worth 700 million yuan was approved to 
help poor counties start industries, with another 50 million yuan 
designated for grazing areas. The estimate in early 1989 was that 
state aid and development funds to poor regions cost same 4.05 
billion a year (SHBZB, 4 April 1989).
While the above policies had an area focus, the CAD role was at 
first confined to assistance to individual households. In 1978, the 
ministry started the rallying call for fuoin experiments. The 1982 
joint circular extended the roles of CADs to being advisor, planner 
and coordinator to central government,
"to assist the party leadership to work out poverty aid plans, 
do investigation and surveys and summarize work experience; 
strengthen coordination between departments, organize 
collective assistance and mutual help among the masses; 
allocate appropriate amounts of rural relief funds for fuoin 
work" (Huibian, 1984, Volume 2, p. 216)."
To qualify for fuoin. beneficiaries must not only be poor but 
must also fulfil certain criteria. The following groups are 
eligible:
(a) households with few resources but have labour power and 
production outlets?
(b) soldiers' dependants who cannot maintain subsistence despite 
preferential aid?
(c) households with skills and business experience but have no 
capital?
(d) households experiencing unsurmountable difficulties in the 
short terra (as a result of natural and manmade disasters) ?
(e) former landlords and rich peasants (who had their class labels 
removed) encountering hardships?
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(f) hardship households vho have corrected their past mistakes and
lazy habits afer a period of re-education and observation;
(g) dependants of offenders who support the sentence, abide by the
law and actively engage in production (Gailun. 1987, pp.200-2).
If one looks closely at the above criteria, three features 
stand out prominently. First, eligible households must have the 
potential to regain self-sufficiency, viz. the possession of labour 
power and skills. This distinguished them from "five guarantee" 
targets for whom relief is more appropriate. Second, fuoin acted as 
a supplement to existing assistance measures, for example veteran 
support and debilitating disasters. Third, the last three groups 
were rural equivalents to new groups of urbanites given political 
rehabilitation after 1978. However, an additional qualifer applied 
in the rural case —  such persons must possess the correct moral 
attributes, e.g. repentance, hard work and obedience. In view of 
the difficulty of judging these qualities, much arbitrariness could 
result.
CAD-sponsored fuoin activities took two major forms —  first, 
decentralized help tailored to the requirements of individual 
households and second, poverty aid economic entities. In the 
countryside, the use of fuoin farms were particularly useful. They 
supplied seedlings, fish fry or healthy strains at cheap prices to 
local farmers, which served to develop the local economy besides 
creating employment. The first place to try out this approach was 
Dangyi Xiang of Iudheng County, Shanxi. The ministry considered its 
experience so valuable that it arranged an on-site conference to 
introduce it to other areas. By the end of 1988, fuoin entities
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increased to 76,000 (SHBZB, 14 April 1989).
In adopting both collective and decentralized approaches, the 
MCA dictum was fuzhi-fuben. Thzhi is support through education —  
instilling in the poor the determination to become self-reliant, 
work hard and get rich. This helped to overcome the apathy and lack 
of confidence experienced by the poor. Fuben literally means giving 
support with capital - money, human and technical. Without material 
inputs, the motivated poor would not have the concrete tools to 
improve their lot (Gailun. 1987, pp. 211-12). Since 1984, following 
the successful example of Chengdu City in Sichuan, the work of 
fuoin and fuvou (development aid to soldiers' dependants) have been 
combined (Gailun. 1987, pp.79-80). This "double-support" (shuang 
fu) formula made sense as both embraced the same aims and methods. 
During the period of the Sixth FYP (1981-85), 2,100 counties (90 
percent of all counties) and 56,715 townships/streets (61.9 
percent) had undertaken shuang fu work. Altogether same 11,876,000 
households benefitted and 5,485,000 have reportedly been lifted 
from poverty (tuopin) (Dashiii. 1988, p. 737).
1985 marked the high tide of fuoin. No less than two special 
conferences (one national, in June? one regional, in October) were 
held. However CAD fever for fuoin must have produced neglect of 
elementary relief. At the Central Committee Work Conference on 
Agricultural Work on 19 December 1985, veteran leader Chen Yun 
called for action to solve the food shortage problem in poor areas. 
In particular, the MCA was asked to respond with concrete proposals 
(Dnah-i-ii. 1988, p. 491). This subsequently prompted Minister Cui to
concede, in January 1986, that "we must first let hardship 
households have food, helping the masses in poor areas develop
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production can follow" (Dashiii. 1988, p.491).
Nonetheless, there has been no relaxation of fuoin work. By the 
end of 1986, some 17,378,000 households had received development 
aid; out of these, 8,097,000 households had reportedly escaped from 
poverty (Dashiii. 1988, p.756). The cumulative figures for 
recipient households reached 18,444,000 by the end of 1987
(Minzheng Bu Policy and Regulations Department, ZGMZ, October 1989, 
p. 6) and 21 million by October 1988 (SHBZB. 7 October 1988). The 
percentage of such households escaping from poverty within the year 
was 29.2 percent during 1987 (SHBZB. 25 March 1988) and 30.52 
percent during 1988 (SHBZB. 14 April 1989).
It is hard to comment on the effectiveness of the fuoin 
programme. The first problem was conceptual ambiguity. In 1985, the 
CCP Central Secretariat defined poor households as those with an 
annual per capita income of 200 yuan (Wang, GEMZ. 1991, Issue 6, 
p. 28). Since then the poverty line has not been raised despite 
rising inflation. The state policy was to let local areas work out 
their own poverty measure although the 200 yuan yardstick was still 
used nationally. Even then, one could argue that this benchmark was 
meaningless because living standards across the country were so 
diverse. What's more, what passed for tuooin was equally unclear. 
MCA guidelines were impressionistic at best. The first criterion is 
that after getting aid from the state and the masses, the
designated household can support itself and possess enough food and 
clothes (wen bag). Second, it can afford basic living and achieve 
some surplus (weichi iiben shenghuo. luevou iievu). Third, it 
possesses the means to expand production. Finally, all debts have 
been repaid (Cidian. 1987, p. 149). As to what the above
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qualifying phrases mean, there is no further elaboration. More 
vexing still, hcw vigorously these criteria were being applied in 
different areas was a mystery* Given that policy implementation at 
the rural grassroots was prone to management constraints, the 
accuracy of local reports cannot be assumed. Hence the reliability 
of national statistics was in question.
Definitional problems apart, a few negative outcomes were 
observed. First, fewer households were receiving relief. Also lack 
of clarity on what activities could be supported by fuoin has led 
to confusion, defaults on loans to risky ventures and over-emphasis 
on economic viability of the project as against the need of the 
borrower (Ci, ZGMZ. March 1990, p.38? Zhan, ZGMZ, January 1991, 
p. 10). Nevertheless, there were some beneficial effects. First, the 
use of loans did benefit many poor households, at least one third 
were said to have escaped from poverty. Second, limited state funds 
were recycled to help more people than would have been possible 
otherwise. Finally, the difficulty of obtaining state money and 
bank loans at reasonable interest rates generated local self help. 
The growth of mutual funds and credit schemes run by the masses and 
CADs tapped local savings for rural development and mutual aid.
Variously called social security funds, social welfare funds or 
mutual funds, these schemes operated on principles of individual 
contribution and grassroots management. Some incorporated an 
insurance element to indemnify peasants from loss of crops and 
property. The first project was started in Bqyang County in Jiangxi 
province in 1982. Fund members could borrow money to tie over 
hardships or start a productive venture. Hailed as a model, the 
Jiangxi Disaster Relief, Poverty Aid and Mutual Help Saving
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Fund was a harbinger of similar endeavours. By 1988, Jiangxi had 
19,200 mutual funds covering 94 percent of all villagers' 
committees in the province, collecting premium of 100 million yuan; 
in Shandong, such funds amounted to 2,384, accumulating some 68 
million yuan. For the country as a whole, 75,000 funds were in 
operation by the end of 1988 (SHBZB. 14 April 1989). The premium 
collected and the amount of compensation paid out by grassroots 
insurance schemes were said to be eight to ten times more than 
state relief (SHBZB. 18 February 1988). It would seem that these 
funds lived up to the new principle of "self insurance" (ziwo 
baozhang) as against dependency on the state (Tansuo. 1989, p. 176? 
SHBZB. 28 February 1989).
The definition and measurement of poverty is an exceedingly 
complex matter? all known approaches have their own share of 
problems (Townsend, 1979; Piachaud, 1981, 1988). In China, the
difficulties involved in the study of poverty are even more 
immense. Even if one accepts the use of an absolute measure, the 
200 yuan poverty line is unhelpful. First of all, one does not know 
how it is derived. Secondly, it has not been revised in the light 
of inflation. Hence however reasonable it might be in 1978, it was 
totally unrealistic ten years later. In 1988, 13.5 percent of all 
rural households still had a per capita net income between 200-300 
yuan (FS, 1989, p.465) and same 10-15 percent of rural inhabitants 
had a net income below 50 percent of the country average (FS. 1989, 
p. 107). In my view, these two indicators more satisfactorily 
reflect the extent of rural poverty. The latter, by incorporating a 
relative dimension, is in line with the definition of poverty used 
by the Commission of the European Communities in 1981, which
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identifies the poor as being those households whose disposable 
income is less than 50 percent of the average disposable income in 
the country concerned (Room, 1990. p.55). (According to this 
definition, 43.9 million people in twelve European countries, or 
between 12.8 to 13.9 percent of the population in 1985 were in 
poverty). Seen in this light, rural poverty is still a significant 
problem affecting from one in ten to one in seven of the peasant 
population in China. Given the gigantic scale of needs and meagre 
resources available, anti-poverty policies of the state face an 
uphill battle in helping the poor.
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Social Welfare
Whereas relief usually takes the form of material aid, a social 
welfare programme consists of the provision of a direct service. 
Its components are (a) social welfare services, (b) social welfare 
production, and (c) community services.
1. Social Welfare Services (shehui fuli shivel
At the start of the reform period, the country had 8,235 
institutions catering to 165,000 residents fnashi-p r 1988, p.757).
Table 9 Social Welfare Institutions. 1979-1988
1979 1988
Number of homes 8,235 39,103
CAD-run 765 2,103
ccmmunity-run 7,470 37,000
Number of beds 195,000 695,000
CAD-run 63,000 131,800
community-run 132,000 564,000
Number of residents 165,000 542,000
CAD-run 59,000 n.a.
community-run 106,000 n.a.
Source:
1. Figures for 1979 are from Dashiii. 1988, p.757.
2. Figures for 1988 are from SHBZB. 14 April, 1989.
When the MCA began to pick up the shambles of welfare 
institutions after the Cultural Revolution, it realized that a more 
extensive residential programme could not come about by expanding 
state services. The major obstacle was the lack of state funds. As
a result, it opted to encourage local ccmmunities to increase 
facilities for their homeless indigent. This allowed the CADs to 
focus on upgrading service standards and heme management so that 
state facilities could become role models for community homes.
From Table 9, it is immediately obvious that the decade has 
been a period of robust growth. In terms of residential capacity 
and beneficiaries, total bed numbers multiplied by 280 percent 
while resident numbers by 245 percent. Besides, the increase in 
community provisions was even more remarkable, which rose by 354 
percent versus 120 percent for state services. Clearly the
expectation of having local communities share the burden of 
residential care has been answered.
In 1983, a national workshop on the reform of urban social 
welfare services was convened by the MCA in Zhangzhou, Fujian 
province. There the forum adopted a set of guidelines for good 
practice. In the area of staffing, the following staff to resident 
ratios were recommended —  1:2-4 for aged residents, 1:4-6 for 
normal children, 1:1.5 for infants and disabled children, and 1:1-3 
for mental patients. These were not mandatory standards as there 
were wide variations across the country and gradual iirplementation 
was more practicable. Regarding the composition of home staff, the 
ministry guideline was that administrative staff should not exceed 
ten percent, medical and care workers should be at least 65 percent 
and back-up staff (cooks, cleaners, care-takers etc.) should be 
around 25 percent (Gailun. 1987, p.228).
The extent to which these standards were adopted is not known. 
In my visits to municipal social welfare homes in Beijing and 
Guangzhou, nearly all facilities were equipped to a hi^i standard.
- 207 -
For example, Beijing's Number One Social Welfare Heme not only 
offered good amenities, generous space per head and high staff 
ratios, it also had a rehabilitation wing which was open to the 
community. Similar standards were also attained by the Municipal 
Social Welfare Heme and Old People's Heme in Guangzhou, as will be 
described in Chapter Six. Without any doubt, these homes were shew 
cases; standards were raised deliberately so that they could emit a 
"radiation effect" (fushe zugrpng). Nevertheless, their small 
numbers meant that they could only make a snail contribution to 
meeting community needs. It was in rural establishments that 
staffing issues, in terms of both quantity and quality, gave more 
cause for concern. Frcm my visits in Beijing and Guangdong, most 
rural hemes were thinly staffed. For example, it was quite typical 
to have four workers, inclusive of the superintendent, to serve 
some 40 elders. Almost without exception, care workers were 
untrained. Given these constraints, only rudimentary care could be 
given. The road to professionalizing institutional services is 
still long and arduous.
An area shewing good progress was maintenance standards for 
residents. In 1979, the maintenance (mainly food) cost for one 
"five-guarantee" elder in a community facility was 110 yuan per 
annum? in 1986, it was 399 yuan. While similar figures for 
state-run homes were not available (except for institutions for 
veterans discussed earlier), the ministry estimated that it cost 
1,800 yuan per year to keep one resident in a CAD facility in 1987 
(SHBZB. 25 September 1987). Out of this, some 600 yuan went towards 
direct personal consumption while the rest was spent on 
administration, staffing, health, repair and maintenance. How to
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keep costs dcwn was a big headache to the ministry.
In opening access to institutional services, much ground work 
has been laid. One means was day treatment, e.g. rehabilitation 
treatment, on a fee for service basis. Another form was admiting 
fee-paying residents. Regarding the latter practice, the last 
decade has seen their proportion increase substantially, as can be 
seen in the following table.
Table 10 Percentage of Self-supporting Residents in
__________Urban Social Welfare Homes. 1983-1988____
1979 1983 1986 1988
Social welfare hemes 5.13 6.17 9.05 ) 24.0
Children's hemes 3.10 10.02 14.59 )
Psychiatric hospitals 37.21 47.61 51.81 55.0
Source:
1. Figures for 1979 to 1986 are frcm Dashdji, 1988, p.758.
2. 1988 figures are from SHBZB. 23 June 1989.
Thus, within one decade, the proportion of fee-paying residents 
increased nearly five times. For psychiatric hospitals, by 1988, 
these were more numerous than "three-no" targets. From my 
observation, fee-charging created social stratification. Because of 
the higher fees they paid, self-supporting residents often enjoyed 
higher standards of meals, aaxmmodation and services. The 
implications will be examined more fully in the Guangdong chapter.
After reviewing the situation of residential homes as a whole, 
seme supplemental observations on the adequacy of different types 
of institutions are in place.
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Hemes for the elderly were still insufficient. In 1988, same
600,000 elders were catered. Given an aged population (60 and 
above) of some 85 million, the rate of institutionalization was 
less than 0.8 percent. The major responsibility for looking after 
old people remained firmly with the family. In the cities, this was 
made easier as most retired workers had access to pensions and 
subsidized health care. It was not so in the countryside where 80 
percent of Chinese elders lived. There, care by family members was 
virtually the only means of support in old age.
Regarding children's homes, resources were likewise in short 
supply. From the experience of the ministry, children in care were 
either orphans or disabled (estimated to be 90 percent of inmates 
in children's hemes). Concerning the number of disabled, China 
conducted a massive 1.5 percent national random sample survey in 
1987. The major finding was a staggering 51 million disabled people 
(Di, ZGMZ. June 1990, pp.32-33), equal to 80 percent of the total 
population of the United Kingdom at that time. Of the 51 million, 
same 15.83 percent or 8 million were children aged under 14 (Di, 
ibid.). Obviously only a small number would require institutional 
care. Nevertheless in 1988, there were only 60 children's homes 
caring for 11,000 disabled children. Existing services were no more 
than drops in the ocean. In the last few years, another concern 
surfaced. The ministry estimated that as many as one million 
children were abandoned each year (SHBZB. 19 January 1988? Miner 
Pao. 1 June 1990), most of whom were disabled babies and girls 
(because of the country's one child population policy) (Yang, GEMZ, 
1991 Issue 4, pp. 18-19). Finally, only large cities had special 
facilities for children. In villages, children without families
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were dumped in aged hemes. It was questionable whether these could 
cater to the special needs of children.
Regarding mental hospitals, CADs ran a total of 161 mental 
hospitals with 29,000 beds, caring for 26,000 in-patients in 1986 
(Weniian Xuanbian. 1986, p.250). Talcing the combined capacity of 
CAD facilities and those provided by the Ministry of Public Health 
(for acute cases and patients with work units) and Ministry of 
Public Security (for the criminally insane) as a whole, the country 
had 348 mental hospitals with 70,000 beds in that year (ibid, 
p. 254). Compared to the official estimate of 1.94 million mentally 
ill identified by the 1987 survey, the shortfall in services was 
acute. In recent years, most hospitals had to maximize income 
through admission of fee-paying patients. This hit peasants the 
hardest as they were not covered by labour insurance and had to 
shoulder the high costs themselves (SHBZB. 4 September 1986; 
Henderson, 1990). With hospitalization charges estimated to cost 
seme 500 yuan per month in 1990 (Philips, 1990; Pearson, 1991), 
medical care was becoming increasingly unaffordable to the rural 
poor.
2. Social Welfare Production
In the post-Mao period, there has been a dramatic grewth in social 
welfare production.
In 1981, the state sector had the leading role, making up two 
thirds of units and placing 72 percent of all disabled workers. By 
1983, the proportions have almost reversed and in 1986, the 
predominance of non-state provisions was complete (87 percent of 
all units and 76 percent of all disabled workers). The momentum of
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development continued. At year-end 1988, the number of units 
reached 40,496, seme 26 times that in 1981? they employed 1.48 
million staff, out of which 659,000 were disabled persons (SHBZB. 
14 April 1989).
Table 11 Social Welfare Production. 1981-1986
1981 1983 1986
Number of production units 
CAD-run 
Ccmmunity-run
1,574
1,022
552
5,930
1,707
4,223
19,865
2,654
17,211
Number of workers 
CAD-run 
Ccmmunity-run
186,586
135,000
51,586
307.000
201.000 
106,000
886,000
248.000
638.000
Number of disabled workers 
CAD-run 
Ccmmunity-run
n.a.
48,000
n.a.
121,000
66,000
55,000
369.000 
89,000
280.000
Annual production value (m. yuan) 928 1,127 6,870
Annual profit (m. yuan) n.a. 148 630
Source:
1. Figures for 1981 are from Huibian. 1984, Vol.l, pp.40-45.
2. 1983 and 1986 figures are from Dashiii. 1988, p.759.
This growth pattern - rapid expansion of welfare production and
an explosion of ceanmunity facilities - was similar to the 
development of institutional services, only more breathtaking in 
scope. The reason could be traced to favourable state policies. To 
the authorities, welfare factories were not only venues of 
disability employment, they were expected to generate income to 
support other welfare services (Wong, 1990b).
The first inducement came in 1980, via the Ministry of Finance 
and Ministry of Civil Affairs Joint Circular on the Payment of 
Income Tax by Welfare Production Enterprises Operated by Civil 
Affairs Departments. This provides for the following exemption 
(Faqui Xuaribian. 1986, pp. 167-68):
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(1) units employing disabled persons accounting for at least 35 
percent of operational staff to be exempted from income tax; 
where the proportion is between 10-35 percent, 50 percent 
reduction from income tax?
(2 ) one year's exemption in income tax commencing on the first 
month of operation;
(3) exemption from commercial tax and income tax for units 
producing prostheses and aids for the disabled.
The result was immediate. In 1980, there were 1,309 units? in 
1981, the number increased by 20 percent to 1,574 and to 1,704 in 
1982 (Dashiii. 1988, p.744).
In 1984, a stronger push came with the announcement of the 
Ministry of Finance Circular Concerning Tax Exemption Matters for 
Social Welfare Production Enterprises Operated by Civil Affairs 
Departments. Despite its title, the concessions were also 
applicable to units run by street and rural collectives. The 
provisions are (Facaii Xuanbian. 1986, pp. 206-7):
(1) exemption from turnover tax on incomes earned in labour 
service, repair and service activities in units with disabled 
workers amounting to over 35 percent of the operational work 
force?
(2) exemption from product tax (chanoin shui) or value-added tax 
(zencrzhi shui) for units with disabled workers amounting to 
more than 50 percent of operational staff; units employing at 
least 35 percent disabled workers can be treated similarly if 
they come into deficit or make lew profits?
(3) exemption from product tax on items made for the use of 
disabled persons, e.g. prostheses, wheelchairs.
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Hie inpact was even more electrifying. In one year, production 
units doubled from 6,710 in 1984 (1,869 CAD-run, 4,841
ccmmunity-run) to 14,872 in 1985 (2,318 state and 12,500 non-state) 
(Dashiji, 1988, p.744). Hie incentive for community provisions was 
even more marked. However ministry regulations were unable to catch 
up with this explosion. Hie result has been many abuses (SHBZB, 2 
October 1987).
In order to qualify for tax breaks, seme units inflated the 
number of disabled workers. Seme borrowed names to boost their 
quota. Others "retired" disabled staff on a pittance, retaining 
them on the register tut taking on able-bodied employees to do 
their work. These scandals led to a number of investigation drives 
during which bogus welfare factories were uncovered and punished. 
This prompted the MCA, under pressure from the finance and tax 
departments, to tighten rules for their registration and inspection 
(SHBZB. 2 October 1987).
Apart from quantitative increases in the number of units and 
manpower, welfare factories also made efforts to improve their 
economic performance. Some gains were registered. One indicator was 
the value of goods produced in the year. In 1981, total production 
amounted to only 928 million yuan; in 1988, this was 20.63 million 
yuan (SHBZB. 14 April 1989). Another pointer was annual profit. In 
1983, welfare factories made profits of 148 million yuan; this 
increased to 1,660 million yuan in 1988 (ibid). However, this 
measure has one snag. "Profits" actually meant a combination of two 
components: tax exempted by the government as well as after-tax
profits, or pure profit. As ministry reports did not give separate 
breakdowns, the size of pure profit could not be ascertained.
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Another development concerned attempts to improve the 
management of welfare factories. Historically, bad management 
plagued the running of these units. One factor was non-skilled 
leadership. The other factor was the unmotivated work force. To try 
to improve matters, seme units experimented with the introduction 
of a tiered production responsibility system. Contracts specifying 
output and rewards were signed between successive tiers in the
enterprises (at plant, workshop, work group levels), at times down 
to the individual operative. The aim was to link responsibility,
authority and reward so as to achieve effective management and 
bigger work incentive. Besides, seme units introduced the use of 
piece rates. In addition, the ministry stepped up training for
welfare factory managers, through mounting special short courses in 
CAD colleges. All these took place under a climate of propaganda 
reinforcing the vital role of management and scientific methods.
The above endeavours notwithstanding, marked achievements 
appeared dubious. Experimentation with piece rates and 
responsibility system were confined to individual units. The 
chronic complaints about bad management remain. Neither was the
ministry able to provide leadership and concrete support. Ministry 
publications still abound with calls to arms but few reports 
documenting actual gains.
Throughout the period of review, welfare production units had 
to wrestle with many problems. On the one hand, there were the 
familiar problems of outdated management methods and lack of 
motivation. A more fundamental weakness was the lew productivity of 
the work force, still another structural limitation was their 
pre-modem equipment and amenities. Long used to treating them as
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welfare venues rather than economic enterprises, the state saw no 
need to invest in infrastructure and technology. Being poor 
departments, CADs simply did not have the resources for plant 
modernization even though they were supposed to beccme economically 
competitive in the reform years.
These problems snowballed into bigger disadvantages as the 
urban economic reforms progressed. In a climate of strong 
competition, welfare production units proved no match for other 
"normal” economic enterprises. The force of their only weapon, 
favourable tax policies, became blunted as other local areas, eager 
for fast growth, competed to outdo one another in granting still 
more attractive terms to induce outside investments. More and more, 
enterprises, welfare production units included, were pushed to rely 
on borrowing instead of state subsidies for their capital needs. 
However, commercial interest rates were more crippling for the 
latter. Equally difficult was the procurement of raw materials, 
fuels and supplies, which had to be bought at market prices as 
welfare factories did not enjoy any priority in getting state 
supplies (Jiang and Han, ZGMZ. August 1989, pp.41-43; Zhang, ZGMZ. 
December 1989, pp. 12-13? Yan, ZGMZ. April 1990, pp. 17-19). 
Likewise, there were difficulties in ensuring that other government 
departments observe state policies. For example, some local tax 
departments did not honour the precribed tax relief? bank branches 
sometimes refused to grant credit despite the protests of CADs and 
the ministry (Jiang and Han, ibid). In combination, natural 
limitations and increasing competitiveness in the reform period 
meant that welfare factories were fighting an uphill battle to 
survive.
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More difficulties came in 1988 when the state tightened up tax 
concessions granted to welfare factories. In particular, 29 
commodities and eight product groups were no longer exempted fran 
tax (Jiang and Han, ibid). Fran 1988 to 1989, profits per 100 yuan 
capital dropped steeply from 14.12 yuan to 6.6 yuan (SHBZB. 14 
April 1989; ZGSHB. 8 May 1990). In 1989, 739 CAD-run welfare
factories were losing money despite state subsidies. A proposal to
consider laying off staff and disabled workers (vouhua laodonq
juhe) appeared in ZGMZ for the first time in 1989 (ZGMZ. May 1989, 
pp. 37-39). Obviously the sense of crisis has deepened in the last 
two years under review.
3. Ocxmunity Servies (sheou fuwu)
Since 1986, the MCA has vigorously promoted community services as 
the most dynamic and potentially most productive approach to social 
care. In short, sheau fuwu was expected to beccme the new growth 
point in social welfare in urban areas.
A bigger role for community services was attributed to two 
factors. First, there was the backdrop of the urban economic
reforms when enterprises were • asked to became self-sufficent, 
autonomous and competitive. This required that they reduce their 
welfare burdens for their employees, which not only ate into their 
reserve funds but sapped the energies of the management. What's 
more, changes in the occupational system, especially the growth of 
sel f-employment, labour contracts and lay-offs meant that non-work 
based social services were gaining importance. As the government 
had few resources to invest in welfare, community care presented 
itself as an ideologically desirable and financially feasible
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alternative. Furthermore, under a climate of personal competition 
and profit-making, the tempo of urban life has quickened. Many 
urbanites were too busy learning a new skill, improving their 
qualifications or earning money to devote much time to home-making 
and caring for disabled and elderly members. Assistance by way of 
home-help, child care, rehabilitation and elderly support services 
were much in demand (Wong, 1992).
Second, there was the influence of the community care approach 
in Hang Kong. An MCA official, Zhang Pu spent three months on an 
attachment visit there in 1986 and was deeply impressed by the
dynamic role played by voluntary agencies and local residents in 
providing services (Zhang, 1987, ZGMZ. October 1987, pp. 16-18). 
Upon his return, he recommended an expansion of China's hone-grown 
neighbourhood service programme. Its acceptance led to full-scale 
promotion by the ministry.
In an article written by Zhang, community care was said to
offer four advantages (Zhang, SHBZB. 29 May 1987). First, it allows
direct benefit to the majority of people living in the
neighbourhood. Second, it mobilizes the strength of all sectors of 
society and corrects people's dependency an the state. Third, it 
permits self-management and self-reliance by the masses. Fourth, it 
promotes a more decentralized and diversified approach to match 
local needs and conditions.
In another article, Minister Cui hailed the approach as meeting 
the direct service needs of urban residents while their income 
needs were met by labour insurance. Both assistance in cash and in 
kind contribute to the consolidation of social security in society 
(SHBZB. 18 September 1987). Later an, Cui identified additional
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functions. In his opinion, "to develop the work of community 
services is beneficial in regulating human relations, solving 
social problems, creating a harmonious social environment and 
realizing the guiding thought of serving the work of the party 
centre through the work of civil affairs" (SHBZB. 25 September 
1987). At the same time, the concept of community services was 
clarified. Cui saw sheau fuwu as being built on a model of local 
self-provision of social services and amenities for and by 
residents of a geographical locality. As for "community", it 
referred to an area administered by a street office with its 
constituent residents' committees and residents' small groups. In 
the countryside, the geographical equivalent was a commune (during 
the commune period) and administrative village or township 
post-1987. But in common usage, sheau fuwu related more to the 
model of community care in urban neighbourhoods whereas the term 
rural social welfare network was used for similar programmes 
undertaken by xiancr-zhens. To provide leadership for urban 
community services, the MCA established a unit in its Department of 
Urban Social Welfare. This paralleled the new ministerial 
responsibility of overseeing street and residents' committees, that 
was assigned to the MCA in 1984.
A number of cities stood at the forefront of expanding 
community social services - Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Sha Shi and 
Changzhou. The experience of Beijing illustrated how the concept of 
community care could be operationalized. There, the foci of 
community care was at the street and residents' committee levels. 
In mid-1988, out of its 106 streets, 76 have organised horizontal 
service networks (wangluo) (1988 interview). Responsible officials
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appeared to be very loose in using the term vanaluo. Apparently, it 
designated a system of loosely related service outlets at different 
administrative tiers providing help to clearly identifiable client 
groups. However such questions as linkages between horizontal 
(within one administrative tier across different types of services) 
and vertical levels (city, district, street, residents* committee) 
by way of shared resources, personnel, case referrals or joint 
planning were not defined.
Beijing*s prime targets for community care were the elderly, 
the disabled and soldiers* families. My 1988 visit to Beijing gave 
me the chance to observe this approach at first hand. First among 
the various programmes were those operated to help the elderly. In 
mid-1988, the relevant services included 54 group hemes, 147 day 
care centres, 175 activity centres, 48 health clinics and 66 
match-making/introduction agencies. The emphasis on the aged was a 
result of their growing numbers. For the disabled, community 
support came in the form of 48 sheltered workshops, 37 work therapy 
stations (gong liao zhan) for the mentally disabled, two speech 
therapy centres for deaf children and six massage clinics staffed 
by blind persons. To help retired soldiers, over 100 service 
stations were in operation, providing social activities and support 
services for veterans and their families. Altogether some 800 
service units were located at the street level.
At the residents* committee level, the emphasis was on 
"convenience services** fbianmin fuwu), which were open to all 
residents. These included newspaper and milk delivery, the 
supervision of latchkey kids by neighbours, small canteens, public 
bath rooms, barber shops and repair stations. In 1988, seme 17,000
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service spots were dispersed in residents' committees over the 
capital. Additionally, special targets receive individually
tailored support at no charge. The node of delivery was via care 
and supervision groups (bachu zu). These groups were typically 
small, made up of two to three persons. They provided domiciliary 
help and supervision to single elderly, wayward youths, mental 
patients and discharged offenders.
In guiding the development of ccmmunity services, Beijing has 
adopted a three-year plan since 1986. The overall aim was to 
structure services at the municipal, district, street and
residents' committee levels in a systematic format to help the 
elderly, disabled and veterans. The tangible targets set for each 
street were (at least) one welfare factory, one group heme for the 
elderly, one special nursery for handicapped children, and four 
stations (day care centre and activity centre for the elderly, work 
therapy station, service station for soldiers' families) (SHBZB. 25 
March 1988). As said before, 76 streets have organized these 
service networks within their boundary in 1988, not a mean 
achievement (ibid).
From my visits to Beijing's Western District (Xinjieko Street) 
and Eastern District (Chacyangmen Street, Jiangucmen Street and 
Dongzhimen Street), seme general observations on qualitative 
aspects of community services could be made. First, the services 
provided were extremely diverse in scale and operational standard. 
For example, the 170-place special school for mentally handicapped 
children in Xinjieko Street was sizeable, well-equipped (with 
pre-vocational workshop, ccnputers, special teaching aids) and 
housed in a permanent building. Similarly impressive was the Dong
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Ming Deaf Children's Centre (for children aged 7-17) in the same 
street which offered speech and hearing training to 29 children. 
Most other services however were miniscule, poorly equipped and in 
make-shift accommodation. One innovative programme —  a counselling 
service offering four kinds of consultation (intelligence 
assessment, psychological counselling, legal advice and 
consultation on mental health problems) was run in borrowed rooms 
in a public park on Sundays and was manned by volunteers 
(university teachers, doctors and other professionals). This 
example highlighted poor conditions limiting a very worthwhile 
programme.
Second, the quality of services was highly variable. Seme, like 
the special school and deaf children's centre just cited, were run 
by qualified teachers? the majority made use of non-trained 
personnel and street activists (especially in care and supervision 
groups and civil mediation work). This informal care model avoided 
the pitfalls of over-specialization and growth of welfare
bureaucrats found in Western welfare states. Hcwever, the dewn side 
seemed to be services of questionable quality.
Third, apart from bianmin fuwu. welfare support catered to a 
small clientele. As yet, the ability to make welfare services 
widely available was limited. This was related to the fourth point, 
the dearth of resources - money, space, manpower, materials and 
authority. In trying to overcome these obstacles, street 
organisations could not rely on state agencies for their 
requirements. Instead they were cajoled to use their own initiative 
in solving local problems. Obviously varying ability in generating 
resources vitally affected the scope and quality of welfare
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provisions. Similarly service planning and management differed with 
the quality of local leadership.
By the end of 1988, China had built up a fledgling programme of 
community services. The achievements included: 825 groups homes for 
the elderly run by street organizations for 8,713 residents, 55,000 
supervision and care groups for 90,000 elders, 550 work therapy 
stations for 8,600 mental patients, special nurseries /stations for
4.000 handicapped children and 127,000 convenience service points. 
In addition, there were 2,370 rehabilitation clinics and 250 
counselling/consultation centres. Service proliferation has 
necessitated the creation of new coordinating structures. Towards 
this end, 2,700 community service committees have been set up. Same
1.000 funds were also created to raise and manage revenue collected 
for neighbourhood welfare programmes (SHBZB. 15 November 1988).
From the experience reported so far, the Chinese approach to 
community care has to contend with a number of issues. The 
challenge has at least four dimensions. First, there was need to 
locate community services in a wider programme of local 
development. Community-based service development should be part of 
municipal planning. As yet, these self-initiated efforts have not 
been incorporated in local development agenda. Second, local 
neighbourhoods had a surfeit of responsibilities but little power 
and resources. Most government departments continued to treat 
grassroots agencies as handmaidens, to be given jobs at will but 
were insensitive to their difficulties. Thus neighbourhood agencies 
constantly bemoaned the predicament of following too many masters, 
having "thousands of threads coming from the top to go through one 
needle.” Third, there was the imperative to develop the
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ecQncmic base for community care. In order to discharge their 
welfare function, neighbourhoods sorely needed income from domestic 
enterprises as well as government support. Domestic resources are 
determined by such variables as physical characteristics (e.g. 
land, commercial and industrial activities), good leadership, 
community spirit and the like. More often than not, street cadres 
tended to be elderly and poorly educated. For example, jobs always 
went to demobilized soldiers, redundant staff transferred from 
other enterprises and retired cadres (Leung, 1990).
Government aid was grossly inadequate. The MCA, in particular, 
over-expected from local agencies but did not do enough to help. So 
far it has played a valuable advocacy and guiding role in 
broadening the concept and practice of community care. However its 
support was very much confined to professional leadership, token 
grants and organizational liaison with other agencies. Finally, the 
unique nature of community care put a limit to its effectiveness as 
a reliable source of support. Operating on a decentralized model, 
community support programmes varied a great deal in service scope, 
comprehensiveness and quality. Untrained personnel could not be 
expected to perform the more skilled parts of helping nor could 
volunteers be held fully accountable if their service clashed with 
their personal commitments. Given these constraints, realizing the 
values of equality, uniformity, consistency and reliability is 
difficult, if not impossible.
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Part Six 
Conclusion
In the first reform decade, social welfare work under the aegis of 
civil affairs departments and local collectives supervised by them 
has developed quickly. Substantial expansion, improvement and 
innovations have taken place in all four programmes under review —  
preferential treatment, veteran resettlement, social welfare, 
disaster and social relief. At the same time, there have also been 
daunting problems.
In December 1988, the Ministry convened the Ninth National 
Civil Affairs Conference. Five years have elapsed since the Eighth 
Conference in 1983. The achievements and challenges faced by the 
ministry since then were summarized by Minister Cui in his report 
"Grasping the Situation, Deepening the Reform and Serving a 
Stabilizing Function to Contribute to Socialist Modernization” 
(Cui, ZGMZ. January 1989, pp.4-9).
Cui identified four major accomplishments. First, achievements 
were recorded in reforms an many fronts. These included (1) 
successful building of grassroots political structures, (2) 
invigorating disaster and social relief work, (3) remarkable growth 
in social welfare production and social welfare services, (4) 
improvements made in preferential treatment, (5) greater 
effectiveness in resettling demobilized personnel and retraining 
them for civilian life, and (6) strengthening civil management 
work, for example, revising township and city criteria, reforming 
burial customs, and registration of marriages and social 
organizations. The second achievement pertained to various forms
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of innovative work. These were (1) useful explorations of building 
rural social security networks, (2) positive experience in 
launching community social services in urban areas, (3) premising 
results from rural insurance projects, and (4) success in 
introducing the social welfare lottery. The third positive 
contribution came from developments of social welfare theory, 
manpower training and drafting of relevant legislation and 
regulations. Finally, the ministry has made gains in developing 
more effective organizational structures, raising the quality of 
cadres, and improving accounting systems.
In the light of the findings presented in Parts Two to Five, 
the above summaries were fair observations. Clearly, there have 
been more gains in some areas than in others. For example, 
improvements in preferential aid, quantitative and qualitative 
improvements in social welfare services, rapid development of 
community care in urban areas, more jobs for the disabled in 
welfare enterprises as well as increasing quantities of rural 
community support services have all been very impressive. On the 
whole, the claims have not been exaggerated. In my view, much 
credit must go to the hard-pressed and resource-poor ministry for 
being imaginative and enterprising. No less remarkable has been the 
efforts of local communities. In nearly all areas surveyed, the 
growth of community provisions have overtaken state services. Fewer 
communal amenities would have led to social disruptions as a result 
of the weakening of old social security mechanisms which would have 
exerted a high toll on human welfare in Chinese society during the 
reform era.
On the other hand, the ministers report pinpointed four
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weak links in the welfare programme. First, the structure and 
establishment of civil affairs agencies have not kept pace with the 
increasing scope of work. There were acute deficiencies at the 
grassroots level where organization was inadequate, manpower 
shortage acute and workload excessive. Second, civil affairs work 
was constrained by inadequate resources. There were grave problems 
concerning shortage of state funds, low standards of relief, and 
poor living standards for veteran families and relief targets. 
Third, there were difficulties with work relationships. In such 
work as supervising neighbourhood agencies and receiving and 
dispatching vagrants, problems regarding work specialization and 
inter-agency cooperation have not been ironed out. Fourth, civil 
affairs agencies could not give effective guidance on all areas of 
work. Seme programmes were very advanced; others were more 
backward.
If one compares the above list with the difficulties identified 
in the ministry's five year programme at the start of 1986, one is 
immediately struck by their similarities. The laments of social 
welfare development lagging behind economic growth, lew standards 
of preferential aid and relief, inadequate organization, staffing 
and backward amenities are virtually identical. Indeed, such issues 
have troubled civil affairs departments throughout their history. 
Their persistence continues to signal the residual nature of social 
welfare work in the country. One telling indicator is the weighting 
of civil affairs expenditure in the government budget. The average 
proportion was 1.6 percent before 1978? during 1978-1988, the 
average was 1.55 percent (reference Chapter Four).
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Towards a Conceptual Model of Social Welfare Responsibility 
Responsibility for social welfare before and after the advent of 
the economic reforms shewed markedly different features. The 
approaches followed during these two epochs could be distinguished 
according to the number and nature of their constituent 
institutions, source of funding and underlying value premises. The 
two models are conceptualized in Figure 9.
Figure 9 Conceptual Models of Social Welfare Responsibility
Institutions Source of Funding Value Premises
Pre-reform Model
State Central and local 
governments
Public responsibility
Collective/local
community
Local collective 
income
Ccmmunal obligation
Post-reform Model
State Central and local 
governments
Public responsibility
Collective/local
community
Loc. collective income Communal Obligation 
Welfare levies 
Enterprise profits
Client/service
system
Fee charging
Soc. wel. enterprises
Agency income generation
Self-contribution
Donors Individuals, groups, 
enterprises, overseas 
donors
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Charity
Before 1978, the state and the collective/local community 
shared the major responsibility for social welfare. As the agency 
which had overall control of public resources, the government 
played a praminant role in running and funding welfare projects. 
Meanwhile, collective contribution was required to relieve the 
burden of the state and to operationalize the principles of local 
self reliance and mutual help. In other words, the value of 
communal obligation was emphasized. The fact that the beneficiaries 
were destitute persons meant that recipient contribution could not 
be expected. Similarly, the prevailing poverty of the masses 
precluded the feasibility of individual donations. Under such 
circumstances, the approach of "walking on two legs", relying on 
the state and the masses, was adopted. The underlying moral 
precepts were public responsibility and communal obligation.
Since the early 1980s, the state has been facing mounting 
pressure to meet its traditional obligations as well as respond to 
new demands for service from the general population. However, the 
resources at its disposal were wanting. This dictated a spreading 
of involvements. With the devolution of fiscal authority to local 
areas, the regions, rather than the centre, were required to 
provide most of the funds for their welfare programmes. Even more 
onerous was the duty placed on local communities. Notwithstanding 
the abolition of communes and the consequent collapse of old 
financing mechanisms, they had to find ingenious ways of raising 
revenue to discharge their welfare functions. As the local economy 
developed, many communities were able to do so. Over the last 
decade, communal provisions have expanded more rapidly than state 
services. Despite this, resources are still short.
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One way of sharing responsibilities was to promote user 
attribution. To this end, clients as well as welfare agencies were 
asked to pitch in. Methods such as inccme-generaticn, paying fees 
for service and ploughing back agency earnings to other welfare 
projects have been used. For example, the drastic expansion of
welfare factories, whose significance went beyond job creation for 
the disabled, accentuates the last point. Finally, the rising 
income of the populace, notably the more successful individuals and 
firms, made the pursuit of philanthropy possible. Hence, donations 
and welfare lotteries were promoted for their potential of 
maximizing altruism.
In conclusion, the essence of the post-reform model was further 
widening of responsibility for social welfare. In other countries, 
this approach was variously called the mixed economy of welfare 
(Pinker, 1979), the welfare mix (Pose, 1986), the welfare provider 
model (Higgins, 1986) and welfare pluralism (Johnson, 1987, 1990). 
For welfare states under crises, a key strategy to reduce state 
intervention has been privatization. This has taken several forms 
(Qyen, 1986, p. 14). One was the encouragement of proprietory
services. Another was subventing voluntary agencies to produce 
services rather than direct state provision. A third means was fee 
charging. The fourth was de-institutionalization and wider use of 
family, community and informal care. The fifth form was reducing 
national economic responsibility and returning nation-wide
programmes to local communities. All these to varying extents 
(except perhaps the use of commercial provisions) have their
Chinese equivalents. In China, the ministry's catch phrase of 
"socializing social welfare" fshehui fuwu shehuihua) (Zhang, 1990)
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comes very dose to privatization in the West. Under this new 
orthodoxy, the state must end its monopoly of ensuring welfare and 
happiness for the people. Instead, different sectors of society - 
state, collective, groups and individuals must assume 
responsibility in providing social care. Funding is one form of 
participation. Besides, a wider cross-section of social groups have 
to take part in running services. On an individual level, citizens 
have to accept more responsibility for self protection fziwo 
baozhang). Volunteering is also iirportant. Overall, the role of 
local communities must also increase.
In essence, the government's call for realizing a mixed 
approach to welfare reflects an attempt to re-define the
state-society relationship (C. Chan, 1991). Where formerly the 
state subsumed society and ran all aspects of social, political and 
economic life in the country, the development of civil society new 
has a better chance. All citizens and groups sharing the welfare 
burden with government is one aspect of the emergence of civil 
society in post-Mao China. For the time being, civil society's role 
is still confined to doing the state's bidding. The days are still 
far off when private citizens and groups are able to share genuine 
decision-making power with the state and the party.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE GDANGDCHG EXFH^LEHCE
Guangdong is an undisputed leader in implementing the policies of 
open door and reform. Its success on the economic front is 
impressive, as Chapter Three has shown. Is this also true in social 
welfare? Has its welfare development followed the national 
trajectory? Was there anything unique about the welfare challenge 
it faced and the solutions that it sought? What can we learn from a 
regional perspective? These are the central concerns of this
chapter.
The chapter is organized into four parts. First, the challenges 
to civil affairs arising from socio-economic changes concomitant 
with the economic reforms is examined. This entails an analysis of 
the altered milieu, the challenges for civil affairs and the 
resultant change agenda. Then, a brief review of Guangdong's 
experience with four welfare programmes —  preferential treatment, 
veteran resettlement, social welfare, and relief work —  is made. 
Part Three presents and discusses the findings of my 1988 field 
visits. The data fall into three groups: 1. social welfare work in 
the Pearl River Delta; 2. rural welfare experiments in Huazhou; and
3. findings from the survey of Guangzhou's municipal welfare homes 
and factories and a case study of community social care in a 
Guangzhou neighbourhood. In Part Four, Guangdong's approach to 
welfare in the 1980s is summarized. This takes the form of an 
appraisal of its characteristics and achievements. The lessons that 
can be gained from a regional perspective are also discussed.
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Part One
The Challenge to Social Welfare
Guangdong in the 1980s was a mixed society. The old socio-economic 
framework was imbued with new elements that enriched and made freer 
people*s life styles. The changing economy created new wealth and 
jobs in industries and tertiary occupations so that even needy 
groups like the handicapped and demobilized soldiers could benefit. 
In implementing an export-oriented industrial strategy, even 
welfare factories were able to reach out to new investments and 
markets. Furthermore, the import of new management concepts, 
technology and practices enlivened the moribund welfare 
enterprises. The establishment of townships was a boon to rural 
development. Urbanization of the rural hinterland better met 
residents* demands for social and cultural services, provided jobs 
for surplus agricultural manpower and reduced the welfare gap 
between town and country. All these changes had a positive effect 
on people’s welfare.
On the other hand, the reforms presented daunting challenges to 
the welfare system. In the view of Guangdong civil affairs 
officials, seven issues had the most salience, thereby setting the 
scene for welfare reforms (GDSZJ. 1989, pp. 26-31).
First, in the process of continuing reform, social shocks and 
conflicts produced de-stabilizing social currents. People became 
more mobile as they responded to the gravitional pull of jobs and 
business openings. New interest constellations upset traditional 
Tnat-fyHal and power rankings and heightened tensions between groups. 
For example, such categories as private entrepreneurs, managers,
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individual workers and specialized households gained ascendency 
while old privileged groups like civil servants and workers in 
large state enterprises suffered a fall from grace. In cities, 
reforms in the employment system generated insecurities and 
produced new welfare disparities, leaving some employees completely 
exposed. Additionally, inflation eroded purchasing power. Taking 
1985 retail prices as the baseline, the price index rose to 152.4 
in 1988 and 176.3 in 1990 (Guangdong Statistical Bureau, 1992).
While the majority were able to achieve real gains in their living
standard, segments of the population (workers on fixed pay,
employees of insolvent units, retired persons and especially the
indigent) were left behind. All these created contradictions in a 
socialist province.
In the second place, advancing industrialization, marketization 
and urbanization challenged the legitimacy of old service 
boundaries that divided urban and rural areas. In the field of 
welfare, civil affairs departments were hard pressed to meet the 
needs of people without prejudice to their residential status. Ihe 
case of rural migrants epitomized the dilemma (Li, 1989). At the 
end of 1988, Guangdong had an estimated four million "floating 
population" of non-permanent residents fJincrii Daobao. 6 March 
1989). Should these people, who retain their rural registraton, be 
given urban relief if they fall on hard times? If yes, who should 
pay for it —  the urban CADs or their home communities? As a result 
of family separation, who should assume responsibility for helping 
their dependants if they suffered from lack of care? The latter 
issue became more vexing when many villages were gradually denuded 
of their able-bodied population and left with a growing proportion
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of children, wcmenand the elderly, the so-called "61-38-70 
contingent".1
The third challenge was posed by the changing demography, in 
particular an aging population. In 1982, 8.12 percent of
Guangdong's population and 8.72 percent in Guangzhou were aged 60 
and above. In 1990, the percentage of elderly people in Guangzhou 
was 10 percent (Lai, GEMZ. 1991, Issue 6, p.24). Directly related 
was the question of old age support, both in terms of retirement 
benefits for urban workers and support and care for the rural 
elderly who depend primarily on their families. When villages lost 
their collective care arrangements associated with the communes, 
the funding of the "five guarantees" became threatened. In the 
context of deepening urbanization, the injustice of maintaining 
separate retirement policies for rural and urban residents became 
more pronounced.
The fourth concern centred an the welfare of the disabled. In 
an environment marked by economic competition and rising prices, 
the survival of work schemes for the disabled became an issue. 
Welfare enterprises had a hard time competing with firms more
oriented to efficiency and productivity. The disabled also found it 
more difficult to find jobs in the labour market when firms could 
new pick and choose their employees. The need for special 
protection for disability employment was more acute than ever.
The fifth challenge was posed by changing social values.
Guangdong people were long famous for their business acumen and 
materialism. Economic liberalization had rekindled the spirit of
1 61 refers to 1 June, Children's Day; 38 refers to 8 March,
Women's Day; 70 refers to people aged 70 and above. The 61-38-70
contingent means population segments ccnprising children, women and 
elderly.
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entrepreneurship and materialism. Under this climate, there was a 
noticeable weakening of communal solidarity. With communes
disbanded, the basis for compulsory altruism in rural areas was 
destroyed. In urban neighbourhoods too, the recruitment of local
volunteers became more difficult. Given that welfare support was 
heavily dependent on mutual aid, the replacement of 
public-spiritedness by egoistic self-interest could have negative 
impacts on social mobilization and funding.
The sixth concern was growing self-assertion of the masses as a 
result of a more relaxed and tolerant style of governance. The 
reforms weakened the pcwer of the government and the party over 
economic and social life. In particular, rural cadres found their 
authority over the peasantry more tenuous than before (White,
1987). Peasants new made to bear sole responsibility for their
family's survival were more concerned about their cwn welfare and 
less ready to contribute to the support of needy groups who did not 
work for their living. Instead their demands for a reduction of 
their tax and public burdens grew louder every year. Such nascent 
stirrings for democracy posed more obstacles in exacting welfare
taxes from the masses.
Finally, there was the need to address the problem of social 
inequality. Even before the reform, economic development in 
Guangdong was very uneven. In the 1980s, remote and disadvantaged 
areas fell further behind. For example, in 1987, Shunde, Narihai and 
Dongguan in the Pearl River Delta had annual industrial incomes 
between 2.6 to 3 billion yuan (Guangdong Yearbook 1987). In 
northern Lianshan county, this was only 26.65 million yuan (Liang, 
1990, p.496) • Regarding individual incomes, the gaps were just as
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wide. In 1988, a former peasant working in a xiancr-zhen enterprise 
in a Pearl River county could mate 200-300 yuan per month; a farmer
in a highland area could only manage 525 yuan a year. In general,
the income of rural residents in the mountainous areas was only 
62.5 percent of those residing in the plains (Liang, ibid). At the 
other extreme were the new rich whose annual earnings ran from tens 
to hundreds of thousand yuan. Their wealth and lavish lifestyles 
spurred envy and resentment among their less well-off neighbours.
In view of the above conditions, civil affairs agencies in 
Guangdong realized that reforms in welfare were direly needed? old 
wine in new bottles may not suffice. At the same time, resource 
constraints meant that over-ambition was untenable. Overall, the 
new agenda paralleled those for the country as a whole. These 
included reforms in social security, new experimentation in same 
areas, socializing provisions, and constructing a welfare system 
appropriate to conditions in Guangdong.
Different goals were set for rural and urban areas. In the
cities, the objective was to galvanize the efforts of the state, 
collective, and individuals to increase public provisions. At the 
same time, the advantages peculiar to Guangdong, particularly 
access to new capital and technology, were to be utilized. The 
major development targets were expansion in social welfare
services, welfare production and community care, identical to the 
national agenda.
In the countryside where conditions varied more widely, welfare 
development should match economic development. In poor areas, the 
goal was to ensure subsistence. This meant that traditional 
programmes were to be stressed —  the reinforcement of disaster
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and social relief, preferential treatment, resettlement of
demobilized soldiers, with the addition of development aid. Where
conditions permit, each xiancr-zhen should work towards the
completion of four key projects —  an old people’s heme, a welfare 
factory, a poverty aid economic entity and a social security fund 
—  the four pillars of a rural social security network. In 
middle-inccme areas, the implementation of the four projects would 
have priority, and on that basis, service contents would be 
upgraded to provide more adequate care. For more affluent places, a 
rural social security network was expected to be in place by 1990. 
In addition, pilot schemes with cooperative insurance for disaster 
relief would be extended and experiments with retirement pensions 
would be explored. Finally, the special economic zones would try 
out more advanced forms of social security which are more
comprehensive in coverage and generous in standards (GDSZJ, 1989, 
pp. 27-31). The adoption of differential development models is a 
pragmatic response to regional disparities, which are likely to 
remain for the forseeable future. This is also in line with
ministry thinking.
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Rirt Two
Welfare Developments in the Reform Decade
1. Preferential Treatment
Guangdong provided the full range of statutory subsidies and relief 
to designated targets according to central policy. Because of her 
strong financial position, however, the province could offer
superior benefits. One example was relief to disabled soldiers. For 
those sustaining special class and Class 1 disability, an
additional attendance allowance of 55-60 yuan was available. 
Besides, supplements of 10 and 5 yuan were given to Class 2A and 2B 
disabled, which were not available in other areas. The Guangdong 
government also extended house building grants of between 5,000 to
10,000 yuan to disabled veterans sustaining Special and Class 1 
disability? in other provinces only retired army officers could 
enjoy housing assistance (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 113). For families of 
martyrs and infirm veterans, Guangdong CADs were able to provide 
additional subsidies. For instance, Foshan City upgraded both
relief to martyrs' families and subsidies for infirm veterans by 27
percent in 1988 (GDSZJ. 1989, pp. 112-13). In the province as a 
whole, particularly in more affluent places, veterans enjoyed 
higher rates of statutory benefits.
Mass aid took the form of work point privileges in the commune 
period, which benefitted 60,000 military households per year, 
averaging 60 to 100 man-days per recipient household. However, the 
coverage was far from universal? only 30 percent of soldiers' 
families enjoyed work point bonuses (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 115).
A revolutionary practice made its debut in 1980 with the
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issuance of "Guangdong Province Experimental Regulations on 
Preferential Treatment for Dependants of Martyrs, Serving Soldiers 
and Disabled Veterans". This introduced a universal cash bonus in 
place of work points, the first in the country. For urban recruits, 
their families were eligible to receive half of their original wage 
from their work units. If the recruits were unemployed before they 
answered the draft, a monthly allowance would be paid by the street 
office. In 1988, the minimum preferential allowance for families of 
urban recruits was 20 yuan per month. In rural areas, soldiers' 
dependents were eligible for an allowance equal to 50-100 percent 
of a labourer's earnings. The funding came from a villagers' levy. 
In 1982, centralized collection and distribution of such levies at 
the xiancr-zhen level began. In that year, 1,071 communes out of 
1,902 adopted this approach; 179,346 rural servicemen's households 
(including Hainan Island which became a separate province in 1988) 
received the cash bonus totalling 23 million (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 117).
Table 12 Preferential Treatment Provided by 
_____the Masses in Guangdong r 1981-1987
Year Recipient
Households
Tot. Aid 
(Yuan)
Yuan per 
HH per year
1984
1983
1982
1987
1981
1985
1986
138,918
179,346
164,373
145,046
128,681
112,729
113,792
14,472,554
23,149,182
24,155,146
22,938,260
24,965,200
27,199,994
33,110,000 291
241
104
158
194
147
129
Source: GDSZJ. 1989, p.118
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Table 12 shews that the benefit levels of mass aid increased
year by year. In 1987, the annual rate was about half of the
average per capita income in rural areas. In 1988, the province 
ranked first in the amount of cash raised from the local community, 
amounting to 292 million yuan, out of a national total of 2,054 
million yuan (SHBZB, 14 April 1989).
Guangdong also administered a programme of institutional 
services for retired and disabled soldiers. The earliest statistics 
available were for 1985. In that year, the residential programme 
consisted of 2,006 beds, out of a national total of 41,200 beds 
(Weniian Xuanbian. 1986, pp.451-52). This number put Guangdong
(population 62.5 million including Hainan) far behind provinces
like Hebei (8,277 beds, provincial population 55.5 million), 
Jiangxi (6,997 beds, population 34.6 million) and Hubei (3,615 
beds, population 49.3 million) (ZGSHTJZL. 1987, p. 19). In 1987, 
residential capacity seemed to have decreased slightly, composed of
1,000 beds in convalescent homes and veteran hospitals, 571 beds in 
old people's homes for veterans, and an unknown number in ordinary 
old people's homes (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 119). Thus, when compared with 
cash benefits, Guangdong's performance in residential care for 
veterans was rather lack lustre.
2. Resettlement of Demobilized Personnel
Guangdong followed the national policy of returning former 
conscripts to their place of enlistment. In rural settlement, 
Guangdong had a good record. Its better developed rural economy 
produced richer opportunities in industry, construction, transport, 
commerce and service trades, which gave it an edge over other
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places. Therefore more returnees were able to get jobs in township 
and village enterprises. Between 1985 and 1987, 11,478 men were 
placed in these units (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 124). Those with special 
skills acquired in their army days became technical and 
administrative cadres. The efforts that Guangdong made in 
retraining soldiers for civilian life also proved fruitful. In 
1985, 133 xiana-zhens operated job training and placement stations.
Seme graduates were even headhunted to work in other provinces. 
Those returning to farming and agricultural side-line work also 
benefitted from rising demands for domestic consumption and export.
Enping County pioneered a very successful programme of loans 
and development aid (fuycu) to help former soldiers to start 
businesses in 1982. This experience won praise from the provincial 
CAD and the ministry and spread quickly across the province. 
Between 1981 and 1984, 158,318 former soldiers (including Hainan) 
received fuycy. Among the successes were: 1,426 "ten thousand yuan" 
households, 14,545 households earning more than 5,000 yuan per 
year, 22,270 households becoming specialized households and 14,018 
households forming cooperative ventures with others (GDSZJ. 1989, 
p. 124). Between 1985-1987, Guangdong banks and credit agencies 
extended loans of 300 million yuan to veterans (GDSZJ. ibid).
As has been mentioned, Guangdong was more generous with housing 
assistance. Not only army officers benefitted as in other places? 
by 1987, 1,669 housing units with a total area of 126,000 square
metres were built for 1,380 officers (Li, GEMZ, 1989 Issue 6, 
p. 22). In addition, housing assistance was made available to other 
veterans. Between 1980-87, 10 million yuan was allocated for this
purpose, along with the supply of 3,000 sq. metres of ply wood,
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70,000 tons of concrete and 10,000 tons of steel daring 1980 to 
1987 (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 123). Finally, Guangdong's disabled veterans 
also enjoyed special help. In addition to the provision of
financial aid, rural disabled veterans with Class 2 and 3
disability who were still capable of work had the privilege of 
receiving guaranteed job placement reserved for urban returnees. 
Meanwhile, those who lost their work ability completely had the 
ultimate compensation of getting urban resident status, thereby 
qualifying for subsidized rations available to city dwellers 
(GDSZJ. 1989, p. 123). However, it was not known how many benefitted 
or the conditions under which such treatment applied.
For urban resettlement, Guangdong's programme was in line with 
national practice. The basic principle was the restoration of 
former status. This means that former cadres and workers return to 
their old work units and students resume their disrupted studies. 
To place returnees who have never worked before, the government
assigned job quotas for different functional systems (xitgng), e.g.
certain industries or fields of occupation. Between 1982-1987, 
placements were found for sane 26,000 veterans (Li, GEMZ, 1989, 
Issue 6, p.22).
3. Welfare Services and Welfare Production
(1) Social Welfare Services
Before the reform decade, Guangdong had a modest residential care 
programme for the indigent and disabled made up of homes seized 
from overseas missions and local charities. These suffered the same 
fate of closure and merger during the Cultural Revolution as 
similar services elsewhere. It was not until the early 1980s that
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new momentum in service development was regained.
Table 13 Social Welfare Institutions in Guanadoncf. 1979-1987
CAD-run Hemes Hemes Run by
Year
Mixed
Homes
Children's
Homes
Mental
Hospitals
Other
Homes
Urban & Rural 
Collectives
1979 36 5 3 - 407
1980 38 6 3 - 438
1981 40 7 4 - 417
1982 41 6 3 - 429
1983 40 5 2 - 506
1984 43 5 2 - 722
1985 48 5 2 2 918
1986 50 5 2 2 1,043
1987 53 5 2 2 1,188
Source: Guangdong Province Civil Affairs Department.
From Table 13, a number of interesting facts stand out. First, 
during the period, different types of government facilities have 
had dissimilar rates of growth. There was no growth in 
government-run children's homes and mental hospitals; for mixed 
institutions, there was a modest increase from 36 to 53. On the 
other hand, homes run by collective more than doubled. The build up 
was especially remarkable after 1983.
When one examines resident numbers presented in Table 14, the 
role of ccxnmunity-run facilities is more striking. From 1979 to 
1987, residents receiving statutory care increased from 3,099 to 
3,771. In fact, more growth has occurred in the number of staff 
than in inmates. Meanwhile those living in community homes nearly 
tripled. Without any doubt, the burden of providing care for the 
homeless infirm has passed progressively from the state to local 
communities, in line with the trend nation-wide.
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Table 14 Number of Staff and Residents in 
Social Welfare Institutions in Guangdong. 1979-1987
CAD-run
Facilities
Homes Run by Urban 
and Rural Collectives Total
Year Staff Residents Staff Residents Resident
1979 905 3,099 641 3,592 6,691
1980 983 3,069 631 3,164 6,233
1981 1,193 3,141 609 2,962 6,103
1982 1,251 3,185 652 3,204 6,389
1983 1,274 3,153 840 4,609 7,762
1984 1,284 3,242 1,224 7,599 10,841
1985 1,394 3,333 1,444 10,230 13,563
1986 1,481 3,462 1,779 12,408 15,870
1987 1,581 3,771 2,090 14,539 18,310
Source : Guangdong Province Civil Affairs Department
Taking institutional capacity as a whole, Guangdong had
17,000 beds out of a national total of 449,534 beds in 1985 
(Weniian Xuanbian 1986. p.453), or 5.2 beds per ten thousand 
population versus the country average of 7.8 beds. In 1988, 
Guangdong's bed capacity increased to 25,700. Despite this, her bed 
ratio actually dropped to 4.3 per ten thousand as the provincial 
population grew to 59.2 million (Guangdong Provincial CAD). This 
made the province a clear laggard in residential provision.
To improve service quality, Guangdong adopted the ministry's 
recoanmendations for staff-resident ratios: one care worker to every 
2-4 elderly, 4-6 normal children, 1.5 disabled children and 2-3 
mental patients (GDSZJ. 1989, p.37). Even by Western yardstick, 
such manning scales are very favourable. However, apart from large
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municipal facilities, it was not kncwn hew far they are followed by 
ccranunity-run homes. My field interviews suggested that the latter 
had not attained these standards. Then, a rehabilitation element 
was incorporated into the bigger (mostly state-run) homes. 
Municipal facilities, in particular, were expected to serve as 
examples of good professional practice. As yet, the expectations 
may take time to became reality. In my visit to two municipal 
facilities in 1988, the standard of care varied so widely that 
while one could be regarded as offering good professional service, 
the other had obvious difficulties maintaining cleanliness and 
physical care of residents. Finally, Guangdong heroes have also 
widened access beyond "three-no” targets. Many of the homes I 
visited admitted fee-paying locals and Hong Kong residents who were 
charged full service cost. Overall, facilities were far from 
adequate. So far only privileged groups - labour heroes, retired 
cadres and people who made special contribution but lacked family 
care - could buy the services (GDSZJ. 1989, p.35). Further 
exploration of related themes will follow in the Guangzhou survey.
Three other projects deserve special mention. The first was 
Zhi Ling Special School, a privately-run special school for 120 
mentally handicapped children, the first example of a market 
facility for the disabled in the province. In both its planning and 
on-going operation, the school obtained significant assistance 
(with curriculum design, staff training and professional advice) 
from Caritas Hong Kong, the social service arm of the Catholic 
Church there (C. Chan, 1991). To strike heme the worthinesss of 
private initiatives in social care, its principal received a 
citation of honour from the ministry (SHBZB, 5 June 1987). The
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second work of pride was a gleaming 6,000 square metre vocational 
rehabilitation centre in Guangzhou incorporating facilities for 
vocational training, sheltered workshop, hostel, restaurant, 
library and conference venue. Beginning operation in January 1988, 
it was reputedly one of the most advanced projects of its kind 
across China (GDSZJ. 1989, pp.69-70). In addition, there was a 
speech training centre for deaf children, which occupied one floor 
in the building that housed the vocational rehabilitation centre. 
It offered audiological testing, speech therapy, research, and 
staff training services (GDSZJ. 1989, p.70). Finally, there was the 
Ren Ai Nursery for 90 hepatitis B carriers. This was the brainchild 
of a Christian voluntary agency and it satisfied a hitherto unmet 
need in the city (C. Chan, 1991; Guangzhou Yearbook. 1989, p. 474). 
The first and last were unique examples of voluntary endeavours 
which augmented acute shortages of public provisions. In this 
respect, Guangdong was at the forefront of promoting private 
initiatives in social care.
(2) Social Welfare Production
Guangdong embraced the same fever in the development of welfare 
production as in other places. Following the spirit of national 
policies on tax exemption for welfare factories, Guangdong 
promulgated supplemental regulations. These policies provided the 
enzyme for growth. In addition, Guangdong's proximity to Hong Kong 
gave it a strategic advantage. Beginning in 1987, welfare factories 
in the region began doing export processing work for foreign-cwned 
and operated companies. By year-end 1987, 68 units has signed joint 
production contracts with overseas firms, earning an income of US$6
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m i n ion (GDSZJ. 1989, p.43). In 1989, the number grew to 83 units, 
drawing an investment of US$10 million (GDFCAD. GEMZ, 1990, Issue 
2, p.l)•
Table 15 Social Welfare Production Units in Guangdong. 1979-1987
CAD-run Units Xiana-zhen/street Massage Total
-run units Clinics No.
all disab. all disab. all disab. of
Year units staff wkers units staff wkers units staff wkers units
1979 50 7,479 3,137 — — — 3 65 22 53
1980 62 8,149 3,274 - - - 3 107 31 65
1981 72 8,765 3,518 - - - 4 126 40 76
1982 77 9,046 3,432 - - - 5 134 43 82
1983 88 9,587 3,571 287 7,428 1,208 10 165 77 385
1984 95 10,076 3,031 235 5,484 1,776 12 174 87 342
1985 118 11,444 3,822 307 7,190 2,519 5 157 57 430
1986 124 11,355 4,016 375 9,566 2,736 7 174 69 506
1987 137 11,955 4,411 687 24,912 4,460 7 157 60 831
1989 162 15,000 5,640 1,116 n.a. 8,360 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,281
Notes : In addition, there are 2 factories manufacturing artificial 
limbs run by CADs in Guangzhou and Shantou. In 1987, they employed 
197 (non-disabled) workers.
Source: All figures are from GDFCAD? 1989 figures in GEMZ. 1990,
Issue 2, p.l.
Table 15 shews that state-run units have grown 274 percent 
between 1979 and 1987, resulting in a 41 percent increase of 
disabled workers placed. However, it was in the non-state sector 
that a dramatic transformation took place, from naught in 1982 to 
287 units overnight and then an expansion of 140 percent in five
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years. By 1987, this sector employed as many disabled workers and 
twice as many able-bodied operatives as the CAD units. There were 
just a handful of massage clinics employing blind workers at the 
start of the period; by 1987, both unit numbers and blind masseuses 
had a three fold increase. Two other means of placement —  
employment in small workshops/factories run by urban neighbourhoods 
and self-employment —  absorbed an additional number of disabled 
workers. In 1987, 5,919 disabled persons worked for the former? 
1,534 became individual workers. Taking all sources of employment 
kncwn to CADs into consideration, total placement for the disabled 
was 12,372 in 1985, 16,384 in 1987 and 14,000 plus in 1989 
(GDFCAD). Such numbers were paltry when the disabled population for 
the province may be as high as 2.8 million (based on the 4.9 
percent national projection).
A further set of statistics provided by the GDFCAD helps to 
threw light an the economic performance of social welfare
production and suggest a reason for their limited capability.
Table 16 Economic Performance of Welfare 
Production Enterprises in Guangdong. 1979-1987
(10,000 yuan) 
Units run by Units run by Massage
CADs Stneet/Xiancr-Zhen Clinics
ann w. profits w. losses ann. ann. a m pro­
prod. units amt. units amt prod, profits inc. fits
1979 4,680 — — —  — —  — 4 1
1980 5,385 45 445 17 69 - . - 46 6
1981 4,184 41 345 31 84 -  - 59 8
1982 4,498 42 375 35 105 - - 73 11
1983 6,048 60 556 28 95 394 82 19
1984 9,212 65 935 30 77 336 92 22
1985 12,968 87 1,064 31 40 5,948 332 109 8
1986 11,574 85 641 39 159 8,862 330 127 25
1987 17,784 103 1,025 34 2,090 21,313 2,144 206 5
Source : Guangdong Province Civil Affairs Department
- 249 -
Table 16 shews that the annual production in all units
increased steadily over the eight year period. Until 1986, CAD-run 
welfare factories held the lead in production performance. In 1987, 
this passed to the community sector. If profits and losses were 
reckoned, the health of CAD units was far from robust. In most
years, more than one quarter of them suffered losses; for 1987, 
deficit units were losing twice as much money than profits gained 
by solvent ones. On the other hand, performance of community 
provisions was less easy to gauge, if only because comparable
statistics were not available. Nevertheless what was most 
impressive was the 6.5 fold increase in profits from 1979 to 1987. 
This could be attributed to the take-off in export-processing work. 
My visit to the Pearl River area suggested that community-run
welfare factories were more successful in exploiting new 
opportunities than the state sector. Xiana-zhens were usually more 
flexible and aggressive in signing such work contracts.
In the late 1980s, welfare factories in Guangdong were meeting 
with increasing competition. In an econcmy with a growing market 
component, a large disabled work force (at least 35 percent) was a 
drag on productivity. Besides, there were problems with pre-modem 
machinery, poor credit worthiness and inefficient management. Most 
importantly, the advantages of tax exemption, the only trump card 
of welfare factories, have lost their magic when townships competed 
to outdo one another with financial inducements to attract outside 
investors. Under such circumstances, welfare production enterprises 
have beccme very vulnerable. These issues will be examined in 
greater depth in the Guangzhou survey.
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(3) Ccmmunity Social Services
Frcm 1984 onwards, urban neighbourhoods in Guangdong have became 
more adventurous with community care experiments. Key beneficiaries 
included the elderly, the disabled, soldiers' families, hardship 
households and children. Ordinary residents also came under the 
scope of convenience services like repair stations, home help and 
delivery services upon the payment of a small fee.
The push towards community care was uneven across the province. 
Some cities and municipal districts within them were more advanced 
than others. The leaders included certain districts in Guangzhou, 
Zhanjiang, Jiangmen, Shantou and Shaoguan. At the end of 1987, the 
province boasted 117 social centres, 140 multi-service centres, one 
rehabilitation clinic and one match-making service centre for the 
elderly. Besides, there were four ccmmunity social centres (for 
multiple targets), 47 heme help stations and 2,489 convenience 
service points for residents (GDSZJ. 1989, p.94). There were also 
in operation 48 special classes for disabled children, all at 
street or residents' committee level. In addition, neighbourhood 
volunteers set up 3,421 care and support groups for 5,747 frail 
elderly (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 104).
In sum, there has been a good deal of experimentation in 
expanding ccmmunity care. However current attempts were piecemeal 
and rudimentary. Success depended on many conditions, as a later 
part will show. Apart from seme shcw-case examples, Guangdong's 
efforts fell behind cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou and 
Wuhan. In medium-size cities and townships, neighbourhood 
provisions had scarcely begun to make an inpact on meeting the 
social service needs of residents.
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4. Social and Disaster Belief
(1) Social relief in urban areas
At the end of 1987, Guangdong had a total of 15,000 "three-no” 
persons living in cities and towns. Of these, 3,000 received care 
in CAD-run institutions, 6,639 obtained care in group homes set up 
by streets and townships, and 5,000 subsisted on state relief in 
their own homes. Standard rates varied according to domicile —  45 
yuan per month for an eligible resident in large cities, 40 yuan 
for medium and snail cities, and 35 yuan for a township resident 
with urban registration (GDSZJ. 1989, P.84). Because of the 
meagreness of state grants, recipients had to apply for top-up 
subsidies from street organizations. Besides, hard-15) redundant 
workers laid off during the austerity drive in 1961-65 were also 
eligible for regular subsidy (40 percent of their previous basic 
wage and two-thirds of health care costs). At the end of 1987, such 
beneficiaries stood at 4,700 (GDFCAD). The other category that 
became newly eligible for regular relief was rehabilitated 
deviants. This followed the national policy announced in 1979 
(GDSZJ. 1989, p.85).
Taken together, the number of people on regular state subsidies 
was small. At the end of 1987, less than 36,000 persons benefitted 
from a total grant of 4.9 million yuan (GDSZJ. 1989, p.137).
(2) Rural social relief
When communes were first disbanded, Guangdong experienced the 
familiar crisis of funding the "five guarantee” programme. This 
prompted the provincial government to issue a directive reminding 
local areas not to neglect their duties in 1980 (Shouce. 1982, pp.
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363-65). Specifically, it called for a minimum maintenance standard 
of not less than 480 catties of grain per person per year and five 
yuan pocket money per month. In localities running projects that 
yielded collective incomes, the revenue usually came from this 
source. Where ccmmunal allocation was not possible or not adequate, 
welfare funding was shared between the sub-district, administrative 
village and villagers' committee. This practice prevailed in most 
of the Pearl River delta counties in 1988. The responsibility was 
either shared equally by the three tiers of administration or 
according to a locally agreed forumla which varied from place to 
place.
1984 saw the passing of another regulation —  the Guangdong 
Temporary Regulations on the Work of the "Five Guarantees". This 
upgraded the annual subsistence standard to 240 yuan per head 
exclusive of 480 catties of grain. On the other hand, it also 
extended the duty to support to married daughters (who usually 
marry outside of their native village) and children under 
pseudo-adoption arrangements (not regarded as legal heirs). 
Formerly exempted in accordance with local custcm, they became 
liable? aid was granted only if they were manifestly unable to 
fulfil their duty.
In essense, rural relief remained a local responsibility. Only 
very poor areas could get state grants. By 1987, centralized 
collection and distribution of relief goods and cash at the 
xiana-zhen level was practiced by 82 percent of all xiancr-zhens 
(1,690) in Guangdong. To effect better management of resources, 933 
special funds with the aim of improving care for aged peasants were 
set up, accumulating seme 45 million yuan through levies,
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donations, state subsidies and collective inccme. Because of 
improvements in funding, Guangdong was able to increase the average 
relief payment from 265 yuan in 1986 to 352 yuan the following year 
so that about one third of welfare recipients could attain the 
living standard prevailing in the local community. In addition, by 
year-end 1987, 14,539 indigent elderly were cared for in 1,188
village-run heroes (GDSZJ. 1989, p.88). As a rule, they enjoyed more 
comprehensive and higher-quality care than those living on their 
cwn.
Taking the "five guarantee" programme as a whole, out of same
160,000 plus qualified persons, only 138,000 actually received 
support in 1988 (Li, GEMZ. 1989, Issue 6, p.22). This rate (76.7 
percent) was inferior to the national average of 87.5 percent for 
the year (ZGNCTJNJ. 1989, p.278). In terms of relief standard, 
Guangdong's spending of 441 yuan per head (Wang, GEMZ. 1989, Issue 
3, p.33) or 55 percent of the per capita rural income was not too 
lew. In seme rich villages in Shunde county, communal aid was on a 
par with local earnings, against the backdrop of a very limited 
number of recipients being supported by handscroe profits from the 
booming rural industries.
(3) Natural Disaster Relief
Sitting in the path of south-easterly tropical cyclones, Guangdong 
is vulnerable to their furies, occasioning damage to crops, 
livestock and property. The province is also prone to floods, 
droughts, frosts and damage due to environmental pollution. All 
these resulted in about 30 major onslaughts from nature every year 
(Chen, 1990), affecting seme ten million people.
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During the 1980s, Guangdong made three innovations in disaster 
relief work in accordance with ministry policy. First, it was one 
of the first regions to adopt a fixed contract system in relief 
budgetting. On receiving its share of relief money from the central 
treasury, provincial authorities contracted out the bulk of it to 
each xian (county) as a fixed sum. The xian allocation supposedly 
reflected such values as the number of disasters sustained in 
previous years, number of xiang-zhen under poverty, fiscal receipts 
of the local area and papulation size. Each xian then managed the 
best it could within its budget.
Second, Guangdong was given authority to channel part of the 
relief allocations to help disaster victims to develop production. 
Third, Guangdong grafted a system of interest-free loans onto its 
regular relief programme. Outright grants were reserved for the 
nonworking poor and emergency requirements. The loans so recovered 
were retained by the xian government to help other victims. Similar 
to the national trend, total spending on disaster relief has 
declined: from 46.4 million yuan in 1985, 43.3 million yuan in
1987, to 35.7 million yuan in 1988 (GDSTJNJ. 1989, p.448). In 1987, 
4.32 million victims were helped (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 137). At the rate 
of only 10 yuan per head, the handouts were blatantly inadequate 
for even emergency needs. The capping of state input, partial 
diversion into development aid and substitution of loans for grants 
no doubt effected savings. The benefit to victims was dubious.
(e) Aid to the Poor
Guangdong's maiden attempts at development aid started in 1964 
in Changning Commune, Boluo County. Such work was aborted by the
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Cultural Revolution. In the late 1970s, GDFCAD was eager to revive 
the early experiments, and Shantou, Hingning, Kaiping, Boluo, 
Haikang, Gaojue and Xinfeng counties were chosen as tricil sites. In 
the event, the projects shewed such promise that the ministry
popularized the Guangdong approach at the 1978 Seventh Civil
Affairs Conference. From then on fuoin work in Guangdong took off.
Guangdong’s fupin programme was underpinned by careful planning 
and organization. Three strategies were followed. First, the 
provincial and local administrations took pains to integrate fuoin 
into the overall development plan of the area. Second, policy
formulation and implementation involved all concerned government
agencies. Third, executive bodies with representation from all 
agencies were created to coordinate work at each level. Working at 
the xiancr-zhen and villagers' committee levels, there were 1,237 
fuoin companies with a special corps of 5,211 workers (GDSZJ. 1989, 
pp.40-41? Li, GEMZ. 1989, Issue 6, p.23). By 1988, 575,000 poor 
households were drawn into the programme and 4,500 economic 
entities were in operation (Li, ibid). Additionally 600 special 
funds were set up for financial management. As a result, 250,000 
households reportedly left poverty (tuopin) (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 145). 
The target rate for 1990 was 50 percent. One means of achieving 
this was to expand fupin enterprises; by 1990, 60 percent of all 
xiancr-zhen should have them.
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Figure 10 Guangdong and Its Location
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Part Three
The 1988 Qianqdnrq Field Data
Figure 10 shews the location of Guangdong and places visited. The 
site visits were intended to concretize the experience of welfare 
work in Guangdong by looking at a number of representative 
locations. As it was, the study grid included (a) the full range of 
civil affairs welfare services 1; (b) the structure of services
in both urban and rural areas, (c) welfare work undertaken at all 
administrative levels 2, and d) welfare work in affluent and 
backward places. For analytical purposes, the above venues were 
divided into three groups: 1. the Pearl River Delta; 2. Huazhou
county? and 3. Guangzhou. Zhanjiang city adjacent to Huazhou was 
not included as the constraint of time did not permit a longer 
visit. The figures and tables that follcw summarize the empirical 
data and are self-explanatory.
1 The types of services visited were as follcws: 13 old people"s 
hemes, 2 children's hemes, 2 combined social welfare hemes, 1 home 
for retired veterans, 7 welfare factories, 4 poverty-aid economic 
entities, 1 artificial limb factory, 1 reception, repatriation and 
settlement farm and 1 civil affairs training college.
2 Guangzhou, Zhongshan and Dongguan had muncipality (shi) status. 
Shunde, Nanhai, Panyu and Huazhou had county (xian) status. Yanbu, 
Dali, Songjiang, Guizhou, Lincheng, Wannuidun, Chashan, Shelong had 
township (zhen) status. Zhengan and Jianghu were administrative 
villages (xiang).
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Figure 11 Economic Characteristics 
of Selected Guangdong Cities/Counties. 1988
GZ ZS DG NH SD py HZ
Admin, status Muni. Muni. Muni. Cty. Cty. Cty. Cty.
Popn. (million) 5.77 1.11 1.27 0.90 0.89 0.74 1.03
Industrial 22.91 
output (billion yuan)
4.62 4.16 4.30 4.78 2.05 0.45
Agricultural 0.38 
output (billion yuan)
0.55 0.74 0.43 0.40 0.35 0.44
Ind.& Agri. 23.29 
CXrtput (billion yuan)
5.17 4.90 4.73 5.18 2.40 0.89
Urban worker 
average wage 2,803 
per year (yuan)
2,763 2,942 2,586 2,815 2,288 1,557
Annual peasant n.a. 
net income (yuan)
1,134 1,030 1,281 1,168 1,085 438
Abbreviations
GZ = Guangzhou 
ZS = Zhongshan 
NH = Nanhai 
FY = Panyu 
Muni. = Municipality
DG = 
SD = 
HZ = 
n.a. = 
Cty. =
Dongguan
Shunde
Huazhou
not available
County
Sources:
1. All statistics are from GDSTJNJ 1989.
2. Urban worker average wages are for workers in state-owned 
enterprises.
3. Per capita net income of peasants are from ray Guangdong 
interviews, March to August 1988.
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F igure 12 The Pearl River Delta and H uazhou County
H ainan
1. The Poarl River Delta
Hie current sample Includes Narihai, Shunde, Dongguan, Zhongshan and 
Panyu. The first four were dubbed the Four Little Tigers of the 
Delta because of their wealth. All five had county status; in 1988, 
Dongguan and Zhongshan were designated as municipalities. Despite 
this classification, they had much affinity with the other three 
places and were representative of the affluent counties in 
Guangdong which were fast becoming urbanized and industrialized.
Historically, the five delta counties were very advanced in 
agriculture, commerce and cottage industry. Situated at the Pearl 
River estuary, they were linked by a network of roads, waterways 
and bridges to the provincial capital (Guangzhou) and by land and 
water transport to Hong Kong and Macau. They were the centres of 
emigration to urban Guangdong and overseas, thereby drawing 
handsome remittances which aided trade and local charity. The 
combined advantages of good location, fertile soil, warm climate, 
plentiful water and a mercantile tradition contributed to the 
area's prosperity.
After 1949, their vitality faded somewhat with the closure of 
the national border and an isolationist policy. Stagnation followed 
in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. The economic reforms 
rekindled the flame of life. Building on their many strengths, they 
leapt to grasp new flexible policies and use them to the full. In 
doing so, an important catalyst was local leadership. Unlike their 
seniors at provincial and municipal levels, county leaders were 
recruited locally and were firmly committed to restore growth and 
glory to their native areas (Vogel, 1989). Under such 
circumstances, the delta counties thrived an all fronts. In
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agriculture, cash crop cultivation, fresh-water products, silk 
cocoons, vegetables, fruits and poultry keeping reaped much higher 
income than rice farming. Transportation, building and service 
trades boomed. Above all, it was the rural industries which 
accounted for their wealth (Sit and Wong, 1990; Vogel, 1989). In 
the first reform decade, the number of township enterprises grew at 
a breakneck speed of 35 percent per year. By 1988, as Figure 11 
shews, more than 80 percent of local income came from industry.
(1) Care for the aged
Care for the aged was restricted to elders registered for the "five 
guarantees". The vast majority of beneficiaries were given out-door 
relief; only seme 20 percent were taken into care. Hemes run by the 
cun (villagers' committees) were typically small (12-20 places) 
while those run by the zhen (town) were larger. By 1988, none of 
the five places had attained the provincial guideline of having one 
heme in each xiancr-zhen.
All the homes visited occupied purpose-built premises and were 
adequately furnished. Some had extensive gardens, exercise rooms, 
reading and meeting rooms. Most of the bigger hemes benefitted from 
donations, with Hong Kong money contributing substantially to 
construction and provisioning costs. Seven hemes also admitted 
fee-paying cases; five took in retirees frcm Hong Kong. The latter 
usually paid fees which were hefty by local standards; in return 
superior accommodation (single or larger rooms), more privacy and 
better meals were provided. According to home staff, differential 
treatment was well accepted by the locals. However this point could 
not be confirmed as there was no chance to interview residents.
- 262 -
Figure 13 The "Five Guarantee" Programme in 
Selected Oounties/Cities. Pearl River Delta. 1988
Nanhai Shunde Zhongshan Dongguan
"Five-guarantee"
elders 2,085 2,002 2,456 1,995
Old-age hones 16 13 13 22
zhen-run 6 3 5 17
cun-run 10 10 8 5
Total residents 399 340 190 390
Maintenance standards for residents (yuan)
food p.m. n.k. 45 n.k. 45
toted, p.a. 988 900-950 n.k. 800
Maintenance standards for non-residents (yuan)
food p.m. min.35 45 n.k. 25
total p.a. n.k. 900-950 n.k. 800
Funding for "five-guarantees" (yuan)
zhen 8-10 15 yes supplement
cun ) the rest 15 yes majority
cooperative ) the rest 15 yes some
county gifts gifts gifts gifts
Source : 1988 Pearl River Delta Inteviews
Panyu
1,100
16
10
6
423
n.k.
910
25
745
yes
yes
yes
gifts
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Figure 14 Old Acre Hemes Visited. Pearl River Delta. 1988 
Home Yr.est. Admin.Staff Res. Res.category Financing
1(NH)
2 (NH)
3(ZS)
4(ZS)
5(ZS)
6 (ZS)
7 (DG)
8 (DG) 
9(FY)
10 (FY)
Note :
1958 zhen 5 33
1986 zhen 22 96
1983 zhen n.k. 53
”3-^0”: 31 
self-fin.:2
by zhen
vil. committee.
vil.small group
1986
1982
muni. 50 
govt.
muni. 5 
CAD
82
16
113-No": 67 HK donation for 
self.fin.: 24 bldg. :HK$l.lm.
HKres.: 5(fee p.m. $: 1,000)
"S-No”: 21 HK donations for 
self. fin.: 24 bldg.
HK res.: 8 (fee p.m.90 yuan)
retired cadres bldg. costs by 
HK res. government, some
(HK$600 p.m.) HK donations
aged veterans costs by municipal CAD 
& dependants
1984 zhen 9 57 M3-No”:
HK res.: 3 
(HK$1,000 
or $1,500)
1987 zhen n.k. 38 "3-No"
bldg. costs:
35,000 yuan by govt., 
HK$1 m. HK donations
bldg. costs by don., 
500 yuan per cap. fee 
from admin, districts, 
supplements from zhen
n.k. zhen n.k. 24 M3-Non: 19 Monthly per capita fee
self fin.: 5 frcm admin, districts
(HK$300 for res. with HK relatives)
1987 zhen 6 46 self fin.: 11
1987 zhen 5 33 "3-No"
Bldg. costs: 24,000 
yuan from xian govt.,
40.000 yuan from zhen. 
HK$320,000 from HK 
donations, monthly fee 
fr. vil.can. (for rural 
3-No) & CAD (for urban 
indigent)
Bldg. costs: 40,000 
yuan from xian govt,
18.000 yuan from zhen.
50.000 yuan frcm 
peasant levies, 30,000 
yuan fran enterprise 
don., sane HK dan., 
fee fr. vil.can.
HK= Hang Kong Source : 1988 Pearl River Delta Interviews
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In general, the cost of maintaining one "five guarantee" elder 
varied from place to place and from one heme to another. The 
general pattern, as Figure 14 shows, was to have tripartite 
contribution —  from xiancr-zhen. cun (residents' committee) and 
cooperatives (residents' small groups) while the xian (county) 
government only gave occasional grants. On the whole residents 
enjoyed better living standards than non-residents. For both 
groups, food and medical care were the two largest expenditure 
items. Whether resident or not, most places were able to issue 
about 45 catties of grain to each elderly person plus money for
vegetables and meat. Most also got about ten yuan per month for
pocket money. Medical costs appeared to be a headache. With the
disappearance of collective health insurance, the price of health 
care has soared. Most places spent about 200 yuan per recipient per 
year on medical treatment. Major illnesses or surgical operations, 
which may run into thousands of yuan, were particularly crippling 
for localities. The tacit admission was that in seme situations, 
treatment could not be had because of a lack of money. Actually, 
the affordability of health care was a general concern for all 
rural dwellers. Not surprisingly, the heavy costs of procuring 
treatment, especially for chronic ccmplaints, was a source of rural 
poverty (SHBZB, 4 September 1986).
Given that the decision to grant the "five guarantees" was 
determined locally, the possibility existed that eligible persons 
might be wrongfully denied because of fiscal constraints or
reluctance to increase the local burden. Most of the civil affairs 
cadres interviewed did not dismiss this likelihood entirely but 
hastened to add that close neighbourly relations would preclude
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such cruelty. A more important factor, it was pointed out, was 
motivational in nature. Not all eligible persons wanted local 
charity, which was tinged with social stigma. For example in 
Shunde, 1,600 childless elderly refused to apply. Of these, seme 
were receiving remittances from relatives. The major deterrent was 
the requirement that the aided give up their property when they 
die. Although it was stressed such persons usually had nothing 
valuable to leave behind, this condition was defended as fair to 
the collective which had spent considerable money for their 
support. Much as the ministry condemned this practice for violating 
the right of the aged, communal norms rather than legal principles 
prevailed. Senior officials felt rather helpless in intervening in 
what were afterall local decisions.
(2) Care for the Disabled
Figure 15 Services for the Disabled, Selected 
Counties/Cities. Pearl River Delta. 1988
Disabled persons
Nanhai Shunde Zhongshan Dongguan Panyu 
2,680 2,600 3,059 2,870 1,915
Welfare factories 
auspices:
8 25
county/city n.k. 2 1 0 1
zhen yes 19 0 5 0
cun yes 4 0 0 0
disabled wkers 330 381 51 542 133
all workers 678 878 n.k. 716 144
Source : 1988 Pearl River Delta Interviews
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In 1988, most places with the exception of Shunde had a 
spattering of welfare factories. Zhongshan and Panyu had only one 
unit each? the Panyu factory also doubled as a poverty aid economic 
entity. Although Shunde boasted more welfare enterprises than the 
rest, only 381 disabled workers were on the payroll and units were 
unevenly placed. For example in the county capital Daliang zhen. 
there were 11 units, Chencun had five and three zhens had none. 
Such uneven distribution was found in other places.
Figure 16 summarizes crucial facts on the six welfare factories 
in the delta area. There are a number of interesting points about 
them. First of all, the average wages of disabled workers were 
generally lcwer than able-bodied workers. However, as the former 
worked shorter hours, there was little substantive difference in 
pay by piece or time rates. In terms of housing and fringe 
benefits, there were few differences. If anything, these tended to 
favour disabled workers. Second, stratification in occupational 
welfare appeared to be linked to employment status rather than 
disability. Most of the units engaged an unknown number of 
temporary workers. Invariably able-bodied and often from outside 
the vicinity, temporary personnel appeared to get less pay and had 
no job security. The one fringe benefit they enjoyed was free 
accommodation, which appeared crowded and substandard. Third, not 
all disabled persons were accepted by welfare factories. Fran my 
interviews and direct observation, the deaf and physically disabled 
were over-represented. There were few visually and mentally 
handicapped workers, except in Factory 1NH, where the plant 
director was a blind labour hero. Virtually no unit would take in 
persons with a psychiatric disorder, who were considered too
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difficult to handle. In my interviews with civil affairs officials, 
I was often taken aback by their perception of the mentally ill - 
that these persons were crazy and prone to violence. Their attitude 
of fear and suspicion reflected ignorance and prejudice towards 
mental illness. If even service providers had such misgivings, the 
case seems rather hopeless in the wider ccmmunity.
Figure 16 Welfare Factories Visited. Pearl River Delta. 1988
All Tenured Tenured 
Unit Yr.Est. Products Workers Dis.Wker. Welfare Provision
(av.wage p.m.)
1NH 1959 jute and plastic 190 
ropes, metal & 
products, 
am. production:
8 m. yuan? profits 
inc. tax relief:
870,000 yuan
2NH 1987 aluminium door & 
windcw frame
50
140 free housing, water, 
(180 yuan) electricity & health 
care for disabled
25 free housing for all 
(150 yuan) workers
3SD 1984 metal containers 132 
repro- (use HK & UK imported 
vision machinery)
ed am.production: 3 m. 
yuan? am.profit inc. 
tax relief: 8-10%
4DG 1988 plastic goods 7
5DG 1958? copper wires 
1986 am. prod 
repro 700,000 yuan
6PY 1985 garments
am.prod: 2.5m 
yuan? profit:
250.000 yuan? 
tax relief:
410.000 yuan
42 n.k. 
(200 yuan)
108
144
(70
temp.
wkers)
3 n.k.
(160 yuan)
47 health care allowance
(200 yuan) 5 yuan p.m.
62 free housing, health
(n.k.) care allowance 5 yuan
p.m.
Source : 1988 Pearl River Delta Interviews
Notes : Factory 6PY also engaged 6 persons frcm poverty households 
and another 6 from veteran families. Most of the disabled labourers 
were outworkers. HK= Hong Kong. UK= United Kingdom.
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(3) Fupin : Aid to the Poor
Figure 17 Aid to the Poor, Selected Places 
_________ in the Pearl River Delta. 1988
NH SD ZS DG PY
Poverty line (yuan p.p.p.y.) 400 420 300 n.k. 240
rural hh. receiving aid 1,430 2,400 3,251* n.k. 328
peasants receiving aid 4,0004- 6,700 10,688* n.k. 1,517
urban hh. receiving relief 234 300 n.k. 740 n.k.
urban relief (yuan p.p.p.m.) 40 35 n.k. 40 n.k.
Notes : * for year 1985? hh= household; p.p.p.m.= per person per
month; p.p.p.y.= per person per year.
Source : 1988 Pearl River Delta Interviews
To appreciate the significance of fuoin in this region, two 
contextual factors are pertinent. First, the delta basin is among 
the richest parts of Guangdong. Second, there is a general labour 
shortage due to rapid development. Hence it was logical to expect 
that poverty, to the extent that it exists, would be small-scale 
and of residual importance given the area's affluence.
Hie actual conditions appeared to be more complex. First of 
all, relevant data could not be gathered from each of the five 
places on all relevant aspects. Local officials either could not 
produce them at the time or upon follcw-up enquiry. Second, the 
quality of the data was not always satisfactory? either the figures 
were out-of-date or looked unreliable. For example, Zhongshan only 
had 1985 statistics. Also, Panyu had an unusually small number of 
households designated for fuoin. However, to assume fewer poor 
peasants in Panyu would be reliable since it had the lowest rural
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per capita net income among the five places. Third, most cadres 
interviewed considered the poverty measures too low and in need of 
revision. This suggests that the number of registered poor could 
not reflect the extent of rural poverty.
In terms of soundness of methods, Panyu's fupin programme was 
the most exemplary. As early as 1985, the county government set up 
a special office in charge of development aid to poor households 
and veterans' families. Based on a survey on 600 poor households, 
firm guidelines were issued to direct fupin efforts at lower 
levels. First of all, eligibility was clearly defined. Qualified
households were those who (l) encountered financial hardship due to 
sickness, disability, insufficient labour power and other
misfortunes, (2) had an annual per capita income below 200 yuan, 
and (3) possessed certain labour resources and were capable of 
regaining self-sufficiency within a few years with help. Second, 
special organizational structure was created. Fupin offices were 
set up in the county and down the line. Third, there was 
multi-agency involvement (including the planning, taxation, 
finance, commerce and trade, grain and food supply, agriculture, 
education, health, credit agencies, trade and sales and civil 
affairs departments). Depending on the expertise of respective 
bureaucracies, various kinds of assistance were given.
The experience of Hanghe township was illuminating. This 
township of 25,000 persons had a per capita income of 800 yuan per 
year in 1986. Between 1985 and 1987, 34 target households regained 
financial independence. A number of factors contributed to its
success. First, the party committee took special responsibility, 
leading cadres led by setting a personal example and mobilizing
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other party members to take part. Second, there was active 
involvement of the ccmmunist youth league, local militia and armed 
forces. Organized into teams, such personnel gave vital manpower 
and technical assistance. Third, success in securing support of 11 
state agencies which gave concrete help. Seme went so far as to 
"adopt” a number of families to make sure that help was tailored to 
individual circumstances. This case orientation was also stressed 
in Tanzhou township. There, a similar approach —  departments 
dividing up the work of helping target families —  was followed. 
These two cases suggest that the combination of factors
precipitating poverty was unique. To be effective, both 
institutionalized arrangements and individual adaptation were 
needed.
(4) Experiments in Rural Social Security
Civil affairs departments were active in promoting commercial 
insurance to indemnify poor peasants against the loss or damage to 
life and property. Better-off households were generally able to 
take out their cwn policies. For the destitute, CADs helped by 
paying their premium. In Narihai, Shunde and Panyu, the county CADs 
paid the annual premia for "five guarantee" households to insure 
them against loss of household property. In 1988, the Shunde and 
Nanhai County CADs each paid 20,000 yuan while Panyu paid 1,600 
yuan for this purpose; at the same time, township finances also 
contributed two yuan per person per year. In Dongguan, CADs helped 
"five guarantee" households to take out life insurance. In the 
event of death, survivors could get seme 300—1,000 yuan, which 
could cover funeral expenses. Thus buying commercial services not
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only gave help to the insured poor, it also reduced the burden of 
CADs that had the responsibility for their welfare.
Another CAD sponsored activity was the creation of social 
welfare funds to collect and manage money devoted to welfare 
projects. Shunde, Dongguan and Panyu all had these funds. The 
revenue came from receipts from the sale of welfare lotteries,
donations from individuals and enterprises as well as profits made 
by welfare factories.
Rural pension schemes epitomized the attempts at ziwo baozhana 
(self-protection). These had several characteristics. First, they 
were all initiated and run by peasants, usually by the village or 
cun. Second, they were unevenly distributed. In 1988, rural pension 
schemes were only found in sane villages in Nanhai, Shunde and
Dongguan. Third, the monthly payments were generally low. The usual 
range was between 15 to 30 yuan per month, hardly enough for 
subsistence. Thus the term "pension" was a misnomer; living
supplements would be more appropriate. Generally speaking, pension 
schemes were not widespread in the delta region. Areas running such 
projects tended to have a better base of rural industries. Local 
will, often tied to the determination of party and state leaders, 
was equally important. For the vast majority of villages lacking in 
both, rural social security meant the "five guarantees" and a small 
menu of welfare homes and production units to take care of the most 
needy.
2. Huazhou County
Huazhou county lies in southwest Guangdong at the middle and upper 
courses of the Zhan River. Its northwest fringe adjoins the border
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of neighbour Guangxi province. Much of the terrain consists of 
plateau (61 percent) and hilly ground (26 percent) ? plains account 
for only 13 percent of its land (GDSZJ. 1989, p.50). Its major 
economic pursuit is agriculture? in 1987, the county earned 320 
million yuan from agriculture while industrial income amounted to 
180 million yuan (1988 interview). With a per capita annual income 
of 438 yuan, Huazhou ranked as a lew-middle income area in the 
province. Besides underdevelopment, the county was prone to yearly 
visitations of frosts, floods, droughts and tropical cyclones, 
making it one of the most disaster-prone areas in Guangdong (GDSZJ. 
1989, p.50). In 1987, Huazhou had a total population of 189,469 
households or 961,831 individuals. Nearly all inhabitants were 
classified as rural householders (186,397 households or 891,874 
persons).
In the past, civil affairs work was mainly concerned with 
preferential treatment, relief, and letters and visits (i.e. 
complaints and enquiries). Before 1983, there were no rural old age 
homes, the "five guarantees” were not fully implemented and there 
were no work schemes for the disabled. In 1984, the county 
government in conjunction with the provincial CAD were determined 
to alter the state of affairs and turn Huazhou into a model welfare 
ccmmunity on the basis of a non-affluent economy. If proved viable, 
the formula could be transplated elsewhere. The policy 
consideration was that if a semi-developed place like Huazhou could 
make a success of it, other areas, notably the richer places with 
underdeveloped welfare programmes, would have no excuse in 
neglecting their social commitments. It was clear from the start 
that civil affairs agencies wanted to kill two birds with one 
stone.
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The Huazhou rural welfare model had six ingredients. The aim 
was to guarantee a measure of security for the rural masses through 
responding to the conditions that produced hardships. The 
contingencies included poverty, old age, disability, military 
service, demobilization and natural disasters.
(1) Development Aid (Fuoin)
In 1979, the annual per capita income was only 320 yuan. A 
significant number of households —  sane 22,111 households or
130,000 persons remained in poverty. To attack this problem, fupin 
topped the government agenda. Since 1984, the major strategy has 
been to build development aid around fuoin economic entities. These 
projects - farms, quarries and factories - created employment for 
poor and disabled persons. A particular contribution from fuoin 
farms was to facilitate rural development through the supply of 
superior seeds and strains at low cost and teaching of good 
agrarian practices. For example, seme farms specialized in 
producing pond fish and frogs, delicacies that fetched good prices 
from well-off consumers eager for more refined dining. Same 
concentrated on fruit and vegetable cultivation. As at mid-1988, 
the county operated 351 fuoin economic enterprises, 78 run by 
xiancr-zhens and the rest by villagers' committees (1988 interview).
A key to the success of fuoin was full party and state support. 
To demonstrate this, the county party secretary and the county head 
used personal example. Each "adopted” the poorest village as their 
personal base for fuoin. Other agencies exempted fees and taxes or 
supplied resources and technological aid. Seme gave help on a case 
by case basis or followed the said example of helping whale
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villages. Between 1984 and 1987, total input amounted to 8.25 
million yuan. In 1987 alone, 3.78 million yuan was injected (1.31 
million yuan in interest-free loans, 2.3 million yuan in lcw- 
interest bank loans and 170,000 yuan lent by CADs). Interestingly, 
very little state grant was actually used. Even though Huazhou was 
poor by Guangdong standards, its income was not lew enough to 
qualify for state relief (400 yuan, reference Chapter Four). 
Nevertheless, the result was remarkable. Frcxn the original number 
of 22,000 hardship households, 13,690 households were said to have 
escaped from poverty by early 1988 (interview data).
(2) Help for the Disabled
In 1987, the county had 1,180 disabled persons on its register, of 
whan 687 were deemed capable of work. The policy of helping the 
disabled was mediated through employment creation. 1985 saw the 
founding of the first welfare factory in the county. By mid-1988, 
these had increased to 24, one for each xiana-zhen. Their total 
work force was 805, of which 265 were disabled workers and 490 were 
from fuoin and soldiers' households. Goods to the value of 7.1 
million yuan were produced, netting 600,000 yuan profit for the 
units and paying an average monthly wage of 80 yuan to the disabled 
workers. From 1985 to 1988, seme 11 million yuan had been invested 
in welfare production (1988 interview).
The largest welfare factory was fun by the county CAD. It 
started out as a small work scheme (seven employees) in 1980 making 
straw hats and shoes. Revamped in 1985, its work force increased to 
over 80. The following year saw the completion of its purpose-built 
premises (a four-storey building occupying 1,600 square metres). In
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1988, it employed 170 persons including 78 disabled. Hie major 
items of manufacture were clothes and recycled cement bags. 
Originally, the factory used new paper for the bags. When raw paper 
became hard to get, it bought used bags and scraped them clean for 
resale. In 1987, total production value amounted to 2.4 million
yuan and 150,000 yuan profit was made. In the first quarter of
1988, production value was 1.4 million yuan (1988 interview).
Besides difficulties with raw materials, this factory also 
faced other problems, as was the case for many local welfare
enterprises. One major hurdle was getting affordable bank loans. 
Huazhou cadres found banks reluctant in giving preferential credit, 
notwithstanding the agreement reached at higher levels by banks, 
CADs and the provincial government. Some banks even refused to 
release money designated for them or used stalling tactics in 
paying them. Consequently, welfare factories were reduced to 
borrowing at high interest rates and making endless appeals for 
help. The money squeeze compounded difficulties from lew
productivity, out-dated equipment and poor profit margin.
Other problems stemmed frcsn inadequate management. During my 
visits, I was struck by common sight of unhygienic conditions, long 
working hours, lack of safety precautions and indiscriminate hiring 
(e.g. family members of officials). In general, special employment 
fell far short of needs. Using the national prevalence rate for 
projection, a county the size of Huazhou would have 45,000 disabled 
persons. Clearly, the 265 working in welfare factories were a drop 
in the ocean.
(3) Care of the Aged
Hie main thrust of age support was the provision of residential
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care for the destitute homeless. The first hcane was started in 
1984. Within a year, 20 hones followed on its heels, one for every 
xiam-zhen. In 1988, these catered for 425 elders without families 
and another 46 aged dependents of solders' and martyrs' families.
Not surprisingly such haste invited ccmpncKnises. Most homes 
were converted frcm unused buildings and amenities were basic. 
Staffing was also minimal. Nevertheless, by 1988, most of them were 
able to provide monthly rations of 30 catties of grain plus 30 yuan 
for each resident. Inmates were also given free health care, two 
suits of clothes per year and a few yuan for pocket money each 
month. The three bigger hones that I visited all occupied purpose 
built structures, were adequately furnished and had spacious 
grounds. Besides, each boasted a modicum of consumer durables - 
colour television set, electric fans, sewing machines and washing 
machines (often donated) that added to the comfort of residents. 
Furthermore, all hemes produced food for their cwn consumption and 
operated commercial ventures (e.g, milling flour, distilling 
vinegar, fermenting rice wine, growing fruit and vegetables, and 
poultry and pigs for sale). In general, such work went to the staff 
and healthy residents, the latter also helping to care for frail 
inmates.
Most elderly recipients received decentralized relief, i.e. 
given assistance in their cwn hemes. Huazhou operated a system of 
levies requiring each rural inhabitant to contribute 1.5 to 2 
catties of unhusked grain per year. The most unique aspect of 
decentralized care at Huazhou was the designation of one carer (who 
may be a relative or a village cadre) for each aided person. The 
carer performed such chores as fetching firewood, water, relief
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items and medicine for his/her charge, farming the latter's plot 
and taking care of cleaning, maintenance and repair. In return, he 
received compensation in two forms —  an extra share of produce 
(since "five guarantee" elders were entitled to a double land 
allotment) amd the assets of the deceased. Specificity of right and 
duty gave a better chance for the needy to receive support.
In order to make the most of scarce resources, Huazhou made an 
innovative use of its aged homes —  as service stations to minister 
to non-resident dependents. Accordingly, such places became a base 
for collecting welfare levies, distributing grain and relief goods 
and a venue for visiting medics. By far, their most beneficial 
effect was enlarging the size of the service corps. Typically the 
team included the civil affairs assistant, head and staff of the 
aged home and local leaders. Such a structure was definitely 
superior to relying on one xiana-zhen civil affairs cadre for all 
welfare work.
(4) Preferential Treatment
Three groups qualified for preferential treatment. The first group 
were destitute dependents of martyrs —  in 1988 there were 39 
martyr's dependants in the county register. The monthly rate was 20 
yuan for village inhabitants and 46 yuan for urban residents. The 
second target group consisted of old and destitute veterans. Of the 
registered 2,144 veterans, 660 received regular subsidies of either 
15, 20 or 25 yuan per month. Families of serving soldiers, 
numbering 2,000 households made up the third group. Out of these, 
1,700 received living subsidies in 1988. Different rates applied to 
urban and rural recipients. The urban rate was 25 yuan per
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household per month or 300 yuan per year. In the villages, 
centralized collection and distribution took place within the 
xiana-zhen. Each year, every rural inhabitant contributed two to 
three catties of grain. Communal largesse was issued twice a year, 
each household getting either 800 or 1,100 catties according to 
family size. The intention was to ensure living standards
equivalent to 70 percent of average prevailing income in the 
community. However, a cash grant system for soldiers' dependants in 
rural areas had not been implemented in full.
(5) Resettlement of Demobilized Personnel
The county had seme 11,449 demobilized soldiers in 1988. The 
government accepted responsibilities for finding work for four 
types of personnel —  army cadres, servicemen who have earned 
military decorations three years in succession, personnel disabled 
from active ccmbat, and long-serving soldiers. Apart from these, 
the rest of demobilized personnel did not enjoy placement rights 
when they returned to their heme communities. Seme veterans were 
recommended for posts such as rural cadres and teachers in 
village-run schools. Seme went into farming, commerce or other 
fields. Only army cadres who reached retirement age were eligible 
for state pensions. Again, resettlement policies and practices were 
in line with practices elsewhere. Because of a lack of data, the 
extent to which policies were actually implemented could not be 
ascertained.
(6) Collective Insurance
In early 1988, Huazhou introduced insurance for the loss of crops
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and house damage. This was launched by the provincial and Maoming 
municipal CADs following the 1987 Party Central Document Number 
Five which called on capable rural authorities to begin pilot 
projects an rural collective insurance (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 49). The 
county was selected because the area suffered frequent natural 
disasters and because it had earlier been chosen as a testing 
ground for a rural welfare system. The inclusion of insurance made 
the Huazhou model more comprehensive. To achieve affordability, 
universal coverage and financial viability, the scheme opted to set 
the insured amount, premium and compensation at low levels.
After the planning work, the organizers set up the Huazhou 
County Social Insurance Fund as the central operating authority 
under the direct supervision of county leaders. In 1988 the Fund 
had a staff of six cadres. Below this, xiana-zhens established 
social insurance fund branches; villagers' committees had their cwn 
social insurance fund groups. All these agencies had special paid 
staff, with emoluments paid out of a 15 percent deduction from the 
premia collected from subscribers. Their jobs included carrying out 
propaganda, collecting subscriptions, investigating and paying 
claims as well as financial management.
As said before, the scheme initially offered two types of 
insurance. Property insurance covered the damage or loss of 
domestic dwellings from natural disasters. Members could take out 
policies for 3,000, 2,000 or 1,000 yuan vhile premia were fixed at 
0.35 percent for brick and wood buildings and 0.25 percent for 
cement structures. For harvest insurance, all crops (fruit, 
peanuts, jute) were valued as for wet paddy. The assumed yield was 
600 catties per mou (one sixth of an acre) and the full amount to
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be insured was 70 percent of the assumed harvest (420 catties). For 
this, a three percent premium (2.52 yuan) was charged for each 
mou's yield (calculated at 84 yuan). Ccmpensatian standards varied 
according to the volume of loss and when the damage occurred, with 
different rates for the seedling, growth, maturing and full harvest 
stages in the crop cycle.
Diversified methods of payment were adopted to facilitate 
universal subscription. The first source was premia paid by 
policy-holders. In 1988, self-sufficient households paid a total of 
2.09 million yuan, amounting to 77 percent of funds collected. 
Second, collective subsidies. Xiancr-zhens contributed 150,000 yuan 
and villagers* ccmmittees 100,000 yuan from their collective 
income. This source accounted for 9.2 percent of the Fund's inccme.
Third, loans from neighbours. This accounted for 170,000 yuan or
6.28 percent of money collected. Fourth, an advance or loan from 
villagers' ccmmittees. This allowed households experiencing 
temporary hardship to borrow money for the premia. In 1988, this
source contributed 30,000 yuan (1.1 percent) to the Fund. Finally,
shared payment by CADs (60 percent) and collectives (40 percent) in 
respect of hardship households and "five guarantee" recipients. 
Accordingly, the public coffers doled out subscriptions for 4,417 
and 4,493 households respectively, totalling 164,300 yuan or 7.1 
percent of funds collected (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 55). Due to this 
flexibility, subscription was near universal. 92 percent of all 
households (171,000) took out house damage insurance (insured 
value, 170 million yuan? premia paid, 545,700 yuan). At the same 
time, 90 percent of land under cultivation (850,000 mou) were 
insured (insured value, 70 million yuan? premia paid, 2.16 million
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yuan) (GDSZJ. 1989, p. 50). Such a record was truly impressive.
Unfortunately one month after the scheme commenced, disaster 
struck. Different parts of the county were hit by severe bouts of 
floods and draught. The damage occasioned claims of four million 
yuan, far exceeding the 2.7 million premia collected from policy 
holders. This threw the Fund managers into a quandary. Making 
reparation according to schedule would bankrupt the Fund? 
withholding payment would wreck its credibility. Confronted with 
such stark alternatives, the Huazhou leaders sought help from the 
provincial CAD and the Ministry. A consensus —  that contractual 
obligations have to be honoured —  was struck. In the end, help 
from the higher authorities saved this nascent scheme.
This initial crisis forced the Fund operators to review the 
compensation schedules, financing and management procedures. As a 
result, subscription rates were refined according to more realistic 
actuarian principles and stricter management controls were put in 
force (Li, GEMZ, 1990, Issue 1, pp. 10-13). Attention was also given 
to inflation safeguards by prudent investment, mainly through 
lending to credit agencies. In 1989, a new policy —  insurance 
covering the death of draft animals —  was added, a welcome 
safeguard for manual farming. In combination, these measures
improved the scheme's viability.
Overall, the Huazhou experiments —  to build a rural social 
security network with limited available resources —  has been 
valuable. On the positive side, the system under construction 
offers comprehensive protection against common contingencies that 
could bring ruin to the peasants. It also shews what will and 
commitment can accomplish even in the face of adversity. On the
- 282 -
other hand, haste, lack of experience and expertise can produce 
expensive mistakes. The obvious example is the insurance project. 
It transpired later that from pilot testing to full implemenation, 
the introduction took only two months (Li, 1990, ibid). Clearly 
excessive zeal and lack of judicious planning had been counter­
productive. Nonetheless, the good lesson to emerge has been to 
prove that a workable model of rural social security is not 
inpossible. It is still too early to say hew far the Huazhou 
experiments have accomplished their aims. As yet, no programme 
evaluation has been conducted or released. By the same token, 
whether the model has the potential for replication remained 
unknown. Most importantly, a transplant depends on the willingness 
of other localities to try and adapt. In all appearances, it has 
not been easy to persuade others to follow suit. By 1990, only 
Guangning and Huidong counties have participated in the experiment 
on a smaller scale (Wang, GEMZ. 1991, Issue 3, p.21).
3. Guangzhou
Situated at the mouth of the Pearl River Estuary, Guangzhou 
(formerly Canton) is the political, cultural and economic centre of 
South China. Historically, it was famous as a base for foreign 
trade. As the provincial capital and largest city in Guangdong, the 
metropolis administers Guangzhou city and eight adjacent counties. 
In 1988, the total population was 5.77 million, of which 3.49 
million resided in the city proper (GDSTJNJ. 1989, p.60).
Economically, Guangzhou's strength was built more on a base of 
light industry, ocmmerce, services and less on heavy industry and 
agriculture. Its significance in foreign trade did not wane in the
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period under Mao. This was evidenced by the fact that since 1957, 
Guangzhou has hosted China's bi-annual trade fair for overseas 
buyers. When the reform programme unfolded, Guangzhou, like the 
delta counties, was able to reap handsome dividends. By 1988, urban 
earnings in Guangzhou were higher than in other Chinese cities. Its 
per capita annual income of 2,743 yuan put Guangzhou in third 
place, behind only Shenzhen (3,542 yuan) and Zhuhai (3,045 yuan), 
both special economic zones (FYUD, 1990, pp. 366-67).
Guangzhou was included in the current purview for two purposes. 
First, to permit a review of key welfare provisions at the 
municipal level. Here the focus was on statutory welfare 
institutions and welfare factories under the aegis of Guangzhou 
Civil Affairs Department. Second, to examine local community social 
services that were being fostered to respond to the rising needs of 
urban residents. Admittedly, this confined scope did not reflect 
the spectrum of CAD service. Rather than weighing how adequate 
Guangzhou's welfare services were in meeting internal needs, the 
intention was to review the performance of core provisions, which 
formed the backbone of the welfare programme in all Chinese cities. 
Hopefully this would unravel crucial issues affecting the urban 
approach to welfare planning.
Survey on welfare production enteprises and welfare homes 
In 1988, the Guangzhou CAD ran a total of 16 welfare factories and 
three residential facilities. Detailed information on these was 
solicited through a questionnaire containing both structured and 
open-ended questions. In the technical design and refinement of 
the research instrument, I cwed much to the GDPCAD. Above all, the
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provincial office helped to send out and collect the completed 
replies in the months of July and August 1988. Because of its 
staunch support, all 19 units fully cooperated with the survey. The 
accounting date for all statistics was the end of June 1988.
(1) Welfare Production Enterprises
The 16 units polled were set up in three distinct periods. 1953-61 
was the first phase (nine units); the second wave occurred in the 
early 70s (fcur units) while the dawn of the reform decade 
(1979-81) saw another three come into being. A merger took place in 
1986 when an insolvent rain-coat factory was taken over by a big 
electronic goods factory. This reduced the sample to 15 units.
Fran the above formation pattern, two points were significant. 
First, there was a hiatus of 10 years (1961-1971), from the end of 
the Great Leap Forward to the first half of the Cultural
Revolution. This suggested that political and economic turbulence 
are detrimental to welfare initiatives. Second, contrary to
reasonable expectation, no new project was undertaken by the 
municipal CAD after 1981. This may be peculiar to Guangzhou as 
nationwide, expansion in welfare production went hand in hand with 
the reform. Fran information available (reference Table 15), the 
dynamism in programme creation had passed to local communities. 
This set in stark contrast the stagnation of state investment in 
welfare production.
Regarding enterprise nature, the vast majority (14) were 
engaging in various forms of manufacture. The product line ranged 
from the making of machinery, metal parts, electrical goods, 
consumer appliances, plastic utensils, packaging, paper products
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to clothing. Of the ether two, one was a motor repair depot and the 
other a trading company servicing all welfare factories in the 
city. These units (15) were predominantly state-owned? only one was 
a collective enterprise.
The enterprises varied in size. Using the value of fixed assets 
as one indicator, the range was wide, with units owning assets
between 105,514 to 3,045,120 yuan. Among the 15 units, four had 
assets valued below 500,000 yuan, three were worth between 500,000 
to less than one million yuan, six between one to less than two 
million yuan; only two were valued at more than two million yuan. 
After depreciation, the range went down to between 88,375 and 
2,134,300 yuan. Six units had net assets belcw 500,000 yuan, six 
were worth between 500,000 to less than one million yuan; only 
three were valued over one million yuan.
Another benchmark was total annual production value. For the 
year 1987, annual output of the 15 units ranged between 306,670 and 
8,503,600 yuan. Two units produced less than one million yuan worth 
of goods, five between one to less than two million yuan, three 
between two to less than three million yuan, two between three to 
under four million yuan, while three had output more than four 
million yuan. Judging from the above two criteria, most of
municipal units were small operations, in contrast to the state
industrial sector which was generally more modem and sizeable.
One special interest was their work force. Staff numbers not
only reflected unit size. Creation of special employment was their 
raison d'etre as well as a measure of their social effectiveness. 
Table 17 summarizes their staff profile in selected years.
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Table 17 Work Force of Municipal Welfare
Production Units in Guancrzhou. Selected Years
1979 1984 1988
unit (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
l 304 136 - 250** 113** 52.0** 226 87 43.0
2 373* 124* 33.0* 303 123 41.0 244 115 47.0
3# 43 3 13.0 39 7 37.0 62 9 47.0
4 273 134 56.5 352 151 58.3 313 141 63.5
5 90 11 20.0 85 12 23.5 76 13 28.3
6 - - - 146 37 38.5 107 32 49.3
7 - - - 167 14 13.7 175 65 57.0
8 361 134 46.4 301 138 58.2 237 114 65.1
9 249 181 85.4 249 178 87.7 247 179 93.2
10 310 172 74.8 305 165 83.3 268 149 76.8
11 118 41 48.8 424 153 46.6 388 157 70.7
12 ]n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. ]n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
13 444 178 45.6 417 155 57.0 amalgamated with 14
14 309 136 56.7 305 111 52.1 765 252 50.6
15 295 164 63.8 259 144 81.4 216 126 84.6
16 423 146 43.8 336 122 48.8 204 93 58.5
3,582 1,560 50.4 3,938 1,623 51.9 3,528 1,532 59.6
Notes : (a) = total work force; (b) = disabled work force; (c) = J
of disabled workers among production workers? * fig. for
1980; ** fig. for 1985? # trading company? n.a.= not
available.
Source: 1988 Guangzhou Survey
Three points were noteworthy. First, the total work force 
remained quite stable over the years. Second, their pool of
disabled personnel also remained unchanged. In both categories, 
there was a gain of about ten percent between 1979 and 1984 but
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contraction in 1988 to bring institutional capacity slightly below 
the 1979 level. Third, there was seme achievement in social 
effectiveness —  the proportion of disabled workers among all 
production staff increased from 50.4 percent to 59.6 percent. 
Still, this did not alter the fact that as a job venue, for 
ordinary workers and the disabled, municipal facilities have
reached saturation. Fewer people were actual ly employed at the end 
of the decade than in the beginning.
Another oddity was revealed when the component of
administrative and support staff (e.g. cook, cleaners) was studied. 
Because the trading company had an exceptionally large number of 
cadres, it was disregarded in calculting the averages. Table 18 
shows their adjusted staff composition in selected years.
Two observations are apposite about Table 18. First, in each
chosen year, the proportion of administrative and supportive
personnel varied widely among units. In the first two years, the 
ranges were more modest. However by 1988, the variation had
widened, with the adjusted maximum at 42.8 percent and the adjusted 
minimum at 17.0 percent. Second, there was an overall growth in the 
size of back-up staff in all units. In 1979, the average was 17.4 
percent? in 1984, 24.2 percent and in 1988, 28.3 percent. This
meant that over the years, CAD-run welfare factories had taken on 
more cadres and support staff than front-line operatives. If not 
for this expansion, their work force would have declined further.
Nearly all sample units were benefitting from fiscal
concessions. For example, six were exempted fran income tax, nine
from product tax, ten from value-added tax, seven from turn-over 
tax and three from commodity tax. Tax exemption and net profits
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Table 18 Percentage of Administrative and Support Staff in
Welfare Production Enterprises in Gnancrzhou. Selected Years
Unit 1979 1984 1988
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
46.5 
13.2
25.6
19.9 
14.1 
23.5
15.3 
n.a.
11.3 
16.8
12.9
21.3
30.1
20.1 27.5
48.7 61.3
26.4 29.1
29.4 36.4
16.3 24.3
29.3 32.0
21.3 26.2
17.3 17.0
22.3 23.5
22.6 42.8
n.a. n.a.
25.7 amalgamated
28.5 29.0
30.1 27.8
25.6 22.1
adjusted max. 25.6
min. 11.3
adjusted av. 17.4
30.1 
16.3
24.2
42.8
17.0
28.3
Note : Unit 3 was disregarded in calculating adjusted maxima and
averages.
Source: Guangzhou Survey, 1988.
made up the gross profit of these units which contributed to 
re-investment, improvement of employee benefits and plant 
maintenance.
An analysis of their profit and loss records from 1979 to 
mid-1988 revealed three interesting features. First, their
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financial performance was erratic, with profits and losses 
fluctuating wildly from one year to the next. The case of unit 14, 
an electronics factory and the most profitable unit, was 
indicative. In 1979 to 1981, losses between 129,900 to 275,000 yuan 
were registered three years in succession. From 1982, it began to 
show a profit, peaking at 3.3 million yuan in 1984. Thereafter, a 
progressive drop in profits was set in motion to end in only 
464,100 yuan for the first half of 1988. Second, despite the stress 
an solvency, a significant portion of welfare factories operated at 
a loss, as shewn in Table 19.
Table 19 Proportion of Guangzhou Welfare Production
 Enterprises Registering Deficits. 1979-1988
Year % Year %
1979 14.3 1984 12.5
1980 6.7 1985 0
1981 25.0 1986 20.0
1982 18.8 1987 26.7
1983 12.5 1988* 33.3
Note : * for January to June 1988 
Source: Guangzhou Survey, 1988 
The above table revealed the worsening financial crisis facing
welfare factories in the last decade. In 1987, four units out of 15
were in the red, with total losses of 954,818 yuan against total
profits of 3.7 million yuan in 1984. By June 1988, deficit units
(five) increased to 33.3 percent (total losses 660,716 yuan? total
profits, three million yuan). If one compared these to the total
output value: 43 million yuan in 1987 and 24 million yuan in 1988
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(January to June), total net profit (after deducting deficit) was 
6.3 percent and 9.9 percent respectively, not too slim a margin. 
However, it must be remembered that 40-70 percent of profits were 
actually exempted taxes. Without this portion, net profits would be 
very lew indeed. An examination of individual units found that one 
third were especially vulnerable; three had had a chronic history 
of insolvency in seven out of ten years.
On being asked about the difficulties they were facing, 
respondents (factory managers) were well-agreed on the major 
problems. First, the shortage of funds. These included difficulties 
with cash flew, lack of state grants, high interest rates and 
inflated prices of raw materials. The second stress factor was the 
poor quality of human capital. High concentrations of disabled 
workers reduced productivity and ccnpetitiveness. A related burden 
stemmed from their ownership status; being state-owned units, they 
were saddled with large pension and health bills. Finally, there 
was inadequate policy coordination and support. Often, state 
agencies (e.g. banks, credit agencies, tax departments, supply 
organs etc.) turned a blind eye to what should have been 
preferential state policies. Being lew in the bureaucratic pecking 
order, CADs were quite helpless in fighting for their rights. 
What's more, the latest reports suggested that the situation was 
getting worse. Not only were state policies not honoured, same tax 
concession policies were being reversed. Without this prop, the 
very survival of welfare factories was at stake (Li, GEMZ. 1990, 
Issue 1, pp.20—23; Wang, GEMZ. 1990, Issue 3, pp,32-33; Chen, GEMZ. 
1990, Issue 3, pp.34-35; Sang, GEMZ. 1991, Issue 2, pp.23-25; Li, 
GEMZ. 1991, Issue 3, p.13).
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(2) Welfare Institutions
The current survey covered one ccnibined social welfare heme, one 
old people's home and a mental hospital, all sizeable institutions 
located at the outskirts of the city.
Hie Municipal Social Welfare Hone
This was set up in 1957 to accommodate "three-no" targets. Its 
original mission was the provision of indoor relief (and education 
for orphans). Since the 1980s a rehabilitation component was added 
to upgrade service scope and qualilty. In June 1988, it had 346 
residents made up of 80 percent disabled persons and 20 percent 
elderly. Among the first group, most were handicapped children 
suffering from mental retardation, physical disability and hearing 
and speech Impairment. There was also a sizeable group of disabled 
young adults who were stuck there because of the lack of job 
placements. Most of the elderly residents required personal care 
because of disability and weak health.
The vast majority of residents had a "three-no" status (87 
percent) while the rest (13 percent) paid their cwn fees, mainly 
through pensions from former work units. Throughout the last 
decade, the home has maintained an average of 45 self-finance 
clients. In mid-1988, the home charged them 45 yuan for food, 30 
yuan for accommodation, 45 yuan for nursing care and full cost for 
medical treatment. For the indigent, the municipal CAD paid for 
their keep. At a monthly rate of 62 yuan per head, this could only 
buy subsistence care ( food cost at 45 yuan per month). Like aged 
hemes in the delta areas, differential levels of care within the 
institution prevailed.
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In 1988, the hcrne provided a range of services including 
residential, medical, nursing services and rehabilitation services 
to adults. For children, the younger ones were educated inhouse 
while the older ones attended middle schools outside the heme. In 
mid-1988, it had 231 persons on its staff (26 cadres, 15 doctors, 
14 nurses, 106 care workers, 70 minor staff). The manning ratio was 
about 1:1.5, a ratio that met provincial guidelines.
The home depended on state grants to meet its operational and 
capital costs. When I visited it in 1988, it had just completed a 
rehabilitation wing and considerably improved the living quarters 
for disabled children. Such expenditure was met from earmarked 
grants from the municipal CAD. Much as the management wanted to 
extend repairs to other amenities, especially the dilapidated 
quarters for aged residents, they could not get additional state 
money. To augment meagre subsidies, the home resorted to 
inccme-generation activities. Besides admitting self-financing 
residents, the home had set up a piggery, a shop and a small art 
and craft workshop since 1986. Together these earned 10,000 yuan a 
year. Nevertheless its remote location, lew capital and backward 
facilities all imposed real limits in the profitability of these 
ventures.
At the present time, the home was facing two important 
problems. First, shortage of funds. The .result was restricted 
capacity to improve services or even maintain existing standards in 
the context of accelerating costs. Second, personnel issues. The 
heme had problems in providing staff training in rehabilitation and 
special education as well as motivating staff effort. In these 
areas, Guangzhou suffered from severe shortage of expertise, a
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condition true of China as a whole. The lack of money obviously did 
not help uplift work morale. Overall, the home gave the impression 
of a long-established agency keenly aware of its mission to meet 
community needs and upgrade services but frustrated in its 
attempts. The fact that it was under constant pressure to set a 
good professional example to similar programmes made the burden 
more onerous to bear.
Municipal Old People's Home
The home originated in 1965 to accommodate "three-no" targets. 
Since 1978, it was empowered to admit fee-paying cases: pensioners, 
aged persons from double-career families who could not care for 
them and a number of retirees from Hong Kong and Macau. In 1979, 
the home had 279 residents, of whom only 21 were self-financed 
clients (7.5 percent). By 1986, the latter group increased to 52 
(out of 322, or 16 percent), 152 (out of 430, or 35 percent) in 
1987, and 176 (38 percent, out of 459) in June 1988.
In June 1988, the home provided care for 389 seniors (age over 
60 for males and 55 for females) and 70 slightly younger but 
disabled (mostly blind) persons. The mean age was 78. A look at 
their health classification revealed something of interest. While 
121 were incapable of self care and 28 were partially able, some 62 
percent were competent. This high concentration of self-caring 
residents, not typical of similar establishments, raised the 
question of whether admission was really necessary for them. One 
was left with the uncomfortable suspicion that possession of means 
may have tipped the scales in their favour.
Regarding maintenance standards, the indigents were supported
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by the municipal CAD at the monthly rate of 62 yuan per head. For 
self-paying cases, charges were set at full cost basis. Services 
provided originally were confined to institutional care. Under the 
new ethos of giving more professional service to clients, the home 
new aspired to include not only daily care, medical and nursing 
servies but also rehabilitation treatment. From my personal 
observation, the last consisted of physical exercises, acupuncture 
and light work. To man these services, the heme had 222 staff 
members (27 administrators, 10 doctors, 10 nurses, 121 care 
workers, 54 minor staff). Although the overall staff-inmate ratio 
was about 1:2, the provision of professional services could not be 
assumed. The bulk of the staff were untrained care workers; doctors 
and nurses were few.
As far as funding support went, this heme seemed to be better 
placed than the municipal social welfare home. In the last two 
years, it obtained 1.9 million yuan from the Guangzhou municipal 
government, 970,000 yuan from the GZCAD and 500,000 yuan from the 
welfare lotteries fund for building living quarters for the elderly 
and a rehabilitation block. It was also more successful in income 
generation. In 1980, the home started to grew fruit trees 
commercially. In 1984, a piggery and a shop were added. Together 
these earned some 15,000 yuan per year. The latest, and the most 
profitable venture was its Chinese restaurant. This was a gift from 
a Hong Kong donor to supplement its income. Since 1987, the eatery 
has been earning some 40,000 yuan each year. Business was brisk 
when I ate there. Its location on the busy circular road going into 
Guangzhou and good food quality made it a popular eating place for 
locals and tourists alike.
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Although the hone seemed to be better endowed financially, its 
management still felt hampered by inadequate resources. Ihe home's 
avowed goal was to achieve a first-rate programme of its kind in 
the country and to fully live up to the ministry's expectation of 
municipal hones as exemplars of professional practice. Up to now, 
the achieved maintenance standard was still lew. Similarly, 
buildings and amenities improvement could only be effected 
incrementally. Above all, the major constraint was shortfall of 
trained medical and rehabilitation personnel. On the other hand, 
the hcrne had good potential. It had plenty of land for new 
development. It benefitted from much community attention in the 
form of donations and visiting experts. It was also active in 
external relations and was frequently visited by people within 
China and from abroad. For example, Caritas Hong Kong gave it 
continuing help with staff training. Thus constraints 
notwithstanding, the institution was on a sound footing to 
discharge its functions. Of the three facilities under review, this 
was the best showcase.
Municipal Psychiatric Hospital
This facility began operation in 1973. Its purpose was to provide 
in-patient psychiatric care to destitute persons under the care of 
civil affairs agencies. Similar to its sister institutions, it also 
responded to the call to liberalize admission. In 1979, it catered 
to 471 in-patients, out of which 304 were "three-no" recipients and 
167 paid their own fees. Over the years, both categories increased 
only modestly. By mid-1988, total patient population was 618, 
consisting of 413 free patients and 205 self-financing cases. In
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terms of sex and age, males outnumbered females (409 to 209), 
adults (26-55, at 69 percent) and elderly (above 55, at 23 percent) 
made up the dominant cohorts.
Ihe monthly maintenance standard for residents was set at 62 
yuan for indigent cases, the same as the other two places. For 
retirees on pensions, the monthly board cost 47 yuan, with other 
services charged at cost (about 200 yuan per month). The care to 
inmates was the responsibility of 24 administrators, 28 doctors, 55 
nurses, 139 care-aids and 79 minor staff. A mental health worker 
conducting extended research in this hospital (Pearson, 1991) found 
that its medical personnel were exposed to a gradation of 
professional preparation. 16 doctors have had three years in 
medical college, four have completed four year training in 
university, and eight have had training of five years or more in 
university. Only ten doctors have "specialized" in psychiatry, 
namely taken a six-month local course on psychiatry. This was the 
same with the nurses, of whom only one in six have had any formal 
qualification (three years in college) and none of them have had 
training in psychiatric nursing. Besides, there were no
psychologists and occupational therapists, who form the backbone of 
any psychiatric rehabilitation team in more developed countries. 
The scarcity of specialist practitioners restricted what could be 
done for patients. Much of the medical treatment provided was 
confined to chemotherapy (91.4 percent) and nursing care given by 
(nan-qualified) nurse aids and care workers. During the greater 
part of the day, patients were kept in supervised custody (sitting 
out in the ward's courtyard) rather than engaged in a planned 
programme of treatment and rehabilitation. Even when compared with
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other psychiatric facilities in the country, this hospital did not 
distinguish itself in standards of professional practice. It seemed 
to be more of an asylum than a place of cure. In the view of
Pearson, the Guangzhou hospital "came very close to embodying the
archetype of a total institution. It would be rare in the U.K. or
the U.S.A. to find a psychiatric hospital, however deprived and 
institutional their environment, that was so socially, emotionally 
and therapeutically impoverished." (Pearson, 1991. p. 436).
Like the other two, the psychiatric hospital relied on CAD
handouts for the bulk of its operation expenses. In 1987, this
amounted to 1.3 million yuan. To augment its limited budget, the 
hospital had to create more income for itself. One measure was to 
lease out land for fruit growing and fish farming, yielding scare
20.000 yuan per year. It also operated a laundry service and tuck 
shop. The most ambitious project was started in 1982 by way of a
hostel for holiday-makers. Since 1986, this camping facility has 
been contracted out to private operators and brought in seme
100.000 yuan a year (Pearson, 1991). Despite these enterprises, the
hospital felt severely hamstrung by lack of funds. The need was
most acutely felt in the area of maintenance and repair, where
state grants were very short. Unlike the other two institutions,
the hospital had more problems attracting donations.
Being strapped for cash was only one headache. Another hurdle 
was general lack of support frcm society. The mentally ill in China 
suffered frcm strong social stigma; those without work, family and 
work unit were social outcasts. Ex-patients had little prospect of 
finding jobs or other placements, making the chance of discharge 
and social re-integration very remote. An equally daunting problem
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related to management. As the staff did not choose to work there, 
poor morale found an outlet in staff talcing prolonged sick leave. 
Lew pay did not help matters either. However, dismissals required 
higher-level approved. More often than not, the hospital was 
frustrated in its attempts to fire recalcitrant staff.
The three municipal facilities have much in ccanmon. Being 
statutory facilities, they could count an reliable professional and 
financial support from above. Favourable staff ratios, increasing 
specialization of services and widened service access have been 
achieved. However, they were not immune to difficulties, which 
impinged on many fronts. Despite the constancy of state grants, 
there was perennial shortage of money. Forced to become more 
self-reliant, all have taken up entrepreneurship in earnest, with 
various degrees of success. Oonccmitantly, the combined effects of 
liberalized access and money-making were likely to be goal 
confusion, discrimination against traditional service targets and 
distraction from providing a good service. Even more intractable 
were problems with staffing, in particular shortage of trained 
personnel and poor morale. Finally, it was worth pointing out that 
no new residential facilities have been built by the GZCAD in the 
1980s. Simply maintaining a modest tempo of expanding existing 
facilities and professional upgrading seemed to have exhausted 
their capabilities. Reliance on state welfare to meet escalating 
social needs was a non-starter.
(3) Community Social Services
Found to the west of Guangzhou city, Jinhua (Golden Flcwer) Street 
was under the jurisdiction of Li Wan District. Hiis sub-district
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measured sane 0.44 sq. metres in area and administered to 31,349 
inhabitants. It was subdivided into 15 residents' conmittees, each 
of which has 2,000 residents. The area was typical of much of old 
Guangzhou with its narrow alleys and high-density housing, mostly 
of pre-1949 vintage. Residents' inacmes were said to be about 
average in the city.
Jinhua Street prided itself on its community spirit (Jinhua 
iingshen) in "respecting the old, loving the young, supporting the 
disabled and bringing convenience to residents". Its work in public 
hygiene and community health was recognized as early as the 1950s, 
when it was voted an advanced neighbourhood. The street office now 
had a dynamic and relatively youthful leadership composed of cadres 
in their mid-thirties, rather than the previous corps of retired 
workers.
The locality had a flourishing domestic social programme. Like 
many other neighbourhoods, there were priority targets who had 
first claim on local resources. The first group were the elderly, 
who numbered seme 14 percent of all residents, much higher than 
Guangzhou's average of 10.4 percent. In 1984, the street pioneered 
a day centre which catered to four groups of elders —  namely aged 
state cadres, neighbourhood cadres, workers and other aged 
residents —  thus breaking out of the confines of serving only 
"three no" groups. The centre organized a broad range of social, 
recreational and cultural programmes. Its members had won many 
prizes in local competitions. Its educational work was of special 
interest (such as family education classes for daughters-in-law and 
mothers-in-law and health talks). It also operated a match-making 
service for elders. In 1985, the street built a small group home
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with nine beds. When I visited the neighbourhood in mid-1988, its 
beneficiaries included five single elders and one orphan. In 
addition, there were 23 support and care groups run by local 
volunteers.
Mothers and children were the second target group. The street 
office ran a very large nursery-kindergarten serving 700 children. 
In addition, there were two nurseries operated by residents*
ccranittees and three by private operators, making the neighbourhood 
self-sufficient in infant care services. Even children from other 
districts cculd benefit, by paying a slightly higher fee. Another 
popular programme was a maternity and child health clinic. Its
services included antenatal and postnatal care, specialist
consultation in gynaecology and paediatrics as well as general 
practitioner services. Service charges were minimal (0.1 yuan 
registration fee and sane 0.5 yuan for medicine) and below-cost, 
with the subsidy coming from the street's income from other 
sources. Most practitioners were retired medical personnel.
The street's convenience services were open to all residents. 
Among these was a canteen service started in 1958. New, it also 
provided school meals, at 0.5 yuan each, for pupils from three 
primary and two secondary schools. Again, this programme was being 
subvented, this time from profits of the street-run teahouse. 
Beyond this project, other services were charged at cost. These 
included interior decoration, removals, professional water tank
cleansing (two times a year for 150 yuan), minor construction work, 
child-minding and home help.
Above all, the locality was famous for its work with the 
handicapped. Such work began with two conventional programmes. The
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first was a welfare factory for the disabled. In 1988, it employed 
156 handicapped persons and made some 460,000 yuan annual profit 
from manufacturing electrical appliances and ceramics goods. The 
second was a work-therapy station (gong liao zhan) for the mentally 
ill and handicapped. Started in 1977, the small centre ensured that 
the 22 clients take their medication, were occupied with light 
industrial work and generally did not become a nuisance to 
neighbours.
The break through in community rehabilitation, which gave it a 
nation-wide reputation, came in 1986. The programme was the brain 
child of an orthopaedic surgeon in Guangzhou's Zhongshan Medical 
university. His idea of using non-institutional methods and a 
combination of professional and volunteer elements to help disabled 
people found an immediate response frcsn the street party leaders. 
The programme began by building up a core organization of 17 
persons —  doctors, red-cross personnel, health workers, cadres and 
local representatives. The group then launched a training 
programme. 33 volunteers, half local cadres and the rest red-cross 
cadets from a local middle-school were recruited and given basic 
training. Subsequently these grassroots rehabilitation workers were 
to train up family members of disabled persons. Following from 
this, a survey was conducted to identify the number and nature of 
disability within the area. Out of the 29,964 persons contacted, 
344 disabled persons (1.15 percent of residents) were identified as 
disabled. Individual assessments by doctors and health workers then 
ensued. The major diagnostic categories were mental illness and 
handicap (29.4 percent), various forms of paralysis (18.3 percent), 
heart and branchial conditions (12.8 percent), arthritic ailments
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(8.14 percent) and impairments involving sight, hearing and speech 
(19.2 percent). 60 percent of the afflicted persons who were deemed 
capable of benefitting frcsn rehabilitation treatment became the 
service targets.
To carry out the individual rehabilitation plans, two modes of 
delivery were adopted. One was domiciliary treatment given in the 
patient's heme. Initially services were provided by trained
volunteers. The work usually involved motor training, nursing, 
check up and training in self-care skills. After a while, seme of 
the tasks were transferred to a designated family member, who would 
work jointly with the rehabilitation volunteer. The other medium 
was to set up a rehabilitation clinic. This was actually more 
helpful in giving services involving the use of therapeutic 
equipment and procedures (acupuncture, acupressure, herbal medicine 
etc.) and a more convenient work base for visiting experts. For 
monitoring and supervision purposes, comprehensive records were 
kept on both hcme-care cases and out-patients. To make sure that 
the prescription was being followed and to give specialist 
consultation, doctors also made regular home and clinic calls. The 
medical teams's own evaluation shewed that the majority of service 
users had improved since treatment began. The programme was not 
only well-regarded in China, it has also attracted attention 
abroad. For example, World Health Organization experts had 
inspected it three times, as had visitors from 32 countries.
The success of this show-case could be attributed to a number 
of factors. First, the neighbourhood had a long tradition of local 
self-reliance founded an a spirit of service to residents. Second, 
it benefitted from strong local leadership. Third, there was the
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availability of valuable expertise, such as that connected with the 
community rehabilitation project. Finally, it had a sound financial 
base. In 1987, its locally-run industries produced an income of 
seme 29 million and profits of 2.8 million. Without these assets, 
the current service programme could not be sustained.
Another success story was Nan Hua Xi Street in Haizhu District, 
which also enjoyed nation-wide fame for its programme of home-spun 
social services and environmental improvement. The experiences of 
the two neighbourhoods were so similar that it would be tedious to 
give another long description. Suffice it to say that Nan Hua Xi 
possessed all the advantages that Jinhua Street had, the most 
important means being its lucrative street-run enterprises. In
1988, these generated 5 million profits, more than that earned in 
Jinhua Street (1988 interview). Clearly the same variables that 
determined success were operative in this case.
As said before, Guangdong was not too advanced in the area of 
community care. GDPCAD officials attributed the backwardness to
constraints in resources and lack of a spirit of volunteering. 
These observations were worthy of reflection. As one of the most 
developed areas in China, Guangdong's resources were the envy of
many provinces. More accurately, the drawback related to values and 
lifestyles, often shaped by the changing environment. My many 
conversations with Guangdong citizens suggested that local 
self-centredness may be a result of adaptation to society in 
transition from plan to market. For the fit and eager, time was too 
precious to waste on selfless pursuits of helping others. The less 
able were too pre-occupied with their fight for survival. Both
groups had little time to spare for unpaid work, the vital 
ingredient in realizing the spirit of mutual care in communities.
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Part Pour
Conclusion
The preceding sections examine Guangdong's welfare developments as 
well as the finer strokes of its welfare landscape in the 1980s. 
Under the Sixth Five Year Plan period (1981-85), civil affairs work 
underwent a process of recovery. The pace was slew and steps taken 
fairly modest, as acknowledged by civil affairs officials. The 
tempo of welfare reform and new initiatives quickened after 1985. 
Indeed, most of the achievements were made during the last five 
years.
At the end of 1990, Guangdong Minzheng offered this 
retrospective assessment of regional developments under the Seventh 
Five Year Plan (Wang, GDMZ, 1991, Issue 3, pp.20-22). First, there 
has been rapid expansion of urban and rural social welfare 
services; for instance, the number of welfare beds met 95 percent 
of the planned target. Second, pilot schemes in grassroots social 
security have been initiated. In 1990, the province counted 225 
rural welfare networks in 13.8 percent of village ccmmunities. In 
urban areas, 4,985 units of community services were in operation. 
Third, there has been substantial improvement in preferential aid 
standards. Fourth, fuoin efforts have improved the effective use of 
disaster relief funds and sparked off experiments in cooperative 
insurance in three counties. Fifth, civil affairs economics 
(minzheng jingji), i.e. all ventures generating income for welfare 
projects, have been greatly strengthened. This included expansion 
in snHai welfare production, consolidation of mass levies, growth 
in donations and increased input from the state. Figure 18 presents
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the numerical output during 1986-1990.
Figure 18 Social Welfare Achievements in Guanorioncr. 1990 
Social welfare services
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6,472 
121,607 
24,246
22,760 
66,100
133.000 
million man/units
268.000 
238,000
1,506 
46,159 
17,801
production value (1990) 1,125,000,000 yuan
profits (1990) 44,780,000 yuan
Social welfare lottery sale 280,000,000 yuan
designated for welfare fund 83,940,000 yuan
Total aid from the masses 507,000,000 yuan
Expenditure fr. local govt. 658,000,000 yuan
Hong Kbng-Macau donations 35,000,000 yuan
Source : Wang, GEMZ. 1991, Issue 3, pp.20-21.
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Guangdong at the end of the 1980s was a hybrid society. Its 
economy was largely export-oriented. In the countryside, the 
restoration of the family as an economic unit and freeing of farm 
prices turned rural society into a market-dominated system. In 
urban areas, economic and social life has become more outward 
looking and capitalistic. 14 cities have been given the status of 
coastal open cities, with extra freedoms and tax breaks for foreign 
trade and investment. Enjoying greater privileges still were the 
four special economic zones. At the same time, outside influence 
(in particular from Hang Kong) has penetrated deeply into 
Guangdong. Open door and reform policies have produced amazing 
growth. Between 1980 and 1990, Guangdong*s agricultural and 
industrial income increased from US$13.8 billion to US$44.2 
billion, an average of 12.5 percent per year and the fastest rate 
in the world (The Economist. 5-11 October, 1991, p.22). In terms of 
lifestyle, its residents were enjoying the highest living standard 
and considerably more freedom than the rest of the country.
Ihe chronicle of its welfare developments revealed a different 
story. As the above review shows, civil affairs work remained 
markedly residual. In both service scope and quantity, welfare aid 
was extremely selective. Only the most needy were served despite 
the growing trend to open access of CAD services and to step up 
community social care. Ordinary folks had to rely on themselves, 
their families and work units to satisfy daily needs. Ihe case for 
improved social protection was more compelling in the rural 
hinterland. As yet, social security was almost undeveloped apart 
from a few pilot pension schemes. Ihe millions working in rural
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industries were denied job tenure and welfare packages. Should 
misfortunes descend —  poverty, disability, lack of family care, 
old age, the only fall back was an embryonic programme of welfare 
services and relief, and these were not available in all 
communities. Oftentimes, standards of help were basic. For example, 
existing poverty lines were unrealistically lew. In theory, CADs 
had oversight for rural welfare. In practice, the gaps were too 
wide to be plugged by a toothless department. Much as CADs 
trumpeted the virtue of communal mutual help, add from neighbours 
remained discretionary and stigmatizing.
In most service areas, the province has adopted the same 
strategies for planning and delivery recommended by the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs. Among the four programmes examined, Guangdong has 
been especially successful in reforming preferential add and 
improving resettlement for demobilized soldiers. Here, CADs could 
only claim partial credit? a lot of the contribution came from
local communities, which have taken on the major role of catering
to the local population. In social welfare services and production, 
this was even more prominent. Municipal authorities were now 
largely confined to running showcase projects in the avowed hope of 
stimulating professionalism. Our review of Guangzhou welfare 
facilities revealed that even this mantle was not an easy one.
Municipal authorities were facing severe restrictions —  financial, 
human and organizational —  and appeared to have exhausted their 
ability to respond to new needs. Ihe case of relief was quite sad. 
When state grants were cut, the nesses were urged to protect 
themselves through insurance, savings and their own labour. People 
from places with enough jobs and economic opportunities have
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managed well. Ihe less capable and those from poorer places faced 
big risks. Naturally, backward places had less ability to develop a 
welfare framework. Then of course, relative deprivation has 
deepened, as in other places. But many parts of Guangdong have 
attained affluence, so the inequity stands out more starkly.
An important lesson from Guangdong is the primary importance of 
local values and leadership. As the experience of the Pearl River 
counties shewed, wealth need not mean greater generosity and better 
protection. Much depended on how local areas set their own 
development agenda. Nearly always, the priority has been 
whole-hearted pursuit of economic growth. Welfare matters receive 
scant attention from local leaders who measured their performance 
by their success in stimulating the local economy. Because of their 
humble position, Guangdong civil affairs agencies carried 
insufficient clout in the local administration to ensure enough 
funds for welfare projects. Consequently, they had to make a virtue 
of necessity —  local communities and the masses were constantly 
reminded of the moral superiority of self help and mutual support. 
In this context, socializaticn of welfare (shehui fuli shehuihua) 
was elevated to a sacred creed. Even though the collective had 
always borne the burden for communal welfare, the post-reform 
orthodoxy was to eschew dependence on the state. This view is as 
misleading as it is dishonest.
The case of Huazhou underscored the role of local factors in 
another way. If economic development was a necessary and sufficient 
condition for welfare advancement, aspirations for a rural welfare 
nexus would be a non-starter. Nevertheless local will, with strong 
backing from above, could work wanders. Despite initial problems
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with the insurance scheme, its other projects were running well. 
However, its fungability, i.e. capacity of being transplanted 
elsewhere, was questionable. It remained to be seen whether the 
model was inherently difficult to emulate or whether local
resistance was the main barrier to diffusion. In many ways, 
Guangdong was a microcosm of Chinese society. First, there were 
marked diversities in social and economic development within the 
province. Welfare service distribution and standards were 
manifestly uneven. Second, its welfare push lacked the vigour 
discerned in its economic growth. Admittedly, the welfare gap was 
true of the country as a whole. Above all, the most important 
lesson from Guangdong was that policy implementation could not be 
simply assumed. There were too many factors that distorted and 
delayed planned change, especially in a big country with so many 
layers of administration and diversified interests. A regional 
study like the present one was a step forward in enriching our 
understanding of social welfare under Chinese socialism.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE gJUIIRE OF WFTFARK
Organizing Concepts
Each society has its cwn ways of organizing social welfare. The 
approach it adopts develops cut of a unique set of historical and 
cultural circumstances. It can be said that the resulting pattern 
reflects its choice of values and institutional arrangements which 
are rooted in the very fabric of society. These cultural specific 
elements constitute what Pinker calls a "culture of welfare", which 
"includes the values which influence people's notions of obligation 
and entitlement, and the conventions through which these notions 
find practiced, expression" (Pinker, 1986). Indeed the key role of 
contextual factors and societal choice has been stressed by many 
social policy writers (Titmuss, 1974? Robson, 1976; Mishra, 1981; 
Rose, 1986). Social welfare is an integral part of society. As such 
it cannot be studied in isolation from its structural framework.
Human actions have their basis in values. In the sphere of 
social welfare, the impact of values is well understood. For 
example, T.H. Marshall sees the welfare state in twentieth century 
Britain as the embodiment of common beliefs in social rights 
(Marshall, 1970). Likewise Alex Robertson sees "post-industrial 
values", stressing the importance of the quality of life, 
self-actualization and societal obligation to facilitate the 
fufillment of human potentials as the driving force of the vast 
expansion of social programmes after World War Two (Robertson, 
1980). Values endorsing collective intervention in social problems
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legitimize public social expenditure. Without this bedrock: of 
support, welfare matters tend to be left to individuals, families 
and voluntary organizations. The case of the USA, a "welfare 
laggard" among industrial nations, is said to epitomize this. Its 
complex system of values with predominance given to rugged 
individualism, success orientation, problem moral ism and acceptance 
of ethnic and religious freedoms over humanitarian regard for the 
needy allegedly prevents the institutionalization of state welfare 
(Tropman, 1976, 1989). These themes have been discussed in Chapter
One.
On the other hand, prevailing institutional arrangements can be 
products of evolution, tradition, or reform. In the old days, 
individual wellbeing was secured within the framework of the 
family, village and church (in the West). With the advent of 
industrialization, social programmes under public auspices evolved 
to deal with the effects of structural malfunctions (Wilensky and 
Lebeaux, 1965). Notwithstanding their weakening, primary groups are 
still the prime agents of social care for ordinary people. A vast 
literature in the West shews that families and kin (Land and
Parker, 1978? Finch and Groves, 1980, 1983? Walker, 1982? Lewis, 
1986? Finch, 1989), neighbours and informed networks (Abrams, 1981, 
1984? Gottleib, 1981? Willmott, 1986? Bulmer, 1988? UK White Paper 
- Caring for People, Community Care in the Next Decade and Beyond,
1989) continue to assume this mantle. Indeed, under the influence
of neo-conservative ideology and fiscal crisis, many governments 
like the Thatcher and Reagan administrations have trumpeted the
virtues of community and informal care.
- 312 -
In Japan, the vital role of occupational welfare is wellknown. 
Its importance is such that "employer-based welfare is a major 
determinant of life-chances”. In turn, the wide obligation of 
employers is itself "an extension of the traditional culture" 
(Pinker, 1986).
Finally, regarding reform, all social legislation that created 
the welfare state were deliberate attempts to fashion new 
collective arrangements to satisfy social wants. In most countries, 
welfare bureaucracies have grown in size and complexity in response 
to changing needs and expectation of a bigger role for governments.
In China, the notion of a culture of welfare is extremely 
pertinent. China is a vast and complex society. Its civilization is 
one of the oldest in the world. The hold of tradition is a potent 
force that moulds the perception of welfare and the acceptability 
of cultural practices. By tracing the shape of the historical 
framework, this chapter seeks to reveal the contextual boundaries 
of social welfare before the communist revolution and analyse its 
relevance in the current period. This will set the scene for an 
analysis of the role of the family, the collective and the state in 
contemporary China, which will follow in the next three chapters. 
As will become clear, continuity and change in welfare values and 
institutional practices have imposed a unique character on the 
Chinese welfare system, of which the civil affairs programmes are 
but one component.
Ihe Traditional legacy
Ihe traditional period covers the late Qing (1634-1911) and the 
Republican interregnum (1911-1949). Nineteenth century China was
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a time of political and moral decay. Ihe Manchu government suffered 
a string of defeats at the hands of Western powers, resulting in 
unfair treaties, huge indemnities, economic exploitation and loss 
of national self esteem. Ihe establishment of the Republic did not 
put ah end to disorder and humiliation. Ihe brief interregnum saw 
China tom by warlordism (1916-1928) and wars between the 
Nationalists and Communists, the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and 
full scale civil war leading to victory of the Communists 
(1945-1949). Economically, China was going through the early stages 
of industrialization. Socially, there were rapid social changes as 
a result of wartime dislocation, civil strife, modernization and 
urbanization (Sheridan, 1975). Thus, both periods were times of 
chaos and instability.
Welfare Values
(1) Family obligation
Of all values that underpin people's concept of obligation and 
entitlement, none is more important than the value of family 
obligation.
All through Chinese history, the family system occupied a 
revered place as the basic unit of society. People were regarded as 
members of families, never as individuals (Fei, 1947; Hsu, 1949, 
1955; Feng, 1949; Liang, 1975). Of the five cardinal human 
relations (wu lun) in traditional society —  ruler and subject, 
father and son, husband and wife, older brother and younger 
brother, friends (Analects of Confucius) —  three were family 
relationships. Rules of proper conduct were prescribed for each 
dyad, namely "affection between father and son, righteous
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conduct between ruler and subject, distinction between husband and 
wife, proper order between old and young, and trust between
friends" (Mencius). Among these, the primary principle was xiao or 
filial piety. Children were expected to obey, support and respect 
their parents and elders. At the same time, mutuality or reciprocal 
obligations was sanctioned. These dyads constituted what Raymond 
Firth called the "social cement" of traditional Chinese society 
(Firth, 1951).
The importance of the family as a social care unit was 
reflected by old sayings. Such proverbs as "men rear sons to 
provide for old age? they plant trees because they want shade" and 
"men rear sons to provide for old age, they store up grain to
provide for years of famine" attest to the value of raising (male) 
children as social investment (Yang, 1957). Han Yu-shan refers to 
this as the "group insurance" principle (Han, 1946).
"Among the concrete benefits which come to the individual from 
the system of filial piety is that of 'group insurance1. Each 
child .. .has his birthright, the right to... whatever assets 
the family possesses. Each aged person counts on as much
comfort in his declining years as the family can possibly
give." (Han, ibid.)
Even principles governing extra-familial conduct were derived 
from family ethics. Loyalty to one's ruler came from the same moral 
source as loyalty to one's parents. Thus, xiao or filial piety was 
the cornerstone of an orderly society when all members perform 
their social obligations (Bodde, 1981; Fairbank, 1983? Schwartz, 
1985). At the same time, good government was assured when 
sovereigns treat their subjects as their children (Book of Rites). 
Hence, the kind of authority exercised by the father in a 
patrilineal family formed the ideal of political rulership
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(Schwartz, 1985) .Also, the act of gratifying one's family brought 
another bonus. Ihe learning attendant on the practice could teach 
one to care for others so that "one reveres other elders as one 
reveres one's cwn and loves other children as one loves one's cwn 
children” flao wu lao viii ren ii lag, you wu you viii ren ii you). 
In summation, the importance of the traditional family extended 
beyond the functions it performed for its members. It played "a 
leading part in economic life, in social control, in moral 
education, and in government” (Latourette, 1964, p. 565? Chew, 
1991). Stable families were the key to a harmonious and 
well-integrated society.
(2) Concepts of mutuality
In Confucian thinking, man was regarded as basically benevolent. 
Asked by one of his disciples about the meaning of philanthropy, 
Confucius said, "it is to love all men” (Analects of Confucius). 
Similarly, Mencius taught that human beings were bom with 
"feelings of commiseration" (Ce ren ii xin) (Mencius). To both 
Confucius and Mencius, the charitable inpulse was intrinsic in 
man's nature. Philanthropy was a virtue as well as a hallmark of 
humanity.
Notwithstanding such thinking, universal love was an ideal 
concept. Western ideas of loving all persons in equal measure, as 
one's Trakfvr loved all without regard to status, worth and 
character, had no resonance in Chinese ethics. In Chinese society, 
entitlements and obligations were strictly ordered. Ihe value of 
family obligation has already been discussed. Beyond the immediate 
family, differential treatment of others was prescribed. Among
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these, people sharing five affinities (wu toner) with oneself 
merited favours. The wu torn (five same) relations were tona zona 
(same surname), tona zu (same clan), tona xiana (same village), 
tona xue (same master) and tona shi (same place of work). Fei 
Xiaotong called this a concentric pattern of social relations (Fei, 
1947) with positions measured by how close one stood in relation to 
the actor. Ihe more distant the location from the centre, the 
weaker the claim so that ultimately one did not have any obligation 
to people not known to oneself. This is in direct contrast to views 
in the West where social welfare in modem society is regarded as 
help to the stranger whose social plight constitutes the basis of 
his claim for assistance (Watson, 1980) •
A similar observation was made by Western missionaries working 
in China in the Republican period. The lack of a free-floating 
"universal ethic" uniting disparate groups, jealous provincialism 
and particularism were found to be endemic and distressing (Garret, 
1970). The popularity of mission bodies like the Chinese YMCA was 
attributed to their success in overriding particularist concerns 
and their ability to persuade different groups to take part in 
common action to meet social needs (Garrett, ibid.)
(3) Religious Values
In examining indigenous Chinese religion, some features stood out 
in sharp contrast with the Judeo-Christian tradition (Liang, 1975? 
Yang, 1961; Fairbank, 1983). First, there was no creation myth 
about the universe. Second, there was no universal church. Third, 
there to be two distinct cultural traditions. One, the
Taoist or folk tradition of the common masses, manifested itself in
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polytheist worship of anything from gods, ghosts, spirits to 
natural objects. The other, the grand tradition, was followed by 
the Confucian scholar-gentry. Basically agnostic and naturalistic 
in outlook, the Confucian orthodoxy proscribed supernatural and 
animist beliefs and practices. Instead there was the belief in a 
harmonious cosmos in which man was but one element. Ihe human and 
natural orders were linked and reflected upon one another. Under 
this view, man must be filial, all must observe proper conduct and 
rulers must govern wisely to ensure Heaven’s favour. Such beliefs 
legitmized existing social norms (li) and a polity based on 
obedience and stablity. They were more important as reinforcers of 
social and political control than in matters of welfare in a direct 
sense.
The imported religion of Buddhism has had more explicit 
influence on Chinese welfare philosophy. Two strands were 
particularly important. One was the concept of charity symbolized 
by Guan Yin, Goddess of Mercy. In her was abstracted the principle 
of compassion. Not only did she promise mercy and relief for the 
suffering, she also appealed to people's sense of benevolence. The 
popular belief that credits could be gained from the performance of 
good deeds, and that these could be transferred to one's offspring 
and to the next life, encouraged moral investment through 
almsgiving. The other strand related to the role of monastries in 
dispensing relief to the poor and as places of refuge. That they 
could carry out such work was made possible by two conditions. Some 
owned large estates? at the same time, they attracted a lot of 
donations. The shannan xinui (charitable men and devout wcmen) 
donated money not only for the maintenance of the temples but
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towards good work to help the poor. In comparison, Christianity has 
made little inroad in Chinese society. It was not until the second 
half of the nineteenth century that large waves of missionary 
activity invaded China. Although their evangelical work did not 
result in mass conversions (Varg, 1958), their social evangelism 
exerted a strong appeal. Missionary bodies became strong champions 
of welfare ethics to help the Chinese masses during the Republican 
period.
(4) Ecology-based values
China was an agrarian society. The majority of the people lived an 
family farms. Ihe land-based economy induced economic and emotional 
attachment to the land and the ancestral village. Rural values also 
influenced the gentry who might live in the towns but retained 
strong links with their native place. Fei Xiaotong describes the 
quagmire of old agricultural conditions and practices as an 
"economy of scarcity". Ihe long-established low-level manpower 
economy required supportive values of contentment and limitation of 
wants (Fei, 1947). John Fairbank shares this view. He held the view 
that the age-old accceptance of institutionalized penury of peasant 
life enabled the individual to fit into his kinship group, sustain 
his lot in life and become socially integrated in the community 
(Fairbank, 1983). Ihe logic was that subsistence living required 
constant hard work. Uius there was a rational reason for extolling 
industriousness, a commonly acknowledged character trait of the 
Chinese. Vivian Shue likewise characterized peasant culture as 
consisting of three elements. First, farm family autonomy. Ihe aim 
was to achieve family self-sufficiency and avoid indebtedness
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which might necessitate, in the last resort, the selling of land 
upon which livelihood depends, ihe second was risk aversion. This 
was manifested in the "safety first" principle since peasants 
generally lived too close to subsistence to allow them the luxury 
of taking risks. Third, harmony and withdrawal from conflict. 
Peasants generally believed in harmonious conduct of village 
affairs and were content to be led by their elders (Shue, 1988). 
The widespread acceptance of fate also makes failure easier to bear 
if human effort fails (Harrell, 1987).
The relevance of ecology-based values on welfare was not hard 
to grasp. First, they interacted with and reinforced cultural 
values like familism and localism. Second, hard work, acceptance of 
penury and want containment made peasants self-reliant and reduced 
expectation of help from government and non-local agencies. When 
relief was actually given, feelings of gratitude rather than 
entitlement prevailed. In fact, in the long course of Chinese 
history, the concept of personal right was not prominent? what was 
emphasized was the sense of duty to authority, whether it was the 
family or the state (Wang, 1979). In a recent study of Chinese 
welfare values in Hong Kong, Julia Tao also found the notion of 
right alien to the psychological realities of welfare recipients 
(Tao, 1990).
Institutional Arrangements
(1) Family and Lineage
In China, family (jia) and lineage (zu) are different concepts 
(Freedman, 1961) • Family is the realm of domestic life, a realm of 
co-residence and the constant involvement in affairs of the hearth,
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children and marriage. Ihe extended kin group is traced exclusively 
through male children. Ihe special network of kin relations are 
sometimes so extensive and organized as to form patrilineal descent 
groups kncwn as clans or lineages. Seme of these hold substantial 
common property.
There have been many studies of Chinese family and kinship 
systems. The work of Lang (1946), Yang (1959, 1961), Levy (1949), 
Hsu (1971), Freedman (1958, 1966) are prime examples. From the 
perspective of social care, a number of observations on relevant 
institutional arrangements can be made. First, within the iia. 
common sharing and mutual obligation prevailed. The old, the young, 
the sick and disabled were looked after within the family, with 
women acting as the major carers. When families divided and sons 
married and set up their conjugal families, elderly parents usually 
lived with one of the sons and his children. Second, the extended 
kin supplemented the resources of the family. Large lineages often 
possessed corporate assets. The proceeds were used to relieve poor 
lineage members, support widows and orphans, maintain ancestral 
halls, finance rites of worship, subsidise employment of tutors and 
village amenities. While strife and conflicts occurred in everyday 
life, external solidarity was maintained when deeding with 
outsiders. Loyalty to one's family and kin was so intense that it 
prevailed over loyalty to the nation.
The family system was profoundly affected by rapid social 
changes in the Republican interregnum. Three developments were 
particularly relevant. First, the authoritarian and selfish aspects 
of familism were attacked as part of the debunking of Chinese 
culture by intellectuals. Repression of the ycung, women and
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individuals was condemned. Excessive loyalty to the family above 
all else was seen as an impediment to nation building (Wang, 1979). 
Second, modernization and urbanization had weakened the attachment 
to the family and village, enlarged work and educational
opportunities for young people and women, and challenged the 
authority of elders. Above all, it was war that caused a family
revolution. Writing about China during the Anti-Japanese War, Edgar 
Snow observed,
"possibly this war has more profoundly shaken the Chinese
family system than arxy previous catastrcphies. Millions of
children have been separated from their parents, seme by army 
conscription, seme in the confusion of escape from death, but 
thousands by voluntary desertion of family for country... Far 
up in North Shaanxi I saw an ancient temple transformed into a 
printing shop run by workers who were all atheists. Elsewhere 
in China the gods are tossed into the rain and the temples
coverted into hospitals and barracks, with little protest from 
anyone" (quoted by Dafin Gatu, 1983, p. 67).
Under the above conditions, the familly's capability to provide for 
their members was weakened.
(2) locality-based institutions
Feasant attachment to the land and the existence of lineages gave 
rise to localism. In many parts of China, it was not uncommon to 
have whole villages populated by people bearing one or a few 
surnames. Ocmmunity spirit was founded on generations of residence, 
by association in childhood and identification of common economic 
interests. Village communities were responsible for the maintenance 
of roads, supervision of fairs, building and upkeep of public 
edifices, sinking of wells, engagement of theatrical companies, and 
policing. For charitable purposes, many villages set up local
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societies for the care of foundlings, poor families and their 
children, and mutual loan associations (Tsu, 1912). Even among 
migrants, the special bond with one's ancestral village was strong. 
In South China where 80 percent of overseas Chinese originated, 
remittances and charitable donations marked their contribution to 
their home communities. Indeed most sojourners longed to retire to 
their place of origin or be buried among their ancestors. Even in 
contemporary China, villagers commonly address each other by 
prefixing names with the titles of uncle, aunt, elder brother and 
the like although they are not related by blood. Concern for 
renaing (human feelings) still features prominently in their 
dealings with fellcw villagers (Madsen, 1984). Ihe same custom is 
found among rural inhabitants in the New Territories of Hong Kong.
Outside the village, urban migrants also gave support to people 
from the same locality. Ihe conduit was through the formation of 
district and provincial clubs. Known as hui guans, these clubs 
acted as channels of mutual protection and regulated social and 
business intercourse. They also served as natural agencies for 
mutual aid (Whyte and Parish, 1984). For example, they provided 
care for transients and new arrivals, assisted destitute members, 
arranged free repatriation or burials, helped needy students and so 
on. Provincial and district associations were very active in Hang 
Kang before the 1950s. Their welfare work included the dispensing 
of free medicine, schooling and relief for their members (Ngan, 
1985). Ihe value of localism was instrumental in helping immigrants 
adjust to an unfamiliar and hostile environment (Hamilton, 1990; 
Wong, 1988). At the very least, regional associations kept alive 
people's emotional ties to their native place.
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(3) Hie role of government
The Confucian sages advocated government by virtue, which was 
deemed more effective than the rule of laws. In particular, 
Confucius warned against greedy and self-seeking government. It was 
wrong of rulers to overtax the people and allow concentration of 
wealth among the privileged few (Hung, 1979). Mencius went further 
by pointing out that inequality was a greater social evil than 
poverty. To him, the state had an inescapable duty to eliminate
destitution among the people and realize the economic sufficiency
of families (Tsu, 1912). All through Chinese history, there was the 
belief that kings must govern with compassion and wisdom. Otherwise 
they would lose the mandate of heaven (Wang, 1979). The religious 
overtone to the moral responsibility of kings and government to 
secure the livelihood of the people and peace in society was 
reflected in the Chinese word for revolution —  ”ge miner” which 
literally means transferring the mandate (Bodde, 1957, p. 56).
Several state policies have been useful in promoting the 
macro-economic wellbeing of the people. One was the state monopoly 
on the sale of such vital commodities as salt and iron ore, which 
precluded exploitation by unscrupulous merchants. Central and local 
governments also maintained a system of public granaries and 
operated price levelling policies. Grain would be bought when 
prices hit rock bottom and sold when they became too high, to
ensure that farmers would not go bankrupt and prices were
affordable. In addition, disaster areas would be granted tax 
reduction or exemption (Yim, 1978). These ancient practices 
actually predated policies of modem states to protect the domestic 
economy and special groups in society.
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The direct welfare work of government was not well documented. 
What was kncwn was that there was a long tradition of famine 
relief. During times of famine, kings and officials often decreed 
the feeding of the hungry from grain stored in public granaries 
(Tsu, 1912). Natural disaster relief by the government took many 
forms. The methods included opening soup kitchens, direct handouts 
in money or in kind, and work relief (engaging the poor for public 
work projects) (Meng and Wang, 1986). Seme of these operations were 
of gigantic scale. One example was the famines that followed severe 
flooding in Henan province during 1593-94. Out of the 18.7 million 
victims affected, the state gave relief to 12.3 million? total 
expenditure was estimated to be between 850,000 to 1.1 million 
ounces of silver (Yim, 1978).
In comparison, social relief was not as systematic. In a book 
published after the fall of the Qing, The Spirit of Chinese 
Philanthropy. A Study in Mutual Aid by Yu-Yue Tsu (1912), 
aneodoctal accounts were given of seme state social programmes. For 
example, Emperor Kang Xi ordered the establishment of foundling 
hospitals throughout the empire in 1711. In 1724, a government 
almshouse was opened at CJanton (Guangzhou) and in 1739, Emperor 
Qian Long commanded it to feed 4,676 destitute persons. In 1783, 
the same emperor reprinted an edict published in 1659 which 
condemned the desertion and killing of infants. Above all, the Qing 
Poor Law recognized the right to relief of those dependent persons 
who could be classified as the worthy poor.
"All poor destitute widowers and widows, the fatherless and 
children, the helpless and the infirm, shall receive sufficient 
maintenance and protection from the magistrates of their native 
city or district, whenever they have neither relations or 
connections upon whan they can depend for support. Any 
magistrate refusing such maintenance and protection, shall be 
punished with 60 blcws." (Tsu, 1912, p.26)
- 325 -
By tradition, the auan (widower), qua (widows), gu (orphans) 
and du (single persons) categories were regarded as deserving of 
charity. From the above, it was apparent that eligibility was 
contingent on lack of family support. The act of state help 
represented efforts to restore integration and harmony in society 
when the natural agency of the family was non-existent. In 
present-day China, such persons fall under the "three no” category.
Despite the enlightened thinking enshrined in the legislation, 
the Poor Law provisions were not enforceable. In the first place, 
there was no special administrative machinery. What's more, such 
relief duties imposed an magistrates did not involve additional 
resources from central government. Neither were local 
administrations allowed to raise taxation for this purpose (Tsu, 
1912). Indeed, the reach of the imperial government into the 
everyday life of the people was tenuous. It was estimated that the 
size of the entire civil service was around 100,000 at the end of 
the imperial era, when the population totalled 400 million (Pye, 
1984, p. 69). Historians are generally agreed that state power 
extended to only the xian level (about 50,000 people) in the Ming 
and to the zhou (around 250,000 people) in the Qing dynasties (Pye, 
1984). District magistrates, with their administrative seat located 
in the xiancheno (county capital) relied on the local gentry as 
arbitrators at the grassroots. Accordingly the latter collected tax 
and maintained order. Only in severe cases of criminality and 
rebellion would magistrates intervene. The indirect and remote 
nature of government influence was captured vividly by the saying, 
"heaven is high above and the emporer is far away" rtian ctao wangdi 
yuan] (Hamilton, 1990).
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In the Republican interregnum, either central government did 
not exist or was unable to inpose national influence. In most 
years, the government was unable to raise enough revenue and 
national indebtedness was a big problem. For example, in 1925, 
outstanding debts of the central government alone amounted to 1,634 
million yuan and rose to 2,212 million yuan in 1928 so that a large 
part of revenue was consumed by interest and debt servicing. To 
meet constant deficits, the government resorted to more borrowing, 
as much as 25 percent of its expenditure from banks through the 
issue of bands (Fairbarik, 1983). A number of reasons accounted for 
the fiscal malaise. First, the economic base was weak. In 
particular, China's fledgling industries were undermined by foreign 
inports (Fei, 1939). Second, there was widespread corruption. Most 
importantly, constant war, internecine as well as anti-Japanese, 
necessitated heavy military spending. In particular, extermination 
of the communists was the single obsession of Nationalist leaders. 
Whatever money there was went to the military.
The effect is not hard to imagine. Little money could be found 
for social programmes. To give but one example, in the year 
1929-30, military spending amounted to 92 percent of the state 
budget; education expenses took only 1.5 percent (The China Year 
Book 1929-30. p. 656). In the area of health, state provisions 
appeared rather limited. The China Handbook 1937-1945 listed three 
central hospitals (Chungking, Kweiyang and Lanehcw) providing seme 
119,884 outpatient treatments and 7,105 inpatient treatments in 
1944. At the next level, there were 123 provincial hospitals/ 
clinics and 38 public health offices, units and laboratories.
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lower down, the health system consisted of one health centre for 
each county (with a 20-40 bed hospital and outpatient clinic), a 
health centre for each district and a health station for each 
towryVillage (China Handbook 1937-1945). For labour affairs, the 
national government introduced the Chinese Factory Law (1929, 
1942), labour Ifiiion Act (1933, 1943) and Factory Inspection law
(1931). Small-scale experiments on workers' welfare fund and social 
insurance were also tried out (ibid).
Another piece of social legislation enacted was the Civil Code 
of 1929. Among its many provisions, some were related to the 
protection of women and children. For example, the law prohibited 
the sale, murder, harsh treatment, or coercion of women and 
children into marriage. It also declared women to be equal and 
complete citizens? for the first time, women were given the rights 
of equal inheritance with men (Levy, 1949). However because of the 
limit of state authority, lack of publicity and resources, these 
provisions, as well as other labour legislations, remained largely 
unenforced.
Relief work was the job of departments of social affairs. In 
1929-30, the government expended 1.4 million yuan for famine 
relief. In the years 1938-1944, seme 867.7 million yuan was 
appropriated to help 30 million refugees (China Handbook 
1937-1945). Bearing in mind the size of the war-time dislocation 
and vast population, these expenditures were rather paltry.
(4) Voluntary Agencies
Trade and craft guilds constituted another channel for mutual 
assistance. Set up primarily for the protection of the interests
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of the specific trades and crafts, they were also agencies for 
social relief among their members (Tsu, 1912? Skinner, 1977? Whyte 
and Parish, 1984? Hamilton, 1990). For sane guilds, common identity 
was symbolized by worship of a master or deity, for example Du Ban 
for builders and Hua Guang for opera singers.
During the Republican period, missionaries played an 
outstanding role in spearheading programmes of health, education, 
welfare and relief. In their attempt to counter the cannon people's 
indifference to Christianity, many turned to social service work. 
This met the dire needs of the population and supplemented 
inadequate state amenities.
The most prominent work by missionary bodies was in education. 
In 1922, 211,819 students were educated in 7,046 schools and
colleges set up by overseas missions. By 1936, Protestant 
institutions were educating some 12 percent of the total number of 
college students in China, and in some years, between 15 and 20 
percent (Holden, 1964, p. 494). Christian institutions also
pioneered education in medicine, law, journalism, social work and 
agriculture in China (ibid, pp.490-529).
In medical work, foreign input was no less significant. In 
1922, the missions had established 326 hospitals in 237 cities, 
giving a toted of 144,477 in-patient and 3 million out-patient
treatments. At the end of 1941, missionary and private hospital
beds were more numerous than beds maintained by municipal and 
provincial governments (China Handbook 1937-1945).
In welfare work, Christian organizations were also active. 
Among them, the YMCA was the most prominent. It was famous for its 
work with young people —  student associations, athletics,
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recreation, social clubs, education —  and welfare (cpium-cantrol 
campaigns and relief) (Garret, 1970). The Chinese YWCA was also 
wellknown for similar programmes plus nurseries and work with 
women. At the end of the Sino-Japanese war, many missions were 
active in providing relief for refugees and founding hemes for war 
orphans, the aged and disabled.
Another international agency should be added to the above list. 
This was the China Office (CNERA) of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNHCR). After the war, it mounted a 
massive relief and rehabilitation programme. US$945 million was 
allocated to provide emergency relief, repatriate displaced persons 
and run institutions for children, the elderly and cripples (China 
Handbook 1937-1945).
Traditional Culture of Welfare
Traditional Chinese values have seme affinity to values underlying 
a residual model of social policy in Western countries —  self 
reliance, the family and the market as primary need-meeting 
mechanisms, problem moral ism, importance of mutual help and 
charity, supplementary role of government, minimal and temporary 
nature of public welfare provisions. Hcwever, there are also 
essential differences. One is stress on group orientation rather 
than individualism. In the Chinese context, individuals are not 
seen as bearers of rights but servants of duty to their primary 
group. In the West, however, individuals are seen to possess 
inalienable rights as a person and as a citizen who is entitled to 
equal treatment under the law.
The second divergence is the central place of the family and
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lineage groups in Chinese society. Not only are they regarded 
asnatural agencies of social care, they also have a moral 
significance that approaches the position of sacred duty. In the 
West, under the onslaught of modernization, there is more readiness 
to compensate the loss of family functions through social 
programmes.
The third distinguishing feature is the relationship between 
individuals and the state. In traditional Chinese society, the 
influence of government was mediated through kin and local groups. 
The notion of contractual relations between individuals and the 
state did not exist. To the extent that the state provided relief 
for disasters and the unattached, such acts were regarded as the 
beneficence of virtuous rulers rather than duty owed to citizens. 
In the West, a universal political franchise has made voters more 
assertive and governments more answerable to electoral calls for 
public welfare. Carxxmintantly, the notion of citizen rights 
supported the expectation of a bigger role for governments in 
societal affairs. In welfare matters, the emergence of an 
institutional model of social policy sanctions comprehensive 
provisions by the state. The new welfare ideology embraces values 
of collective responsibility, rights of citizens, primary role of 
governments, and notions of social development and prevention. The 
acceptance of welfare state values set them further away from the 
welfare residual ism in traditional China.
By coincidence, Chinese traditional welfare values also have 
much in cannon with the principle of subsidiarity in European 
Catholic social teaching which preached against state encroachment 
in civil life. In the social policy domain, the latter advocated
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for the greatest decentralization and diversity in service 
delivery, for example preserving the role of families, 
neighbourhood and the church and assigning a subsidiary role for 
governments (Mangen, 1991; Pinker, 1991b). Both value systems are 
decidedly conservative in welfare matters and act as normative 
restraints on collectivist proposals for statutory involvement in 
social welfare. However, the role of organized religion in China 
never had the same importance as in the West. People devoid of 
family and local ties were more supplicants than citizens who could 
make claims on the wider society.
In terms of conventions, the pre-modem Chinese welfare system 
had its cwn characteristics. The basic principle of care delivery 
was founded on blood ties. At the centre is the family, where the 
bond that tied parents and children together was enshrined in the 
precept of filial piety. Obligations then flcwed cut to the wider 
kin network. Thus the family system as a whole has been China's 
basic welfare system. To the extent that resources of primary 
groups needed supplementation, locality-based institutions extended 
the framework of mutual help and support. Limited geographic 
mobility arising from difficult transport, emotional attachment to 
one's ancestral village and dependence an family farming reinforced 
localism. Persons cut off from kin and local community had to 
create surrogate structures in the form of provincial and district 
associations. These gave support to immigrants in an alien 
environment who otherwise could not count on help from strangers.
Mutual aid was likewise furnished by members practicing a 
common trade or occupation. Government social programmes, apart 
from relief of disasters, refugees and unattached persons have
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tended to act as agencies of last resort. In the Republican era, 
missionary bodies filled the vaccum created by weakened families, 
urban migration, dislocations from war and needs of destitute 
groups.
In the West, before the advent of large-scale public welfare 
provisions, traditional institutions like the family, parish, 
friendly societies, guilds and charities performed valuable 
functions in social care. However, the scope of state welfare 
activities in the twentieth century has widened significantly. 
Although the family, friends, neighours and informal networks still 
give succour to individuals, those who are deprived of such support 
increasingly looked to the state to meet their needs. In the 1980s, 
pluralism in welfare arrangements has been the norm in many 
European nations (Mangen, 1991? Pinker, 1991a). Even then, a 
central role is reserved for the state which increasingly takes on 
an enabling role through financing rather than direct provision of 
services, supporting voluntary efforts and helping private carers 
(Baldock and Evers, 1991).
Taking the traditional culture of welfare as a whole, the 
Chinese system presented itself as a complex entity. Values and 
practices were interwoven to form a stable framework of
expectations and practices. Social changes in the late Qing and 
Republican periods weakened traditional arrangments somewhat but 
did not overturn the basic pattern. The pre-revolutionary legacy 
was a residual model of welfare with Chinese idiosyncrasies. This 
model coexisted happily with an economy of scarcity and subsistence 
agriculture. To the extent that communist China maintains these 
characteristics, adoption of past practices give the assurance of
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continuity, foster stability of basic social institutions and 
satisfy cultural expectations. Reliance on family and local 
collectives also has the practiced advantage of saving valuable 
state resources. For these reasons, tradition still maintains its 
usefulness so that a new organic pattern can emerge from the 
marriage of the old and the new.
Conclusion
The first point about the historical legacy is that both the values 
and practices of welfare were integral parts of Chinese culture. 
The spirit of philanthropy was positively sanctioned, regarded as 
natural to man's nature and extolled as a virtue. The Buddhist 
concept of charity, imported but sinicised, reinforced the value 
and practice of philanthropy. Second, Confucian ethics imposed a 
strong sense of duty to one's family members and primary relations. 
Principles of mutual interest and aid also gave rise to practices 
centred around the local community and shared occupation. Third, 
because of the emphasis on family care and limits of state 
influence, there was no tradition of statutory welfare apart from 
disaster and famine relief. The role of government was more to 
provide a macro-framework for social order, stability and 
prosperity than to engage in direct social provisions. Fourth, 
because entitlement to welfare was closely bounded and group-based, 
there was no concept of universal right to welfare support. 
Individuals excluded could not appeal for special consideration 
apart from regard for common humanity and charity. Under the 
circumstances, help that was given had an informal, discretionary 
and stigmatizing character. Finally what made hardship and
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privations easier to bear were unique cultural beliefs. Such 
ecology-based stresses as hard work, limitation of want, 
self-sufficiency and acceptance of fate make the Chinese masses 
undemanding on formal welfare bureaucracies.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
TOE ~RQTE OF THE STATE 
The Concept of the State
The concept of the state is open to a variety of interpretations. 
First, it can be understood in the limited sense of government 
organization, namely the state apparat. Under this conceptualiza­
tion, two commonly used terms are relevant. The first and more 
abstract is auoiia. usually translated as "the state", that entails 
the organized strength of centralized and united political power, 
and stresses its coercive functions. The second is zhengfu, usually 
translated as either "government" or "administration", that refers 
to the administrative units of the state's organization, from the 
central to the basic levels (Goodman, 1984). However, in order to 
understand the full implications of the Chinese state, it is not 
possible to ignore the other components. Schnrmann, for example, 
identified three major hierarchies that make up the Chinese 
political system —  namely the Communist Party, the People's 
Liberation Army and the government (Schurman, 1968, pp.532, 557). 
It is commonly agreed that a workable concept has at least to 
include the state-party matrix (Schurmann 1970? Barnett, 1967? Pye, 
1981; Goodman, 1984? Bums, 1989b).
The fusion of party and state is a key feature of socialist 
polity (Furtak, 1986). In China, this phenomenon is even more 
pronounced. As the vanguard party, the Ctomraunist party leads the 
nation. The CCP has held to the theoretical position that the party 
inaices policy but the state implements it. In practice, the party
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subsumes the government. Not only does it set policies, it also 
controls personnel appointments and engages in public 
administration. In structure, the party and state systems have 
separate organizations. In operation, however, overlapping 
leadership in the two hierarchies and domination of party over 
government in every level prevails. This results in a fusion of 
power and functions. In our discussion of the MCA, it is obvious 
that the ministry sees itself as the executive department that 
carries out the dictates of the party. The party group (dang zu) is 
the actual command centre of ministerial decision-making. Most 
important regulations and policies are issued jointly by the CCP 
and State Council or subordinate ministries. Given the above 
reality, the concept of the state includes the combined will and 
authority of the two structures.
A subsidiary issue is the place of mass organizations. For 
practical reasons, state-directed agencies like labour unions, 
women1 s federation and youth federation have not been distinguished 
from the state system. One reason is that they are not autonomous 
from the dictates of the state and party. The other reason is that 
their function in social welfare is not extensive enough to form a 
separate delivery system. This does not mean they are not worthy of 
study in their own right. For the time being and in the context of 
our study, they are still subsumed under the state.
For the purpose of this study, the Ministry of Civil Affairs —  
in discharging its welfare oriented functions either directly or 
through the collectivities it supervises —  is offered as a case 
study of the Chinese approach to social welfare. In the foregoing 
review of the ministry's welfare remit, both before and after the
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economic reforms, the role of the state that emerges is restricted. 
State organs are the agency of last resort, never the first port of 
call. Overall, the crcwning characteristic of the approach is one 
of welfare residual ism. The reform challenge did not alter the 
basic pattern. Despite the transformation of the institutional and 
structural framework, welfare reforms have been incremental and 
adaptive. State input remained limited (CAD expenditure averaging 
at 1.6 percent in both periods, reference Chapters Two and Four). 
In fact, when one compares the post-revolutionary pattern with the 
traditional culture, there are striking continuities.
In the rest of the chapter, all state-related themes which have 
been discussed earlier are re-examined and synthesized. I shall 
argue that a small state role derives frcm the state's negative 
conception of relief and welfare. This is in spite of its formal 
canmitment to an ideology of need-based distribution, universal 
right and equality. The departure frcm the ideal position is in 
turn influenced by the state's ideas an production, consumption and 
distribution. The result is that the CAD approach is seen as having 
limited utility when compared with other instruments of change. In 
addition, paucity of resources —  funds, manpcwer and authority 
impose restrictions on state generosity. The new line of 
socialization of social welfare is an attempt to breathe new life 
into an inadequate welfare system and to readjust the state-society 
relationship. In a nutshell, the interaction of definition, values, 
strategies and resources in the context of change has shaped the 
state's policy an civil affairs.
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The Formal Pngriticn cn Welfare
In Chinese communist ideology, social welfare reflects the 
superiority of the social system which is no longer characterized 
by exploitative relations, unfair monopoly of the social product 
and perpetuation of inequality between social classes. The old 
capitalist social order having been overturned and a new society 
put in its place, social welfare has a real chance of full 
realization. This is against its use as palliative and bribe given 
to the masses to win their compliance under capitalism and the use 
of charity by Western missionaries to infringe on the dignity of 
the Chinese people (Lu, 1986? Gailun, 1987, p.7? Wenxuan. 1985, 
p. 183-85). Under Chinese socialism, social welfare manifests true 
humanitarian regard between equals. Citizens are new masters of 
their country. They have the right to work, livelihood, assistance 
in old age, sickness, disability and during times of difficulties, 
which are written into the Constitution and other social 
legislation. In the Seventh Five Year Plan, the state's ccaMiitment 
to social security is also reaffirmed.
As a social institution, social welfare is part of the 
superstructure. It is devoted to meeting the human needs of 
citizens more fully and compassionately. What makes this possible 
is not only the new structure and ideolology. The state, as an 
instrument reflecting and defending the will of all people, pursues 
policies that bring this about. It's methodology of central 
planning and redistribution assures a fair distribution of the 
social product (Ferge, 1979, pp.244-47). The principle of 
allocation differs according to stages of societal development. In 
the transitional phase, people are still rewarded on the basis of
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work (Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme; "The Question of 
Relations Between Distribution According to labor and Bourgeois 
Lawful Rights", (3iina-chi Yen-chiu. No.4, April 14, 1962? "Why the 
Principle 'To Each According to His Labor' Most be Followed in 
People's Communes", Chung-kuo China-nien, No.8, April 16, 1959). 
When communist society is attained, distribution will be based on 
need. Meanwhile, deduction frcm the social product for the purpose
of social insurance and common welfare is regarded as legitimate. 
This is because citizens have fulfilled their economic and civic
duty to society and are entitled to enjoy the fruits of their
labour (Wenxuan. 1985, p. 180? McAuley, 1991).
The Conception of Welfare Work under Civil Affairs 
The above position gives social welfare an esteemed and secure 
place in China. Hence it is logical to expect strong state
commitment to all policies that maximise public welfare. However, 
one is immediately confronted with the anachronistic case of the 
CADs. I believe the answer has to be sought in the very nature of
social welfare work under civil affairs.
In the official view, civil affairs work is distinguished by 
three special characteristics - duo yuan xincr. aun zhona xincr and 
shehui xincr (Cui, Tansuo. 1989, p.23).
In his speech to the Eighth Civil Affairs Conference (1983), 
the civil affairs minister explained the meaning of these concepts 
(ibid). By duo yuan xincr is meant the multifarious contents of 
civil affairs work. Pun zhoncr xincr clearly lays down the aim of 
civil affairs as serving the masses and its work method as 
requiring their mobilization, commonly known as the mass line
- 340 -
(Dixon, 1981, p. 17). Shehui xincr is manifested by its intimate and 
wide social implications on social life and social problems. The 
same proclamations are contained in the Preface to the ministry's 
official history (Dashiii. 1988, p.6).
In another publication, the uniqueness of civil affairs work is 
said to be its social, political and administrative nature (Gailun, 
1987, pp. 11-13). The first, social nature (shehui xincr) is as 
defined above. Its overall aim is to deal with social conflicts, 
resolve social problems and mediate relationships in society. The 
second is its political nature (zhencrzhi xincr). Political meanings 
permeate all aspects of its work. In different periods, political 
considerations dictate its work content and emphasis. Thus their 
work agenda is affected by objective requirements of the time as 
identified by the party and state. The third is its administrative 
nature (xinzhencr xincr). CADs are state agencies. Their job is to 
execute state policies in accordance with state laws and 
regulations. They carry out their work using administrative means 
and their authority are stricly defined.
Ever fond of using catch phrases, official delineations are not 
too useful because they are abstract and all-embracing. Their 
meanings often overlap. Such traits as social directedness, mass 
line, political orientation and administrative nature can be 
applied to almost any other line of work. There is no reason why 
they cannot be used to describe functions and methods in education, 
health, agricultural development, policing, indeed party work as a 
whole. An alternative line of enquiry is needed.
I believe a more premising strategy is to explore the what, who 
and why dimensions of civil affairs. Regarding the what question,
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civil affairs programmes fall into three kinds. Here our focus is 
on its social welfare dimension. Among the three, political 
construction and civil management involves universal services of an 
administrative nature. For example, the job of building grassroots 
polity, viz. formation of xiana-zhens. villagers' ccanmittees and 
residents' organizations is oriented to whole communities. 
Likewise, routines such as registering marriages and social 
organizations, reforming burial customs and mediating in 
territorial disputes serve the general population. Only in social 
security work is there the notion of selectivity fWenxuan. 1985, 
pp. 26-27).
An examination of the population served by CADs consistently 
identifies two groups of beneficiaries. The CADs call them "the 
most adorable" (zui keai) (martyrs, soldiers and their dependants) 
and "the most pitiable" fzui kelian) ("three-no" categories, 
disabled, hardship households and disaster victims) (Tansuo. 1989, 
p.Ill; also reference Chapter Two). Although CAD programmes have 
been made available to other persons in need, the emphasis is still 
on these categories. This points to the third variable about the 
paradox —  the cause of dependency. Except for those whose 
requirements are transitory (e.g serving soldiers, disaster 
victims), the residual targets of welfare services all lack ability 
for unassisted survival. It is not inaccurate to call them people 
who have lost their rightful claims for support since they do not 
belong to basic social organizations (family and work unit). Under 
these circumstances, such goods and services as are given to them 
smack of the stigma of relief and charity. Programmes of 
preferential treatment, veteran resettlement, social welfare, and
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social relief thus represent attempts to manage the marginal 
population in Chinese society.
The following observation summarizes the place and function of 
CAD welfare work aptly,
1'Whether from the perspective of the past and present, or frcm 
the volume of work involved, welfare administration is 
ultimately the core work (zhu ti gyngzuo) of civil affairs 
departments. The basic aim of doing such work properly is to 
readjust social relationships, solve social problems, promote 
social stability and the four modernizations." (Wenxuan, 1985, 
p.25)
During the reform decade, the theme of social stability has 
been accentuated. This is because of the expected unsettling 
effects of economic change. Towards the late 1980s when the reforms 
threw up sharp social divisions and unrest, CADs were even more 
conscious of this function (SHBZB, 17 May 1988). Accordingly they 
gave themselves the task to "grasp the situation, deepen the 
reforms, play the part of a stabilizing mechanism to contribute to 
socialist modernization" (Speech of the Minister of Civil Affairs 
in the Ninth Civil Affairs Conference, 17 December 1988, Tansuo. 
1989, pp.170-96).
TTya nrwiqiinist Change Strategy
In its system of thought, communism assigns a peripheral place to 
direct programmes of welfare and relief. This stems from faith in 
structural transformation in laying the framework of a welfare 
society. After seizure of power through violent revolution, Chinese 
communists, like cxxnmunists elsewhere embarked on holistic 
structural reform (Furtak, 1986). In villages, land reform, purge 
of landlords and struggle against lineages started immediately
- 343 -
after liberation. By 1957, agricultural collectivization was 
completed. Peasants thereby became members of communes, earning the 
right to work and a means of subsistence if the collective produce 
was enough for everybody. Indigent and unattached persons were 
assisted through the "five guarantees" and communal relief schemes. 
In the cities, nationalization of industries, commerce and 
handicraft was accomplished by 1958. Urban residents were 
guaranteed work through labour bureau allocation. Once employed, 
they enjoyed life tenure and their social needs were met by a 
generous system of occupational welfare. Furthermore, control of 
prices, wage equalization and subsidized commodities enhanced 
security of livelihood. Under the circumstances, communists 
believed that the conditions giving rise to dependency were 
eradicated. To the extent that hardships still occurred, the 
instances would be few and causes tied to individual circumstances. 
Such optimism was characteristic of communists in Hungary (Ferge, 
1979) and the Soviet Union (McAuley, 1991), who saw no need for 
developing autonomous social policies, believing that broad 
societal policies would suffice.
The above beliefs notwithstanding, Chinese communists are 
realistic enough to acknowledge that poverty will remain a problem 
for society for a long time. The cause is economic backwardness. 
For the time being, the population has to bear with frugality. But 
when the economy develops, and there is faith in its early advent 
because of the system's innate superiority, common prosperity and 
full realization of human potentials will result.
The Communist formula for rapid growth is tied to its 
perception of the proper place for production, consumption and 
distribution.
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Mao followed the Marxist dictum that the means of production 
must expand faster than the means of consumption and that output 
must be maximized in order to enhance final consumption (Pairault, 
1988). The commitment to high rates of production results in two 
economic consequences. First, in the belief that the key to fast 
growth lies in industrialization, especially in heavy industry, 
priority in state investment is given to heavy industry, then light 
industry and finally agriculture. Consequently, structural 
imbalances occur. Among its many effects, one is the justification 
of superior reward structures for the urban industrial elite and in 
corollary, tolerance of lower standards of life for the peasantry. 
Another outcome is deficiencies in consumer goods and services, 
both in quantity and in quality. The second economic consequence is 
de-emphasis of consumption and commitment to high rates of
accumulation to expand production even more quickly. Thus in the
first five FYP periods, the accumulation rate averaged 24.2
percent, 30.8 percent, 26.3 percent, 33.0 percent, and 33.2 percent 
respectively (ZGTJNJ 1986. p. 61), higher than in other socialist 
societies. In the reform period, the fundamental goal of the 
country was to achieve the four modernizations. The weight of
investment has been kept ip. The average rate during the Sixth FYP 
was 31.3 percent (ibid.).
The preference for lew social consumption is especially
pertinent to social policy. Social consumption has personal and 
collective aspects. The neglect of private consumption means that 
consumer items are deliberately kept scarce (also a result of 
underdevelopment in light industry and tertiary sector) and the 
standard of living maintained at a basic level. On the other hand,
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de-emphasis on collective consumption means lew investment in the 
social services like health, education, housing and welfare. To the 
leadership, social consumption is non-productive. With a population 
as huge as China, they rationalize that increasing social 
consumption even marginally will consume massive resources that can 
go into expansion of production. So for the time being, the masses 
are asked to adopt an attitude of forebearanoe and making do for 
the sake of socialist construction.
Just the same, the thirst for rapid growth has implications for 
distribution. One is that industrial workers, as the vanguard in 
the modernization process, have been welfare elites. For example, 
they were the first group to benefit from labour insurance. In the 
opinion of Joyce Kallgren, their privileges reflect the strategic 
importance of the country's chosen path of development (Kallgren, 
1969). The other effect is a stage-derived maxim of distribution. 
As said before, work merit is still the allocation criterion before 
the advent of true communism. Since resources are still far from 
abundant, payment by labour is economically necessary (McAuley, 
1991). What's more, it is socially just. Mao hit the nail on the 
head when he made the following observation,
"A sharp distinction should... be made between the correct 
policy of developing production, promoting economic prosperity, 
giving consideration to both public and private interests and 
benefitting both labour and capital, and the one-sided and 
narrow policy of 'relief', which purports to uphold workers' 
welfare but in fact damages industry and commerce and impairs 
the cause of the people's revolution." (Selected Works. Vol.4, 
1961, p.203)
This stage concept was re-examined during the reform era. At 
the 13th Party Progress in 1987, Premier Zhao Ziyang defined
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China*s economic system as in the "primary-stage of socialism1' when 
the productive forces are still backward and the commodity (market)
economy immature, a state of affairs which will persist for at
least one hundred years. In order to maximize efficiency, labour 
contribution (an lao fen pei) is still the main criterion of 
distribution at this stage although inequality must not be so wide 
as to geminate contradictions in society ("Advance Along the Road 
of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics", 1987).
The observance of the above principle has practical
consequences. In the urban economy, John Dixon observes that a 
work-based system serves important functions. It has allowed the 
continuance of a lew income policy, thereby maximizing the 
investment capacity of the state when work units administer welfare 
to their employees based on need. Also by linking reward to work 
attitude and effort, the welfare policy has been firmly grafted to 
work incentive policy. Both labcur discipline and productivity are 
envisaged outcomes (Dixon, 1981, p. 6).
The need for realism also means that it is important to rein in 
demands for improved pay and welfare. Already, urbanites are 
enjoying a standard of living twice as high as that of the
agricultural masses. Politically, it becomes necessary to remind 
them that further increases are not only selfish but will not be 
tolerated by the disadvantaged peasantry. Otherwise, morale and 
incentive of agricultural labourers will be dampened.
At the same time, the nation of desert underlies the 
distribution principle in collective agriculture. Although commune 
members had entitlements to basic grain, the official line was 
"more production, greater share? more production, more food" and
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"no labour, no food" (Chuncx-kuo China-nien. No.8 , April 16, 
1959). Peasants were enjoined to accept the difference in 
living standards between the countryside and cities. Individual 
self-reliance and local self-sufficiency, both traditional 
values, were espoused in place of absolute equality, which can 
only cone about in communist society.
Thus, under the influence of traditional and post- 
revolutionary values, loafers and malingerers have no place in 
a society that treats work as a right and a duty. To the extent 
that CAD beneficiaries cannot earn their right to support 
through labour, inferior treatment is ideologically acceptable 
and in line with cultural expectations.
In the West, social policy has been influenced by similar 
considerations. The Victorian principle of less eligibility 
legitimized differential treatment between welfare recipients 
and the lowest paid workers. Similarly the more modem variant 
of workfare is a spiritual cousin to Chinese welfare 
philosophy. In fact, the work ethic is an important imperative 
in all societies. Even in modem welfare states, administrative 
devices like requiring income support applicants to demonstrate 
willingness to work, enter training schemes and keeping 
benefits level low have the express purpose of discouraging 
dependency (Wilson and Wilson, 1991).
PnaliFm in Welfare
Frcm the above discussion of Marxist theory, welfare and relief 
work emerges as a separate category of human need. CAD welfare 
programmes fall into the area of non-productive collective
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consumption. With the exception of soldiers, the recipients do not 
make any contribution to socialist production. Thus their claim for 
support cannot be justified on the grounds of social justice. 
Although there is formal ccxnmitment to an ideology of need-based 
distribution, dependence is despised in a system that weds welfare 
to work. Traditionally, frugality, the work ethic, self reliance 
are all culturally significant. They achieve the position of 
ideological imperatives in a stage-related distribution hierarchy. 
This leaves only social stability and demonstration of socialist 
superiority as the valid grounds for granting social support.
Not surprisingly welfare services administered by CADs have 
become peripheral services for a perpherial population. This 
selective approach has a number of characteristics. First, 
eligibility is defined after a process of successive elimination 
—  recipients entitled to regular support must have no family, no
work unit and no means of livelihood. Second, decentralized 
responsibility is insisted upon. This means that the family and the 
collective most share the responsibility with the state. The case 
is pushed to the extreme in the area of compensation for military 
service. Rather than instituting a pay structure for a modem army, 
the state prefers to keep the old tradition of requiring 
preferential add from the local masses. While this practice may 
have been suitable when the Red Amy was basically bands of rural 
guerillas constantly on the move and local soviets could not build 
up their fiscal base, it is ludicrous in a powerful modem state. 
In the last decade, the burden of local communities has actually 
increased. They, rather than the state, have played a bigger role 
in meeting local needs. Third, the state's contribution is miserly.
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Both before and after the reforms, annual state input averaged at 
1.6 percent of the government expenditure. The consistency of this 
low ccxnmitment leads one to suspect that the state's perception of 
civil affairs has not changed at all in the last forty years.
The state's limited attention to direct welfare and relief does 
not mean its role is anywhere less central in Chinese social life. 
In contrast, there is another position on social welfare which is 
macroscopic and universalist in orientation. Under this broad 
framework, the state is a positive and major player assuming such 
roles as architect, enforcer, arbitrator and resource supplier. 
First of all, the state and the party designs a blueprint of a 
socialist society. Then through structural engineering, the plan is 
brought into reality. In doing so, a variety of policy instruments 
are used —  employment, income, pricing, rural-urban trade 
(Hussain, 1989), family law and so on. The state's third role sees 
it being involved in arbitrating values, privileges and 
state-society relationships. If policies can be regarded as 
"authoritative allocation of values" (Easton, 1953), policy 
readjustments reflect changing priorities. Likewise, the economic 
reforms introduce new constellations of social interests as well as 
liberalization of state authority in economic and social life 
(Bums, 1989a). Finally, the state engages in direct provision of 
resources. Prominent examples are social insurance funds committed 
through state-owned and large collective-cwned enterprises. As 
extensions of functional bureaucracies or horizontal layers of 
administration, these enterprises ultimately rest on a featherbed 
of state subsidies. In a sense, the state is the largest employer, 
albeit in the urban economy only. Under the circumstances, what
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belongs to the state and what belongs to the work unit becomes hard 
to distinguish.
The priority given to the broad and narrow conceptions of 
welfare can be glimpsed by comparing state expenditures on 
different policies.
Table 20 compares the state civil affairs expenditure (d) with 
social insurance and welfare funds for ordinary workers (a) and 
retired and resigned staff (b). The paltriness of civil affairs 
funds is very striking. In 1978, (d) was only 18 percent of (a); it 
was responsible for releasing seme 13 percent of pensions (mostly 
for veterans and government cadres). In the space of ten years, all 
welfare expenditures have soared. However, although the total 
labour insurance and welfare bill for workers has exploded (nearly 
ten times) and the growth of benefits for retirees was even more 
remarkable (more than 15 times), civil affairs spending has not 
quite trebled. In 1988, state spending on civil affairs was only 
same six percent of the insurance and welfare bill for the urban 
work force.
In Table 21, we have further evidence of the state's preference 
to guarantee livelihood through the use of subsidies rather than 
direct dispensation of welfare and relief. At the start of our
review period, total state price subsidies and handouts to deficit 
units amounted to 15 billion yuan, 11 times more than the
expenditure on civil affairs. The burden of subsidies has worsened 
in the reform decade. By 1988, these have grown to 76.3 billion 
yuan and civil affairs spending was only five percent of total
subsidies. Ministry of Finance sources concede that total state
subsidies account for 31 percent of government revenue in 1990 
(Mina Bag, 3 September 1991).
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Table 20 Selected Spending of Government. 1978-1988
(100 million yuan)
Total Insurance Total Insurance Toted Civil
& Welfare Funds & Welfare Funds Affairs
Year for Staff & Workers f.Retired & Resigned Expenditure
Staff & Workers
(a) (b) (C) (d)
1978 78.1 17.3 (2 .2) 13.9
1979 107.3 32.5 (2 .8) 18.8
1980 136.4 50.4 (3.3) 17.5
1981 154.9 62.3 (3.3) 19.2
1982 180.5 73.1 (3.2) 19.6
1983 212.5 73.1 (3.2) 21.8
1984 257.7 106.1 (3.0) 24.1
1985 327.4 145.6 (3.7) 30.0
1986 413.1 169.1 (3.3) 34.4
1987 501.7 204.3 (4.0) 36.2
1988 655.5 270.2 (6.6) 40.1
Note : Figures in brackets refer to pensions distributed by
civil affairs departments (mostly army cadres).
Source : China Report. Social And Economic Development 1949-1989.
p.372 for (a), and p.373 for (b) and (c) ? Dashiji, 1988, 
p.734 for statistics for 1978-1986 and SHBZB. 14 April 
1989 for statistics for 1987-1988 in (d).
Table 21 Total State Subsidies. 1978-1988 
(100 million yuan)
Total Price Total Subsidies to
Year Subsidies Deficit Enterprises
(a) (b)
1978 93.9 60.2
1979 180.7 67.3
1980 242.1 60.0
1981 327.7 64.2
1982 318.4 52.7
1983 341.7 103.0
1984 370.0 68.0
1985 299.5 118.5
1986 284.5 205.0
1987 294.6 376.4
1988 316.8 446.5
Source : China Report. Social and Economic Development 1949-1989. 
p.336.
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Admittedly, aggregate statistics are complex indices which are 
affected by many variables. For example, higher retirement 
expenditures reflect changes in demography, e.g. rising number of 
the elderly. More funds are needed to improve standards and meet 
hitherto unmet needs. Likewise, increased ccmmital is called for to 
fulfil new duties. However, taken as a whole, budgetary figures 
reflect national priorities. Fran the above comparison, state 
policies and programmes are accorded different weightings. In the 
competition for state resources, the urban workforce gets the 
lion's share. For them, the welfare system is generous and very 
much resembles an institutional model of welfare. In contrast, 
funds allocated for civil affairs, including money for its welfare 
programmes, have always been paltry. State inputs are more like 
left-overs than an important commitment.
OmsLrajnts and Potentials
In forming a policy an civil affairs, the contribution of ideas 
mediated through Marxist theory, values and change strategies has 
been of crucial importance. Also influential are resource issues. 
In one sense, negative valuation of social welfare under civil 
affairs is itself a constraint, albeit an ideological one. Besides, 
the state's ability to implement a chosen policy is affected by the 
resourcces it has at its disposal.
In Chapter Four, I have analyzed the organizational, human and 
material deficiencies faced by civil affairs organs. Here I will do 
no more than recapitulate their nature and import.
Organizationally, the first issue confronting the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs is role ambiguity. Its impossibly wide range of
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duties, their disparate nature and lack of coherence is not helpful 
to the emergence of agency goals and mission. The second difficulty 
lies in the inadequate organizational structure. After repeated 
restructuring, the ministry organization has become more 
streamlined and specialized. Hcwever, local agency structure, in 
particular the one-man system at the xiana-zhen level, is woefully 
inadequate. Regretably, the ministry is powerless to dictate 
improved administrative forms for subordinate organs.
Civil affairs departments are severely hamstrung by manpower 
constraints. To begin with, there has always been a shortage of 
cadres to fill approved posts. In xiana-zhens. part-time 
appointments and high staff turnover are perennial maladies. 
Hcwever, local administrations are prone to brush such complaints 
under the carpet. As personnel matters are controlled locally, 
superintending CADs can only plead the case for adequate staffing 
and continuity in posting. Ultimately, whether this will have any 
effect depends entirely on the wealth and attitude of local 
governments. In the case of Guangdong, one finds that affluence 
need not imply generosity? neither does lew income restrict welfare 
development given the will to do more. Furthermore, CADs tend to 
get landed with a high concentration of elderly and poorly educated 
cadres. One way to tackle the problem has been cadre education, 
witness the opening of civil affairs institutes. Hcwever training 
capacity is restricted, due to the shortage of funds and expertise. 
In the forseeable future, professionalization of welfare work is 
unlikely. Meanwhile inferior pay and welfare benefits, poor working 
conditions and low social status take its toll on the morale of 
staff.
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The financial woes of CADs are unbroken tales In the long saga 
of a half-starved organization. Throughout their history, there has 
never been a time when CADs have had enough money to do the job. 
For clients, the price to pay has been restricted access, limited 
service scope, meagre benefits, substandard living standards, 
dangerous buildings, unmet needs, social stigma and the need to 
subsist on the charity of neighbours. At agency level, CADs have to 
struggle with totally inadequate organizations, manpower shortage, 
scarce funds for training, buildings, poor pay and severe economies 
in managing their programmes.
The economic difficulties faced by civil affairs departments 
have increased rather than eased despite increasing affluence. On 
the one hand, the transformation of the institutional framework has 
severely challenged the ability of the collective to satisfy the 
welfare needs of their members. The weakening was more pronounced 
in villages after communes disappeared from the scene, wrecking 
arrangements that financed ccmmunal welfare projects. In the 
cities, the state's drive to make enterprises more competitive, the 
divergent forms of ownership with differential access to staff 
welfare, trimming of health and welfare bills by enterprises, 
introduction of labour contracts and legitimation of redundancies 
make econonomic survival more precarious. Whether in town or 
country, new insecurities are creeping up under the ethos of 
economic competition.
Because traditional agencies are stressed, the civil affairs 
system is aairad to relieve seme of their pressures. The irony is 
that CADs are themselves equally stressed, if not more so. On the 
one hand there is no prospect of prying more money from the
- 355 -
central administration, which glorifies economic construction but 
abhors dependency. On the other, the/ have to squeeze harder from 
the same agencies in order to "socialize" the welfare burden. In 
the end, CADs are caught up in a circular process where the tasks 
of supplementation and exploitation complement each other.
In the final analysis, the ministry's quandary is symptomatic 
of the predicament of the state as a whole. Economic liberalization 
has enriched enterprises and local areas but weakened the financial 
powers of the centre. By the same token, mounting budget deficits, 
hefty subsidies, official corruption and a defective taxation 
system also diminish the state coffers. In welfare terms, the 
benefits of devolution, both political and financial, are mixed. On 
the positive side, the effects are a less oppressive state, more 
personal freedoms, wider sharing of wealth with local areas and 
enterprises, and more incentive for hard work. On the other hand, 
there are the costs of reduced leverage of central agencies in 
policy implementation, redistribution and social development. There 
are also wider disparities, group conflicts and social instability.
From the view point of potentials, the government is able to 
locate allies from the repertoire of traditional values. First, the 
importance of cultural emphases on frugality, industry, 
self-reliance and collective mutual help collude with revolutionary 
stresses an sacrifice, the proletarian work ethic and local 
self-sufficiency. The similarities of old and modem ethics make 
the more receptive to official pleas to lower expectation
for direct assistance, to assume more responsibilities for personal 
welfare, to earn one's livelihood through honest labour and to make 
do with meagre collective provisions. Revolutionary values dovetail
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nicely with traditions. They build on and exploit the latter to 
serve contemporary ends.
Another set of values centre on the duty of the family. Here, 
emphasis on family obligation provides a very potent source of 
legitimation to legal requirements for family support. When 
professional programmes such as child care, aid to the handicapped, 
job placement, counselling, and heme help remain underdeveloped, 
families bravely soldier on without compensation. In particular, 
the precept of filial piety is invoked to furnish the basis of 
elderly support. Thus, limited state aid is accepted as natural 
because family care is always preferable to reliance an impersonal 
bureaucracies. Chinese familism, after being stripped of such 
feudalistic remnants as patriarchal authority, subjugation of the 
young, exploitation of women and excessive devotion to family 
interest can still preserve its role as the agency for social care. 
"Fine traditions11 can be merged with new socialist ethics to build 
up socialist spiritual civilization. This explains why all state 
policies related to the family aim to preserve its integrity, an 
area to be explored in depth in the next chapter.
Conclusion
In China, state action is the outcome of the interaction between 
theory, values, change processes and constraints. A passive role of 
the state in direct welfare and relief matters results from a 
narrow conception of social welfare under civil affairs. Despite 
Marxist commitment to need-based distribution, egalitarianism and 
leadership role of the state and party, the state has other 
priorities. In its desire to accelerate growth, the leadership has
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chosen to emphasize the requirements of production, distribution 
according to work and deferred consumption during the primary stage 
of socialism. Direct handouts represent unearned assistance for 
nonproductive citizens. As such, they can only be justified on the 
grounds of humanity and social stability. In place of this
approach, the state subscribes to a comprehensive concept of social 
change whereby macro-societal policies pave the way for a just and 
equal society. In order to realize this goal, the state accepts a 
primary responsibility to maximize welfare in the broad sense. 
Ultimately, state intentions are held back by economic
backwardness. In spirit and practice, the Chinese approach to 
welfare has little affinity to Mishra's structural model of social
policy. Its bifurcation into two inodes —  one broad, one narrow —
and separate systems for the rural masses and urbanites, makes 
China a unique model on its cron.
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CHAFim NINE
TTm.TTRRIAN CHINESE FAMTT.T5Jf
Introduction
In the West, large-scale collective intervention in social welfare 
was linked to the decline of the family as a result of 
modernization (Wilensky and Lsbeaux, 1965) and professional 
services were seen to support, ameliorate and substitute for the 
loss of family functions (Kahn, 1979). In oriental cultures, the 
family is an extremely important institution (Dixon and Kim, 1985). 
Closer to hone, in the Chinese community of Hong Kong, the family 
is sacrosanct. As late as the mid 1960s when the colony was 
undergoing intensive industrialisation and public debates 
surrounded the issue of whether the government should play a more 
active role in welfare, the government used the need to preserve 
family duty as a pretext to perpetuate its laissez faire policy. In 
its view, the family was still intact; tinkering with welfare 
intervention would encourage people to relinguish their 
responsibilities (Social Welfare White Paper, 1965; Chew, 1980; 
Hodge, 1981). Mich as critics disagreed with the verdict and 
voluntary agencies roundly condemned government inertia, the 
community acquiesced, so strong was its belief in family 
self-reliance.
In China, similar views were embraced by ccramunist leaders. In 
the preceding chapter, I was able to shew that welfare residual ism 
was linked to official disapproval of dependency, preference for 
other change strategies as well as pragmatic constraints. The end
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result was decentralization and the basic institutions in society 
divided up the job of social care. When the historical legacy is 
examined, one finds that such practices were rooted in the past. In 
particular, the group insurance principle enshrined in Chinese 
familism has functioned as the de facto welfare system.
This chapter dissects the relationship between the family and 
welfare after 1949. The conscious promotion of utilitarian familism 
has been one of the key ingredients of China's welfare system. The 
unspoken assumption is that the ubiquity of family care makes 
direct welfare and relief unnecessary. Four related themes will be
tackled. To begin with, 1 shall examine the communist view of
Chinese familism. Despite its many negative aspects, the overall
verdict was that traditions could be made to work for the benefit
of individuals and society. Thus, immediately after seizing power, 
the Marriage Law was promulgated to create new forms of marriage 
relations. Next, I shall analyse the impact of state policies - 
production, distribution, social security and other services - on 
the family. From this review, there is overwhelming evidence that 
by and large state policies have served to maintain family 
integrity. This is especially true in the pre-reform period.
The third theme is the relevance of family status in questions 
of welfare and relief. More importantly, access to civil affairs 
aid was contingent upon lack of family support. If aid was to be 
made available, the household rather than the individual became the 
unit of service. Then, I shall examine the challenges faced by the 
contemporary Chinese family. These came from three sources —  as a 
result of demographic change, the reform process and on-going 
modernization. Emergent problems exerted new pressures on the
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welfare system. In the attempt to respond to social change, 
"socialization of welfare" was one strategy. Hcwever this had the 
the effect of multiplying the family burden. To highlight the 
interdependence of welfare and the family, the case of elderly care 
is used as an example. It is found that on the one hand, the 
observance of family duty was used to justify limited bureaucratic 
intervention. On the other, underprovision accentuated the need for 
intergenerational dependence. The chapter ends with a conclusion on 
the relationship between the family, polity and economy. The 
salience of change and continuity is also delineated.
Before preceding with the above analysis, I shall clarify my 
use of two related concepts. The term family (jia) refers to a 
social unit established by blood and marriage and the relations 
between members. Members of families have definite rights and 
duties under the law. On the other hand, household (hu) refers to a 
group of persons sharing a common budget and living under one roof. 
In the vast majority of cases, the family and household are 
coterminous. In demographic statistics, much of the data refers to 
the hu rather than the jia. However, for the purpose of this study, 
I shall focus on the sociological family.
The Socialist Verdict on the Family
In China, the family rather than the individual has always been 
regarded as the basic constituent unit. The official designation 
for the family is the cell or shehui xibao (Pan, 1986, pp.2-3). To 
Marxists, the family fulfils key functions in two productive 
processes - the production of resources for living and human 
procreation. Therefore people living in any time and place are
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subject to the restraints imposed by the development of not only 
labour relations tut also family relations (Pan, 1986, p.2; Hunvin 
Jiatincr Tansuo. 1985, pp. 151-52, hereafter HYJTTS). With the advent 
of ccmmunist society, the economic and social significance of the 
family will disappear. Hcwever, in the socialist stage, the family 
still remains a unit of shared consumption and personal welfare 
(HYJTTS. ibid, p. 150). This carries with it the implications for 
unequal inheritance and distribution of rewards based on labour.
In addition, Chinese ccmmunists recognise the baggage of 
cultural tradition. They knew full well the moral and social 
significance of the family. Family honour and security is the 
motivating force for hard work (Harrell, 1985) ? for the sake of the 
family, almost any hardship can be endured. Precisely for this 
reason, loyalty to the family interferes with loyalty to the state 
and higher moral causes. So, very early on, the leadership realised 
that the family was a beast that had to be tamed.
Chinese sociologists have delineated many functions for the 
family - production, reproduction, consumption, education, sexual 
gratification, emotional support, child care, social security, 
political functions, religious worship and so an (Pan, 1986, 
pp. 165-75? HYJTTS. p.87? Yue, 1989a, pp.20-25). From the vantage 
point of communist leaders, some of these functions were ripe for 
abolition, like ancestor worship. Others could be taken up by more 
appropriate agencies. For instance, the tasks of education, 
production and political participation could be turned over to 
schools, enterprises and party organizations. Still others could 
be shared by the family and society, e.g. childhood socialization, 
social security and health care for workers. Hcwever, most private
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care functions could only be tampered with at great cost. These had 
to do with biological requirements of individuals and demands for 
domestic services which were not available through purchase or 
bureaucratic allocation. Such needs included care of children, the 
sick, the disabled, the elderly and sharing of housework. The use 
of alternatives would require massive state input to subsidize 
social consumption and supply substitute care. More important 
still, the effects of transferral could undermine the basis of the 
family and destabilize society. In the foreseeable future the state 
reckoned that the family's place was irreplaceable.
Economic considerations apart, many old ethics were deemed 
worthy of preservation in their own right. Mao pinpointed the 
importance of summing up the pros and cons of tradition, and as a 
result, selective incorporation when he said,
"In the process of sorting out the development of our past 
civilization, the dregs of feudalism must be discarded but its 
democratic essence retained. Only then can we lay the basis of 
a new national culture and raise our national self-esteem." 
(Selected Works. 1961, Volume 2, p.668? Pan, 1986, p.214)
In the process of appraisal, the following traditional values 
and practices were positively sanctioned : fidelity of women (zhoncr 
zhen), the idea of respect between marriage partners (xiana iincr yu 
bin), devotion to family duties, especially in caring for the old 
and the young (zun lag ai you) and brotherly love (xiong you di 
gong) (Pan, 1986, p.215-18? New Trends in Chinese Marriage and the 
Family. 1987, pp. 142-45, hereafter New Trends? Yue, 1989b,
pp. 172-206). In particular, the stress on family obligation was 
thought to contribute to social stability (Pan, ibid, p.220) ? 
reciprocal relations "help to strengthen the economic ties among
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family members, form close bonds in the family, and ensure that the 
young and old are all cared for." (New Trends, ibid, pp. 142-43).
Notwithstanding the above, other aspects of traditional 
familism were condemned. These included patriarchal authority, 
exploitation of wcmen, polygamy, arranged marriages, oppression of 
the young, ancestor worship, lavish weddings and funerals (Yang, 
1959). Above all, selfish devotion to the interests of the "small 
family" as against the those of the "big family" (the collective 
and the state) was the most repugnant (Pan, ibid, p. 219). 
Permitting its survival would obstruct the socialist revolution and 
undermine the authority of the state.
The legal Position on Marriage and the Family
The concrete outcome of dialectical analysis was the 1950 
Marriage Law. It had the social goals of preserving the sanctity of 
marriage, protecting the rights of marriage partners and abolishing 
malpractices such as concubinage, "buy and sell" marriages and 
exploitation of women. Unions based on love and free choice on a 
monogamous basis are the only acceptable form of matrimony. The 
right to divorce is also upheld. Furthermore, the principle of 
mutual support among family members is prescribed as a duty. 
Spouses are bound in duty to love, respect and look after each 
other (Article 14). Parents have the duty to rear and educate their 
children; at the same time, children are obliged to support and 
assist their parents (Article 15). The ultimate intention of the 
law is to lay the foundation of modem socialist marriage and 
family relations (Goode, 1970). In the new socialist family, 
relationships between spouses, parents and siblings should be
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one of equality, mutual respect and sharing of cannon ideals (Pan, 
1986, pp.222-23)•
To promote the acceptance of the law, a great deal of effort 
was put in propaganda, campaigns and adjudication (Goode, 1970). 
One measure of "success” was the dramatic increase of divorce. In 
1950, 186,167 divorce cases were handled by the courts. In 1951,
the number shot up 120 percent to 409,000 and 1,170,000 in 1953 
(Platte, 1988). Indeed this surge was so alarming that the law 
became known as the divorce law and the authorities had to suspend 
theirs propaganda to allay the fears of the masses (Meijer, 1971, 
p. 114). Despite the statutory provision, divorces were hard to 
obtain in China. The Marriage Law mandates mediation before divorce 
is granted (Article 25). Hence families, work units and 
neighourhoods are bent on effecting marital reconciliation through 
a process of civil mediation (China’s Civil Mediation System. 1988; 
Sun and Ye et al., 1988.). As a result, the divorce rate in China 
is low. In 1979, crude divorce rates were 0.61 for Singapore, 1.17 
in Japan, 3.61 for the USSR and 5.25 for the USA. For China, it was 
0.21, making it one of the lowest in the world (United Nations 
Demographic Yearbook 1983. pp. 517-19).
In 1981 a new Marriage Law was put into effect. This upheld the 
same principles regarding ffeedan of marriage, right to divorce, 
protection of rights of family members and mutual assistance 
embodied in the early legislation. On family obligation, the 
responsibility now extends to grandparents and grandchildren 
(Article 22). In addition, two important revisions are incorporated 
—  raising the minimum age of marriage (from 20 to 22 for men and 
18 to 20 for women) and relaxing the grounds for divorce. The
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latter permits marriage dissolution when one party can prove 
complete alienation of mutual affection, making approval for 
divorce easier. Not surprisingly, its promulgation led to another 
wave of divorce (Platte, 1988).
Besides the above, other laws also contain clauses on family 
responsibility. For instance, Article 49 of the 1982 Constitution 
sets out the general rights and duties of marriage partners and 
family members. The Inheritance Law of 1985 requires the setting 
aside of a share of the estate for the maintenance of dependents 
who cannot work and have no income (New Trends. 1987, p. 149; 
Palmer, 1988). To punish non-observance, the Criminal Code of 1979 
provides for a maximum prison sentence of five years for offences 
considered especially serious (Clause 183). Indeed such legislative 
insistence is ironic in a country well-known for its tradition of 
filial piety (Chow, 1991). The only acceptable explanations were 
official anxiety and common non-observance of the cultural ideal.
State Policies and the Family Before the Reforms
Policies on Rural production, distribution and social services 
In the domain of production and distribution, a number of measures 
provide a framework of support and equal cpportunties to Chinese 
citizens (Wong, 1990a). In the land reform in 1950, land was seized 
from landlords and rich peasants and allocated to poor peasants. A 
key part of the process was the struggle against the exploiting 
classes, often involving fellow villagers denouncing their kin and 
even immediate family. An example of the latter was having children 
of landlords "draw a clear line" between themselves and their
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parents. Likewise, the properties of lineages were confiscated. In 
doing so, the corporate basis of extended families, potential 
rivals to state pcwer, was removed. Nevertheless, the major 
achievement has been the abolition of landlessness, which is a 
ccaumon cause of rural poverty in developing countries (Hussain, 
1989). So, despite scene excesses, the land reform gained the 
support of peasants who eagerly welcomed the acquisition of land to 
feed their families.
Private land ownership ceased after 1957. In the ccmmunization 
drive, peasants were forced to relinquish their plots and farm 
property to join communes. In this process, rural families lost 
their status as independent producers. In return, they were 
guaranteed work as members of communes and obtained the right to 
the collective produce, hence the assurance for subsistence. 
Distribution was to be based on labour input as measured in work 
points. Hcwever 70 percent of the grain was allocated on a per 
capita basis; households not earning enough for their basic 
requirements could borrow from the production team (Croll, 1987). 
More important for family stability was the payment practice by 
household, with goods and cash turned over to its head. This 
strengthened patriarchal authority. At the same time, it reaffirmed 
the family as a unit of consumption (Fei, 1983). Meanwhile, the 
nonworking poor were relieved by the collective. Thus for twenty 
years, the commune system provided a collective canopy to succor 
China's rural inhabitants.
Although rural policies were pro-family an the whole, attacks 
on the family did occur. During the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), 
familism was assailed in the feverish attempt to transform rural
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society into a communist one. Thus private family plots, rural 
markets and family sideline activities, which provided important 
supplements to family inccme, were banned. Nurseries, old peoples1 
hemes and canteens sprang up cvernight to socialize family 
functions and release dormant labour (women, old people) for 
production. In the wake of economic collapse, these structures 
disappeared as rapidly as they came. Greater tolerance of private 
economic pursuits then ensued, thereby reviving farm output (Dixon, 
1981). The same pattern was repeated again in the early years of 
the Cultural Revolution. A frenzy of anti-traditionalism and class 
struggle, including assaults on feudalistic familism, seized the 
peasantry. This wave subsided after a while. The collective format 
remained intact until 1983. For most of this time, family stability 
was the norm.
Finally, the discharge of family duties was abetted by another 
policy. Since 1957, a rigid system of household registration 
effectively put a stop to urban migration and restricted 
residential mobility. Enhanced family and communal solidarity was 
the result (Parish and Whyte, 1978).
Urban production, distribution and social security 
In the early years of the regime, family enterprises were 
permitted. However, by the mid 1950s, most big industries were 
nationalized and organized into state-ewned enterprises. later on, 
smaller-scale commercial, service and craft activities, many 
operated by families, were transformed into collective units 
(Lockett, 1988). Henceforth, the urban population became dependent 
on the state for job allocation. Hcwever, once employed, they were
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protected by life tenure.
Even though cash wages were low, work unit welfare services in 
the form of company housing, health care, canteens and the like 
more than compensated. Furthermore, the system of labour insurance 
offered comprehensive protection against the vissicitudes of life - 
sickness, maternity, disability, death and retirement. Although 
entitlements to occupational welfare varied among enterprises, most 
of the urban population enjoyed social security cover either as 
employees or as family dependents. For instance, housing is 
allocated an a family basis and can be retained even upon 
retirement. Another benefit is public health insurance which covers 
50 percent of the treatment costs for family members. Indeed, work 
units and their work force become so interdependent that they form 
sociological communities (Walder, 1986; In, 1989). While this theme 
will be pursued in depth in the following chapter, suffice it to 
say now that urban families enjoy a standard of living twice as 
good as peasants under the umbrella of the collective. Seen in this 
light, the oft-trumpeted claim in the superiority of the socialist 
system has sane truth. Ironically, pampered urbanites make up no 
more than 25 percent of China's population.
Similar to the rural scenario, urban life in China was 
characterized by residential stability, again, the result of 
household registration policy. Mutual vigilance was often vigorous, 
notably during the Cultural Revolution. More importantly, the 
severe shortage of housing, the result of neglect of urban 
infrastructure, has the effect of postponing household division 
(Fei, 1983; Yang, 1988; Ikels, 1990b). Thus many young married 
couples continued boarding with one set of parents, reinforcing
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intergeneratioml dependence.
Family Functioning in the Pre-ref d m  Decade
In the West, decline in family size and increasing nucleation has 
been associated with the weakening of family functions through the 
diminution of internal resources to meet needs and deal with 
contingencies (Titmuss, 1969). It is difficult to say the same 
about family transformations in China. First of all, the average 
household size has shewn no dramatic decline in the first thirty 
years of conmunist rule. In the three national censuses conducted, 
the average number of persons per household had been 4.3 (1953), 
4.29 (1964) and 4.43 (1983). Only in urban areas had family size
decreased appreciably (from 4.66 in 1953 to 3.95 in 1982) (Ma, 
1986). Second, despite the trend for more nuclear families and 
fewer multi-generation and joint households, it is dangerous to 
infer a dilution of reciprocity. Most elderly persons continued to 
live with their married children (Liu and Xue, 1987, p. 38). Even 
without co-residence, grewn-up children made financial contribution 
to parents, visited frequently and helped out with chores, (Pan, 
1986, p.151).
Mutual help occured in the reverse direction as well. The older 
generation were just as likely to assist with housework, minding 
grandchildren and finance for weddings and major purchase (Yang, 
1988). Ihat this was possible was mainly due to family savings and 
the higher wages of older workers, where, in urban areas, pay was 
linked to seniority (Davis-Friedmann, 1983; Davis, 1988). In
addition, as said before, the shortage of urban housing delayed new 
household formation. Finally, the lack of social security in rural
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areas, inadequate supply of pre-school and social welfare services 
made the continuation of family care vital for the survival and 
happiness of individuals (Chen, 1985). Davis-Friedmann, a prominent 
scholar on family and labour studies in China was right to conclude 
that "overall, government policies supported stable households and 
parent-child obligations11 (Davis-Friedmann, 1983, p. 103).
Welfare Policy and the Family
As my review repeatedly points out, civil affairs aid is highly 
restrictive. For a long time, the "five guarantee" scheme was 
practically the only welfare measure for the indigent in rural 
areas. Its introduction in the mid 1950s served the poliitical end 
of persuading reluctant peasants to join advanced agricultural 
cooperatives (1956) and later communes (1957). Through this, the 
authorities sought to demonstrate that collective agriculture was 
just as effective, if not better than families in providing for old 
age and destitution (Davis-Friedmann, 1978). Overtly though the 
scheme was designed to give help to childless elders, disabled and 
orphans who had no families, no work ability and no means of 
livelihood. Family status, or rather the lack of it, was the most 
decisive qualifying condition. According to local custom, lack of 
family care was usually interpreted as having no sons; married 
daughters being regarded as members of their husbands' family and 
thus not liable. Whatever the motive, because of the scheme's 
stringency, few people benefitted. Those who did suffered the 
stigma of charity.
If the granting of wubao was contingent upon absence of family 
support, family status was relevant in another sense. People facing
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hardship from natural disasters, sickness, insufficient labour 
power and other misfortunes were helped on a family or household 
rather than individual basis. Similarly, preferential treatment was 
given to dependants of serving soldiers and martyrs; poor 
households were known as kunnan hu. both relieved as one unit. In 
allocating work, rural cadres also gave needy households priority 
in having one member work in a commune or brigade enterprise, 
thereby drawing a regular income. Later still, recipients of 
development aid were designated as funin hu. The relevance of 
family and household criteria made escape from domestic duty 
impossible.
Overall, the state's welfare policy in the countryside was 
characterised by reliance on the masses and the collective. State 
aid was restricted to the poorest areas and natural disaster 
victims. People's needs were first met within families and then the 
collective. Unlike before, lineage support was no longer possible. 
With the seizure of lineage property, communes had replaced the 
extended family group in supplementing resources of the iia.
In the cities, regular relief was reserved for "three-no 
targets" fsanwu duixiam). Again, the same qualifications applied. 
Temporary grants were given to whole families. Likewise, CAD-run 
institutions only admitted destitute people without families. 
Hence, the family was the first line of defence in resolving 
difficulties. What was different from rural areas was that the work 
unit gave greater support to families, hence CAD rules specifically 
withhold state relief to people with employment ties. To the extent 
that work unit resources were inadequate, neighourhood services 
sprang into action. All these channels must be exhausted before
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state aid could be considered.
Although welfare systems in rural and urban areas were 
organised along different lines (Chew, 1991), they do have common 
structural features. They are both decentralized, with 
responsibility devolved to basic institutions of society. The 
systems also operate in a hierarchical fashion, with clearly 
defined orders of priority for each agency (Wong, 1986). As long as 
the family was intact, outside intervention was deemed unnecessary. 
Charlotte Ikels, writing on the care of disabled elderly in China 
wryly observed,
"Institutionalization has not been an available alternative for 
the disabled elderly. While there are hemes for the aged, they 
are by and large for the use of healthy older people who lack 
families, i.e. the childless elderly. There is an appealing 
symmetry here - the lack of institutions means family care and 
family care means no need for institutions." (Ikels, 1991b)
Thus utilitarian familism served as an alternative to public
welfare. Then, because of non-supply of social services, family
solidarity became more vital and had to be maximized at all cost.
The irony is complete when the state resolved to build a 1 •welfare
system with Chinese characteristics founded on the fine tradition
of mutual care by relatives, friends and neighbours" (Seventh Five
Year Plan for Social and Economic Development, 1986-1991? SHBZB. 12
June 1986). The marriage of informal care and formal provisions is
to be the hallmark of China's distinct welfare system.
rhallpnges on the Family
The 1980s has been a period of rapid social change. As said before, 
the jarrffVTTri c reforms drastically altered the structural 
environment. The dpmiae of communes reinstated the family as a unit
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of production. In most places, the resurgence of family
enterprise resulted in higher output and better standard of
living. For the more capable families, this meant greater 
ability to meet family obligations. Not so for the losers. What 
was true for both was that a weaker collective framework
increased private burdens. Furthermore, urban migration
disrupted family life in many villages. Not surprisingly, women 
tended to get extra burdens in family care on top of their 
productive work. In general, the new commodity economy exposed 
rural families to high economic and social risks, albeit 
without the support of familiar collective institutions.
In comparison, there was more stability in the urban 
institutional structure. Nevertheless, changes in the system of 
employment produced new strains in the form of unemployment,
reduced occupational welfare and social security vaocuum for 
larger groups of the urban population, e.g. employees of 
individual and private enterprises. The relaxation of price 
controls also produced inflation, an unfamiliar monster, which 
eroded urban incomes. Employees an fixed wages and those 
working in poor units were hardest hit.
Besides the reforms, the Chinese family is also facing 
accelerating changes in its internal structure. Two factors are 
relevant here - official control of fertility and rapid aging.
The laissez-faire attitude of the state on fertility 
experienced a fundamental shift under the new reform
leadership. In 1979, the government announced the ambitious 
one-child population policy. The impetus to this draconian 
measure was the four modernisations. In order to achieve its
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projected economic targets, the size of the population has to be 
controlled within 1.2 billion by the year 2000 (Renmin Ribao. 27 
January 1979). The government went about its implementation with 
much rigour (Wasserstrcm 1984? Wong, 1984; Croll, 1987? Davin, 
1988) so much so that criticisms of arbitrariness, cruelty and 
violation of human rights occurred.
Overall, the results have been quite successful. In the cities, 
most families observed the one child rule. China now has an 
estimated 50 million only children (Miner Pao. 6 January 1992). In 
the countryside, enforcement has proved more difficult. The 
implications for society are worrying. In the cities at least, a 
fcur-two-one family pattern (four grandparents, two parents, one 
child) has emerged. Over the long haul, the new family structure 
will alter family relationships, worsen the dependency ratio and 
accentuate the problem of elderly care. In the meantime, government 
and society fret over the education of only children, likely to 
grow into spoiled brats because of over-protection and indulgence 
from doting adults.
The other factor resulted from population aging, a universal 
demographic experience. In 1964 the percentage of citizens 65 and 
older was only 3.6 percent. By 1987 it had risen to 5.5 percent 
(Liu, ZGMZ, May 1989, p.33). The 1990 census put this group at 5.59 
percent, a gain of 0.67 percent from the 1982 census (China 
Statistics. 1991, Issue No.7). If the age of seniority is lowered 
to 60 inclusive, a more common indicator of age in China, the 
proportion accounted for 8.59 percent, an increase of 0.96 percent 
over 8 years (ibid.). The financial implications of the grey
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revolution, especially the rising costs of health care and 
pensions, has been an official worry since the mid 1980s.
Fran information available, the onslaught of structural 
transformation, state family policies and demographic change has 
produced strains in the family. In recent years, a number of family 
problems have been reported. One concern was the the rising divorce 
rate. The trigger point seemed to be the 1980 Marriage Law. In the 
first year of implementation, the percentage of divorce court cases 
went up fran 0.27 to 0.34 per thousand population (Platte, 1988). 
Ban (1986) also reported that since 1981, the number of divorces 
increased by 30-80 percent in most areas and doubled in scare 
places. In 1988, official sources gave the divorce rate of 1.2 per 
thousand population (IRC Yearbook. 1989, p. 393). Although still lew 
by international standards, the trend aroused anxiety in a society 
that puts a premium on marital stability.
Another problem related to illegal marriages. One expressed 
concern was cohabitation and unlawful unions e.g. underage 
marriages, unions between close relatives and bigamy (Ming Pao. 20 
June 1991? Xia, ZGMZ. April 1989, p. 14). In the late 1980s, people 
marrying before the legal minimum age averaged 15-20 percent? in 
1986 alone, this amounted to 6.1 million people (Xia, ibid). By 
1988, women who married before age 20 accounted for 19.9 percent of 
the wedding total, up 4.5 percent from 1982 (IRC Yearbook. 1989. 
p.395). A related effect was above-planned births. In 1985, these 
stood at 1 million? in 1987, 2.5 million (Tong, ZGMZ. October 1989, 
p.35) and 8 million in 1988 (IRC Yearbook. 1989, p. 397? Miner Pao. 
20 June 1991). Such youngsters, dubbed ''black children", are 
potential victims of discrimination. Not legally registered, they
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do not qualify for subsidised rations, education, housing and job 
allocations. Before achieving independence, they are the sole 
burden of their parents. Thus, despite the effort put into 
controlling fertility, holding dcwn population growth was 
difficult. At year end 1990, China had 1,143 million citizens 
(China Statistics. 1991, Issue No. 3). In all likelihood, the 
target for 2000 looks doomed as the net increase averages 15 to 17 
million per year (Miner Pao. 16 November 1990? Hong Kona Economic 
Journal. 15 November 1990).
Additional problems have been reported. One related to 
abandoned babies. The Ministry of Civil Affairs estimated that each 
year one million babies are abandoned in the country (Miner Pao. 1 
June 1990). From what was knewn, most of these were girls and 
disabled children, relinquished so that their parents could have 
another chance of bearing a healthy son (GEMZ. 1991, Issue No. 4, 
pp. 18-19). Stirring much official indignation was the reappearance 
of abduction and sale of women (Mina Pao. 20 June 1991? Time. 
November 11, 1991). Likewise, social evils which were eradicated in 
the 1950s have made a ccme back. These included prostitution, 
mercenary marriages, gambling, superstition and drug addiction 
(Miner Pao. 24 November 1990? Li, GEMZ. 1990, Issue No.2, pp. 16-17? 
BR, 12-18 August 1991, p.7).
In interpreting the above reports, caution is needed. The 
information has been anecdotal. What's more, Chinese journalism 
tends to be alarmist in reporting examples of "spiritual
pollution". While this undoubtedly reflects official anxiety, 
outsiders cannot readily gauge their magnitude and seriousness. 
Under the circumstances, it would be wrong to infer that the
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Chinese family is breaking down or facing a serious crisis. 
Nevertheless, enough information has surfaced to suggest that 
Chinese familism is under stress. Bearing in mind the heavy 
dependence on family care, any impairment in family functions 
exerts additional pressure on the formal welfare system.
care of the Elderly
Of all the problems affecting the family, none is as worrying as 
the issue of old age support. In the cities, labour insurance and 
related expenditures for retirees have risen from 1,730 mil ion yuan 
in 1978 to 31,330 million yuan in 1989 fCRSAFn 1949-1989. p. 373) 
when pensioners increased from 3.14 million to 22.01 million (ibid, 
p.372). At the same time, the adequacy of pensions has been eroded. 
This was because pensions were linked to basic wage (60-75 
percent), not including bonuses that accounted for sane 30 percent 
of take-home pay. Workers who retired when wages were lew, before 
the 1980s, experience hardship despite getting price subsidies from 
their work unit and the government. Even when money was not a 
problem, longevity increased the likelihood of physical dependency. 
Prolonged care of frail elders was enough to create a family crisis 
in double-career families (Ikels, 1990a).
The situation was even more critical in the countryside. The 
number of civil cases involving refusal to support elderly parents 
has risen sharply fZhontxaio Laonian. 1986, Issue No. 10). More 
instances of elderly abuse were recorded (ibid). While isolated 
episodes may not be indicative of general trends, wide publicity 
indicates social concern. In rural China, aged peasants are not 
entitled to pensions. Hie vast majority of the elderly were still
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dependent on family support. Welfare provisions remained grossly 
skeletal. For example, recipients of the "five guarantees" numbered 
no more than three million among 800 million peasants; 
institutional services were so limited that only half a million 
could be housed. The dilution of communal obligation was certainly 
not a blessing to the needy.
As the country's welfare bureaucracy, the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs has to wrestle with the problem. A number of strategies 
have been adopted. First, there were persisting attempts to trumpet 
the virtue of honouring the aged. Two justifications were invoked. 
One was the appeal to the authority of tradition. The masses were 
reminded that caring for aged parents was the key essence of 
Chinese familism, a strict moral duty (Fei, 1983; Cui, 1986; SHBZB. 
29 January 1988; In, ZGMZ. May 1988, p.7; Liu, ZGMZ. May 1989, 
p.34). The second justification was socialist, that old age support 
was a compensation to the proletariat who devoted their working 
lifetime to building socialism. Honouring one's parents was the 
individual contribution to helping society discharge its social 
obligation (Pan, 1986, p.224).
Another strategy was to enforce legal strictures on family 
care. The authority of the laws were constantly cited to impose 
support duties not only on sons but also married daughters. 
Furthermore, civil affairs cadres have taken the lead to encourage 
the signing of quasi-legal care contracts between aged peasants, 
their children and relatives (Yang and Zeng, ZGMZ. October 1990,
p. 21).
Other administrative innovations have been introduced, as 
detailed in preceding chapters. These ranged from strengthening
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ccanmunity care, relaxing admission to institutions for needy 
persons with families and incane, experiments with pension schemes 
and welfare service networks in rural areas to encouraging 
remarriage of widows and widowers. To underline the responsibility 
of all sectors of society, the concept of the socialization of 
welfare was spelt out. In sum, all these measures had the goal of 
tackling the pragmatic problems of age support. They were also 
intended to promote new concepts of morality. Nevertheless, by 
their very nature, official initiatives amounted to partial answers 
of very complex problems. The chance is slim that they can arrest 
the cause even if they can relieve the symptoms when the basic 
issue is family adaptation to social change.
Within the civil affairs system, there were two schools of 
thought on old age security. One view was that family care should 
be the primary fwei zhu) way of dealing with age support; all other 
bureaucratic measures were supplementary fwei fu). As a result, 
everything possible must be done to shore up the family. The second 
view was more progressive, namely that weakening of family 
functions was inevitable under the influence of modernization and 
urbanization. Hence society should speed up the formalization of 
social security (Liu, in ZGMZ. May 1989, p.33). By and large, it 
was the first view that carried the day. In the Forum on Social 
Security organized by the MCA in 1988 (reported in SHZHB, 29 
January 1988), Minister Cui Naifu summarized the consensus of 
participants as follows,
"Our country must emphasize the function of the family in 
building up our social security system. Family care is more 
voluntary and effective than care by any special agency. If 
family issues are handled well, this can alleviate pressures on 
society. If handled badly, societal burdens will be 
aggravated." (Tansuo. 1989, p.128).
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Conclusion
In China, the family functions as a social support system that 
mediates between need and bureaucratic intervention. There was 
almost a blind faith in the annipotence of the family in meeting 
welfare needs of individual members. In the sphere of direct 
welfare and relief, the availability of family support disqualifies 
people from communal and state assistance. Every effort has been 
made to preserve the tradition of family reciprocity. However, on 
closer examination, communist commitment to the family has been at 
best ambivalent and at worst exploitative (Chew, 1991). Government 
policies are multi-dimensional. They include measures of direct 
attack, reform, legal prescription, propaganda, glorification of 
cultural virtues as well as actual support. Overall, the attitude 
towards Chinese familism has been one of tolerance rather than 
whole-hearted celebration. Nevertheless, official desire to
maintain family integrity has been unwavering. The state believes 
that is the clue to individual happiness; it also relieves the 
state of its welfare burdens.
In the above analysis, the most striking discovery was the 
intimate relationship between the family, government policies and 
the institutional framework. Decades of socialism have impinged on 
the way that needs are met within families and in society. The 
element of continuity was also important. The cultural legacy 
furnished the social-psychological foundation of an approach to 
welfare based on family responsibility and localism.
In the last decade, it was apparent that the process of 
economic change, demographic evolution and state intervention has 
produced unsettling effects on the family. Even thcugh the state
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still clings to a policy of relying on utilitarian familism as the 
core agency of social care, its avcwed aim of socializing welfare 
responsibilities does not offer the right remedy to problems 
encountered by the Chinese family. So far, the authorities have 
steadfastly equated personal welfare with family welfare. This may 
be correct in most situations: people are happier living in
families where their need for love and security is answered in a 
family group. Whether it is right to treat family interest as 
synonymous with individual interest remains to be seen. In a 
modernizing society, the ascendency of individualism has been the 
lessen of the West. As individuals demand more freedcm for 
themselves as persons, they may relish the family bond but reject 
its bondage of mutual obligations. This may well be the shape of 
things to cone for China. What will happen if individuals rebel 
against traditions and official strictures? If that happens, the 
family cannot be the expedient tool that it has been for the last 
forty years. It appears that the state is not yet ready to face up 
to this eventuality.
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CHAPUR TEN
THE QOTJHCTTVE CRNOPY
Introduction
In a capitalist society, one's occupation is the main determinant 
of incane and life chances. Remuneration is tied to the 
marketability of one's skills. The remuneration package among 
employees is also marked by inequality. It is in the statutory 
social services that entitlement is supposedly equal, consistent 
and determined along need and citizenship criteria (Titmuss, 1958; 
Marshall, 1950). For these reasons, the potential role of employers 
as an instrument of social policy was neglected. Since the oil 
crisis in the mid 1970s, the bias of state welfarism has been 
recognized (Higgins, 1986). The 1980s saw counter trends in the 
form of neo-conservatism and corporatism (Mishra, 1990). Many 
realized that welfare provided in the occupational system, as in 
Japan, was an integral part of the social wage and a genuine
alternative to state services (Rose, 1986). Nowadays, pluralist
arrangements for welfare are accepted as a more realistic option in 
even advanced welfare states (Pinker, 1991a).
In socialist societies, work-based distribution rather than 
market allocation determines one's ultimate entitlement to welfare. 
In China, goods and services channeled through the unit of 
production —  the collective —  is of paramount importance.
Hcwever, human geography is also vital. One's place at birth, in
either village or city, crucially affects one's life placement. 
Then, one's attachment to different types of enterprise brings
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differential rewards. Horizontal inequalities in welfare 
notwithstanding, within the collective unit, distribution is highly 
egalitarian. The all-embracing nature of the collective canopy also 
makes minimal state welfare tolerable to the vast majority of 
citizens. Hence this reduces state involvement in social service 
funding and administration. Furthermore, communal amenities 
buttress the resources of families in meeting needs.
In this chapter, the role of the collective in welfare will be 
analysed in depth. It is argued that since welfare responsibilities 
are decentralized to the unit of productiian, a limited state role 
in direct welfare matters becomes feasible. To begin with, I shall 
trace the etymology of the collective concept and clarify its 
meaning. Second, I shall examine its sociological significance. 
This is followed by a finer delineation of its welfare role. The 
conclusion is that as long as the collective framework remains 
intact, demands for state services are kept to the minimum. 
Conversely, the erosion of this premise requires compensatory 
provisions. The fourth part analyses the effects of the economic 
reforms. In the countryside, the demise of communes created a 
welfare crisis; in the cities, reforms in the enterprise structure 
altered a hitherto self-sufficient system. Such pressures led to 
repercussions in the civil affairs systems, whose responses are 
analysed and assessed. Finally, a conclusion on the close 
relationship between production, distribution and consumption is 
drawn with reference to the narrow approach of welfare.
Etymology
Marx believes that private ownership is the source of oppression
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because of its monopolistic and exploitative nature. Nothing short 
of its replacement by public ownership can usher in a new socialist 
order (Manifesto of the Oommunist Party. 1968). Hie collective is 
an economic organization based an socialist public ownership. In 
the history of Chinese socialism, the meaning of the term 
"collective” experienced several twists and turns. Its exact 
content in rural and urban areas is not the same. Because of its 
nebulous nature, an examination of its etymology is essential.
When the Chinese Ccxnmunist Party began its struggle, Mao 
realized that the peasantry, rather than the urban proletariat was 
the class that would sustain and ultimately accomplish China's 
revolution. Party pcwer was first consolidated in villages with the 
setting up of peasant "soviets” or councils as a form of government 
in its early (Kiangxi) period (1927-1934). After the fanning of 
class hatred, the party eliminated landlords and redistributed land 
confiscated from them to poor peasants. To promote more socialist 
production, they started to organize cooperatives in villages and 
hamlets from the early 1930s. However, these structures were 
short-lived? they collapsed when soviets fell after defeat by the 
Nationalists (Schurmann, 1970).1
The communists perfected their techniques of rural organization 
during the Yenan period (1937-1946). Using the natural village as 
base, they built upon existing informal labour sharing arrangements 
(among relatives and friends) to pool labour and animals together 
to form more permanent mutual aid organizations. Hie cultivation
1 For a full description of the cooperative and collective 
movements, see Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organisation in 
Oommunist China. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Calif., 
1970.
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and promotion of village leaders to become cadres also solidarized 
the masses because they were working among people they knew and 
trusted. In time, mutual aid teams became identified with units of 
the people's militia. So, war, like work, was integrated into the 
pattern of rural life in the early form of collective 
organizations.
After the revolution, the regime's first task was to overturn 
existing economic relations. In the rural areas, land reform 
preceded attempts to socialize economic assets. Land was
redistributed to land-deficient households. Private posession of 
land (along with draft animals and implements) lasted a few years 
only. In 1953-1956, village policy turned to co-cperativization. 
The drive started by the creation of mutual add teams and quickly 
progressed to agricultural producers co-operatives (APCs) and then 
advanced APCS (Schurmann, 1970; Vogel, 1980). The difference
between the two forms of APCs is that in the elementary type, land 
was amalgamated but still privately held while in advanced APCs, 
there was complete socialization of peasant property and joining of 
smaller APCs into larger units covering an entire village. Same 
writers have used the word ''co-operative'' to designate the 
first-stage APC and the word "collective" to refer to the more 
advanced type (Schurmann, 1970, p. 454). By the middle of 1957, 96 
percent of peasant households had joined the advanced APCs (ibid).
More radical transformation came in 1958 when people's communes 
were launched. The conditions for an instant conversion into full 
communal ownership were considered ripe. No doubt the success of 
the First Five Year Plan also prcnpted feelings of urgency and the 
following assessment;
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"As long as production materials such as forests, fruit trees, 
houses, sheep, small plots of land were still under private 
ownership, it was impossible to carry out unified planning and 
unified use, something which affected the development of 
production and construction. Private ownership of these 
production materials and small collectivity ownership (the 
small APCs) came into contradiction with productive forces 
which since the Great Leap Forward have demanded development. 
The setting up of a people's commune was the best way of 
resolving these contradictions." (Renmin Ribao. 13 January 
1958)
The life of people's communes was to span over twenty years. 
From 1958 until 1983, rural Chinese society was organized in a 
three-tiered structure (commune —  production brigade —  production 
team). Except for brief spells, the production team, based in the 
natural village or hamlet was the accounting unit. Under this 
system, property ownership was corporatized. Farm households lost 
their economic sovereignty. Instead individuals became members of 
collectives which provided for all their material requirements. 
Consumption as well as distribution was shared on a more or less 
egalitarian basis. In the event, people's communes came to be 
regared as "multi-functional units for production, consumption, 
residence, social services, and development entrepreneurship" 
(Shue, 1988, p.60).
In the cities, socialist transformation or shehui zhuvi gaizao, 
the transfer of economic ownership from private to public hands, 
took place at about the same time as rural collectivization. The 
change agenda consisted of a number of stages in which the scale of 
ownership gradually expanded from smaller to larger co-operatives 
until they were owned by "all the people", that is, by the state 
(Vogel, 1969, pp.125-26).
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Whyte and Parish (1984) summarize the process succinctly. 
Immediately after 1949, large firms controlled by the Nationalist
government and its leading figures, foreign-owned firms and vital 
enterprises like banks, utilities and trading companies were taken 
into the state sector. Private capitalism was tolerated for a 
while. Then starting in 1955, the campaign to socialize the urban 
economy began. First, the remaining capitalists were squeezed to 
relinquish control of their enterprises and turn the units into 
"joint state-private firms”, which were later nationalized. Then, 
during 1956-1958, the authorities tried to organize all of the 
small peddlers, shopkeepers, repair personnel and handicraft 
workers into "collective enterprises". Additionally, in the late 
1950s, the collective sector was swollen by the incorporation of 
small-scale neighbourhood industries which mopped up previously 
unemployed persons (e.g. women) (Lockett, 1988; Chen, 1988). Before
the decade ended, the transformation of the urban economy was
complete.
The distinction between state and collective-owned units was 
fuzzy. Both have public, as against private, ownership. Until the 
late 1970s, the state sector dominated the urban economy, employing 
some 75 percent of the urban labour force. Both ownership and 
control rested with the state, which supplied all the plans, raw 
materials, marketing and management input and co-ordinated their 
production under the state plan. Meanwhile collectives were
supposed to be responsible for their own profits and loss. In 
theory, ownership belonged to the people who worked in them; in 
practice, big collectives were run like state firms and only small 
units operated under a self-sufficient mode. Under Maoist thinking,
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the collective sector was regarded as inferior to the state economy 
and transitional in nature. Indeed, sane collective units were 
merged and taken into the state system before 1978.
With the abolition of private ownership, the state took up the 
responsibility of central planning, enterprise management and 
pricing. As a corollary, the onus of finding work for the urban 
population also passed to state labour bureaux. As discussed in 
Chapter Eight, to resolve the issue of economic and social welfare, 
the state's policy has been to graft it onto the work system. 
Regarding distribution, citizens have to earn their reward through 
work. However, once engaged, workers enjoy life tenure. They then 
stand under a collective umbrella; their wellbeing becomes 
inseparable from that of their work unit.
The process of tracing the evolution of rural and urban 
collective institutions unravels a string of lexicons —  rural 
co-operatives, communes, urban state enterprises and collective 
units. While the origins and meanings of these terms differ 
slightly, they share three things in commmon. First, they are all 
units of economic production marked by advancing progress to 
public, as against private, ownership. Second, their members depend 
on them totally for their life needs. Third, the relationship 
between individuals and collectives on the one hand, and that 
between collectives and the state on the other is marked by 
contradiction.
Elaboration of the last point is found in two speeches by Mao. 
In his 1956 speech "On the Ten Major Relationships", Mao stressed 
the importance of balancing tripartite interests.
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"The relationship between the state on the one hand and 
factories and agricultural co-operatives on the other and the 
relationship between factories and agricultural co-operatives 
on the one hand and the producers on the other should both be 
handled well. To this end we should consider not just one side 
but all three, the state, the collective and the individual." 
(Selected Works. Volume V, 1977, p.299)
Furthermore, in "Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the 
People" (1957), Mao identified two basic contradictions affecting 
the peasantry in economic terms. One was between accumulation and 
consumption. The other was between the state and the co-operatives 
over the allocation of savings (Selected Works. Volume V, 1977? 
also, Schurmann, 1970, p.92). In the first area, the peasants 
sacrificed consumption so that industry could accumulate capital 
for development. The second contradiction arose from the fact that 
the state and the collective carpeted for savings —  the state to 
re-invest peasants1 surplus in industry and the cooperative to 
reinvest in domestic production (ibid). The second conflict gave 
rise to peasant grievance. Although Chinese farmers were not 
exploited to the same extent as their Soviet counterparts (Parish 
and Whyte, 1978? Schurmann, 1970), their lot was markedly inferior 
to urban residents. All along, they did not enjoy subsidized grain, 
municipal amenities and the generous perks from urban work units. 
They could not move domicile to urban areas because of the 
household registration policy in force since 1957 (Siu, 1990). 
Although both rural and urban folk had recourse to a collective 
umbrella, the quality of the shade was not the same.
Sociological Analysis of the Collective
The ubiquity of the collective is a distinct hallmark of Chinese
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socialist society. Mediating between individuals, the state and the 
wider society, collectives occupy the central ground as an 
intermediate social organization. No citizen is immune from its 
influence. Indeed membership is the key to personal survival.
The Chinese rural social structure is typified by what Vivienne 
Shue (1988) calls a "honeycomb" pattern. The constituent parts, the 
people's communes form discrete, cell-like units. The three-layer 
system —  teams, brigades and communes —  coincided with natural 
villages (cun), administrative villages (xiancr) and marketing areas 
(zhen) long familiar to rural residents (Skinner, 1971; Parish and 
Whyte, 1978; Shue, 1988). Without interruption to existing 
residential, social and economic relationships, solidarity of 
neighbourhoods was enhanced by a number of measures. First, rural 
cadres were predominantly recruited from the local people, who were 
sensitive to local feelings and interests and were ready to defend 
them against outsiders (Madsen, 1984; Shue, 1988). Second, communes 
were explicitly conceived as highly self-contained entities, in 
which economic life, social intercourse and political authority 
were fused in a single, comprehensive organization. Production, 
investment and distribution was internally organized. Furthermore, 
the Maoist principle of local self-reliance enjoins dependency on 
the state and emulation of other places. Third, their relationships 
with the outside world were circumscribed. Although communes were 
bounded by production quotas and other demands sent down from 
county authorities, they had few horizontal dealings with other 
units. Furthermore, curtailment of occupational and residential 
mobility bound the peasant firmly to his roots. All in all, 
villages were full communities (aemeinsdhaft) in the sociological 
sense.
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If oommes were distinguished by relative independence from 
state interference and self-containment, this was not true of urban 
collectives. In cities, the state is omnipotent; its control over 
all aspects of enterprise functioning is tight. Walder, in his 
seminal work Communist Neo-traditional ism: Work and Authority in
Chinese Industry (1986) identifies "organized dependence" and
" institutional culture" as the two institutional features of 
Chinese industry, which are also typical of the organizational life 
of other urban work units. The first refers to the ways in which 
workers are dependent economically on their enterprises,
politically on the party and management, and personally cn 
supervisors. Regarding the second feature, the major manifestations 
are compliance secured by authority and incentives, patron-client 
relations between superior and subordinates (wherein derives the 
concept of neo-traditionalism) and instrumental and exchange ties 
between colleagues. Because of these features, the work unit is 
more than an agent of production and distribution. It is also an 
arm of government and the administrative parent of its employees. 
Individuals are so completely subsumed under the collective that 
their very identity cannot be separated from their danwei.
Other writers have coined different terms to refer to the same 
phenomenon. In Feng (1989) labels the urban collective system as 
"work unit system", danwei zhidu. His analysis of the nature of the 
work unit is in harmony with Walder's. He further points out the 
negative effects. For example, total subjugation of workers to the 
will of their danwei negates their individuality and freedom. Work 
units can also become little kingdoms, acting against state 
interest by abusing and hoarding valuable assets. For society as
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a Whole, the fusion of economic, social and political functions is 
detrimental to a sensible division of labour and the pursuit of 
economic efficiency. Another terminological contribution comes from 
Brantly Womack who designates similar patterns as '•work unit 
socialism", danwei shehui zhuvi (Womack, 1991). A key feature is 
that within enterprises, there are strong elements of voluntaristic 
and cooperative power relations, not just bald coercion of workers. 
However, in its external relations, there is often a tension 
between state authority and the danwei.
In summary, the above analyses converge on three points. First, 
collectives, whether rural or urban, are the building blocks of the 
institutional structure. Their universality means that all Chinese 
citizens are enveloped in them. Second, they are multi-purpose 
organizations with a wide mandate. They not only complete economic 
tasks for the state, they are also instruments of administration 
and natural communities. Third, membership results in personal 
gains and costs. While personal autonomy is sacrificed, individuals 
derive substantial economic and social benefits from the 
association. As such, an element of exchange is involved when both 
care and control characterise the relationship (Wong, 1986).
The Welfare Role of Collectives
Collectives have been China's welfare instrument par excellence. In 
the proletarian state, agricultural and industrial workers become 
masters and owners of the means of production, rather than 
exploited employees. Naturally the satisfaction of their needs is a 
public duty. The deliberate fusion of work and welfare rests on the 
notion of the sanctity of labour: work is liberating and ennobling.
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It is also related to the socialist principle of fair distribution. 
Essentially merit-based, welfare is not a right from birth but 
something to be earned (Dixon, 1981) • In the period under Mao, 
distribution for the Chinese masses was basically egalitarian, 
consumption was protected and livelihood was secure.
Ocmmunes and urban collectives have different reward
structures. Under the commune system, the first collective
contribution to welfare were benefits stemming from the pooling of 
risks. Unlike private cultivation, peasants were protected from 
such vicissitudes as bad weather, poor harvest, natural disasters 
and deprivation arising from differential abilities. Secondly, 
ocmmunes with power to dispose of incomes could balance rewards 
according to effort without neglecting basic needs. Thus households 
not earning enough '*work point grain" were entitled to per capita 
allocations which guaranteed subsistence (Parish and Whyte, 1978; 
Croll, 1987). Thirdly, collective withholdings in the form of 
welfare fund, gong vi iin and public accumulation fund, gong ii iin 
paid for common requirements. The former covered entertainment, 
medical expenses, education fees, childcare costs and aid to the 
destitute (Davis-Friedmarm, 1978); the latter provided reserves for 
public works and production needs (Parish and Whyte, 1978).
Naturally, there are pros and cons of such a system. On the 
negative side, it "stunted incentives, misallocated resources and 
held back personal incomes by putting household economic activities 
in a strait-jacket of collectivism". Contrariwise, it gave each 
rural family a measure of material security via the common rice 
bowl (Hussain, 1989) •
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Fran the description in previous chapters, communal welfare 
arrangements should be familiar. These included the "five 
guarantees", relief to hardship households, disaster relief and aid 
to veterans. Admittedly, access was carefully guarded and benefit 
levels miserly. Long-term relief was particularly hard to get. The 
"five guarantees" were granted only to destitute persons without 
families and work ability after meticulous screening by neighbours. 
Indeed, the rules were so stringent and the stigma so strong that 
the scheme functioned more by way of preventing abuse than a means 
of eliminating household poverty (Davis-Friedmann, 1978; Hussain,
1989). Because services were funded and operated locally, standards 
and scope of amenities also differed widely between areas. 
Nevertheless, the conditions giving rise to destitution in the 
countryside are dealt with, albeit at subsistence levels. This is 
not a mean feat for an agrarian nation.
Other social provisions financed from the agricultural surplus 
included health and education projects. Wide availability of
primary and junior middle schools at brigade and commune levels 
improved education attainment of rural children. Even more
impressive were achievements in health care. A delivery model 
making use of widely dispersed health stations, bare-foot doctors 
(paramedics with elementary training to treat simple illnesses and 
carry out preventive procedures) and collective insurance won wide 
acclaim as a viable paradigm for health care in developing nations 
(World Bank, 1985). Consequently, China's infant mortality, life 
expectancy, and morbidity patterns were more typical of a middle- 
inccme country than one with China's income (Davis, 1989).
If rural residents ate from an iron rice bcwl, the utensil of
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their urban peers roust be made of stainless steel. What's more, 
this bowl is much bigger, better designed and holds more enviable 
contents.
The danwei system, prevalent only in Chinese cities, gives a 
degree of security unattainable even to employees in the most 
advanced welfare states. First, there is no danger of losing one's 
job. Then, the danwei provides a full range of benefits in kind and 
in cash. These include labour insurance collective welfare 
provisions, and goods and subsidies allocated by the state.
Labour insurance was set up under the Labour Insurance 
Regulations of 1951 and 1953. Initially confined to industrial 
workers in the state sector, coverage was extended to employees in 
tertiary occupations in 1956 (Dangdai, p.307). Meanwhile employees 
in state and party organizations were covered in a separate but 
comparable scheme through regulations issued in 1950, 1952 and 
1955.2 Regarding eligibility, the stipulated benefits are only
mandatory for workers in state-owned enterprises and civil 
servants. By and large, big collectives are able to implement all 
or most of the provisions on a voluntary basis. Meanwhile small 
collective units (for example, street enterprises) can only afford 
partial coverage (Whyte and Parish, 1984; Lockett, 1988? Friedmann, 
1988).
1 For detail description of labour insurance, see Dangdai. 1987. 
Other useful references are Nelson Chew, The Administration and 
Financing of Social Security in China. 1988? Wang Junzhe, Laodong 
Guanli. 1987? and State Council, Facaii Hu i hi an. Laodong Renshi Juan 
1949-1985. 1986. See also Appendix 2.
2 These are the 1950 Temporary Regulations on Relief for Injuries 
and Death for Revolutionary Workers, 1952 Instructions Governing 
the Implementation of State-funded Medical Treatment and Prevention 
Procedures (Goncrfei Yiliao Yufang Zuoshi), and 1955 Temporary 
Regulations on Handling Retirement of Government Workers.
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Also relevant was employment status. Only tenured workers 
enjoyed the full range of labour insurance benefits. Discriminated 
against are seasonal workers, temporary workers and contract 
workers recruited from the countryside (Whyte and Parish, 1984? 
Blecher, 1984; Davis, 1988). Such personnel receive inferior pay, 
no pension and little by way of job security.
There are three remarkable features about labour insurance for 
the urban work force. First, it offers comprehensive benefits. The 
range includes sickness, invalidity, maternity, medical care, 
pensions and survivors benefits. Second, provision standards are 
generous. For example, pensions (qualifying age of 60 for men and 
55 for women) are between 60-75 percent of basic wage (minimum 10 
years service) ? workers* dependents are eligible for 50 percent of 
medical expenses. Third, they are nan-contributary, that is funded 
by the enterprise. These attainments make the scheme ocnparable to 
the most advanced social security systems in the West. Seme 
scholars feel they are above what China can afford (Chew, 1988; 
Zhao and Yang, 1988).
As for direct ccnpany-run services, these are discretionary 
provisions. Called "collective welfare facilties", iiti fuli 
zuoshi. the offerings can include dormitories, nurseries, canteens, 
clinics, libraries, bath houses, schools, shops and so on (Dangdai.
1987). Amenities in kind can amount to seme 30 to 50 percent of the 
cash wage. What's more, these perks, like labour insurance, are 
funded entirely by the work unit. However, large variations prevail 
between units. In general, large state enterprises and powerful 
state bureaux provide the best facilities. For people who work in 
them, the danwei is self-contained in welfare terms. Only workers
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in poor units need supplementation front neighbourhood facilities.
In addition, the work unit also distributes a host of cash 
subsidies and items to augment employee income and compensate for 
price hikes. The range of subsidies is mind-boggling —  grain, oil, 
meat, clothing, fuel, daily commuting, family visiting, haircuts, 
nutritious food items for different seasons, hardship allowances 
etc. Most of these are state-supplied and work units act as the 
distribution agent. Some are largese of the danwei to beat the 
strait-jacket of official wage rates. In the past, when commodity 
markets were underdeveloped, scarce commodities like consumer 
durables and tickets to sports events and cultural performances 
were distributed through work units. As the coveted items were not 
enough for all, it was not surprising that competition gave rise to 
the use of auanvi (personal connections) with management and peers 
(Walder, 1986).
The enumeration above plainly shews the pampered treatment 
obtained through the work unit. In general, enterprise welfare 
served a number of functions. First, it increased the standard of 
living of urbanites whose nominal incomes were lew. This put flesh 
on the government's "lew wage, high welfare" (di aonozi. aao fuli) 
policy. Second, by making work units responsible for the welfare of 
their employees, the state's burden was alleviated. As a result, 
the state could concentrate on other tasks of nation-building like 
economic development and political work. Third, it reduced the 
scope for direct welfare relief. In terms of civil affairs aid, 
since work units have acted as the front-line help station, 
comparatively few needed to fall back on state charity. In fact 
civil affairs regulation specifically forbids relief to people
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belonging to work units (Facaii Xuanbian. 1986, p. 256).
At the same time, there were unwelcome effects. One was that 
reliance on enterprise welfare obstructed the development of 
professional social services. Man/ collective programmes tended to 
make use of unskilled personnel; inprovement in service standards 
became difficult (Iu, 1989). Then, there were problems of waste and 
heavy expenditure, which ultimately had to be picked up by the 
state. More importantly, there were implications for equality. 
Variations in range and quality arose from ownership types, 
enterprise assets and employment status. An even wider cleavage 
divided the lot of peasants and workers. The more generous the 
benefits opened to urban workers, the greater the injustice for 
rural residents. This contradiction was a grave affront to 
socialist equity.
The Reform Challenge
The death of the commune system meant a drastic alteration in the 
rural institutional framework. Since 1984, collective cultivation 
has been replaced by family farming and private entrepreneurship. 
In most areas, the local collective, the village, has been stripped 
of common assets. The exception is in places where rural industries 
flourish; such enterprises usually remain in public ownership (Oi,
1990). When the rural economic system operates more on the rules of 
the market, peasant households have to handle risks on their own.
Of immediate concern to civil affairs was the question of 
responsibility for welfare. It was true that rural welfare was none 
too generous to begin with. Since the reforms began, vulnerable 
groups have been left to the mercy of fellcw villagers who were
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new more conscious of the cost and benefits of facing up to their 
communal burden. For a few years, the "five guarantee" scheme stood 
on the verge of collapse because peasants were reluctant or unable 
to pay welfare levies. Civil affairs agencies had to work with 
local communities to find other sources of funding and running 
programmes. As recent experience shows, the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs is fast becoming, or at least, aspires to become the 
Ministry of Rural Social Security (Hussain, 1989).
Ironically, one of the "solutions" was to have villages play a 
bigger part in social care. As discussed in Chapter Five, during 
the last decade, local contributions have increased faster than 
state input. The most important reason was diminution of state 
capacity. The policy to decentralize authority from the centre to 
the periphery weakened government powers in correcting regional 
imbalance and instances of social neglect. Up to now, the vast 
majority of the rural population is still uncovered by social 
security. The challenge is the more daunting under the 
circumstances of rapid aging, urban migration and weakening of 
family ties.
Other experiments have been conducted. The foremost was 
development aid. Fupin was designed to alleviate rural poverty when 
different ability in risk-taking widened income inequalities among 
households. In general, the problem of rural poverty could be 
better tackled in the context of rising prosperity', for instance 
from higher incentives and greater efficiency in private 
cultivation as well as rural industrialization. Places earning more 
resources could better finance assistance schemes. However, in the 
case of fupin. limits were easily reached. Poor areas needed help
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most but could not get more aid from the state. More significantly, 
the programme involved little additional state input since it was 
resourced from the disaster relief allocations. In the event, 
diverting money from disaster relief meant that fewer victims of 
the elements could receive help (reference Chapter Five). In 
addition, there was the neglect of infrastructure maintenance. As 
the catastrophe of the East China floods during May to July 1991 
shews, failure to maintain dykes, dams, irrigation projects and 
protect soil erosion enhances peasant vulnerability to natural 
disasters (Wide Angle Magazine. 16 August 1991? Contemporary 
Magazine. 15 August 1991).1
Pilot attempts in building rural social welfare networks, viz. 
old age hemes, employment schemes for the handicapped, veterans and 
poor households, credit unions, social security funds etc. were 
targeted at the survival needs of the indigent. Nevertheless most 
rest an a shaky financial base of a precarious local economy. Many 
of the more progressive projects like insurance and pension schemes 
are still "experimental" (shidianl and unaffordable to poor 
communities. In a nutshell, rural social security is distinguished 
by its absence.
The urban collective landscape has not changed as much. 
Nevertheless, the ground rules under which urban enterprises 
operate have been tampered. The need to introduce reforms in the
1 Torrential rains falling between May to early August 1991 
caused severe flooding in eighteen provinces on both banks of the 
Yangtse River. According to official Chinese estimates, disaster 
victims numbered 86 million, more than two million houses 
collapsed, grain loss amounted to several billion kilos and 
immediate economic damage totalled more than 47.5 billion yuan. 
Besides abnormal weather, an equally important cause of the 
flooding was neglect of water works and the ecological system.
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enterprise system stemmed from its perceived defects —  lack of 
incentive, inefficiency, waste, high costs of employee welfare, 
overstaffing, little labour mobility ("Decision of the CPC Central 
Committee on China's Economic Structure Reform", 1984? Yuan Qihui, 
1986? He, 1986? Gaige He Wanshan Wocaio de Shehui Baozhanc Zhidu.
1988). Therefore official policies concentrated on invigorating 
enterprises so that they could become independent, competitive and 
profitable. Fran 1983 onwards, enterprises have been given more 
autonomy. They now have the power to select employees, fire the 
recalcitrant, hire on contract, lay off redundant staff and have 
more say in determining wages, bonuses and welfare.
The repercussions on their employees were obvious. First, they 
were exposed to the danger of unemployment. Workers losing their 
jobs stood to lose the entire occupational package. Although 
unemployment relief was introduced in 1986, the benefit was meagre 
and only short-term. Second, work units had attempted to cut 
welfare benefits, especially health costs. Administrative measures 
included requiring co-payment from employees, restricting the use 
of expensive drugs, making special arrangements with clinics and 
hospitals (instead of reimbursing receipts) and paying fixed sums 
to each worker to cover his/her medical expenses fGeiae He Wanshan 
Woauo de Shehui Baozhancr Zhidu. 1988, pp.83-85? Zhonqquo Jinqji 
Gaige Shinian. 1988, p.539? Ikels, 1990a? Philips, 1990). Third,
employees in danweis near bankruptcy were badly hit. Unable to get 
additional funds from their parent bureaux (most plant management 
have signed responsibility contracts restricting their rights and 
duties), seme had difficulty paying wages, much less medical bills 
and pensions. Finally, the danwei system was becoming irrelevant to
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larger numbers of the urban population —  people who worked for 
themselves and private enterprises and those an temporary and piece 
work. This was the inevitable result of diversifying the ownership 
structure.
To better align the social security system to the needs of the 
economy, a number of policies have been pursued. One was the reform 
of funding. Relevant measures included centralization of pension 
funds, introduction of unemployment insurance and employee 
contribution (reference Chapter Four). Another was to encourage 
private insurance, especially among individual workers who made 
higher earnings. Yet another was to create new organization. 
"Socialized” agencies or companies (city-wide or in particular 
occupational systems) have been set up to administer pensions and 
unemployment insurance. Similarly, the civil affairs system was 
asked to step up welfare provision to reduce the burden of 
enterprises.
The MCA welcomed the challenge as a golden chance to assert its 
usefulness. Chapter Five details its many endeavours. First, there 
was cautious expansion of statutory services. Furthermore, access 
to CAD facilities were widened. New needy persons who have families 
and work units are not excluded; outpatient treatment on a payment 
for service basis and admission of self-finance residents are 
possible. However, the institutional capacity of CADs remains 
limited. Consequently, urban neighbourhoods have been drafted for 
the job, the rationale being that they offer services that are 
cheap, flexible and sensitive to local needs. This was not new of 
course. Community social care has always played a supplemental role 
to enterprise welfare in urban areas. The difference was the vigour
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with which CADs propagandized and fostered such developments. 
Nevertheless, with few fresh funds and little human capital to 
inject, high expectations on community care are unwarranted. 
Variations in local resolve and ability are bound to produce 
unequal outccmes.
Conclusion
For the vast majority of Chinese citizens, welfare was intimately 
bound up with their collective. Before the reform, the commune 
system furnished collective protection against common hardship, 
albeit at a very basic level. Urbanites fared much better, then as 
well as new. For them, civil affairs aid was completely irrelevant 
because the work unit system provided a better cushion. Indeed, the 
complete fusion of work and welfare was a unique feature of Chinese 
social life. As it was, workers surrendering their personal 
independence to the dictate of the management, the party unit and 
the state were compensated by unprecedented economic and social 
security. Occupational benefits became "carrots": they maxmized
compliance, softened resistance and increased employee loyalty. The 
power of the Chinese danwei was the mere compelling because until 
recently, exit was inpossible. It was more omnipotent than 
enterprises in other socialist countries (Walder, 1986). In a 
similar vein, big Japanese firms may offer as many perks. However 
they do not control the private and political life of their 
employees.
Ihe use of collectives as a welfare instrument had other social 
implications. One was the effect on stratification. Residential and 
employment status gave rise to unequal access to goods and
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services. Another area affected was personal space. When 
collectives constituted communities, the boundary between the 
public and private domain became hard to draw. The result may be 
unchecked interference with private life. Third, there were impacts 
on human relationships. Within the collective, peer relations could 
be both intimate and tense; mutual aid and mutual suspicion existed 
alongside each other. Nevertheless, for the country as a whole, 
governance was facilitated because collectives acted as a state 
instrument to keep individuals in line.
The onslaught of the economic reforms upset the cosy pattern. 
When the collective was either overturned (as in the countryside) 
or strained (as in urban areas), pre-existing welfare arrangements 
stood in need of replacement or augmentation. On the policy level, 
the state advanced the concept of complementarity, namely 
commensurate policy packages have to accommodate and support each 
other. In concrete terms, what was required was that "backward" 
social policies catch up with economic policies (Sixth Five Year 
Plan), the obvious assumption being that the former served the 
cause of economic development. Of relevance to the "narrow" 
approach of welfare, civil affairs agencies were also asked to play 
their part. Despite the best of intentions, reforms in special 
welfare only made small inroads in the bigger question of social 
security. The gap was more glaring in the countryside. In a way, 
this is not unexpected: nothing short of a complete overhaul of the 
structure of work, distribution and occupational welfare can 
provide the solution to universal social care.
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C H A P m t TTFVFN
ncrernsTcw
The Ministry of Civil Affairs in China and its subsidiary apparatus 
must be a very strange organization by the standards of welfare 
bureaucracies elsewhere. First of all, it is such a bizarre hybrid. 
Although welfare has always been its major mission, its brief 
includes such curious duties as oversight for funeral parlours, 
place names and society registration. Second, this system presides 
over both formal and informal care networks. Thus, on the one hand, 
there are programmes run by state agencies according to official 
rules? an the other, there are loosely constructed mutual add 
services run on a voluntary basis by local communities. Third, its 
fortunes have been so tortuous. Not only have civil affairs 
agencies survived waves of service expansion, contraction and 
administrative restructuring, they have also gone through death and 
rebirth. What lessons can we draw from this strange saga?
I shall conclude this thesis by summarizing four themes that 
emerged from the current study. First, what does the MCA case study 
tell us about social welfare in China? Second, through analysing 
its welfare institutions, can anything be learnt about Chinese 
society? Third, what are the dynamic linkages between welfare and 
Chinese socialism? Fourth, what contribution can this study make 
towards social welfare theory?
fha-racteristics of Social Welfare in China
As has been amply demonstrated, civil affairs welfare reflects a
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residual approach to social care underscored by a narrow conception 
of welfare. This has manifested itself as programmes of social 
amelioration for groups in society who lack the ability for 
unassisted living. If we make use of the four parameters of social 
programming proposed by Bruce Gates (1980) —  who gets what, hew 
are services delivered and hew are they financed —  we can draw the 
follcwing conclusions. First, eligibility is tightly controlled —  
only the "three-nos”, hardship households, dependants of soldiers 
and martyrs, disaster victims, the disabled, aged, orphans and 
homeless persons qualify for sustained help. In other words, the 
major targets are persons who have no families and work potential, 
the two major claims of social protection in Chinese society. 
Second, when aid is indeed given, it usually comes by way of 
in-kind services and material relief, both at very basic levels. In 
the 1980s, there have been dedicated attempts to raise 
professionalism in the larger state facilities. However, local 
programmes vary widely in service scope and quality. Third, the 
policy implementation system is made up of state agencies at 
different tiers as well as grassroots organizations. Its complexity 
and unwieldiness means that the ministry has considerable problems 
with the exercise of authority, coordination and control. Because 
resources were short, benefits were offered grudgingly, stingily 
and with a strong dose of stigma. Fourth, financial arrangements 
are equally chaotic. As state resources are minimal, communities 
are asked to pick up the major expense. For example, in the absence 
of state guarantees for a right to subsistence, derived from a 
national poverty line and a uniform social assistance programme, 
aid is granted on a discretionary basis and self-reliance is
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elevated to become a grand doctrine. Hence individuals, families 
and neigbourhoods practiced self help and mutual help, tailored aid 
according to their means and used whatever methods to harness 
resources instead of descending on the state treasury. The 
solemnity of Constitutional rights notwithstanding, civil affairs 
welfare denoted charity rather than entitlement.
Civil affairs departments do not operate in a vacuum. As a 
matter of fact, they are not the only agencies dispensing welfare 
in contemporary China. In the wider society, there is another 
structure of social amenities catering to ordinary citizens. This 
is underlaid by a host of societal policies related to universal 
employment, incomes equalization, price control, enterprise 
subsidies, regulation of urban-rural trade and central planning of 
the economy. Working in concert are various ministries, local state 
agencies, communes and enterprises. In terms of budgetary 
importance, this care network completely overshadows the civil 
affairs programmes.
Homogeneity does not characterize the wider system. Among 
independent citizens, urban residents are consistently favoured, 
especially government employees and workers in urban state 
industries. This brings to mind the notion of socialist elites. For 
these, the model of welfare is a mixture of institutional and 
structural arrangements. Regrettably such treatment is not 
available to rural dwellers. For them benefits and amenities remain 
mean and skeletal, much of which is locally provided. Although it 
can be argued that discrimination against peasants, the unemployed 
and marginal groups are quite cannon in developing countries 
(MacEhersan, 1982), such stratification in a state that professes
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communist ideals of egalitarianism and fraternity is inherently 
unacceptable. To the extent that China insists on its cron road to 
socialism, it must be pointed out its welfare system is a dual
model marked by diverity and inequality. At the very least, there 
are two welfare regimes, one broad and one narrow, designed for the 
working and nonworking populations. Even for the former, 
residential or class membership (peasant or worker) forms the basic 
social divide in welfare.
In Chapters Seven to Ten, I have analysed in depth the factors 
that operated to keep civil affairs welfare in its lcwly place.
Here I shall confine myself to a brief recapitulation.
First of all, a limited role for direct state involvement in 
welfare and relief was the result of the state's welfare ideology
and growth model. For Chinese communists, civil affairs welfare
fell into the arena of non-productive oonsunption and as such 
contravened the socialist principle of distribution according to 
work before the advent of communist society. Because of its 
commitment to rapid growth, like socialist states elsewhere, the 
state temporarily eschewed equality goals in favour of efficiency 
(Pairault, 1988? McAuley, 1991). This emphasis was more pronounced 
in the reform era when the consuming ethos was expressed in the
four modernizations. Wider the quest for prosperity, social 
policies received attention only insofar as they facilitated
economic development. At the same time, central government's
ability to extend and improve welfare aid was held back by dire
constraints —  budgetary deficits, insubordination of local 
authorities and organizational deficiencies of civil affairs 
agencies. As a result, welfare pluralism was embraced with a
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vengeance; collectives, families and individuals must all share the 
state's burden.
Second, there is the influence of the traditional culture. 
Norms of family solidarity, localism and a passive state role in 
welfare matters coexisted with such values as hard work,
containment of want, self-reliance and acceptance of fate to form a 
bedrock of welfare conservatism characteristic of a rural economy. 
In the past, the role played by families, kin, local communities 
and religious organizations were more prominant than that of the 
state. During the Republican period, the privations of war and weak 
government also meant that high expectations of the state were 
unrealistic. Such historical legacy appealed to a leadership 
anxious to deter mass dependency. Thus, in the name of preserving 
old virtues, the state vigorously championed private initiatives in 
welfare.
Third, the persistence of Chinese familism absolved the state 
from taking on too many private burdens. Firm notions of domestic 
obligation and wide observance of family reciprocity was positively 
exploited to allcw the state to give priority to the task of 
political and economic construction. Besides considerations for 
economic expediency, the moral superiority of family care was 
unquestioned, both by the people and the state. For the latter, its 
blind faith in utilitarian familism led to the conclusion that as 
long as families remained intact, direct welfare intervention was 
unnecessary. Thus supply of free services was contingent on a lack 
of family ties.
Fourth, a residual role for direct welfare and relief was 
practicable because of the centrality of the collective. As
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agencies of production, distribution and political control, work 
units dominated civil life. Their ubiquity made them convenient 
welfare instruments. Indeed the fusion of employment and benefit 
structures strengthened loyalty between the collective and its 
members, eased governance and saved state money in setting up 
special facilities. The universal and comprehensive nature of the 
collective canopy served to contain the demand for welfare services 
so that the civil affairs system need oily deal with the emergency 
requirements of the workless.
In combination, these four forces shaped the role and direction 
of civil affairs welfare. The institutional pattern that evolved 
exhibited much tenacity during the first three decades of communist 
rule. The first thirty years saw a welfare ministry in the making. 
Welfare provision was its most important business despite the 
vicissitudes of political dictates. Indeed its resilience is quite 
remarkable considering that it has always been on the receiving end 
of the state's economic and political master plans. What is also 
striking is its adaptive ability. This is especially true in the 
first reform decade when the environmental context became 
increasingly altered. Again, on pain of leadership demand, the 
residual system was asked to strengthen its stabilizing role to 
ease the pangs of social convulsions. Thus the call for new 
initiatives in social security and other programmes to improve the 
lot of the needy can be interpreted in this light. Within the 
system of civil affairs, experiments with fupin. insurance schemes, 
social security funds, pension projects, cash subsidies for serving 
soldiers were all attempts to tackle new problems of the mixed 
society between plan and market. In essence, these changes in the
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"small system” are in the nature of reactions to the changes in the 
"big world". In simple terms, the Chinese change ethos has always 
been economy leads and social development follows. The reform 
influence has not changed this basic pattern. Rather it has 
accentuated the need for adaptation.
learning About Chinese Society
China's welfare system is wedded to its basic social institutions. 
Primarily, the creation of socialist economic relations has largely 
determined the shape of its benefit structure. By adjusting its 
functions and processes, the welfare system reacts to the 
environment and also exerts an impact on it. In this sense, the 
welfare system is both a dependent and independent variable in 
social change. Because of this dynamic relationship, a study of 
civil affairs under Chinese socialism reveals something interesting 
about Chinese society as well as the special character of its own 
anatomy.
The first thing to note about the Chinese context is its 
socialist framework. Chinese socialism is committed to human 
betterment on the basis of equality and fraternity. Many state 
policies are decidedly egalitarian in intent tut less successful in 
outcome (because of discriminative treatment for different groups). 
In our examination, the basic social institutions such as work 
units, communes, neighbourhoods all aspire to community and welfare 
besides fulfilling their productive functions. In the event, they 
do become small communities, distinguished by mutual dependence and 
close human relationships, but with an ironic twist —  close 
surveillance and suppression of personal freedom. So in their moral
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transactions, tensions arise. On the m e  hand, ccmnunities strive 
to attend to all the needs of their members. On the other, they 
demand unconditional surrender. In short the terms of trade reflect 
value conflicts between security and liberty, or care and control. 
However, as power does not tip in favour of individuals, the 
symbiosis is associated with a loss of privacy and personal 
autonomy.
Second, despite its socialist ideology and machinery, 
traditions are potent in shaping expectations and behaviour. Even 
now, families remain close-knit and members are bonded in mutual 
obligations. Lineages disappeared in the early days of the regime. 
Their replacements, the local collectives, function as social and 
administrative parent to their members. Meanwhile the state 
continues to act as the pater familias. The contemporary polity 
looks strangely like the old Confucian order —  hierarchical, 
authoritarian and paternalistic —  and civil society remains 
stunted and repressed. In patterns of social care, families, kin 
and local communities take up more important space than the state. 
Despite calls to socialize welfare, non-state agencies are expected 
to do the state's bidding while it retains the mandate to direct. 
In essence then, current strands reach deep into the past. 
Socialist ethics and practices in welfare as well as patterns of 
governance dovetail very nicely with Confucianism.
Third, China is very much a dual society. In terms of social 
structure, income, welfare entitlements and life chances, rural 
China is a world apart from the cities. This schism breeds envy and 
discontent. In the area of welfare, the end of communes and the 
incorporation of markets in rural society destroyed the pre­
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existing collective framework and thus any sentolanoe of equality. 
The absence of social security protection for the rural masses 
became all the more glaring and unjust. However, the arrangements 
that have been put in place so far are experimental, piecemeal and 
precarious. Contemporaneously, population influx into urban areas 
threw the rigid administrative divide into a quandary. Even for 
bona fide urban residents, the hitherto cosy workfare system frayed 
under the friction of enterprise reforms, introduction of labour 
markets and transmutation of the ownership structure. In short, an 
already stratified society is opened to further fragmentation and 
inequality. Under the uneasy cohabitation of plan and market, China 
in the 1980s was a society in flux. Fundamentally new problems 
defied staid and timid solutions. In the field of social planning 
at least, incremental ism had proved unequal to the task.
Fourth, China faces formidable constraints in its struggle to 
meet the social aspirations of its citizens. By any standard, the 
achievements of its economic reforms are impressive. For the 
majority, livelihood is less squalid than under a stifling command 
economy. In many places, affluence has arrived. Inspite of this, 
social development trailed behind economic reforms as the nation 
thirsts for even more rapid growth. Furthermore, its immature 
taxation system allowed the escape of much needed revenue. No doubt 
the new wealth has enriched some individuals and organizations. 
However, the central coffers stand impoverished, due in part to the 
progress in fiscal devolution. An unwelcome by-product, in policy 
terns, is the loss of central control over local development. The 
current study is replete with details about the process and effects 
of this trend in one welfare bureaucracy. Seen in this light,
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socialization of welfare is a forced response to the state's fiscal 
and authority crisis. Similar experience assailed other policy 
areas. In housing, education and health, privatization strategies 
were also in evidence. The shrinkage of state responsibility leaves 
nagging doubts about the implication for civil welfare.
China on the brink of the 1990s is in a state of transition. It 
has achieved a good deal of social progress measured in terms of 
nutrition, income, education and health. The deepening of econcmic 
reforms held out the premise for greater abundance. However, 
contradictions abounded. One climactic testimony was the eruption 
of massive student protests which prompted a violent crackdown on 4 
June 1989. Sparked off by the death of Hu Yacbang, the liberal- 
minded former party chairman, student demonstrations were overtly 
directed at bureaucratic corruption, insensitivity to student 
hardships and lack of democracy in decision making. However, the 
social origins of these protests can be traced to the
contradictions associated with the birth of a mixed economy —  
marked inequality, threat to vested interest, privation of
disadvantaged groups, failure to meet rising expectations and so on 
(A. Chan, 1991). The volatility of these forces made the quest for 
stability more important than ever. The Chinese government, after 
embarking on a course of economic consolidation and adjustment from 
late 1988 to 1991, is now more keenly aware that the pace of social 
development should quicken. Nevertheless, the prospect of political 
liberalization appears uncertain as China contemplates the turmoil 
that emerged from the collapse of ccmunism in Eastern Europe, 
especially the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and draws the 
lesson that it cannot afford to relax state and party power over
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civil society (Contemporary Magazine. 15 January 1992, pp. 6-8).
Social Welfare Under Chinese Social iam
The structural interface between social welfare and Chinese 
socialism is close. What are some of the dynamic points about their 
linkage in relation to structure and function? I shall examine 
these issues ftcm the Marxist and functionalist perspectives. Then 
I shall also comment on the tension between social and economic 
policy in the transitional society.
From the Marxist perspective, social institutions are part of 
the superstructure which arise from the base or substructure —  the 
means and mode of production. Thus, welfare institutions, whether 
broad or narrow, are the outgrowth or by-product of the socialist 
economic structure and must serve system interests. These 
organizing concepts were useful in analysing the connection between 
the part and the whole.
First, social welfare in China is an integral component of the 
social structure. The socialist system very much determines the 
nature and place of the civil affairs welfare and the broad 
workfare systems. The preceding section makes this point clear and 
will not be repeated.
Second, welfare fulfils important functions for Chinese 
socialism. For example, premising welfare on work rewards merit and 
labour discipline. Welfare reforms are required to serve the cause 
of economic growth by maximizing efficiency through new wage 
systems, work contracts, labour markets, development aid and 
pacifying potential discontent of the have-nots. Welfare also 
contributes to the consolidation of state powers. Before the
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reforms when political criteria overvhelmingly determined the fate 
of individuals, welfare was denied to class enemies. (Even new, it 
remains questionable whether dissent and insubordination does not 
deprive people of civil, political and social rights.) in this 
sense, denied of welfare was a means of upholding the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. The veteran programmes further illustrate the 
political nature of welfare. To the masses, compensation for 
national service via preferential add is a state-inposed duty. In 
particular, the new cash grant scheme and direct services for 
veterans facilitate stability of conscription and maintains 
military morale.
Third, welfare remains deeply ideological. Examples are sundry. 
For instance, in fuoin and fuvou. help is never given without 
admonition for eventual self-reliance. Marriage registration work 
is accompanied by lectures on socialist ethics in marriage and 
family relations. Even the disabled are educated to become 
independent and support the four modernizations. In ideological 
terms, nearly all welfare tasks are used as vehicles to contribute 
to socialist civilization.
Fourth, as said before, welfare institutions are not passive 
sponges that soak up economic change, their subservience 
notwithstanding. In the current review, old values and practices 
like utilitarian familism and community care collude with state 
interest in deterring dependency. At the same time, resistance to 
welfare taxes, stemming from selfish notions of each family for 
itself and material insecurity of rural households, can thwart the 
best intentions in building up the fiscal strength of local areas 
and assuring poor people's right to subsistence.
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Finally, the very critique that Marxists brandish at welfare 
capital ism can be turned on its head and used to analyse similar 
institutions under socialism. In the Chinese case, the socialist 
state is no less bent on legitimation and accumulation (O'Connor, 
1973; Gough, 1979) than capitalist ones. Its welfare structures are 
unashamed tools of economic and political construction. Like the 
case in the former Soviet Union (George and Manning, 1980), their 
objectives for system integration and social integration are 
explicit. This is especially true in the reform period when their 
function as a shock absorber and stabilizer was stressed as never 
before.
Structural-functionalist theory stresses the imperative of 
system coherence. In the Parsonian (Parsons, 1951) scheme, society 
is conceived as an holistic entity with four parts working in 
harmony to ensure the survival of the total system. Among its 
constituent subsystems (Parsons and Smelser, 1956) —  goal
attainment, adaptation, integration and pattern-maintenanoe —  the 
first two are concerned with political and economic tasks while 
integration is directed at maintenance of harmony and solidarity 
and pattern-maintenanoe at continuation of basic value patterns. By 
and large, the institution of social welfare belongs to the 
integration subsystem. Later, ideas about eufunctions (or 
functions) and dysfunctions, intended and unintended consequences 
(Merton, 1968) have been widely accepted, even by non-pundits of 
functionalism.
Applying the above concepts yields interesting analyses about 
the dynamics of welfare in socialist China. Although functionalism 
streses harmony and Marxism emphasizes the role of conflict in
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social change, both perspectives have much in common as a mode of 
explanation. Both make use of such concepts as part and whole, 
functioned imperatives, system "fit11 and mutual adaptation. Another 
interpretation along such lines is not really necessary. I shall 
restrict myself to three additional comments.
First of all, social welfare in China is not a separate 
sub-system like welfare state institutions under capitalism. Most 
basic Chinese social institutions incorporate a welfare dimension. 
The fusion of multiple roles strengthens the power of these units. 
Where welfare is concerned, the commune and workfare systems have 
so dominated the whole approach to welfare that civil affairs is 
relegated to the sidelines. Under its shadows, the residual system 
can only offer poor services for the remnants of society.
The second point, a derivative of the first, concerns the 
duplications of welfare dualism. In welfare terms, one country two 
systems may be advantageous in maintaining the values of work, 
independence and economic development. This may not work well for 
clients of the residual system. To the extent that social welfare 
aspires to integrate people in society, being labelled and 
marginalized is a negative experience because of the denial of 
respect. Even for society as a whole, the status quo is divisive 
and a negation of socialist principles of equality and common 
prosperity. Paradoxically, making welfare contingent on community 
membership has not made its receipt more secure and satisfying. 
When resources are grossly inadequate, living on the charity of 
neighbours may be more stigmatizing than getting help from 
impersonal state agencies.
Third, the welfare system involves personal sacrifices at
- 419 -
every level. Within the private circle of family and kin, personal 
security is exchanged for reciprocal duty so that what separates 
bond and bandage becomes thin and unclear. In collectives, receipt 
of services rests on the contention of community and freedom. Even 
within the state service sector, being supported at public expense 
satisfies subsistence needs at the same time as it reinforces 
inferiority* Indeed, these conflicts are familiar in capitalist
societies (Marshall, 1981; Pinker 1981). To firm believers in the
family and community, the choice may not be worse than the loss of 
personal identity and anomie in a mass society. What is
distinctive, and objectionable, about welfare in China is not its 
heavy reliance on traditional institutions. It is rather the lack 
of alternatives, the pcwerlessness of persons to escape from the 
social net and the perennial subjugation of individual right to 
collective interest. In a coercive and authoritarian regime, these
are serious issues.
From the foregoing analysis, the ties between social welfare 
and economic institutions and between social and economic policies 
are firm and inseparable. The position of the former is definitely 
subordinate. This is as it should be in the Marxist scheme of
things. Neither is this too different under welfare capitalism
(Marshall, 1981). In fact the Chinese honesty about goals is
refreshing. For instance, the concept of policy compatibility and 
complementarity can be put to good use in closing the acknowledged 
gap between economic and social development. However, the record so 
far is limp and limited. To date, the welfare reforms have been ad 
hoc, incremental and subject to drift. This leads one to question 
whether government ccranitment was stronger in rhetoric than in 
deed.
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Die lack of harmony in the social and economic sectors is more 
distinct in the 1980s. In the first half-decade, economic 
liberalization and open door policies brought hope, speedy economic 
results and gains in living standards. By the second half, the 
contradictions of a two-track economy have become too painful to be 
ignored. Die state has announced its plan to press ahead with 
economic reforms in the 1990s. In corollary, within the labour 
system, work contracts would extend to the collective sector? more 
tenured staff in state firms would switch to contract work. In 
social security, unemployment insurance and pension fund reforms 
would accelerate (Wide Ancle. 16 February 1992, p.20). Die urgency 
of these issues is undisputed. What has not been set out is a 
cxxrprehensive agenda linking reforms in all social sectors —  
income, social security, health, housing and education. Also, 
immediate attention is needed to shorten the welfare gap between 
urban and rural China, if not close it entirely. Nowadays, one in 
twenty persons in China is on the move (Mine Pao. 15 February 
1992), becoming one of the 50 to 60 million "floating population” 
of the country (Solinger, 1991). To turn a blind eye to their needs 
and security is a recipe for disaster.
Contribution to Social Welfare Dieorv
Die story of civil affairs is a case study of social welfare in a 
socialist country. As said before, its basic features are highly 
idiosyncratic. Die system is a mixture of both formal and informal 
care. Its statutory component is a curious bureau with little 
prestige, disparate duties and a deficient structure. Its position 
of weakness is tied to mainstream values of Chinese socialism and
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the dominant organizational arrangements of meeting needs. Without 
the economic reforms, it may have slumbered on in its 
insignificance. Although the ugly duckling has no chance of 
becoming a swan, the arrival of a hybrid society stirred its 
feathers. A sense of promise was interpreted by those within it 
that saw the challenge of enlarging its role in social security. 
Thus in its search for an identity, the civil affairs ministry 
found a new sense of meaning, which brought out fresh ideas and 
interesting experiments in a hitherto stagnant system. In this 
sense, the detailed description of residual welfare in action is an 
exotic biography. Does it have anything to offer to social welfare 
theory?
In terms of locating determinants of welfare, the thesis 
substantiates the significance of structural and cultural factors 
in the choice of welfare patterns —  the influence of traditions, 
the role of the family, the collective and the state. In the 
chapters dissecting the four variables, parallels with experiences 
elsewhere have been drawn and will not be repeated. Additionally, 
the comparison identifies a number of themes which may have 
universal salience.
First, there is the relevance of continuity and change in 
welfare. In China, the legacy of its welfare culture casts a long 
shadow. At the same time, changes evolve from the need to adapt to 
novel problems. The resultant system is thus a union of both old 
and new elements.
Second, there is the importance of primary groups and informal 
networks. In China, care provided by families, kin, neighbours, 
friends and workmates makea up the bulk of welfare services enjoyed
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by Chinese citizens. Indeed, sluggish growth, fiscal problems, high 
service costs and disenchantment with statutory provisions since 
the mid-1970s have helped Western nations to "rediscover" the 
potency of the informal sector and private initiatives in welfare. 
On this score, there is clear evidence of convergence between 
Chinese and Western approaches. In post-ccmmunist Eastern Europe as 
well, rejection of the old system in its totality also led to the 
introduction of marketization strategies in social policy in an 
attempt to break down the hegemony of state socialism and increase 
democracy (Deacon, 1990). Admittedly the promotion of voluntary 
action is often laced by a hidden agenda to save public money. 
Nonetheless, Chinese experience shows that primary and informal 
ties are as sustaining as help given by welfare bureaucracies. 
Also, intact families and communities are crucial to personal 
welfare. The danger, however, lies in exploiting such institutions 
without giving enough support to nourish them. As well, China's 
reliance an family and locality illustrates this latent pitfall.
Third, we should note the universality of structural 
challenges. In the course of industrialization and modernization, 
social transformations such as population aging, falling birth 
rate, nuclear families and change in family attitudes are 
world-wide experiences (Wilensky, 1975). In China likewise, these 
issues have adverse implications for social care. Other problems 
are the effects of a developing economy. These have to do with 
increasing urbanization, unenployment of surplus rural labour and 
income inequalities. In the first thirty years, the W C  was able to 
control these problems with the iron hand of central planning and 
political absolutism. The reforms opened the floodgates. Until new,
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social policy solutions remain handicapped in mitigating their 
effects. In many ways, these issues are old and familiar tensions 
in any society. Specifically, what are the balance of claims 
between the haves and have-nots? How can conflicts be resolved 
between work incentive and right to welfare? To what extent should 
entitlement take account of different contribution, merit, status 
and residence? China's choice is a fragmented system that
discriminates against the "three-nos", the disabled, the poor and 
rural dwellers. Her failure in the test of equality is not unique. 
All systems dicriminate. To the extent that equality is a key 
measure of social justice, the latter will always arouse debate 
because consensus on what constitutes justice may be unattainable.
Finally, China has to struggle between what is ideal and what 
is feasible. On the one hand, Chinese socialism is ccmmitted to 
egalitarianism and meeting of needs. Yet, paucity of resources does 
not permit generosity. As said before, events in the last ten years 
highlight the dilemma. For as long as different areas of
development have to scramble for limited state funds, welfare 
standards cannot attain uniformity and adequacy. In this sense,
ideals have been ccnprcntised by material shortages. There is 
consonance in other places. In Britain, the Thatcher government1 s 
effort to roll back the boundary of the welfare state was dictated 
as much by ideology as by economic necessity. Cost-cutting measures 
have also been widely adopted in Western Europe (Johnson, 1990; 
Hills, 1990) and the new Eastern Europe (Deacon, 1990).
In short, the range of problems that China faces has affinity 
with the experience in many nations. Her responses may be broadly 
similar. Does this make China a case of an existing model of
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welfare? Or is it a unique model with its cun stamp, in short 
welfare socialism with Chinese characteristics? In my view, the 
second position is more appropriate.
First of all, China's welfare model is a mixed model. It 
combines at least two separate components. Civil affairs welfare is 
plainly residual —  highly selective, minimal in standard and 
scope, and remedial. Operating in parallel but not linked in any 
way is a collective vehicle for the working population, with an 
upper tier for the urban population and a lower deck for the rural 
masses. The treatment for the urban and industrial elites are as 
comprehensive and generous as institutional welfare in the most 
advanced welfare states. Meanwhile, entitlement for peasants is 
marked by huge gaps and inferior programmes. Hie changes in the 
institutional framework has made related arrangements even more 
chaotic and deficient. Hie resulting amalgam has less coherence and 
stability than other mixed economies of welfare.
Second, China's approach to welfare is very different from 
Mishra's structural model. Hie Chinese system is an odd mixture. 
Hie dual (or multiple) economy of welfare negates Mishra's ideal 
type of universal ism, need-based distribution, state monopoly, high 
resource commitment and citizen right. In a nutshell, the Chinese 
welfare system is a bastard, not a thoroughbred. Indeed, it is 
arguable whether Mishra's model is not a mythical creation in the 
first place. Hie poor conditions discovered in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union in the wake of communism's collapse do not 
resemble what the theory postulates. In a way, one may question hew 
far the record of actually existing socialism has lived up to its 
professed ideals. One missing ingredient seems to be an economy
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that delivers. Until new, Chinese socialism seems to have averted 
collapse after decade-long efforts at open door and reform (Nee, 
1991). However, the future of China's transition to a market 
society is still uncertain.
Strictly speaking, China's model is not a pluralistic model in 
the Western sense. In their diverse forms, the non-state sectors —  
the collective, the neighbourhood, the family —  enjoy little 
genuine autonomy in lifestyle and social transaction. Despite some 
loosening of state control in social and economic life, the state 
still holds the right to intervene and impose. There are very few 
voluntary associations in the true sense. Most of them are state- 
sponsored or kept on a short leash. Inspite of their heavy 
involvement in welfare, the freedom of mass agencies to do as they 
please is conditional. Their work in welfare remains a delegated 
assignment, representing an involvement in policy implementation 
rather than its formulation. Of course they are not completely 
powerless. They can dither, resist or ignore orders. Open
rebellion, however, is not tolerated. For all these reasons, the 
comparison with a corporatist model, where state, capital and 
labour in their organized form have stipulated rights to make 
social and economic decisions, is also inappropriate.
In retrospect, the modified welfare mix concept has offered a 
workable framework for analysing social welfare under Chinese 
socialism. The role of markets in social policy is only just 
beginning. For instance, there has been wider use of fee charging 
in welfare services and limited introduction of commercial services 
in child care and health (Hillier 1988; Henderson, 1990). However, 
it is in economic life that market forces have made their mark.
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Market provision of welfare goods is premature as the fourth 
component of China’s welfare mix.
To conclude, it has to be said that the experience of China 
does not fit at all easily into any of the existing models used in 
comparative social policy. This study has clearly revealed the 
limitations of existing paradigms. Perhaps, as one looks deeply 
enough into the structure and context of any welfare system, it is 
only natural to find out its unique character. In the case of 
China, the particular combination of structural and cultural 
imperatives has determined its welfare landscape. This finding, 
however, should not be taken as evidence against the use of the 
comparative method. If the study has succeeded in highlighting the 
uniqueness of the Chinese approach to welfare, it can only do so 
through comparison. At the very least, this exercise penetrates a 
little deeper into the many enigmas of social welfare under Chinese 
socialism.
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Armroix 1
MPimnR of gropy
"Empirical methods of information gathering are pragmatic and 
eclectic. They can depend a good deal upon first-hand 
experience and impression —  acquiring a 'feel1 for the place 
and/or the subject —  and can embrace a variety of 
information-gathering techniques within any one exercise, 
according to whatever seems most feasible, appropriate, or 
convenient for the task in hand. This may include participant 
observation, work experience, social survey techniques, formal 
or informed talking around, consultation of official or agency 
records, and/or a general bibliographic review. Only * armchair 
reasoning* is frowned upon. Anything else is fine, so long as 
it works." (Jones, 1985, p.27)
This vignette of comparative social policy analysis is an apt 
description of the methodological considerations of the present 
study. Of the research means cited, only participant observation, 
work experience and 'armchair reasoning1 are judged inappropriate 
fron the outset. However canforting such realism may be, the field 
of China study presents further dilemmas (Bums and Rosen, 1986, 
pp.23-33). Until the 1980s, field work opportunities were limited. 
Likewise restricted was available literature, which, even if 
obtainable, came with value biases and unknown methods of data 
collection. Because of these hazards, the present study has to 
fall back on satisficing, i.e. to embrace what is available and 
achievable.
All things considered, the present time seems to be the best 
time to conduct a study of this kind. First, the last ten years 
has seen China more eager than before to establish contact and 
exchange with other countries. Since 1978, China has sent 150,000 
students to study abroad (BR, 4-14 November 1991, p. 19). Many 
academic exchange programmes with overseas institutions have been 
established. Furthermore, growing links with Hong Kong creates a 
positive climate for a Hong Kdng-based researcher to study the 
"mother country". Compared with other provinces, Guangdong is more 
committed to the open door policy. My exploration there met with a 
ready response. A desire for further mutual understanding was given 
by the Guangdong civil affairs authority as the reason to support 
the writer's research in the province. Finally, a publication 
explosion of sorts has occurred in the Mainland. Both by design and 
fortuitous means, such materials have found their way overseas. 
Planned outlets include distributions by direct sale, official 
release and subscription. Chance offerings are those indigenous 
reports, handbooks, surveys and serials that were made available 
during and as a result, of personal contact. Many of these are 
"neibu" (internal circulation) documents which are generally more 
reliable than materials for overseas consumption. They are also 
more carriid in discussing issues and problems (Bums and Rosen, 
1986, p. 19).
In order to paint as full and accurate a portrait of Chinese 
snrn ai welfare as possible, a number of methods were adopted. 
These can be grouped under (1) official documents (2) visits and 
interviews (3) survey and (4) secondary sources.
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Official Documentary Sources
Under this category, the most important sources are Ministry of 
Civil Affairs publications. In the last decade, the MCA has 
generated a growing literature on its work. Among the most useful 
are Shehui Baozhancr Bao (SHBZB), renamed Zhonaauo Shehui Bag 
(ZGSHB) in 1990 and Zhonaauo Minzhena (ZGMZ), its official 
newspaper and magazine. (For a description of the two sources, 
refer to Chapter One.) Together they give a detailed account of 
current practices, statistics, innovations, viewpoints and expose 
of problems. SHBZB dated from April 1986 and ZGMZ issues from 
January 1987 have been systematically analysed. These have been 
invaluable in reporting the latest developments.
To shed light on earlier events, Ministry of Internal Affairs 
compendia of policy documents and historical accounts have been 
consulted. These elaborate the contents of policy and regulations. 
Of particular usefulness is the Ministry's official history, 
Minzhena Bu Dashiii (Dashiii. 1988) and Minzhena Gonazuo Gailun 
(Gailun. 1987). The first chronicles key events in the Ministry by 
year, month and day. Its appendices include major reports and 
period summaries. The latter describes its work in different stages 
and its essence. Though not as precise as SHBZB and ZGMZ in 
documenting statistics and debates on issues, it reflects the 
official interpretation of events.
In addition, regional and local civil affairs sources have been 
utilised. Two useful sources are Guangdong-issued Minzhena Gonazuo 
Shouce (Civil Affairs Work Handbook, hereafter Shguoe) and 
Guandqdong Minzhena (Guangdong Civil Affairs, GDMZ). In 1989, the 
Provincial bureau there edited Gaiae Kaifana Zhona de Zhonaauo 
Shehui Fuli - Guanqdonqfihg>nq Zhuanii (Chinese Social Welfare Under 
Reform and Open Door - Special Issue on Guangdong Province, GDSZJ) 
with the Hong Kong Social Workers' Association. Together, these 
reveal crucial information on local priorities and implementation 
issues. This regional literature concretizes the policy process 
involved.
By and large, published MCA sources make up the core of the 
data base. Despite gaps in the information and varying quality 
pertaining to different periods, their authority and general 
reliability is undisputed. Obviously, the perspective is decidedly 
''official''. However they do mate room for the airing of other views 
and debates as part of the process of considering policy options. 
Careful digging of data across years and sources can reveal hidden 
gems. It can also expose inflated generalizations and
inconsistencies.
Non-MCA official sources are also valuable. These comprise FRC 
annual reports, statistical yearbooks, CCP and government
documents, national newspapers, magazines, and reports from various 
ministries (e.g. Ministry of Labour and Personnel, National
Committee on Aging, All-China Federation of Trade Unions). These 
publications contain occasioned reference to welfare work. 
Nevertheless, they elucidate social issues, problems and 
environmental contexts that impinge on welfare arrangements. A 
perspective is also gained on how organizations develop their own 
institutional mission vis-a-vis other agencies. Admittedly, such 
data are not always consistent with MCA releases. This is no doubt 
related to different definitions and accounting methods. The 
discrepancies are a source of confusion and vexation. So far I
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have avoided the pitfall by adopting MCA sources if these diverge. 
I nay have taken a short cut. On the other hand, the gain is 
greater consistency.
Finally, social science journals edited by academic and 
professional bodies in China were screened. The more useful ones 
are Shehui. Shehui Kexue and serials from the leading universities 
(Beijing, Zhongshan and People's University). The articles cover 
survey results, theoretical discussions, and policy debates in a 
more critical fashion than government publications.
Visits and Interviews
TWo series of visits were conducted from March to August 1988, to 
Beijing and Guangdong Province respectively.
The three-week visit to Beijing took place in April 1988. The 
purposes were three fold. First, to interview officials in relevant 
ministries and national bodies on the macro issues surrounding the 
reforms, in particular about social policy developments (social
insurance, labour and employment, social welfare), and national 
plans. Second, to visit welfare services in Beijing to gauge the 
extent of policy implemention there and observe new innovations. 
Third, to interview MCA officials about state policies and trends. 
Additionally, I visited a number of academic institutions. The 
purpose was to enable professional exchange and familiarization
with training issues. The schedule of visits is in Figure 4.
The Beijing visit programme was arranged by Beijing University 
Department of Sociology in conjunction with the People's University 
Institute of labour and Personnel. Beijing University had been 
commissioned by MCA to run courses for their cadres and trainers.
Because of its close relationship with the Ministry, it was able to 
arrange interviews with senior officials in charge of policy. My 
interviewees included the Head of the Department of Rural Relief, 
Deputy Head of Urban Social Welfare and her division chiefs in
charge of social welfare institutions, welfare production and 
ccmmunity services. In addition, visits to labour-related agencies 
were arranged by the People's University. I conducted interviews 
with officials in the Ministry of labour and Personnel, All-China 
General labour Union and a large factory noted for its management 
and labour welfare reform.
The interviews were not structured. The sessions consisted of 
an official briefing followed by answer and discussions. In the 
latter part, issues arising from the briefing and my review of 
published sources were raised. Thorough heme work paid handsome 
dividends. My knowledge about MCA work, especially their esoteric 
terminology reduced the need to go over tedious explanations. Hence 
more time could be spent in discussion. Finally, my putonch.ua was 
adequate, thus dispensing the service of an interpreter. All these 
factors contributed to good communication.
The interviews have been fruitful in several respects. First, 
they authenticated, clarified and added to knowledge gained through 
documentary analysis. Second, they imparted a clear perspective on 
national priorities. Somewhat lacking was frank and in-depth 
discussion of problems. This is inevitable by virtue of the fact 
that the interviews were initial contacts. A certain degree of 
formality is quite natural.
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Figure 19 Die Beijing Visits. April 1988
1.4.88
2.4.88
4.4.88
5.4.88
6.4.88
7.4.88
8.4.88
9.4.88
10.4.88
12.4.88
13.4.88
14.4.88
15.4.88
16.4.88
18.4.88
19.4.88
20.4.88
21.4.88
Beijing University
China National Committee on Aging
Beijing Number One Social Welfare Home
Shehui Baozhara Bao - Editorial Office
Die China Federation of the Handicapped Huaxia
Publishing House
China Rehabilitation Research Institute
Anding Psychiatric Hospital
Discussion with Haidian District Mental Health
workers
Visit to hcxne-care beds
Beijing University Welfare Fund for the Disabled 
Department of Sociology, Beijing University
Beijing West City District Community Services
Ministry of labour Bureau of Labour Insurance and 
Welfare
Beij ing City Social Life and Psychological
Counselling Service Centre
Economic System Reform Institute of China
Institute for Administrative Cadres of Civil 
Affairs
Beijing Dyeing and Printing Plant
All-China Federation of Trade Unions
Institute of Labour and Personnel, People's
University
Beijing University
Beijing Rubber Hardware Factory 
Shijingshan Heme for the Aged
Beijing East City District Canmunity Services
Ministry of Civil Affairs Department of Urban
Social Welfare
Ministry of Civil Affairs Department of Rural
Relief
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Visits to the Beijing Municipal and local civil affairs 
service units were conducted primarily to learn about 
implementation of policies at the local level. First-hand 
observations instilled a stronger sense of realism and piquancy 
than was possible from written description. I had the opportunities 
to ask local cadres to give their views on local needs and 
priorities. Unfortunately, there was no chance to interview service 
users except casual chats in the presence of officials.
The visits to Guangdong served similar purposes. Over a period 
of six months and involving 30 days in field interviewing, the 
Guangdong programme had full support from the Guangdong Provincial 
Civil Affairs Department (GDPCAD). Planning trips in December 1987 
and March 1988 preceded the field visits. The agreement reached was 
to familiarise me with the full range of civil affairs operations 
at every tier of administration - provincial, county, municipal, 
township and street levels. In addition, extensive interviews were 
held with GDPCAD officials on their views concerning regional 
developments. Finally the provincial authority facilitated the 
completion of a survey in Guangzhou. The full itinerary, kinds of 
welfare facilities visited and administrative classification of my 
destinations are given in Figures 5, 6 and 7 respectively.
The Guangdong visits were remarkable in severed, respects. 
First, the range of CAD operations covered was comprehensive. 
These included better-knewn facilities for the aged, disabled, 
children, to less-visited amenities for vagrants, veterans and 
destitute people. The operating authorities included government and 
collective agencies at different administrative levels. Also, both 
rural and urban facilities as well as places with different incomes 
were represented.
The Provincial CAD was extremely helpful in outlining 
possibilities and enlarging my horizon. In fact, my initial plan 
was more modest, namely to conduct a study of civil affairs work in 
Guangzhou. GDPCAD suggested I broaden my purview to cover the whole 
spectrum of work in the province. Their helpfulness was unreserved. 
Once the schedule was finalised, GDPCAD saw to travel arrangements, 
accommodation and prepared lower-level units for my coming. An 
escort was provided on seme journeys.
Another unique factor was the access to hitherto inaccessible 
areas. Huazhou, a remote low-inccme county with a full range of 
social security provisions, was the case in point. GDPCAD was eager 
to present this showcase. Indeed they were candid enough to say 
that the destinations on my itinerary were often the best of their 
kind and the poorest and most backward places were not represented. 
As our trust in each other grew, I had their permission to visit 
any welfare facility within Guangdong. But, in the end, it was my 
own time constraint that would not allow me to take up the offer.
My Guangdong visits were grouped around three geographical 
clusters. The first was in the Pearl River Delta areas, where I 
paid visits to Narihai, Shunde, Zhongshan and Dongguan, the "Four 
Little Tigers" of the delta and Panyu County. The second cluster 
comprised Zhanjiang and Huazhou. The third was Guangzhou. 
Altogether, four counties, four cities and ten township/ 
administrative villages were included.
An easy rapport between researcher and hosts was the third 
notable feature. As Cantonese, we shared a common dialect and were 
able to understand the finer cultural nuances. Incidentally, my
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Figure 20 Visits to Gmngrinnq Province. Marri-t-Auaust 1988
8.3.88 Guangdong Province Civil Affairs Training College
9.3.88 Guangdong Province Civil Affairs Department
9.5.88 Guangdong Province Civil Affairs Department
10.5.88 Narihai County Civil Affairs Units
11.5.88 Shunde County Civil Affairs Units
12.5.88 Shunde County Civil Affairs Units
13.5.88 Panyu County Civil Affairs Units
14.5.88 Zhongshan City Civil Affairs Units
1.6.88 Zhanjiang City Civil Affairs units
2.6.88 )
3.6.88 )
4.6.88 ) Huazhou County Civil Affairs Units
5.6.88 )
6 .6.88 Guangzhou Ccnimunity Social Services
7.6.88 Guangzhou Social Welfare Institutions
8.6.88 Guangdong Province Artificial Limbs Factory 
Guangdong Province Civil Affairs Training College
18.7.88 )
Dongguan City Civil Affairs Units
19.7.88 )
20.7.88 Guangzhou Community Social Services
21.7.88 Guangdong Province General Labour Union
22.7.88 Guangdong Province Women's Federation
23.7.88 Guangdong Government Office of Systems Reforms
25.8.88 )
Guangdong Province Civil Affairs Department
26.8.88 )
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Figure 21 Social Welfare Facilities Visited 
_____ -in Guanodoncf. Marth - August 1988____
Nature of Facility Number
Old People's Home 13
Social Welfare Factory (for disabled) 7
Foverty-aid Economic Enterprises 4
Settlement Farm (for vagrants) 1
Artificial Limb Factory 1
Social Welfare Institution 2
Children's Home 2
Home for Aged Veterans 1
Civil Affairs Training College 1
Civil Affairs Departments 8
Figure 22 Areas Visited in Gmngdoncr. March-Auaust 1988 
Cities (4)
Counties (4)
Townships/ 
Administrative 
Village (10)
Zhongshan, Zhanjiang, 
Guangzhou, Dongguan
Shunde, Narihai,
Panyu, Huazhou
Yeribu, Dale, Gongan, 
Guizhou, Jianghu, Linchen, 
Zhenan, Wannuedun, Chashan, 
Shelong
escort was a outanahua speaker. She could not take part in the
spontaneous social chatter that often followed when the more formal
interviews were over. I learnt as much, if not more, talking to the 
drivers and cadres as we travelled from one place to another and 
when we ate together. They talked quite naturally about the 
exigencies of everyday life, for exairple lew pay and rising
prices. They could readily identify with the common people. As 
grassroots administrators, their standard of living was not much
different from the masses. They also opined quite freely on the 
distinctiveness of Guangdong. Their orientation was decidedly 
local.
In the Beijing and Guangdong visits, the sampled units were no 
doubt usually above-average, if not model facilities. On the whole, 
civil affairs officials were undogmatic and frank about their
shortcomings. Quite a number of Ministry and provincial cadres had 
taken study trips abroad including Hong Kong. Fully aware that
provisions in China were still backward, they were at pains to
dispel any unrealistic expectations that I might have. This 
openness made them less inclined to propagandise their model of 
social care.
Apart from the civil affairs agencies, I visited other 
Guangdong organizations. Interviews were conducted with the
Provincial Women's Federation, General Trade Union and Systems 
Reform Office under the Provincial Government. These gave me a 
good sense of Guangdong's reform experience and its effects on 
local life.
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Survey
A questionnaire survey was administered to all municipal-level 
welfare institutions (three) and welfare factories (16) in 
Guangzhou. The information sought covered all aspects of their 
operation since 1979. Two sets of questionnaires were developed. 
These were distributed and collected by the GDPCAD. The results and 
related discussion are set out in Chapter Six.
During all stages of the survey, the GDPCAD had provided 
invaluable assistance. Ideally, independence in the research 
process is preferable in order to maximize objectivity and 
reliability. Hcwsver, conditions for doing rigorous field studies 
in China are still limited. A certain amount of bureaucratic 
influence is unavoidable. Such input was accepted for two reasons. 
First, the GDPCAD alone had the authority to request cooperation 
from subordinate units and overcome any misgiving they may have in 
receiving an outsider. Second, logistical help was necessary in 
arranging such things as transport and acccmmodatian in an 
unfamiliar environment. This was especially important in rural and 
out-of-the-way places where transportation and reception facilities 
were poor.
Nevertheless, several safeguards were adopted. The most 
important one was to insist on my full participation in deciding 
the itinerary. I also had permission to contact units directly to 
follow up unclear questions. The fact that I conducted the 
interviewing myself eliminated interpretation bias. Above all, I 
accepted their rationale for supporting my research, namely that 
people outside China should learn more about the country. On my 
side, I reciprocated by sharing with them my knowledge of and 
materials on overseas developments. A good working relationship 
matured with increasing contact. Towards the end, I made friends 
with a number of provincial cadres. I was able to get a deeper 
understanding of regional developments than would otherwise have 
been possible.
Secondary Sources
Secondary sources on the political, social, cultural, economic and 
demographic conditions in China have been consulted. I benefitted 
from the immense scholarship of books, magazines and reports, in 
both English and Chinese, orginating from China, Hong Kong and the 
West. A lot of contextual information and independent appraisal of 
Chinese developments was obtained as a result.
Conclusion
Policy is not just about formulating decisions. It also involves 
translating plans and legislation into practice. Hence the whole 
process is complex and untidy (Gilbert and Specht, 1977; Ham and 
Hill, 1984). Considerable time lag and discrepancies can creep in 
between national goals and local outcomes.
Different perspectives have been suggested concerning studies 
of the Chinese polity, including the policy-making system. At 
first, a "totalitarian11 model (associated with Wittfogel, 1957) 
proposes that domination of the regime in "oriental despotism" 
necessarily means that compliance with central strictures will 
follow. This view has been discredited. An alternative vision is to 
see policy-making in tprma of faction or group interests, conflicts
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and bargaining (Nathan, 1973? Pye, 1981? Lampton, 1987). A third 
conception is the centre-local perspective, which sees centrifugal 
tendencies affecting the integrity of state policies (Posen and 
Bums, 1986? Shue, 1988). I think there is much credence in the 
last view. This study therefore incorporates a regional focus in
tandem with a national purview. The intention is not to test the
robustness of the perspective? it aspires to find out more about 
the complex reality.
Each of the above methods has inherent strengths and 
weaknesses. The combined use of various methods can hopefully
offset the graver shortcomings of individual methods and adhere to 
a more realistic model of the policy process. In the end, both 
perspective and methodology have to be a carpncmise between the
ideal and the practicable. The shortage of studies on social 
welfare counselled against overambition. Even now, access to inside 
information and contact with consumers is still restricted. 
Therefore, triangulation, the combination of theories and methods 
to add breadth and depth to our analysis (Fielding and Fielding, 
1986) directed the methodology. Hopefully a more holistic picture 
of the Chinese welfare mix could ensue.
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Apramix 2
GCJIEE TO IABGGR INSDRRNCE IROVISKKS FOR EMPTOYKES IN 
GOVERNMENT. STATE RGFNCTES AND STATE ENTERPRISES
Retirement
1. Eligibility Conditions
(1) Male employees aged 60, female office workers aged 55 and 
female workers aged 50 with 10 years of continuous service;
(2) For work underground, in high altitude and high temperature, 
and especially arduous or harmful work, male employees aged 50 
and female employees aged 45 with 10 years of continuous 
service?
(3) Male employees aged 50, female employees aged 45 with 10 years 
continuous service certified by hospital and confirmed by 
Occupational Health Assessment Committee as having completely 
lost working ability?
(4) For disability caused by work, certification by a hospital and 
assessed by Occupational Health Assessment Canmitte as having 
completely lost working ability.
2. Retirement Conditions
(1) Personnel meeting conditions (1), (2) or (3) above are entitled 
to:
75% of basic wage for 20 years continuous service;
70% of basic wage for 15 to less than 20 years continuous 
service?
60% of basic wage with 10 to less than 15 years continuous 
service.
If the original pension is less than 30 yuan per month, the 
monthly pension will be at 30 yuan.
(2) Personnel meeting condition (4) above are entitled to:
90% of basic wage and constant attendance allowance equivalent 
to the basic wage of a grade 2 engineering worker if requiring 
constant attendance;
80% of basic wage if not requiring constant attendance.
If the original pension is less than 40 yuan per month, the 
monthly pension will be at 40 yuan.
(3) National labour heroes, labour models and transferred FLA 
combat heroes qualify for an increment of 5-15% of basic wage. 
However, the enhanced pension should not exceed the previous 
full basic wage.
3. Employees not satisfying the above retirement conditions but 
assessed by a hospital and Occupational Health Assessment Committee 
as having completely lost working ability can resign frcm work.
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Resigned staff receive a living allowance of 40% of previous basic 
wage. If the allowance is less than 25 yuan per month, the monthly 
pension will be 25 yuan.
4. All pensions and living allowance are based on the basic wage 
of the employee one month before retirement or resignation.
5. Retired employees moving to another area for settlement will 
be given 150 yuan settlement subsidy. Those who move from large or 
medium cities to rural areas will receive 300 yuan.
Resigned staff moving to settle in another area will be given a
settlement subsidy equivalent to 2 months previous basic wage.
6 . Retired and resigned staff continue to be eligible for free 
medical benefits.
7. Retired and resigned workers are eligible for price subsidy in 
respect of non-grain food. Staff who retired or resigned before 
the wage reform in 1985 are also eligible for living subsidy. The 
standard is 17 yuan for civil servants and staff in state
agencies, and 12-17 yuan for workers in state enterprises, the
exact amount to be decided by the enterprise.
Work-related Injury and Disability
1. Medical benefits. Full fees covering registration, medical 
consultation, standard prescriptions, surgical operation, 
hospitalization, and travelling to be borne entirely by the work 
unit plus two-thirds of meal cost during hospital ization.
2. The benefits and wage payable during the period of treatment 
will remain the same as before.
3. Disability Benefits
(1) Classifications:
Enterprise workers: 
completely disabled
- requiring constant attendance?
- not requiring constant attendance 
partially disabled
Civil servants and state agency employees:
- completely disabled - special grade, grade 1
- partially disabled - 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B.
(2) Benefits in respect of conplete disability 
Enterprise workers:
Such personnel can apply for retirement. Those in need of 
constant attendance are eligible for pensions equivalent to 
90% of previous basic wage and, if necessary, an attendance 
allowance not exceeding the basic wage of a local labourer. 
Those not in need of constant attendance are eligible for 
pensions equivalent to 80% of previous basic wage.
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If the pension is less than 40 yuan per month, the payment 
will be at 40 yuan.
Enterprise workers suffering from stage 2 or 3 silicosis can 
apply for voluntary retirement at 90% of basic wage.
Civil servants and employees in state agencies:
Such personnel classified as suffering from special and grade 
1 disability are eligible for 120 and 108 yuan disability 
relief from Civil Affairs Departments per annum, to be payable 
after retirement.
The retired employee continues to qualify for subsidized 
medical benefits.
(3) Benefits in respect of partial disability 
Enterprise workers:
Such personnel who are still capable of work are to be
redeployed to do other suitable work. When an employee's wage 
has been reduced due to such a transfer, he/she can get an 
occupational disability subsidy, at about 10-30% of his/her 
basic wage before sustaining the disability.
Civil servants and employees of state agencies (below grade
2A):
Such personnel who are still capable of work must have
suitable work arranged for them. Apart from work income, such 
persons are eligible for an in-post disability subsidy, to be 
payable after retirement.
(4) The work unit will pay for fees incurred for the fitting of
necessary protheses (e.g. artificial limbs, eyes) and the 
provision of other aids (e.g. steel vests and wheelchair).
Non-occupational Sickness and Invalidity
1. Medical benefits. Registration fee will be the responsibility 
of the employee. The work unit will pay for medical consultation, 
surgical operations, standard prescriptions and hospitalization.
2. Benefits payable during period of treatment 
Enterprise workers:
When the employee is away from work for less than 6 months, he/she
can draw sick pay at 60-100% of basic wage, depending on the
length of continuous service. When the sick leave is above 6 
months, the employee can get invalidity relief at 40-60% of 
his/her basic wage.
Civil servants and staff in state agencies:
When the employee is away frcm work for less than 6 months, he/she
can draw sick pay at 90-100% of basic wage. When the sick leave is
above 6 months, he/she can draw sick pay at 70-80% of previous
pay. If the sick pay is less than 30 yuan per month, the monthly
payment will be at 30 yuan. If the original wage is belcw 30 yuan
per month, the original wage will be paid.
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3. Benefits payable after sustaining disability 
Disabled male employees aged 50 and female employees aged 45 with 
10 years continuous service qualify for retirement after being 
assessed as having completely lost work ability by a hospital and 
Occupational Health Committee. The retirement pension will be 
between 60-75% of previous basic wage, the amount depending on 
years of continuous service. If the original pension is below 30 
yuan per month, the standard will be set at 30 yuan. Those not 
meeting retirement conditions but being assessed as being 
completely disabled can resign from work and qualify for a living 
allowance of 40% of previous basic wage. If the original allowance 
is less than 25 yuan per month, the standard will be set at 25 
yuan.
Death Benefits
1. Work-related death benefits
(1) Burial expenses 
Enterprise workers:
The enterprise will pay the burial expense equivalent to 3 
months average wage of the enterprise.
Civil servants and employees in state agencies:
The burial expense will be set by the local administration. 
Normally the payment is about 400 yuan.
(2) Relief for survivors
For enterprise workers, survivors will get a monthly relief at 
between 25-50% of the previous basic wage of the deceased, 
depending on the number of dependents. Discretionary subsidies 
will be granted to dependents experiencing hardship.
(3) For survivors of civil servants and employees of state 
agencies, a one-time death grant equivalent to 20 months basic 
wage of the deceased will be paid. Those experiencing hardship 
will be given discretionary subsidies, regular or temporary, 
according to need, the exact amount to be decided by the local 
administration. The subsidy rate will be revised regularly in 
accordance with the rise in price levels.
2. Death from illness
(1) Buried expenses 
Enterprise workers:
The work unit will pay burial expenses equivalent to 2 months 
average wage of the enterprise.
Civil servants and employees in state agencies:
The burial grant is the same as for work-related death.
(2) Relief for survivors
Survivors for deceased civil servants and employees in state 
agencies will be given a subsidy equivalent to 10 months of 
basic pay. Dependents experiencing hardship will be given a 
discretionary subsidy, either regular or temporary, the exact 
amount to be decided by the local administration.
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(3) Death grant
For enterprise workers, a one-time death grant equivalent to 
6, 9 or 12 months previous basic pay will be granted to
survivors, depending on the number of dependents.
Maternity Benefits
1. All fees covering examination, delivery, surgical operation,
and hospital ization as well as prescription during pregnancy and
delivery will be paid by the work unit.
2. Maternity Leave
For normal delivery : 90 days
For complicated delivery: 91 days
Multiple births : 15 days more for each additional birth
Miscarriage before the end of four months of pregnancy : 15-30
days
Miscarriage after four months of pregnancy : 42 days
During the period of maternity leave, the employee will be paid 
her original basic wage.
Medical Benefits
1. For Employees
For sickness or non-work related injury, the work unit will pay 
all fees incurred for medical consultation, examination, surgical 
operation, hospitalization, and standard prescriptions when the 
treatment is obtained in a designated medical facility. When the 
injury is caused by work, besides the above items, the work unit 
pays for for registration, travelling and meals during
hospitalization.
2. For direct dependents of employees
The work unit pays 50% of treatment cost, standard prescriptions 
and surgical operation in a designated medical facility.
Unemployment Benefits
1. Unemployment relief
Employees from enterprises which have declared bankruptcy, who are 
being laid off from near-bankrupt enterprises undergoing 
reorganization, whose employment contracts have expired or 
dissolved, and who have been dismissed will be covered. During the 
period of the first 12 months of unemployment, enplcyees who have 
worked for 5 years or more will get a monthly relief at 60-75% of 
their average wages during the last two years of employment. 
During the 13th to 24th months of umenployment, the rate is 50%. 
Employees working less than 5 years receive a monthly relief of 
60-75% of previous wage up to a maximum period of 12 months.
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2. Other benefits
Employees from bankrupt enterprises and those laid off from 
enterprises undergoing reorganization continue to qualify for 
medical benefits, burial grant and subsidy, and grants and relief 
for dependents during the period of unemployment. Employees whose 
employment contracts have ended or have been dismissed are
eligible for subsidy for medical treatment.
Source: Official regulations issued by the FKC Ministry of Labour
Insurance and Welfare Department, 1986.
Notes:
1. Hie labour Insurance Regulations (1951, revised 1953) apply to 
regular workers in state enterprises employing more than 100 
workers. Temporary workers and seasonal workers in state 
enterprises do not qualify for pensions; they also obtain inferior 
employment welfare benefits.
2. Large collective enterprises above county level generally 
follow the labour Insurance Regulations. Collective enterprises at 
county level and below and smaller collective units adopt the 
Labour Insurance Regulations according to their financial ability; 
they usually offer inferior benefits.
3. Civil servants and employees working in state agencies (shive 
danwei) include staff working in the mass organizations, 
democratic political parties, offices, universities, research 
institutes etc. Social insurance for these groups are covered by 
separate regulations offering broadly similar benefits.
4. Personnel who are self-employed and those working in private 
and rural enterprises are not covered by labour insurance. Welfare 
benefits for employees working in joint and foreign-owned 
enterprises are set out in labour contracts which stipulate 
employment conditions and welfare benefits broadly equivalent to 
those available to state sector employees.
5. Since 1986, all new recruits into state enterprises have been 
engaged on fixed-term renewable contracts.
- 442 -
BIBIOGRAPHY
WORKS IN ENGLISH
Abrams, P., Abrams, S. et al., (1981), Action For Care: 
A Review of Good Neighbour Schemes in England. The 
Volunteer Centre, Berkhamsted.
Abrams, P. (1984), "Realities of Neighbourhood Care: 
The Interactions Between Statutory, Voluntary and 
Informal Social Care”, Policy and Studies. Vol.12, 
No.4, pp.413-29.
Alber, J. (1983), "Social Causes of Social Security 
Expenditure Development in Western Europe 
1949-1977", in Loney, M., Boswell, D. and Clarke, J. 
(eds), Social Policy and Social Welfare. Open 
University Press, Milton Keynes.
Ashton, B., Hill, K., Piazza, A. and Zeitz, R. (1984), 
"Famines in China, 1958-61", Population and 
Development Review 10, 4:613-45.
Baldock, J. and Evers, A. (1991), "Citizenship and 
Frail Old People: Changing Patterns of Provision in 
Europe" , in Manning, N. (ed.) Social Policy Review 
1990-91. Longman, Harlow.
Baldwin, S., Parker, G. and Walker, R. (eds) (1988), 
Social Security and Community Care. Gower, 
Aldershot.
Baker, H.D.R. (1979), Chinese Family and Kinship.
Macmillan, London.
Baran, P. A. and Sweezy, P. M. (1968), Monopoly
Capital: An Essav on the American Economic and
Social Order. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
Barnett, A. D. (1967), Cadres, Bureaucracy and 
Political Power in Communist China. Columbia 
University Press, New York.
Beiiing Review. Beijing, various issues.
Beijing Review (1987), China in Focus (31) Progress in
Urban Reform. Beijing Review Publications, Beijing.
Bell, D. (1960), The End Ideology. The Free Press, 
Glencoe.
Bideleux, R. (1985), Communism and Development. 
Methuen, London.
Blecher, M. (1984), "Peasant Labour for Urban Industry: 
Temporary Contract Labour, Urban-Rural Balance and
- 443 -
Class Relations in a Chinese County", in Maxwell, N. 
and McFarlane, B. (eds), China1s Changed Road to 
Development. Pergamon Press, Oxford.
Bolderson, H. (1988), "Comparing Social Policies: Some 
Problems of Method and the Case of Social Security 
Benefits in Australia, Britain and the USA", Journal 
of Social Policy. Vol.17, No.3, pp.267-278.
Bonnin, M. and Cartier, M. (1988), "Urban Employment in 
Post-Mao China", in Feuchtwang, S., Hussain, A. and 
Pairault, T. (eds), Transforming China1s Economy in 
the Eighties. Vol. 1. The Rural Sector. Welfare and 
Employment. Zed Books, London.
Bodde, D. (1957), China1s Cultural Tradition: What and
Whither. Rinehart and Co., New York.
 . (1981), Essavs on Chinese Civilization.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
Brugger, B. (1989), "Ideology, Legitimacy and Marxist 
Theory in Contemporary China", in Cheng, J. Y. S. 
(ed.), China: Modernization in the 1980s. the
Chinese University Press, Hong Kong.
Bulmer, M. (1988), The Social Basis of Community Care. 
Allen and Unwin, London.
Burch, B. B. (1979), "Models as Agents of Change in
China", in Wilson, R. W., Wilson, A. A. and 
Greenblatt, S. L. (eds), Value Change in Chinese 
Society. Praeger, New York.
Burns, J. P. (1989a), "China's Governance: Political
Reform in a Turbulent Environment", The China
Quarterly. no. 119, pp.48-518.
(1989b), :Civil Service Reform in Contemporary
China" in Cheng, J. Y. S. (ed.), China; 
Modernization in the 1980s. the Chinese University 
Press, Hong Kong.
Burns, J. P. and Rosen S. (eds) (1986), Policy 
Conflicts in Post-Mao China. M.E. Sharpe, New York 
and London.
Castles, F. G. and McKinlay, R. D. (1979), "Public 
Welfare Provision: Scandinavia and the Sheer
Futility of the Sociological Approach to Politics", 
British Journal of Political Science. Vol.9, No.2, 
pp.157-172.
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
(1986), Resolution of the Central Committee of the
CPC on the Guiding Principles for Building a
- 444 -
Socialist Society with an Advanced Culture and 
Ideology. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing.
Chan, A. (1991), "The Social Origins and Consequences 
of the Tiananmen Crisis" in Goodman, S.G. and Segal, 
G. (eds), China in the Nineties. Crisis Management 
and Bevond. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp.105-130.
Chan, C. (1991), "The Multi-Channel Approach to Welfare 
Delivery in the PRC: Towards a Welfare Mix Since the 
Economic Reform", paper presented at the Conference 
on Reform and Policy Implementation in China: A 
Comparative Study of the Transformation of Concept 
into Working Realities. 9-11 September 1991, the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.
Chang, Chen-pang (1988), "The Separation of Party and 
Government in Communist China", Issues and Studies. 
Vol. 24, No.1, pp.1-5.
Chen, Te-sheng (1988), "Private Economy in Mainland 
China: Its Development, Impact and Limitations",
Issues and Studies, Vol.24, No.9, 78-95.
Chen, Xiangming (1985), "The One-child Population 
Policy, Modernization, and the Extended Chinese 
Family", Journal of Marriage and the Family. 
February 1985, pp.193-202.
Cheng, J. (ed.) (1986), A Chronology of the People1s
Republic of China 1949-1984. Foreign Languages 
Press, Beijing.
Cheng, Zhongying (1985), "On Confucian Filial Piety and 
Its Modernization: Duties, Rights, and Moral
Conduct", Hanxue Yaniiu. June 1985, pp.83-106.
China Report - Social And Economic Development 
1949-1989. Influxfunds Co. and Zie Yongder Co., 
1990.
China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service 
Center and International Center for The Advancement 
of Science and Technology Ltd. (1990), The Forty 
Years of Urban Development. Hong Kong.
Chinese Sociology and Anthropology. A Journal of
Translations. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, various
issues.
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State 
Council (1983), "Joint Circular on the 
Implementation of Separation of Government from 
Communes and the Setting up of Village (xiang) 
Governments", 12 October 1983.
- 445 -
Chinese Ministry of Information (1947), China Handbook 
1937—1945. A Comprehens ive Survey of Maior 
Developments in China in Eight Years of War. Revised 
and enlarged with 1946 supplementation, Macmillan, 
New York.
Chow, K. L. and Woo W. (1986), "The Chinese Welfare
System in Relation to the Neighbourhood Level of 
Provisions" in Wong, L. and MacQuarrie, L. (eds), 
Chinese Welfare System: A View from Guangzhou, Hong 
Kong Polytechnic, Hong Kong.
Chow, N. W. S. (1980), Social Welfare in Hong Kong;
Development and Policy. (in Chinese), University 
Publisher and Printer, Hong Kong.
 . (1988), The Administration and Financing of
Social Security in China, Centre of Asian 
Studies, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.
 . (1991), "Does Filial Piety Exist Under Chinese
Communism?", Journal of Aging and Social Policy. 
Vol.3(1/2), pp.209-225.
Chu, G. C., and Hsu, F. L. K. (1979), Moving a Mountain 
- Cultural Change in China. East-West Centre, 
University of Hawaii, Honolulu.
Croll, E. (1974), The Women1s Movement in China: A 
Selection of Readings. Anglo-Chinese Educational 
Institute, London.
 . (1987), "Some Implications of the Rural Economic
Reforms for the Chinese Peasant Household" in Saith, 
A. (ed.), The Re-emergence of the Chinese Peasantry; 
Aspects of Decollectivisation. Croom Helm, London.
(1988), "The New Peasant Economy in China", in 
Feuchtwang, S., Hussain, A. and Pairault, T. 
(eds), Transforming China1s Economy in the Eighties. 
Vol.l. The Rural Sector. Welfare and Employment. Zed 
Books, London.
Danziger, S. and Smolensky, E. (1985), "Income Transfer 
Policies and the Poor: a Cross-national
Perspective", Journal of Social Policy, vol. 14, 
no.3, 1985, pp.257-262.
Davin, D. (1988), "The Implications of Contract 
Agriculture For the Employment and Status of Chinese 
Peasant Women", in Feuchtwang, S., Hussain, A. and 
Pairault, T. (eds), Transforming China1s Economy in 
the Eighties. Vol.l. The Rural Sector. Welfare and 
Employment. Zed Books, London.
- 446 -
Davis, D. (1988), "Unequal Chances, Unequal 
Outcomes: Pension Reform and Urban Inequality”,
The China Quarterly. no, 114, pp.223-241.
 . (1989), "Chinese Social Welfare: Policies and
Outcomes”, The China Quarterly, no. 119, pp.577-597.
 . (1990), "Urban Job Mobility” in Davis, D. and
Vogel, E. F. (eds), Chinese Society on the Eve of 
Tiananmen: The Impact of Reform. The Council on 
East Asian Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge 
and London.
Davis-Friedmann, D. (1978), "Welfare Practices in Rural 
China", World Development. Vol.6 , pp.609-619.
Deacon, B. (1990), "Introduction: The Significance of 
Recent Social Policy Developments in Eastern 
Europe", in Deacon, B. and Szalai, J. (eds), Social 
Policy in the New Eastern Europe: What Future for 
Socialist Welfare? Avebury, Aldershot.
Deacon, B. and Szalai, J. (eds) (1990), Social Policy 
in the New Eastern Europe: What Future for Socialist 
Welfare? Avebury, Aldershot.
Deng, Xiaoping (1985), Build Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics. Foreign Languages Press, Beijing.
 . (1987), Fundamental Issues in Present-Dav China,
Foreign Languages Press, Beijing.
Dernberger, R. F., Dewoskin, K. J., Goldstein, S. M., 
et al. (eds) (1986), The Chinese: Adapting the Past. 
Building the Future, Centre for Chinese Studies, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Dixon, J. (1981), The Chinese Social Welfare System 
1949-1979. Praeger, New York.
Dixon, J. and Kim, H. S. (eds) (1985), Social Welfare 
in Asia. Croom Helm. London.
Domhoff, G. W. (1971), The Higher Circles: the
Governing Class in America. Random House, New York
Du, Runsheng (1989), Many People. Little Land: China's 
Rural Economic Reform. Foreign Languages Press, 
Beijing.
Easton, D. (1953), The Political System. Knopf, New 
York.
The Economist, various issues.
- 447 -
Eisenstadt, S. N. and Ahimeir, O. (eds) (1985), The 
Welfare State and its Aftermath. Croom Helm, London 
and Sydney.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Evers, A., Nowotny, H. and Wintersberger, H. (eds) 
(1987), The Changing Face of Welfare. Gower, 
London.
Evers, A. and Wintersberger, H. (eds) (1988), Shifts in 
the Welfare Mix; Their Impact on Work. Social 
Services and Welfare Policies. Contributions from 
Nine European Countries in a Comparative 
Perspective. European Centre for Social Welfare 
Training and Research, Vienna.
Fairbank, J. K. (1983), The United States and China, 
(Fourth Edition, Enlarged), Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Fairbank, J. K. and Reischauer, E. (1979), China; 
Tradition and Transformation. Allen and Unwin, 
London.
Far Eastern Economic Review. Hong Kong, various issues.
Fei, Hsiao-tung (1939, 1947), Peasant Life in China; A 
Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valiev. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
 . (1986), Small Towns in China —  Functions.
Problems and Prospects. New World Press, Beijing.
Feng, Yu-lan (1949), The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, 
trans. by Hughes, E. R., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 
& Co., London.
Ferge, Z. (1979), A Society in the Making; Hungarian 
Social and Societal Policy 1945-75. Penguin, 
Harmondsworth.
(1987), "The Impact of the Present Economic 
Crisis on Social Policy from Comparative European 
Perspective", in Evers, A., Nowotny, H. and 
Wintersberger, H. (eds), The Changing Face of 
Welfare. Gower, London.
(1990), "The Fourth Road; The Future for 
Hungarian Social Policy", in Deacon, B. and Szalai 
(eds), Social Policy in the New Eastern Europe; What 
Future for Socialist Welfare? Aldershot, Avebuy.
Ferge, Z. and Miller, S. M. (eds) (1987), Dynamics of 
Deprivation. Gower, Aldershot.
- 448 -
Feuchtwang, S. (1987), "Changes in the System of Basic 
Social Security in the Countryside since 1979" in 
Saith, A. (ed.)r The Re-emergence of the Chinese 
Peasantry. Croom Helm, London.
Feuchtwang, S., Hussain, A., and Pairault, T. (eds)
(1988), Transforming China1s Economy in the
Eighties. Vol. 1. The Rural Sector. Welfare and 
Employment. and Vol. 2. Management. Industry and the 
Urban Economy. Zed Books, London.
Fielding, N. G. and Fielding, J. L. (1986), Linking 
Data. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, Calif.
Finch, J. (1989), Family Obligations and Social Change. 
Polity Press, Cambridge.
Finch, J. and Groves, D. (1980), "Community Care and the 
Family: A Case for Equal Opportunities", Journal of
Social Policy. Vol.9, No. 4, pp.487-514.
Finch, J. and Groves, D. (1983), & Labour of Love:
Women. Work and Caring. Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London.
Finer, S. E. (1974), Comparative Government. Pelican 
Books, Harmondsworth.
Firth, R. W. (1951), Elements of Social Organization. 
Watts & Co., London•
Fitzgerald, C.P. (1965), The Chinese View of Their Place 
in the World. Oxford University Press, London.
Flora, P. and Heidenheimer, A. (eds) (1981), The 
Development of Welfare States in Europe and America. 
Transaction Books, New Brunswick.
Flora, P. (1983), State. Economy. and Society in Western 
Europe 1815-1975. A Data Book. Vol. 1: The Growth of 
Mass Democracies and Welfare States. Transaction 
Books, New Brunswick.
Forder, A., Caslin, T., Pouton, G. and Walklate, S., 
(1984), Theories of Welfare. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London.
Foreign Languages Press (ed.) (1989), China1s Civil
Mediation System - A Precaution Against Crime, 
Foreign Languages Press, Beijing.
Fraser, D. (1984), The Evolution of the British Welfare 
State. Macmillan, London.
Freedman, M. (1958), Lineage Organization in 
Southeastern China. Athlone Press, London.
- 449 -
 . (1961), "The Family in China, Past and Present",
Pacific Affairs. Vol. 34, No.4, pp.323-336.
(1966), Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and 
Kwanatuna. LSE Monographs in Social Anthropology 
33, London School of Economics, London.
 . (ed«) (1970), Family and Kinship in Chinese
Society. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
 . (1979), The Study of Chinese Society. Essays bv
Maurice Freedman, Selected and introduced by G.
Skinner, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif.
Fried, M. (1953), The Fabric of Chinese Society, 
Praeger, New York.
Friedmann, R. R., Gilbert, N. and Sherer, M. (eds)
(1987), Modern Welfare States: A Comparative View of 
Trends and Prospects. Wheatsheaf, Brighton.
Furtak, R. K. (1986), The Political Systems of the
Socialist States: An Introduction to Marxist-Leninist 
Regimes. Wheatsheaf, Brighton.
Garret, S. S. (1970), Social Reformers in Urban China:
The Chinese Y.M.C.A.. 1895-1926. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Gatu, Dafin (1983), Toward Revolution: War. Social
Change and the Chinese Communist Party in North China 
1937-45. Institution for Orientaliska Sprak, 
Stockholm.
Gates, B. L. (1980), Social Program Administration:
the Implementation of Social Policy. Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
George, V. (1988), Wealth. Poverty and Starvation: A
World Perspective. Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.
George, V. and Manning, N. (1980), Socialism. Social 
Welfare and the Soviet Union. Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London•
George, V. and Wilding, P. (1976), Ideology and Social 
Welfare. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
George, V. and Wilding, P. (1984), The Impact of Social
Policy. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Gil, D. G. (1976), Unravelling Social Policy. Theory. 
Analysis. and Political Action towards Social
Equality. (Revised and Enlarged Edition), Schenkman 
Publishing Co, Cambridge, Mass.
- 450 -
Gilbert, N. and Specht, H. (eds) (1977), Planning for
Social Welfare: Issues. Models and Tasks.
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.
Glazer, N. (1986), "Welfare and 'Welfare* in America" in
Rose, R. and Shiratori, R. (eds), The Welfare State.
East and West. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Gold, T. B. (1990), "Urban Private Business and Social 
Change", in Davis, D. and Vogel, E. F. (eds), Chinese 
Society on the Eve of Tiananmen. The Impact of 
Reform. The Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Mass.
Goode, W. J. (1970), World Revolution and Family
Patterns, The Free Press, New York.
Goodman, D. S. G. (1984), "State Reforms in the People's 
Republic of China Since 1976: An Historical
Perspective", in Harding, N. (ed.), The State in 
Socialist Society. Macmillan, Hong Kong.
Goodman, D. S. G. and Segal, G. (eds) (1991), China in 
the Nineties: Crisis Management and Beyond, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford.
Ghose, A. J. (1987), "The People's Commune, 
Responsibility Systems and Rural Development in 
China, 1965-1984", in Saith, A. (ed.), The 
Re-emergence of the Chinese Peasantry. Croom Helm, 
London.
Gottleib, B. H. (ed.) (1981), Social Networks and Social
Support. Sage, Beverly Hills.
Gough, I. (1979), The Political Economy of the Welfare 
State, Macmillan, London.
Griffin, K. (1984), Institutional Reform and Economic 
Development in the Chinese Countryside. Macmillan, 
London.
Guojia Tongjiju (ed.), PRC Yearbook. Zhongguo Tongji 
Chubanshe, Beijing, various years.
Hadley, R. and Hatch, S. (1981), Social Welfare and the 
Failure of the State - Centralized Social Services 
and Participatory Alternatives. Allen and Unwin, 
London.
Ham, C. and Hill, M. (1984), The Policy Process in the 
Modern Capitalist State. Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton.
Hamilton, G. G. (1988), "Patriarchy, Patrimonialism, 
and Filial Piety: A Comparison of China and Western
Europe", paper presented at the International
- 451 -
Conference on Chinese Religious Ethics and 
Modernization. 14-16 June 1988, University of Hong
Kong, Hong Kong.
 . (1990), Chinese Society and Economy. trans. into
into Chinese and published by Luen Jing Chuban Sheye 
Gongsi, Taipei.
Hamrin, C. L. (1984), "Competing ‘Policy Packages* in 
Post-Mao China", Asian Survey. Vol.25, No.5, pp.487- 
518.
Han, Yu-shan (1946), "Molding Forces", in MacNair, H. F. 
(ed.), China. University of California, Berkeley.
Handel, G. (1982), Social Welfare in Western Society. 
Random House, New York.
Hannan, K. (1985), "Economic Reform: Legitimacy,
Efficiency and Rationality", in Brugger, B. (ed), 
Chinese Marxism in Flux. 1978-1984. Croom Helm,
London and Sydney.
Harding, H. (1984), "Competing Models of the Chinese 
Communist Policy Process: Towards a Sorting and
Evaluation", Issues and Studies. Vol.20, No.2,
pp.13-36.
Harrell, S. (1985), "Why Do the Chinese Work So Hard? 
Reflections on an Entrepreneurial Ethic", Modern 
China. Vol. 11., No. 2, 1985, pp.203-226.
 . (1987), "The Concept of Fate in Chinese Folk
Ideology", Modern China. Vol.13, No.l, pp.90-109.
Heclo, H. (1981), "Towards a New Welfare State?", in 
Flora, P. and Heidenheimer, A. (eds), The 
Development of Welfare States in Europe and 
America. Transaction Books, New Brunswick.
Heidenheimer, A. J., Heclo, H. and Adams, C. T.
(1983), Comparative Public Policy; The Politics of 
Social Choice in Europe and America, St. Martins 
Press, New York.
Henderson, G. (1990), "Increased Inequality in Health 
Care", in Davis, D. and Vogel, E. F. (eds),
Chinese Society on the Eve of Tiananmen. The Impact 
of Reform. The Council on East Asian Studies, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Higgins, J. (1981), States of Welfare, Comparative 
Analysis in Social Policy. Basil Blackwell and 
Martin Robertson, London.
- 452 -
(1986), "Comparative Social Policy", The 
Quarterly Journal of Social Affairs. 1986, 2(3),
pp.221-242.
Hills, J. (ed.) (1990), The State of Welfare: the
Welfare State in Britain Since 1974. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford.
Hillier, S. (1988), "Health and Medicine in the 1980s", 
in Benewick and Wingrove, P. (eds), Reforming the 
Revolution: China in Transition. Macmillan, London.
Hodge, P. (1981), "The Politics of Welfare", in Jones, 
J. F. (ed.), The Common Welfare: Hong Kong1s Social 
Services. Chinese University Press, Hong Kong.
Holden, R. A. (1964), Yale in China: the Mainland. 
1901-1951. Yale in China Association, New Haven.
Hong Kong Social Workers* Association (1985), Social 
Welfare in China - &n Overview of the Welfare 
Services for Women. Children. Youth and Elderly in 
Guangzhou, Hong Kong Social Workers* Association, 
Hong Kong.
Hong Kong Social Workers* Association, Hong Kong Journal 
of Social Work. Hong Kong, various issues.
Hong Kong Standard. Hong Kong, various issues.
Hooper, B. (1986), China Stands Up ; Ending the Western 
Presence 1948-1950. Allen and Unwin, London.
Hooper, B. (1985), Youth in China, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth.
Hsu, F. L. K. (1949), Under the Ancestor*s Shadow: 
Chinese Culture and Personality. Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London.
 . (1955), Americans and Chinese. Cresset Press,
London.
 . (1971), Kinship and Culture, Aldine, Chicago.
 . (1981), Americans and Chinese: Passage to
Differences. The University Press of Hawaii,
Honolulu.
Hsu, Guan-tai (1988), "An Analysis of Mainland China's 
Enterprise Law", Issues and Studies, Vol.24, No.7, 
pp.64-85.
Hung, F. C. (1979), "Some Observations on Confucian 
Ideology", in Chu, G. and Hsu, F. L. K. (eds), Moving
a Mountain - Cultural Change in China, The East-West
Center, University of Hawaii, Honolulu.
- 453 -
Hussain, A. and Feuchtwang, S. (1988), “The People's 
Livelihood and the Incidence of Poverty” in 
Feuchtwang, S., Hussain, A. et al. (eds), 
Transforming China1s Economy in the Eighties. Vol. 
1. The Rural Sector. Welfare and Employment. Zed 
Books, London.
Hussain, A. (1989), "Rural Social Security and the 
Economic Reforms", London School of Economics, 
London.
Ikels, C. (1990a), "New Options for the Urban 
Elderly", in Davis, D. and Vogel, E. F. (eds),
Chinese Society on the Eve of Tiananmen: The Impact 
of Reform. The Council on East Asian Studies, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 . (1990b), "The Resolution of Intergenerational
Conflict; Perspectives of Elders and Their Family 
Members", Modern China, Vol. 16, No. 4, October 1990, 
pp.379-406.
(1991), "Aging and Disability in China: Cultural 
Issues in Measurement and Interpretation", Social 
Science and Medicine. Vol. 32, No. 6, 1991,
pp.649—665•
Jacobs, J. B. (1982), "The Concept of Guanxi and Local 
Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting", in 
Greenblatt, S. L., Wilson, R. W. and Wilson, A. A. 
(eds), Social Interaction in Chinese Society. 
Praeger, New York.
Jarosz, M. (1987), "Material and Social Inequality in 
Poland", in Ferge, Z. and Miller, S. M. (eds),
Dynamics of Deprivation. Gower, London.
Johnson, D. G. (1988), "Economic Reforms in the 
People's Republic of China", Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, Vol.36, No.3 Supplement, 1988 
(April), pp.S225-S245.
Johnson, K. A. (1983), Women. the Family and Peasant 
Revolution in China. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago.
Johnson, N. (1987), The Welfare State in Transition. 
The Theory and Practice of Welfare Pluralism.
Wheatsheaf, Brighton.
 . (1990), Reconstructing the Welfare State; £ Decade
of Change, 1980-1990. Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.
Jones, C. (1985), Patterns of Social Policy: An
Introduction to Comparative Analysis. Tavistock
Publications, London and New York.
- 454 -
Jowell, R., Witherspoon, S. and Brook, L. (eds) (1989), 
British Social Attitudes: Special International
Report. Gower, Aldershot.
Kahn, A. J. (1979), Social Policy and Social Services. 
Second Edition, Random House, New York.
Kaim-Caudle, P. (1973), Comparative Social Policy and 
Social Security; A Ten Country Study. Martin 
Robertson, London.
Kallgren, J. (1969), "Social Welfare and China's 
Industrial Workers” in Barnett, D. (ed.) Chinese 
Communist Politics in Action, University of 
Washington Press, Seattle.
Kerr, C., Dunlop, J., Harbeson, F. and Myers, C. 
(1962), Industrialism and Industrial Man.
He inemann, London.
King, A. Y. C. (1980), "In Defence of Bureaucracy: The 
De-radicalization of Maoism", in Jones, J. F. (ed.), 
Building China: Studies in Integrated Development.
Chinese University Press, Hong Kong.
Knight, P. I. (1983), Economic Reform in Socialist
Countries: The Experience of China. Hungary. Romania
and Yugoslavia. World Bank Staff Working Papers 
No.579, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Kohl, J. (1981), "Trends and Problems in Postwar 
Public Expenditure Development in Western Europe 
and North America", in Flora, P. and Heidenheimer,
A. J. (eds), The Development of Welfare States in 
Europe and America. Transaction Books, New
Brunswick.
Kraus, W. (1979), Economic Development and Social 
Change in the People1s Republic of China.
Springer-Verlag, New York.
Ksiezopolski, M. (1987), "Polish Policy in a Situation 
of Economic Crisis - Is there a Choice of 
Alternatives?" in Evers, A., Nowotny, H. and
Wintersberger, H. (eds), The Changing Face of
Welfare. Gower, London.
(1990), "Is Social Policy a Problem in a 
Socialist Country? The Case of Poland", in Deacon,
B. and Szalai, J. (eds) (1990), Social Policy in the 
New Eastern Europe: What Future for Socialist 
Welfare? Aldershot, Avebury.
Kueh, Y. Y., (1985), Economic Planning and Local
Mobilization in Post-Mao China. Research Notes and
Studies no.7, Contemporary China Institute, School 
of Oriental and African Studies, London.
- 455 -
Lampton, D. M. (ed.) (1987) Policy Implementation in
Post-Mao China. University of California Press,
Berkeley.
Land, H. and Parker. R. (1978), "Family Policy in the 
United Kingdom" in Kamerman, S. and Kahn, A. (eds), 
Family Policy: Government and Families in Fourteen
Countries, Columbia University Press, New York.
Land, H. and Rose, H. (1985), "Compulsory Altruism for 
Some or an Altruistic Society for All?", in Bean, 
P., Ferris, J. and Whynes, D. (eds), In Defence of
Welfare. Tavistock, London.
Lang, 0. (1946), Chinese Family and Society. Archon
Books, Hamden, Conn•
Latourette, K. S. (1964), The Chinese. Their History
and Culture, Fourth Edition, Macmillan, Tempe, Ariz.
Le Grand (1985), "Comment on Inequality Redistribution 
and Recession", Journal of Social Policy. Vol.14, 
No.3, pp.309-312.
Lee, E. (1984), "Employment and Incomes in Rural China: 
the Impact of Recent Organizational Changes" in
Griffin, K. (ed.) Institutional Reform and Economic 
Development in the Chinese Countryside. Macmillan, 
London.
Lee, Hye Kyung (1986), "The Japanese Welfare State in 
Transition", in Friedmann, R., Gilbert, N. and 
Sherer, M. (eds), Modern Welfare States. A
Comparative View of Trends and Prospects. 
Wheatsheaf, Brighton.
Lee, P. N. S. (1986), "Enterprise Autonomy Policy in 
Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Policy-making
1978-1983", The China Quarterly. No.105, pp.46-71.
Leung, J. (1987), "Some Impressions of Teaching a 
Social Work Course in Guangzhou, China", Hong Kong 
Journal of Social Work. 1986 Winter, pp.30-34.
 . (1990), "Social Welfare with Chinese
Characteristics", paper presented at the Conference 
China and Hong Kong At A Crossroads - Prospects 
for the 21st Century. 3-5 September 1990, Baptist
College, Hong Kong.
 . (1991), Family Mediation with Chinese
Characteristics: A Hybrid of Formal and Informal
Service in China. Department of Social Work and 
Social Administration, University of Hong Kong, Hong 
Kong.
- 456 -
Levy, M. J. (1949), The Family Revolution in Modern 
China. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass,
Lewis, J. (1986), The Carina Process: Mothers and
Daughters at Home. LSE Department of Social Science 
and Administration, London.
Li, Peng, Yao, Yilin and Wang, Binggian (1989), The 
Second Session of the Seventh National People1s 
Congress of the People1s Republic of China, Foreign 
Languages Press, Beijing.
Li, W. L. (1988), "Changing Status of Women in Mainland 
China", Issues and Studies, Vol.24, No.3, 
pp.120-139.
Lin, Yu-sheng (1979), The Crisis of Chinese 
Consciousness. Radical Anti-traditionalism in the 
May Fourth Era. The University of Wisconsin Press, 
Madison, Wisconsin.
Liu, Zheng, Song, Jian et al. (1981), China1s 
Population; Problems and Prospects. New World Press, 
Beijing.
Lockett, M. (1988), "The Urban Collective Economy", in 
Feuchtwang, S., Hussain, A. and Pairault, T. (eds), 
Transforming China1s Economy in the Eighties. Vol.2. 
Management. Industry and the Urban Economy. Zed 
Books, London.
Loney, M. (ed.) (1989), The State or the Market?
Politics and Welfare in Contemporary Britain. Sage 
Publications, London.
Lum, R. D. (1985), Philanthropy and Public Welfare in 
Late Imperial China, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Mass.
Ma, Xia (1986), "An Analysis of the Size of Domestic 
Household and the Family Structure in China", in 
Population Census Office and Department of 
Population Statistics (eds), A Census of One Billion 
People. Papers for International Seminar on China1s 
1982 Population Census. Economic Information and 
Agency, Hong Kong.
MacLehose, Sir Murray (1976), "Address at the Opening 
Session of the Legislative Council", 6 October 1976, 
Government Printer, Hong Kong.
MacPherson, S. (1982), Social Policy in the Third
World. The Social Dilemmas of Underdevelopment. 
Wheatsheaf, Brighton.
- 457 -
McAuley, A. (1991), "The Welfare State in the USSR", in 
Wilson, T. and Wilson, D. (eds), The State and 
Social Welfare; The Objectives of Policy. Longman, 
London and New York.
Madison, B. (1968), Social Welfare in the Soviet Union. 
Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Madsen, R. (1984), Morality and Power in a Chinese 
Village. University of California Press, Berkeley.
Mangen, S. (1991), "Political Change and the Objectives 
of the Continental Welfare State" in Wilson, T. and 
Wilson, D. (eds), The State and Social Welfare. The 
Objectives of Policy. Longman, Harlow.
Mao Tse-tung (1977), Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. 
(First Edition), Foreign Languages Press, Beijing.
Marks, P. C. (1988), "Economic Reform in the 
Countryside and the Rationalization of Politics in 
Mainland China", Issues and Studies. Vol. 24, No.4., 
pp.81-95.
Marshall, T. H. (1950), Citizen and Social Class, and 
Other Essavs. University Press, Cambridge.
 . (1963), Sociology at the Crossroads and Other
Essavs. Heinemann, London.
 . (1970), Social Policy in the Twentieth Century.
Hutchinson, London.
 . (1975), Social Policy. Hutchinson, London.
 . (1981), The Right to Welfare and Other Essavs.
Heinemann Educational Books, London.
Maruo, Naomi (1986), "The Development of the Welfare
Mix in Japan", in Rose, R. and Shiratori, R. (eds),
The Welfare State East and West. Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1968), Manifesto of the
Communist Party, Foreign Languages Press, Peking.
Meijer, M. J. (1971), Marriage Law and Policy in the 
Chinese People1s Republic. Hong Kong University 
Press, Hong Kong.
Merton, R. K. (1968), Social Theory and Social
Structure, (Enlarged edition), Free Press, New York.
Miller, S. M. (1978), "The Recapitalization of
Capitalism", Social Policy. 1978, pp.5-12.
- 458 -
Ministry of Civil Affairs (1986), Civil Affairs Work in 
China. Beijing.
Mishra, R. (1977), Society and Social Policy: 
Theoretical Perspective on Welfare. Macmillan, 
London.
(1981), Society and Social Policy; Theories and 
Practice of Welfare. Macmillan, London.
 . (1985), The Welfare State in Crisis: Social
Thought and Social Change. Wheatsheaf, Brighton.
(1990), The Welfare State in Capitalist 
Society; Politics of Retrenchment and Maintenance in 
Europe. North America and Australia. Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, New York.
Mok, B. H. (1983), "Social Welfare in China, An 
Emerging Perspective”, Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong.
Mote, F. W. (1971), Intellectual Foundations of China. 
(Second Edition), Alfred A. Knopf, New York.
Nathan, A. (1973), "A Factional Model for Chinese 
Politics”, The China Quarterly. No.53, 1973, pp.
34-66.
Nee, V. (1991), "Sleeping with the Enemy: Why
Communists Love the Market", Cornell University, 
Ithaca, New York.
Nee, V. and Mozingo D. (eds) (1983), State and Society 
in Contemporary China, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, New York.
0*Connor, J. (1973), The Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State, St. Martins Press, New York.
OECD (1984), OECD Observer. No. 126, January 1984, 
Paris.
OECD (1990), Social Expenditure 1960-1990. Paris.
Offe, C. (1984), Contradictions of the Welfare State, 
Hutchinson, London.
Oi, J. C. (1990), "The Fate of the Collective After the 
Commune", in Davis, D. and Vogel, E. F. (eds), 
Chinese Society on the Eve of Tiananmen: The Impact 
of Reform. The Council on East Asian Studies, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Otto, G. (1972), Reform of the Economic Mechanism in 
Hungary 1968-71. Akademiai Kiado, Budapest.
- 459 -
Oyen, E. (ed.) (1986), Comparing Welfare States and
Their Futures, Gower, Aldershot.
Pairault, T. (1988), "Ideology and Industrialization in 
China, 1949-1983", in Feuchtwang, S., Hussain, A. 
and Pairault, T. (eds), Transforming China1s Economy 
in the Eighties. Vol. 2. Management. Industry and 
the Urban Economy. Zed Books, London.
Palmer, M. (1988), "China'a New Inheritance Law: Some 
Preliminary Observations", in Feuchtwang, S., 
Hussain, A. and Pairault, T. (eds), Transforming
China1s Economy in the Eighties. Vol. 1. The Rural 
Sector. Welfare and Employment. Zed Books, London.
Parish, W. L. and Whyte, M. K. (1978), Village and 
Family in Contemporary China. The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago.
Parsons, T. (1951), The Social System. Free Press, 
Glencoe, 111.
Parsons, T. and Smelser, N. J. (1956), Economy and 
Society; A Study in the Integration of Economic and 
Social Theory. Free Press, Glencoe, 111.
Pearson, V. (1991), Mental Illness in the People1s
Republic: An Exploratory Study of Chinese
Experience. Ph.D. Thesis, University of York, 1991.
People's Repulbic of China (1980), The Marriage Law. 
Foreign Languages Press, Beij ing.
 . (1982), The Constitution of the PRC. Foreign
Languages Press, Beijing.
 . (1983), The First Session of the Sixth National
People's Congress (June 1983), Foreign Languages
Press, Beijing.
 . (1984), The Second Session of the Sixth National
People»s Congress (May 1984), Foreign Languages
Press, Beijing.
 . (1984), China's Economic Structure Reform -
Decision of the CPC Central Committee. Foreign 
Languages Press, Beijing.
 . (1984), The Sixth Five Year Plan of the People's
Republic of China for Economic and Social 
Development (1981-1985). Foreign Languages Press, 
Beijing.
 . (1986), The Seventh Five Year Plan for Economic
and Social Development 1986-1990. Foreign Languages 
Press, Beijing.
- 460 -
 . (1986), The Fourth Session of the Sixth National
Peopled Congress (April 1986), Foreign Languages 
Press, Beijing.
(1989), The Second Session of the Seventh 
National People1s Congress of the People1s Republic 
of China, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing.
Perry, E. J. and Wong, C. (eds) (1985), The Political 
Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Philips, M. R. (1990), "Strategies Used by Chinese 
Families in Coping with Schizophrenia", paper 
presented at the conference Family Strategies in 
Post-Mao China, Roche Harbour, Washington, 12-17 
June 1990.
Piachaud, D. (1981), "Peter Townsend and the Holy 
Grail", New Society. 10 September, pp.419-421.
(1986), "Problems in the Definition and
Measurement of Poverty", Journal of Social Policy. 
Vol.16, No.2, pp.147-164.
Pinker, R. (1971), Social Theory and Social Policy. 
Heinemann Educational Books, London.
 . (1979), The Idea of Welfare. Heinemann,
London.
(1981), "Introduction", in Marshall, T. H.,
The Right to Welfare and Other Essavs. Heinemann 
Educational Books, London.
(1986), "Social Welfare in Japan and Britain: 
A Comparative View. Formal and Informal Aspects of 
Welfare", in Oyen, E. (ed.), Comparing Welfare 
States and Their Futures. Gower, Aldershot.
 . (1987), "Social Policy and Social Care,
Division of Responsibility" in Yoder, J. A. et al. 
(eds), Support Networks in a Caring Community. 
Martins Nijhoff, Dordrecht.
(1991a), "On Rediscovering the Middle Way in 
Social Welfare", in Wilson, T. and Wilson, D.
(eds) The State and Social Welfare: The Obiectives 
of Policy. Longman, London and New York.
(1991b), "The State, Civil Society and Social
Welfare: A Changing Relationship", a public
lecture given in Dublin, 10 November 1991.
Platte, E. (1988), "Divorce Trends and Patterns in 
China: Past and Present", Pacific Affairs. Vol.61,
No.3, pp.428-445.
- 461 -
Population Census Office and Department of Population 
Statistics (1987), & Census of One Billion People;
Papers for International Seminar on China1s 1982 
Population Census. Economic Information and Agency, 
Hong Kong.
Prout, C. (1985), Market Socialism in Yugoslavia. 
Oxford University Press, London.
Pusic, E. (1987), "The Development of the Welfare State 
in Yugoslavia", in Friedmann, R., Gilbert, N. and 
Sherer, M. (eds), Modern Welfare States. & 
Comparative View of Trends and Prospects, Wheatsheaf 
Brighton.
Pye, L. M. (1980), The Dynamics of Factions and 
Consensus in Chinese Politics. Rand Corporation, 
Santa Monica, Calif.
 . (1981), The Dynamics of Chinese Politics.
Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Cambridge, Mass.
(1984), China: An Introduction. (Third Edition), 
Little, Brown and Co., Boston and Toronto.
Rimlinger, G. V. (1971), Welfare Policy and 
Industrialization in Europe, America and Russia. 
John Wiley and Sons, New York and London.
Riskin, C. (1987), China1s Political Economy. The Quest 
for Development Since 1949. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.
Robertson, A. (1980), "The Welfare State and 
Post-industrial Values", in Timms, N., Social 
Welfare: Why and How? Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London.
Robson, W. A. (1976), Welfare State and Welfare 
Society. Allen and Unwin, London.
Rodgers, B., Doron, A., and Jones, M. (1979), The Study 
of Social Policy; A Comparative Approach, Allen and 
Unwin, London•
Romanyshyn, J. (1971), Social Welfare: Charity £o
Justice. Random House, New York.
Room, G. (1990), ’New Poverty1 in the European 
Community. Macmillan, London.
Rose, R. and Shiratori, R. (1986), The Welfare State 
East and West. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Rys, V. (1962), "The Sociology of Social Security", 
Bulletin of the International Social Security 
Association. Nos.1-2.
- 462 -
Saith, A. (ed.) (1987), The Re-emergence of the Chinese
Peasantry; Aspects of Rural Decollectivization. 
Croom Helm, London.
Saville, J. (1957), "The Welfare State: An Historical 
Approach", New Reasoner, Vol.3.
Schram, S. R. (ed.) (1973), Authority. Participation
and Cultural Change in China. Cambridge University 
Press, London.
Schurmann, F. (1970), Ideology and Organization in 
Communist China, (Second Printing), University of 
California Press, Berkeley.
Schwartz, B. I. (1985), China1s Cultural Values. Center 
for Asian Studies, Arizona State University,
Arizona.
Secretaries of State for Health and Social Security,
Wales, and Scotland (1989), Caring for People.
Community Care in the Next Decade and Beyond, HMSO, 
London.
Selden, M. (1990), The Political Economy of Chinese 
Socialism, translated into Chinese, Zhuguang Books, 
Hong Kong.
Shaw, Yu-ming (ed.) (1988), Changes and Continuities in
Chinese Communism. Vol. I and II, Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado.
Sheridan, J. (1975), China in Pis integration: The
Republican Era in Chinese History. 1912-1949. The 
Free Press, New York.
Shue, V. (1980), Peasant China in Transition: the
Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism. 1949-1956.
University of California Press, Berkeley.
(1984), "Beyond the Budget: Finance Organization 
and Reform in a Chinese County", Modern China. Vol. 
10, No. 2 , pp.147-186.
 . (1988), The Reach of the State: Sketches of
the Chinese Body Politic. Stanford University Press, 
Stanford.
Sidel, R. and Sidel, V. W. (1982), The Health of 
China. Zed Books, London.
- 463 -
Sik, E. (1988), "New Trends in Hungarian Welfare System 
- Towards 'Self-welfarisation' ?", in Evers, A. and 
Wintersberger, H. (eds), Shifts in the Welfare Mix: 
Their Impact on Work. Social Services and Welfare 
Policies. European Centre for Social Welfare 
Training and Research, Vienna.
Sik, E. and Svetlik, I. (1988), "Features in Countries 
with Planned Economy. Similarities and Differences" 
in Evers, A. and Wintersberger H.(eds), Shifts in 
the Welfare Mix: Their Impact on Work. Social
Services and Welfare Policies. European Centre for 
Social Welfare Training and Research, Vienna.
Sinha, D. and Kao, H. S. R. (eds) (1988), Social Values 
and Development: Asian Perspectives. Sage
Publications, New Delhi, Newbury Park and London.
Sit, V. F. S. and Wong, Siu-lun (1990), Chances in the 
Industrial Structure and the Role of Small and 
Medium Industries in Developing Countries: The Case 
of China. Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo.
Siu, H. (1990), "The Politics of Migration in a Market 
Town", in Davis, D. and Vogel, E. F. (eds), Chinese 
Society on the Eve of Tiananmen: The Impact of
Reform. The Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard 
University, Cambridge and London.
Skinner, G. W. (1971), "Chinese Peasants and the Closed 
Community: An Open and Shut Case", Comparative
Studies in Society and History. Vol.13 (Jul 1972): 
272.
 — . (1977), The Citv in Late Imperial China. Stanford
University Press, Stanford.
Sleeman, J. F. (1974), The Welfare State. Its Aims. 
Benefits and Costs. Unwin University Books, London.
Solinger, D. J. (ed.) (1984), Three Visions of Chinese 
Socialism. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.
(1991), "China's Transients and the State: A Form 
of Civil Society?", Hong Kong Institute of Asia- 
Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong.
Social Welfare Department (1965), Aims and Policy for 
Social Welfare in Hone Kong. Hong Kong Government 
Printer, Hong Kong.
South China Morning Post. Hong Kong, various issues.
Stacey, J. (1983), Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution 
in China, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- 464 -
State Council (1981), "Resolutions Concerning Opening 
of Opportunities, Enlivening the Economy and 
Resolving the Question of Employment in Cities and 
Towns".
 . (1986), "Temporary Regulations on the Dismissal
of State Enterprise Workers who Violate Disciplines.
 .' (1986), "Temporary Regulations in Implementation
of Labour Contract System in State Enterprises".
Sullivan, L. R. (1988), "Assault on the Reforms: 
Conservative Criticism of Political and Economic 
Liberalization in China, 1985-86", The China 
Quarterly. No. 114, pp.198-222.
Svetlik, I. (1988), "Yugoslavia: Three Ways of Welfare 
System Restructuring", in Evers, A. and 
Wintersberger, H. (eds), Shifts in the Welfare Mix: 
Their Impact on Work. Social Services and Welfare 
Policies. European Centre for Social Welfare 
Training and Research, Vienna.
(1990), "From a One-dimensional to a 
Multidimensional Welfare System", in Deacon, B. and 
Szalai, J. (eds), Social Policy in the New Eastern 
Europe: What Future for Socialist Welfare? Avebury,
Aldershot.
Szalai, J. and Deacon, B. (eds) (1990), Social Policy 
in the New Eastern Europe: What Future for Socialist 
Welfare? Avebury, Aldershot.
Szalai, J. (1990), "Outline for the Radical Reforms of 
Social Policy in Hungary", in Deacon, B. and Szalai, 
J. (eds), Social Policy in the New Eastern Europe: 
What Future for Socialist Welfare? Avebury, 
Aldershot.
Szalai, J., Keane, J. and others (1990), "Social Policy 
and Socialism: Citizenship, the Working Class, Women 
and Welfare", in Deacon. B. and Szalai, J. (eds), 
Social Policy in the New Eastern Europe: What Future 
for Socialist Welfare? Avebury, Aldershot.
Szelenyi, I. (1978), "Social Inequalities in State 
Socialist Redistributive Economies", International 
Journal of Comparative Sociology. Vol.19, Nos.1-2, 
pp.63-87.
 . (1983), Urban Inequalities under State
Socialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Tao, J. (1990), "The Chinese Moral Ethos and the 
Concept of Individual Rights", Journal of Applied 
Philosophy. Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990, pp.119-127.
- 465 -
Taylor, J. R. (1988), "Rural Employment Trends and the 
Legacy of Surplus Labour, 1978-86”, The China 
Quarterly. No.116, pp.736-766.
Tidrick, G. and Chen Ji-yuan (eds) (1987), China1s 
Industrial Reform. Published for the World Bank, 
Oxford University Press, London.
Timar, M. (1975), Reflections on the Economic 
Development of Hungary 1967-73. Akademiai Kiado, 
Budapest.
Titmuss, R. M. (1958, 1969), Essavs on the Welfare
State. Unwin University Books, London.
 . (1968), Commitment to Welfare. Allen and
Unwin, London.
 • (1974), Social Policy; An Introduction. Allen and
Unwin, London.
Townsend, P. (1969), "Strategies in Meeting Poverty", 
paper presented at the International Conference on 
Family Poverty and Social Policy. 20 September 1969, 
Manchester.
 . (1979), Poverty in the United Kingdom. Penguin
Books, Harmondsworth.
Tropman, J. E. (1976), "Welfare Values and Social 
Policy: Implications for Social Work", in Tropman,
J. E. at al. (eds), Strategic Perspectives on Social 
Policy. Pergamon Press, Oxford.
 . (1989), American Values and Social Welfare:
Cultural Contradictions in the Welfare State. 
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
Tsu, Yu-Yue (1912), The Spirit of Chinese Philanthropy: 
A Study in Mutual Aid. AMS Press, New York.
United Nations (1983), United Nations Demographic 
Yearbook. New York.
Varg, P. A. (1958), Missionaries. Chinese, and 
Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary
Movement in China, 1890-1952. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, N.J.
Vogel, E. F. (1980), Canton Under Communism. Programs 
and Politics in a Provincial Capital 1949-1968. 
(Third Printing), Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass.
(1989), One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong
Under Reform. Havard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass.
- 466 -
Wakeman, F. (1966), Strangers at the Gate. University 
of California, Berkeley.
Walder, A. (1986), Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work 
and Authority in Chinese Industry. University of 
California Press, Berkeley.
 . (1991), "An Exchange of Views about Basic
Chinese Social Organization - A Reply to Womack", 
The China Quarterly. no. 126, pp.333-339.
Walker, A. (ed.) (1982), Community Care; The Family.
the State and Social Policy. Basil Blackwell and 
Martin Robertson, Oxford.
Walker, K. R. (1984), Food Grain Procurement and 
Consumption in China, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
Waller, D. J. (1981), The Government and Politics of 
the People1s Republic of China. Hutchinson, London.
Wang, Guichen et al. (1985), Smashing the Communal Pot 
Formulation and Development of Rural 
Responsibility System. New World Press, Beijing.
Wang, Gungwu (1979), "Power, Rights and Duties in 
Chinese History", the 40th George Ernest Morrison 
Lecture in Ethnology 1979, Australian National 
University, Canberra.
Ware, A. and Goodin, R. (eds) (1990), Needs and 
Welfare. Sage, London.
Watson, D. (1980), Caring for Strangers: An
Introduction to Practical Philosophy for Students of 
Social Administration. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London.
White, G. (1987), "The Impact of Economic Reforms in 
the Chinese Countryside", Modern China, Vol. 13, 
No.4, pp.411-440.
Whyte, M. K. and Parish, W. L. (1984), Urban Life in 
Contemporary China, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
Wilensky, H. (1975), The Welfare State and Eoualitv: 
Structural and Ideological Roots of Public 
Expenditures. University of California Press, 
Berleley.
Wilensky, H., Luebbert, G. et al. (1985), Comparative 
Social Policy. University of California Press, 
Berkeley.
- 467 -
Wilensky, H. L. and Lebeaux, C. N. (1965), Industrial 
Society and Social Welfare. The Free Press, New
York.
Wilson, A. A. (1979), "Mobilization Versus Welfare in
Mass Organizations: A Conflict of Values", in
Wilson, R. W., Wilson, A. A. and Greenblatt, S. L.
(eds), Value Change in Chinese Society. Praeger, New 
York.
Wilson, T. and Wilson, D. (1991), "Social Policy: 
Issues and Objectives", in Wilson, T. and Wilson, D. 
(eds), The State and Social Welfare: The Objectives 
of Policy. Longman, London and New York.
Willmott, P. (1986), Social Networks, Informal Care and 
Public Policy. Policy Studies Institute Research 
Report No. 655, London.
Wittfogel, K. A. (1957), Oriental Despotism: A
Comparative Study of Total Power. Yale University 
Press, New Haven.
Wolf, M. (1985), Revolution Postponed! Women in 
Contemporary China. Methuen, London.
Wolfendon Committee (1977), The Future of Voluntary 
Organizations. Report of the Committee on the Future 
of Voluntary Organizations, Croom Helm, London.
Womack, B. (1991), "An Exchange of Views about Basic 
Chinese Social Organization - Transfigured 
Community: Neo-traditionalism and Work Unit
Socialism in China", The China Quarterly. no. 126,
pp.313-332.
Women of China (1987), New Trends in Chinese Marriage
and the Family. Women of China, Beijing.
Wong, L. and MacQuarrie, L. (eds) (1986), China1s 
Welfare System: A View From Guangzhou. Hong Kong
Polytechnic, Hong Kong.
Wong, L. (1986), "Social Welfare in China: An Overview" 
in Wong, L. and MacQuarrie, L. (eds), China1s 
Welfare System: A View From Guangzhou, Hong Kong
Polytechnic, Hong Kong.
(1990a), "The Family and Social Policy in China",
paper presented at the Conference China and Hong
Kong At A Crossroads - Prospects for the 21st 
Century. 3-5 September 1990, Baptist College, Hong
Kong.
(1990b), "Rehabilitation Services in China: 
Policy and Outcomes", The Asian Journal of Public 
Administration. Vol. 12, No. 2, pp.196-213.
- 468 -
(1990c), "Financing Social Welfare and Social 
Relief in Contemporary China - An Historical 
Review", Hong Kona Journal of Social Work. Vol.24, 
Winter 1990 pp.25-40.
(1992), "Community Social Services in the 
People's Republic of China", International Social 
Work, forthcoming.
Wong, Siu-lun (1979), Sociology and Socialism in 
Contemporary China, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, Boston and Henley.
(1988), Emigrant Entrepreneurs - Shanghai
Industrialists in Hona Kona. Oxford University 
Press, Hong Kong.
Wong. T. T. (1989), "The Salary Structure, Allowances 
and Benefits of a Shanghai Electronics Factory", The 
China Quarterly. No.117, pp.135-144.
Woodhead, H. G. W. (ed.) (1930), China Year Book
1929-30. The Tientsin Press, Tientsin.
Working Party on the Future Needs of the Elderly 
(1973), Care in the Community - The Right Basis for 
Service to the Elderly. Government Printer, Hong 
Kong.
World Bank (1985), China; Long-term Development Issues 
and Options. Johns Hopkins University, London and 
Baltimore.
 . (1987), Social Indications of Development
1987. The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Wu, An-chia (1988a), "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung; A 
New Version of Marxism-Leninism?", Issues and 
Studies. Vol.24, No.4, pp.61-82.
 . (1988b), "The Theory of the 'Initial Stage of
Socialism': Background, Tasks and Impact", Issues
and Studies. Vol.24, No.7, pp.12-32.
Xue, Mugiao (1981), China's Socialist Economy. Foreign 
Languages Press, Beijing.
Yang, Lien-sheng (1957), "The Concept of Pao as a Basis
for Social Relations in China", in Fairbank, J.
(ed.), Chinese Thought and Institution. University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Yang, C. K. (1959), The Chinese Family in the Communist 
Revolution. MIT Press, Cambridge■, Mass.
- 469 -
(1961), Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of 
Contemporary Functions of Religion and Some of Their 
Historical Factors. University of California Press, 
Berkeley.
Yahuda, M. (ed.) (1987), New Directions in the Social
Sciences and Humanities in China, Macmillan, 
Basingstoke.
Yang, Chung-fang (1988), MFamilism and Development: An 
Examination of the Role of Family in Contemporary 
China Mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan", in Sinha, D. 
and Kao, H. S. K. (eds), Social Values and 
Development: Asian Perspectives. Sage Publications,
New Delhi, Newbury Park and London.
Yim, Shui-yuen (1978), "Famine Relief Statistics as a 
Guide to the Population of Sixteenth-century China: 
A Case Study of Honon Province", Ching-shih wen-ti, 
Vol.3, No.9.
Zhao, Zixiang, Lu, Xinlian and Guo, Zhanhua (1985), 
"The Multiplicity of Causes of Divorce", Chinese 
Sociology and Anthropology. Vol.XVII, No.3, 
pp.82-94.
Zhu, Ling (1990), "The Transformation of the Operating 
Mechanisms in Chinese Agriculture", The Journal of 
Development Studies. Vol.26, No.2, January 1990, 
pp.229-242.
- 470 -
WORKS IN CHINESE
Beijingshi Jingwei Laodong Gongzichu (1985), Gonazi 
Gaige Yu Jiegou Gonazi Zhi (Wage Reform and the 
Structural Wage System), Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 
Chubanshe, Beijing.
Beijingshi Minzhengju (ed.) (1986), Beii inashi
Minzhena Tonaii Ziliao (Beijing City Civil Affairs 
Statistics), Beijingshi Minzhengju, Beijing.(Jimi 
Ziliao, Neibu Shiyong)
Beijingshi Minzhengju Yanjiushi (ed.), Zhonaauo Jinaii 
Yu Shehui Fazhan Zhonade Laolina Wenti (The Old Age 
Issue in Chinese Economic and Social Development), 
Beijingshi Minzhengju, Beijing. (Year not listed, 
for internal reference)
Chen, Jiyuan and Xia, Defang (eds) (1988), Xianazhen 
Oive Moshe Yani iu (Study of Different Forms of 
Village and Township Enterprises), Zhongguo Shehui 
Kexue Chubanshe, Beijing.
Chen, Liangjin and Sun, Laixiang (1987), "Renkou 
Laolinghua Yu Woguo Tuixiu Zhidu De Yantao" 
(Population Aging and Exploration of Our Country's 
Retirement System), Beii ing Shehui Kexue. 1987, 
No.4, pp.136-145.
Chen, Sheying (1990), "Shilun Guangdong Yu Jingji 
Fazhan Xiang Shiying De Shehui Baozhang Fazhan 
Zhanlue" (Comment on the Strategy of Social Security 
Development Which is Compatible with Guangdong's 
Economic Development), Zhonashan Daxue Xuebao 
(Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban), No.l, pp.130-37.
China-shih. Wen-ti. Washington D.C., various issues.
Chung Kuo Ching-nian. Beijing, various issues.
Contemporary Magazine. Hong Kong, various issues.
Cui, Naifu (1983), "Guanyu Minzheng Gongzuo de Lishi, 
Renwu he Tedian" (The History, Mission and Special 
Features of Civil Affairs Work), in Cui, Naifu 
(1989), Minzhena Gonazuo De Tansuo (Exploring Civil 
Affairs Work), Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing.
(1986), "Guanyu Nongcun Jiceng Shehui Baozhang 
Gongzuo de Tansuo" (Exploration on Rural 
Grassroots Social Security Work), in Cui, 1989, 
ibid.
(1989), Minzhena Gonazuo De Tansuo (Exploring 
Civil Affairs Work), Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing.
- 471 -
(ed.) (1990), Zhonqcruo Minzheng Cidian,
Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe, Shanghai.
Dangdai Zhongguo Congshu Bianji Weiyuanhui (1987), 
Danadai Zhongguo De Zhiqonq Gonqzi Fuli He Shehui 
Baoxian (Workers' Wages, Welfare and Social 
Insurance in Contemporary China), Zhongguo Kexue 
Chubanshe, Beij ing.
Deng, Weizhi and Zhang, Daiyu (eds) (1987), Zhongguo 
Jiatinq de Yanbian (Changes in the Chinese Family), 
Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, Shanghai.
Fang, Ming and Wang, Ying (1987), Chenqxianq Shequ 
Yaniiu (Community Studies in Cities and Villages), 
Zhongguo Shehui Hanshou Daxue, Beijing.
Fei Hsiao-tung (1983), "Jiating Jiegou Biandong Zhongde 
Laonian Shanyang Wenti - Jailun Zhongguo Jiating 
Jiegoude Biandong" (The Old Age Support Question in 
the Changing Family Structure - A Re-examination 
of the Changes in the Chinese Family Structure), Ta 
Kunq Pao, 9 March 1983.
 . (1986), Jianqcun Jinqii - Zhongguo Nonqmin de
Shenghuo (The Jiangcun Economy - Peasant Life in 
China), Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, Jiangsu.
Feng, Lanrui and Zhao, Likuan (1981), "Dangqian Woguo 
Chengzhen Laodongzhe de Jiuye Wenti" (Current 
Problems in Employment of Labourers in Cities and 
Towns), Zhongguo Shehui Kexue. 1981, No.6.
Guangdong Nianjian Bianji Weiyuanhui (ed) (1987),
Guangdong Nianiian 1987 (Guangdong Statistical Year 
Book 1987), Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, Guangdong.
Guangdongsheng Funu Lianhehui and Guangdongsheng 
Funuxue Yanjiuhui (eds) (1986), Gaiqe Kaifang Yu
Funu (Reform and Open Door and Women), Zhongguo Funu 
Chubanshe, Guangzhou.
Guangdongsheng Minzhengting (ed.) (1982), Minzheng
Gongzuo Shouce (Civil Affairs Work Handbook),
Guangzhou. (Neibu Faxing).
Guangdongsheng Minzheng Xuehui and Shenzhenshi Minzheng 
Shehui Baozhang Yanyiuhui (eds) (1987), Shehui
Baozhang (Social Security), Guangzhou.
Guangdongsheng Renmin Daibiaodahui Changwu Weiyuanhui 
Falu Weiyuanhui (ed.) (1987), Guangdongsheng
Difanqxinq Faqui Huibian 1979.12 - 1986.6
(Compendium of Guangdong Local Laws and
Regulations), Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, Guangzhou.
- 472 -
Guangdongsheng Renmin Zhengfu Shehui Jingji Fazhan 
Yanjiu Zhongxin (ed.) (1988), Guangdong Shehui
Jingii Fazhan Zhanlue Yani iu Ziliao Xuanbian 
(Guangdong Society and Economy - Research on 
Strategic Development), in two volumes, Guangdong.
Guangdongsheng Tongjiju (ed.) (1989), Guangdongsheng
Tongi i Nianiian (Statistical Yearbook of Guangdong 
Province), Guangdong Zhongguo Chubanshe, Guangdong.
Guangzhoushi Minzhengju Shehui Fuli Jiujichu (1988), 
"Guangzhoushi de Shehui Fuli Gongzuo" (Social 
Welfare Work in Guangzhou City), Guangzhou.
Guangzhou Yearbook Editorial Committee (ed.) (1989), 
Guangzhou Nianiian 1989 (Guangzhou Statistical Year 
Book 1989), Guangzhou.
Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui (ed.) (1988),
Zhongguo Jingi i Gaige Shinian (Ten Years of Chinese 
Economic Reform), Jingji Guanli Chubanshe, Beijing.
Guojia Tongjiju (ed.) (1984), 1949-1984: Guanghui De
Sanshiwunian - Tongi i Ziliao (1949-1984: The
Glorious Thirty-Five Years - Statistical
Information), Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing.
 . Zhongguo Tongii Nianiian (China Statistical Year
Book) Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing, various 
years.
 . (1989), Feni inde Sishinian (The Enterprising
Forty Years), Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing.
 . (ed.), PRC Yearbook. Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe,
Beijing, various years.
 . (ed.), Zhongguo Tongi i (China Statistics
Magazine), Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing, 
Various issues.
Guojia Tongjiju Chengshi Shehui Jingji Diaocha
Zhongdui (ed.) (1988), Zhongguo Chengzhen Jumin
Jiating Shouzhi Diaocha Ziliao (Family Income and 
Expenditure Information of Chinese Residents in 
Cities and Towns), Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 
Beijing.
Guojia Tongjiju Nongcun Shehui Jingji Tongjici (ed.) 
(1987, 1988, 1989), Zhongguo Nongcun Tongi i
Nianiian (Chinese Rural Statistical Yearbook) 1987.
1988. 1989. Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing.
Guojia Tongjiju Shehui Tongjici (ed.) (1987), Zhongguo 
Shehui Tongi i Ziliao 1987 (Chinese Social 
Statistical Information 1987), Zhongguo Tongji
Chubanshe, Beij ing.
- 473 -
Guojia Yusuan Bianxieju (ed.) (1987), Guoiia Yusuan,
(National Budgetting) Dongbei Caijing Daxue 
Chubanshe.
Hamilton, G. G. (1990) , Zhoncruo Shehui Yu Jinaii
(Chinese Society and Economy), translated into 
Chinese and published by Luen Jing Chuban Sheye 
Gongsi, Taipei.
He, Jianzhang (1986), Jinoii Tizhi Gaioe Yu Shehui 
Bianaian (Economic System Reform and Social 
Change), Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing.
Hong Kong Social Workers1 Association and 
Guangdongsheng Minzhengting (eds) (1989), Gaiae 
Kaifana Zhongde Zhonqcruo Shehui Fuli 
Guangdongsheng Zhuani i (Chinese Social Welfare 
Under Reform and Open Door - Special Volume on 
Guangdong Province), Hong Kong Social Workers' 
Association, Hong Kong.
Hong Kong Economic Journal. Hong Kong, various issues.
Zhongguo Gongchandang, Honqqi (Red Flag), Beijing, 
various issues.
Huang, Guangqiong (1987), "Woguo Laonian Renkou De 
Xianzhuang He Fazhan Qushi" (The Facts and Trends 
in the Aging of Our Country's Population), in 
Zhongguo Laoling Wenti Quanguo Weiyuanhui and 
Zhongguo Laonianxue Xuehui (eds), Quanguo Laonianxue 
Xueshu Taolunhui Wenii. Laodong Renshi Chubanshe, 
Beijing.
Huang, Li Ruolian (1988), "Guangdongsheng Minzheng 
Xuexiao Fangwenji" (Visit Report on the Guangdong 
Province Civil Affairs College), Hong Kong Journal 
of Social Work. No.l Summer 1988, pp.33-35.
Jiangxisheng Minzhengting (ed.) (1987), Jiangxi Huzhu
Chui inhui (Jiangxi Mutual Aid Credit Union), 
Jiangxisheng Minzhengting, Jiangxi. (Neibu Faxing)
Jingji Ribao (ed.), Zhongguo Oivei ia (China 
Entrepreneur Magazine), Beijing, various issues.
Lei, Jieqiong (1985), "Zhongguo Hunyin Jiating Wenti" 
(Chinese Marriage and Family Issues), Shehui Yaniiu. 
Beijing Daxue Shehui Xuexi, 1985, No. 1, Beijing.
Li, Peng (1991), Guanvu Guomin Jinqii He Shehui Fazhan 
Shinian Guihua He Dibaqe Wunian Jihua Gangyao de 
Baoqao (Report on the Outline of the Ten Year Plan 
for National Economic and Social Development and the 
Eighth Five Year Plan), Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing.
- 474 -
Li, Yining (1989) , Zhonacruo Jingii Wang Hechuche 
(Where Goes the Chinese Economy), Commercial Press, 
Hong Kong.
Li, Yiyuan and Yang, Guoshu (eds) (1984), Zhongguoren 
de Xingge (The Character of the Chinese People), 
Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Minzhuxue Yanjiushuo, Taipei.
Liang, Rong (ed.) (1990), Lun Guangdong 150 Nian
(Comment on Guangdong in 150 Years), Guangdong 
Renmin Chubanshe, Guangdong•
Liang, Shuming (1975), Zhongguo Wenhua Yaovi (Essence 
of Chinese Culture), Zhengzhong Shuju, Taipei.
Liao, Yiguang, Su, Youming et al. (eds) (1987), 
Minzheng Gongzuo Gailun (Introduction to Civil 
Affairs Work), Hunan Daxue Chubanshe, Changsha.
Liu, Ying and Xue, Suzhen (1987), Zhongguo Hunvin
Jiating Yani iu (Chinese Family and Marriage 
Studies), Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, Beijing.
Lu, Feng (1989), ”Danwei - Yizhong Teshude Shehui 
Zhuzhi Xingshi" (The Work Unit - A Special Type of 
Social Organization), Zhongguo Shehui Kexue. 1989, 
No.l, pp.71-88.
Lu, Mouhua (1986), Shehui Gongzuo He Shehui Fuli
(Social Work and Social Welfare), Zhongguo Shehuixue 
Hanshou Daxue, Beijing.
(1991), Zhongguo Shehui Gongzuo (Chinese Social 
Work), Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe, Beijing.
Luo, Hanxian (1987), Zhongguo J ingi i Tizhi Gaige:
Nongcun - Zhongguo Nongcun Fazhan Shehuixue (Chinese 
Economic System Reform: The Village - Chinese Rural 
Development Sociology), Wide Angle Press, Hong Kong.
Mao, Tse-tung (1961, 1968), Mao Tse-tung Xuani i
(Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung), Renmin Chubanshe, 
Beijing.
Meng, Chaohua and Wang, Minghuan (eds) (1986), Zhongguo 
Minzheng Shigao (Chinese Civil Affairs Historical 
Records), Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, Harbin.
Ming Bag, Hong Kong, various issues.
Minzheng Guanli Ganbu Xueyuan (ed.) (1984), Minzheng 
Gailun. Shivong Jiaocai (Introduction to Civil
Affairs. Experimental Curriculum), Minzheng Guanli 
Ganbu Xueyuan, Beijing.
Minzhengbu, Shehui Baozhang Bao (Social Security
Newspaper), Beijing, March 1986 to December 1989.
- 475 -
 . Zhonacruo Minzheng (Chinese Civil Affairs
Magazine), Beijing, from 1984.
 . Zhongguo Shehui Bao (Chinese Society Newspaper),
Beijing, from January 1990 and replaces Shehui 
Baozhang Bao.
(1988), Minzhengbu Dashiii (Key Events in the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs), Minzhengbu, Beijing.
Minzhengbu Zhengce Yanjiushi (ed.) (1984), Minzheng
Gongzuo Weni ian Huibian (Compendium of Civil Affairs 
Documents), Vol. 1, 1984.
 . (1986), Minzheng Fagui Xuanbian (Selection of
Civil Affairs Laws and Regulations), Zhongguo 
Fazheng Daxue Chubanshe, Beijing.
 . (1987), Minzheng Gongzuo Weni ian Xuanbian 1986
(Selection of Civil Affairs Documents 1986) Huaxia 
Chubanshe, Beij ing.
Ngan, M. H. (1985), "Zhongguo Quantong Minjing Fuli 
Tantao" (Exploration on Chinese Traditional Civil 
Welfare" in Wong, W. et al. (eds), Xianggang Shehui 
Gongzuo de Tiaozhan (The Challenge to Hong Kong
Social Work), Jixianshe Publishers, Hong Kong.
Pan, Yunkang (1986), Jiating Shehuixue (Family
Sociology), Chongqing Chubanshe, Chongqing.
Qian, Gang (1986), Tangshan Dadizeng (Tangshan 
Earthquake), Luzhou Chubanshe, Hong Kong.
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Beijing, various issues.
Shanghaishi Minzhengju and Shanghaishi Shehui Fuli 
Yanjiuhui (eds) (1986), Shanghaishi Shehui Baozhang 
Lilun Yantaohui Lunwenii (Proceedings of the Seminar 
on Social Security Theory in Shanghai), Shanghaishi 
Minzhengju, Shanghai.
Shanghaishi Minzhengju (ed.) (1987), Shanghaishi Jiedao
Jinglaovuan Jingvan Cailiao Huibian (Compendium of 
Materials on the Experience of Neighbourhood Old 
People's Homes in Shanghai), Shanghaishi Minzhengju, 
Shanghai.
Shen, Yizhen (1986), "Qiye Fudan Weihe Yulai Yuezhong?" 
(Why is the Social Burden of Enterprises Getting 
Heavier and Heavier?), Shehui, 1986, No.l.
State Council (1986), Fagui Huibian. Laodong Renshi 
Juan 1949—1985 (Compendium of Laws and Regulations, 
Labour and Personnel Volume), Renmin Chubanshe, 
Beijing.
- 476 -
Sun, Kejie, Wang, Wen et al. (eds) (1987), Jianmina 
Zhonaauo Minzheng Cidian (Concise Chinese Civil 
Affairs Dictionary), Chengdu Keji Daxue, Chengdu.
Sun, Kejie, Ye, Cunsheng et al. (eds) (1988), Xiandai 
Hunvin Zhinan (Guide to Contemporary Marriage), 
Guangzhou Wenhua Chubanshe, Guangzhou.
Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong, various issues.
Wang, Jinzhe (1987), Laodong Guanli (Labour 
Administration), Jiangxi Renmin Chubanshe, Nanchang.
Wide Angle Magazine. Hong Kong, various issues.
Wu Chengshi Jiating Yanjiu Xiangmuju (ed.) (1985),
Zhongguo Chengshi Jiating - Wu Chengshi Jiating 
Diaocha Baogao he Ziliao Huibian (Chinese Urban 
Families - Report and Data on the Five City Family 
Survey), Shandong Renmin Chubanshe, Shandong.
Wu, Chengzhi (1987), "Guangzhou Renkou Laohua De Tedian 
Yu Duice” (The Special Feature of Guangzhou's 
Population Aging and Policy Response), in Zhongguo 
Laoling Quanguo Weiyuanhui and Zhongguo Laonianxue 
Xuehui (eds), Quanguo Laonianxue Xueshu Taolunhui 
Wenii. Laodong Renshi Chubanshe, Beijing.
Yan, Jiaqi and Gao, Gao (1986), Zhongguo Wenge 
Shinianshi (Ten-Year History of China's Cultural 
Revolution), Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong.
Yuan, Fang (1986), "Minzheng Gongzuo Yu Shehuixue” 
(Civil Affairs Work and Sociology), in Zhongguo 
Minzheng Lilun He Shehui Fuli Yanjiuhui (eds), 
Minzheng He Shehui Baozhang Wenxuan 1985, Beijing. 
(Neibu Faxing)
(1988), "Buyao Fushi Hua Daiti Jiating Yanglao" 
(Do Not Neglect or Replace Family Care of the 
Elderly), speech given at the Social Security 
Conference held in Beijing, 14 January 1988, 
reported in SHBZB, 29 January 1988.
Yuan, Qihui (1986), "Jianli Shehui Baozhang Zhidu 
Bixuyu Jingji Tizhi Gaige Xiang Shiying” (The 
Building of A Social Security System Must be 
Compatible with the Economic System Reform), Shehui, 
1986, No.5,
Yue, Qingping (1989a), Jiaguo Jiegou Yu Zhongguoren 
(Family and State Structure and the Chinese People), 
Zhonghua Shuju, Hong Kong.
(1989b), Zhongguoren De Jiaguoguan (The 
Chinese People's Perspective on the Family and the 
State), Zhonghua Shuju, Hong Kong.
- 477 -
Zhang, Dejiang (1990), "Jiushi Niandai Zhongguo
Shehui Fuli Shiye Zhanwang" (Prospects of Chinese 
Social Welfare Development in the Nineties), key 
note speech given at the Conference China and Hong 
Kona in the Nineties - Social Welfare Development. 
31 October 1990, Beijing.
Zhang, Shipei and Zhan, Guangzhi (1985), "Qian Tan
Minzheng Zhi De Bianxie" (Introducing the Editing of 
Civil Affairs History), in Zhongguo Minzheng Lilun 
he Shehui Fuli Yanjiuhui (ed,), Minzheng He Shehui 
Baozhang Wenxuan 1985. (Neibu Faxing)
Zhao, Likuan and Dong, Keyong (1987), Gongzi Guanli 
(Wage Administration), Liaoling Renmin Chubanshe,
Shenyang.
Zhao, Likuan and Sun, Shuhan (eds) (1987), Laodong
Shengcan vu Laodong Baohu (Physiology of Labour and 
Protection of Labour), Laodong Renshi Ganbu
Zhuansiuke Shiyong Jiaocai, Laodong Renshi 
Chubanshe, Beij ing.
Zhao, Likuan and Yang, Tiren (1988), "Jianli Xinxing
Shehui Baozhang Tizhi" (To Build A New Social 
Security System), J ingi i Ribao, 3 June 1988.
Zhao, Ziyang (1987), Yanzhevou Zhongguo Texe de Shehui 
Zhuvi Daolu Oiani ing (Advance Along the Path of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics), report
presented at the Thirteenth Party Congress, Joint 
Publishers, Hong Kong.
Zhonggong Zhongyang Shujichu Yanjiushi and Zhonggong
Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi (eds) (1987), Jianchi
Gaiae. Kaifang, Gaohuo - Shiviiie Sanzhong Ouanhui 
Yilai Youguan Zhongvao Wenxian Zebian (To Insist on 
Reform, Open Door and Enlivening - Selection of 
Important Central Documents Since the Third Plenum 
of the Eleventh Party Congress), Renmin Chubanshe, 
Beijing.
Zhongguo Jingji Tizhi Gaige Yanjiushuo Zhonghe 
Diaochaju (ed.) (1986), Gaige: Women Mianlin de
Tiaozhan vu Xuanze (Reform: The Challenge and Choice 
We Face), Jingji Chubanshe, Beijing.
Zhongguo Laoling Weiyuanhui Laoling Kexue Yanyiu
Zhongxin Chubanchu (ed.) (1988), Laoling Wenti
Yanviu Ziliao (Research Materials on Old Age
Issues), No.9, 15 September 1988, Beijing.
- 478 -
Zhongguo Laoling Wenti Quanguo Weiyuanhui Yanyiushi 
(ed.) (1988), Laoling Wenti Yanviu Ziliao (Research
Materials on Old Age Issues), No. 1, 15 January 
1988, Beijing.
Zhongguo Laoling Wenti Quanguo Weiyuanhui and Zhongguo 
Laonianxue Xuehui (eds) (1988), Quanguo Laonianxue 
Xueshu Taolun Lunweni i (Proceedings of the National 
Gerontological Conference), Laodong Renshi
Chubanshe, Beijing•
Zhongguo Laonian (Chinese Elderly), Beijing, various
issues.
Zhongguo Minzheng Lilun He Shehui Fuli Yanjiuhui (ed.) 
(1986), Minzheng He Shehui Baozhang Wenxuan 1985. 
Beijing. (Neibu Faxing)
Zhongyang Renmin Guangbo Diantai Lilun Bu (ed.) (1988), 
Gaige He Wanshan Woguo De Shehui Baozhang Zhidu (To 
Reform and Perfect Our Country's Social Security 
System), Jingji Kexue Chubanshe, Beijing.
Zhu, Qingfang (1990), "Shehui Baozhang Shiye yu Jingji 
Shehui Fazhan de Guanxi" (The Relationship Between 
Social Security and Economic and Social 
Development), paper selected for the Conference 
China and Hong Kong in the Nineties - Social Welfare 
Development. November 1990, Beijing.
- 479 -
